



UNIV. OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

~~Pol. Sci.~~
~~I~~
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Nos. 122-133

DOCUMENTS
OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
1918



418558
3.1.44

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

1919

It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek coöperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as possible, contentious questions, and in particular questions relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying principles of international law, international conduct, and international organization, which must be agreed upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civilization is to continue and to be advanced. A list of publications will be found on pages 713 to 722.

JX

1906

A25

no. 122-133

cop. 2

211

CONTENTS

No.		Page
122.	THE AIMS OF THE WAR, JANUARY, 1918	
	Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London <i>Daily Telegraph</i> , November 29, 1917	5
	Reply by Cosmos, printed in the New York <i>Times</i> December 1, 1917	11
	The President's Address to the Congress, December 4, 1917	15
123.	VICTORY OR DEFEAT: No Half-Way House, speech delivered by David Lloyd George, December 14, 1917	27
	British Labor's War Aims, statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917	45
	Great Britain's War Aims, speech delivered by David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918	57
	Labor's After-War Economic Policy, by Arthur Henderson	70 ✓
	America's Terms of Settlement, address by President Wilson to the Congress, January 8, 1918 . .	77
	British Labor Party's Address to the Russian People, January 15, 1918. February, 1918 . . .	86
124.	THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. MARCH, 1918	
	The Text of the Root-Takahira Understanding of November 30, 1908	91
	The Text of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 3, 1917	95
	Japan and the United States, address at a luncheon in honor of the Imperial Japanese Mission, New York, October 1, 1917, by Elihu Root . . .	99
	The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, address to the Liberal Club of San Antonio, Tex., November 15, 1917, by James L. Slayden	106

No.		Page
	What of Our Fears of Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette	110
125.	THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, BY OTFRIED NIPPOLD. APRIL, 1918	135
126.	THE ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR. MAY, 1918	
	An address delivered by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918	165
	An article written for the <i>Daily Chronicle</i> of London, by Professor Gilbert Murray	171
Special Bulletin:		
	LABOR'S WAR AIMS. JUNE, 1918	
	Memorandum on War Aims, adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, February 22, 1918	179
	The Allied Cause is the Cause of Socialist Internationalism: Joint Manifesto of the Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist League	199
127.	THE DISCLOSURES FROM GERMANY. JUNE, 1918	
	The Lichnowsky Memorandum, Introduction by Munroe Smith	227
	German Text from the <i>Berliner Börsen-Courier</i> , No. 135, March 21, 1918	246
	Translation by Munroe Smith	247
	The Reply of Herr von Jagow	352
	Appendix: Personal and Historical Notes, by Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro	366
128.	AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA, by Jerome Landfield	407
	The German Peace Treaties	416
	The Constitution of Middle Europe, by Dr. Friedrich Naumann, July, 1918	439

<i>No.</i>		<i>Page</i>
129.	A VOICE FROM GERMANY: Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince, by Professor F. W. Foerster	447
	Austria's Peace Proposals: The Letter to Prince Sixtus. August, 1918	462
130.	MEMORANDA AND LETTERS OF DR. MUEHLON. SEP- TEMBER, 1918	469
131.	THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. OCTOBER, 1918 .	
	The League of Nations, by Viscount Grey of Falloden	515
	A League of Nations, by Nicholas Murray Butler .	526
	Labor and the League of Nations, by Ordway Tead	531
	The European Commission of the Danube, by Edward Krehbiel	543
	Address by President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, September 27, 1918 . .	566
	Special Bulletin:	
	The Dawn in Germany: The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures, by James Brown Scott. November, 1918	579
132.	THE "LUSITANIA." November, 1918	
	Opinion of Court, United States District Court, Southern District of New York—In the matter of petition of the Cunard Steamship Company, Lim- ited, as owners of the Steamship "Lusitania," for limitation of its liability	605
133.	OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE, SERIES NO. IV. DECEMBER, 1918	
	1. Official Correspondence between the United States and Austria-Hungary, and Terms of Armistice	651
	2. Official Correspondence between the United States and Germany, and Terms of Armistice	665
	3. Official Correspondence between the United States and Turkey, and Terms of Armistice . .	707

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE AIMS OF THE WAR

Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London
Daily Telegraph, November 29, 1917

Reply by Cosmos printed in the *New York Times*,
December 1, 1917

The President's Address to the Congress,
December 4, 1917



JANUARY, 1918
No. 122

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

SOURCES

- I. Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London *Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1917—The London *Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1917.
- II. Reply by Cosmos printed in the New York *Times*, December 1, 1917.
- III. The President's Address to the Congress, December 4, 1917—*Official Bulletin*, Washington, December 4, 1917.

I

Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London *Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1917

To the Editor of "The Daily Telegraph"

Sir:

We are now in the fourth year of the most dreadful war the world has ever known; a war in which, as Sir W. Robertson has lately informed us, "the killed alone can be counted by the million, while the total number of men engaged amounts to nearly twenty-four millions." Ministers continue to tell us that they scan the horizon in vain for the prospect of a lasting peace. And without a lasting peace we all feel that the task we have set ourselves will remain unaccomplished.

But those who look forward with horror to the prolongation of the war, who believe that its wanton prolongation would be a crime, differing only in degree from that of the criminals who provoked it, may be excused if they too scan the horizon anxiously in the hope of discovering there indications that the outlook may after all not be so hopeless as is supposed.

The obstacles are indeed formidable enough. We are constantly reminded of one of them. It is pointed out with force that, while we have not hesitated to put forward a general description of our war aims, the enemy have, though repeatedly challenged, refused to formulate theirs, and have limited themselves to vague and apparently insincere professions of readiness to negotiate with us.

The force of the argument cannot be gainsaid, but it is directed mainly to show that we are still far from agreement as to the territorial questions which must come up for settlement in connection with the terms of peace. These are, however, by no means the only questions which will arise, and it is worth while to consider whether there are not others, also of first-rate importance, with regard to which the prospects of agreement are less remote.

Let me examine one or two of these. What are we fighting for? To beat the Germans? Certainly. But that is not an end in itself. We want to inflict signal defeat upon the Central Powers, not out of mere vindictiveness, but in the hope of saving the world from a recurrence of the calamity which has befallen this generation.

What, then, is it we want when the war is over? I know of no better formula than that more than once made use of, with universal

approval, by Mr. Asquith in the speeches which he has from time to time delivered. He has repeatedly told his hearers that we are waging war in order to obtain reparation and security. Both are essential, but of the two security is perhaps the more indispensable. In the way of reparation much can no doubt be accomplished, but the utmost effort to make good all the ravages of this war must fall short of completeness, and will fail to undo the grievous wrong which has been done to humanity. It may, however, be possible to make some amends for the inevitable incompleteness of reparation if the security afforded is, humanly speaking, complete. To end the war honourably would be a great achievement; to prevent the same curse falling upon our children would be a greater achievement still.

This is our avowed aim, and the magnitude of the issue cannot be exaggerated. For, just as this war has been more dreadful than any war in history, so we may be sure would the next war be even more dreadful than this. The prostitution of science for purposes of pure destruction is not likely to stop short. Most of us, however, believe that it should be possible to secure posterity against the repetition of such an outrage as that of 1914. If the Powers will, under a solemn pact, bind themselves to submit future disputes to arbitration; if they will undertake to outlaw, politically and economically, any one of their number which refuses to enter into such a pact, or to use their joint military and naval forces for the purpose of coercing a Power which breaks away from the rest, they will, indeed, have travelled far along the road which leads to security.

We are, at any rate, right to put security in the front line of our peace demands, and it is not unsatisfactory to note that in principle there seems to be complete unanimity upon this point.

In his speech at the banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, on May 28, 1916, President Wilson spoke strongly in favour of

A universal association of nations . . . to prevent any war from being begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the cause to the opinion of the world.

Later in the same year the German Chancellor, at the sitting of the Main Committee of the Reichstag, used the following language:

When, as after the termination of the war, the world will fully recognize its horrible devastation of blood and treasure, then through all mankind will go the cry for peaceful agreements and understandings which will prevent, so far as is humanly possible, the return of such an immense catastrophe. This cry will be so strong and so justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honourably coöperate in investigating every attempt to find a practical solution and collaborate towards its possible realisation.

The Papal Note communicated to the Powers in August last places in the front rank

7

The establishment of arbitration on lines to be concerted and with sanction to be settled against any State that refuses either to submit international disputes to arbitration or to accept its awards.

This suggestion was immediately welcomed by the Austrian Government, which declared that it was conscious of the importance for the promotion of peace of the method proposed by His Holiness, *viz.*, "to submit international disputes to compulsory arbitration," and that it was prepared to enter into negotiations regarding this proposal. Similar language was used by Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in his declaration on foreign policy made at Budapest in October, when he mentioned as one of the 'fundamental bases' of peace that of 'obligatory international arbitration'.

In his despatch covering the Allied Note of January 10, 1917, Mr. Balfour mentions as one of the three conditions essential to a durable peace the condition that

Behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction might be devised which would give pause to the hardest aggressor.

Such sanction would probably take the form of coercion applied in one of two modes. The 'aggressor' would be disciplined either by the pressure of superior naval and military strength, or by the denial of commercial access and facilities.

The proceedings of the Paris Conference show that we should not shrink from such a denial, if we were compelled to use the weapon for purposes of self-defense. But while a commercial 'boycott' would be justifiable as a war measure, and while the threat of a 'boycott', in case Germany should show herself utterly unreasonable, would be a legitimate threat, no reasonable man would, surely, desire to destroy the trade of the Central Powers, if they will, so to speak, enter into recognisances to keep the peace, and do not force us into a conflict by a hostile combination. Commercial war is less ghastly in its immediate results than the war of armed forces, but it would certainly be deplorable if after three or four years of sanguinary conflict in the field, a conflict which has destroyed a great part of the wealth of the world, and permanently crippled its resources, the Powers were to embark upon commercial hostilities certain to retard the economic recovery of all the nations involved.

That we shall have to secure ourselves against the fiscal hostility of others; that we shall have to prevent the recurrence of the conditions under which, when the war broke out, we found ourselves short of essential commodities, because we had allowed certain industries, and certain sources of supply, to pass entirely under the control of our enemies, no one will doubt, subject however to this reservation,

that it will surely be for our interest that the stream of trade should, so far as our own fiscal interests permit, be allowed to flow strong and uninterrupted in its natural channels.

There remains the question of territorial claims. The most authoritative statement of these is to be found in the Allies' note of January 10, 1917. This statement must obviously be regarded as a broad outline of the desiderata of the Allies, but is anyone prepared to argue that the sketch is complete, or that it may not become necessary to re-examine it?

Mr. Asquith, speaking at Liverpool in October last, used the following language:

"No one pretends that it would be right or opportune for either side to formulate an ultimatum, detailed, exhaustive, precise, with clauses and sub-clauses, which is to be accepted *verbatim et liberatim*, chapter and verse, as the indispensable preliminary and condition of peace.

"There are many things," he added, "in world-wide conflict such as this, which must of necessity be left over for discussion and negotiation, for accommodation and adjustment, at a later stage."

It is surely most important that this wise counsel should be kept in mind. Some of our original desiderata have probably become unattainable. Others would probably now be given a less prominent place than when they were first put forward. Others again, notably the reparation due to Belgium, remain, and must always remain in the front rank; but when it comes to a wholesale rearrangement of the map of southeastern Europe we may well ask for a suspension of judgment and for the elucidation which a frank exchange of views between the Allied Powers can alone afford.

For all these questions concern our Allies as well as ourselves, and if we are to have an Allied Council for the purpose of adapting our strategy in the field to the ever-shifting developments of the war, it is fair to assume that, in the matter of peace terms also, the Allies will make it their business to examine and if necessary to revise, territorial requirements.

Let me end by explaining why I attach so much importance to these considerations. We are not going to lose this war, but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilised world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them?

In my belief, if the war is to be brought to a close in time to avert a world-wide catastrophe, it will be brought to a close because on both sides the peoples of the countries involved realise that it has already lasted too long.

7
There can be no question that this feeling prevails extensively in Germany, Austria, and Turkey. We know beyond doubt that the economic pressure in those countries far exceeds any to which we are subject here. Ministers inform us in their speeches of "constant efforts" on the part of the Central Powers to "initiate peace talk." (Sir E. Geddes at the Mansion House, November 9.)

If the peace talk is not more articulate, and has not been so precise as to enable His Majesty's Government to treat it seriously, the explanation is probably to be found in the fact, first, that German despotism does not tolerate independent expressions of opinion, and, second, that the German Government has contrived, probably with success, to misrepresent the aims of the Allies, which are supposed to include the destruction of Germany, the imposition upon her of a form of government decided by her enemies, her destruction as a great commercial community, and her exclusion from the free use of the seas.

An immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany if it were understood:

1. That we do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great power.
2. That we do not seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice.
3. That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no desire to deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of the world.
4. That we are prepared, when the war is over, to examine in concert with other Powers, the group of international problems, some of them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of "the freedom of the seas."
5. That we are prepared to enter into an international pact under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

I am under the impression that authority could be found for most of these propositions in ministerial speeches. Since the above lines were written (1), (2), and (3), have been dealt with by our Foreign Minister at the public meeting held in honour of M. Venizelos at the Mansion House.

The question of "the freedom of the seas" was among those raised at the outset by our American Allies. The formula is an ambiguous one, capable of many inconsistent interpretations, and I doubt whether it will be seriously contended that there is no room for profitable discussion.

That an attempt should be made to bring about the kind of pact suggested in (5) is, I believe, common ground to all the belligerents, and probably to all the neutral Powers.

If it be once established that there are no insurmountable difficulties in the way of agreement upon these points, the political horizon might perhaps be scanned with better hope by those who pray, but can at this moment hardly venture to expect, that the New Year may bring us a lasting and honourable peace. I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

LANSDOWNE.

Lansdowne House, November 28.

II

Reply by Cosmos printed in the *New York Times*,
December 1, 1917

At any time a public utterance on international affairs by Lord Lansdowne would command attention. His letter to *The London Daily Telegraph*, which is printed in *The Times* of today, will be read and reflected upon throughout the world. The significance of Lord Lansdowne's letter depends upon the interpretation to be placed upon it. Just one year ago I was privileged to discuss in your paper each one of the topics mentioned by Lord Lansdowne in his letter, and then came to the same conclusions at which he has now arrived. The fundamental assumption of my discussion then was that Germany must be defeated and must accept defeat before any trustworthy or durable settlement of these issues could be had. That assumption is still true, and if Lord Lansdowne's proposals for an after-war settlement are based upon this assumption, they may and should be sympathetically discussed. If, on the other hand, they are, as I can hardly conceive to be possible, a tacit admission that Germany is not to be defeated before a settlement is attempted, then any discussion of Lord Lansdowne's proposals can only be harmful, since such discussion will arouse false hopes in the breasts of those who would bring the war to a close without a determination of its issues. No greater calamity could happen to the world than this. The Roman Senate rang for years with Cato's fierce cry, *Delenda est Carthago*. So our world of liberty-loving men must resound with the cry, *Vincenda est Germania*, until the victory of the Allies is secure.

The reason for this is simple and easily stated, though it be for the hundredth time. This reason is not to be found in hate, or in revenge, or in commercial jealousy; it is to be found in the determination to lay a secure foundation for international order and international peace. Both the German Government and the German people have looked upon their military power as supreme, and as the trustworthy and available basis upon which to rest international policy. This conviction must be overthrown. It can be overthrown in either of two ways: First, by a continuation of the victories of Joffre and Foch and Pétain, of Haig and Byng; or, second, by so widespread and so powerful a dissatisfaction within the German Empire that the Government will be compelled to call a halt before economic disaster and

social revolution do their destructive work. If the vigorous statements of Herr Haase are correct, and if they represent the sentiments of his followers in the Reichstag, as they probably do, then this second condition is rapidly approaching.

Assuming the defeat of German military power, then Lord Lansdowne's proposals fall well within the limits of quickly practicable statesmanship. Let us examine them in order:

1. No one in his senses has proposed to annihilate Germany as a great power. Such a purpose could never be made consonant with the aims for which the Allies are fighting this war.

2. No one who knows Germany, or who understands the working of political forces over centuries, would dream of imposing upon the German people any form of government that was not of their own choosing. German military power may be broken in battle or by economic weakness, but the Germans must themselves revise, reform, and liberalize their own Government. All that the Allies can do after victory is to let the light of real liberty in upon the German-speaking peoples.

3. Then, too, it would be little short of madness to attempt to organize an economic war to follow hard upon the heels of the military struggle that is now being prosecuted. May I quote a few words from a letter addressed to you on November 22, 1916: "If the present military contest is to be immediately succeeded by a new and vigorous economic struggle, using all the implements of privilege, discrimination, and favor, then, while the war may result in a peace, it will not result in that durable and secure peace on which the heart of the world is set."

4. Perhaps the most significant sentence in Lord Lansdowne's letter is that in which he asks that willingness be expressed on behalf of Great Britain to examine that group of international problems which are connected with the question of the freedom of the seas. This is something in which the United States has been interested for more than a century, and which it has always firmly and eagerly urged. By freedom of the seas is not meant any necessary control over the naval policy of any particular nation, but merely that those humane and progressive policies as to the protection of private property and the lives of private citizens from the ravages of naval warfare which the United States pressed so vigorously at the two Hague Conferences, and which have already secured a large measure of support in Great Britain itself, shall be accepted as controlling international policy and as an integral part of international law. If the great body of British opinion for which Lord Lansdowne may properly presume to speak is now ready to discuss these matters with open mind, then the successful end of the long struggle on the part

13

of the United States to accomplish this is in sight, and an important advance will have been made in securing the peace of the world. Great Britain and the United States together can assure this.

5. Lord Lansdowne's last suggestion relates to an international pact, with a view to the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. For such an international pact the two Hague Conferences did much, and for it the present war has done still more. The judicial organization of such a pact lies ready to hand in the work of The Hague Conferences, while its conciliar and administrative organs are being wrought out at this very moment in Paris. The Inter-Allied War Conference is, in effect, the visible beginning of a league of nations to secure the good order and the durable peace of the world. The publication of Lord Lansdowne's letter was so timed as manifestly to show a desire to influence the work of the Paris Conference. It may well do so with advantage if the fundamental assumption be made which has already been described.

The weakness of the German Government has nowhere been so clearly manifested as in its willingness to stage, before the whole world, the farce of appearing to negotiate with Messrs. Lenine, Trotzky, and their ilk, who come to Berlin ostensibly on behalf of Russia, but really with German gold at their back and with German pleadings on their lips. Autocracy is the natural ally of anarchy, since both are sworn enemies of democracy. Autocracy can deal with anarchy if given time enough, but it is learning that it cannot deal in similar fashion with democracy. The plain purpose of the conversations which are to begin in Berlin on Monday is to provoke and arouse unrest in France, in Italy, in Great Britain, and in the United States, with a view to producing a confusion of counsel and a weakening of purpose that will enable Germany to end the war as a drawn battle, and, therefore, as victor. It is for this reason that Lord Lansdowne and those who think with him must be pressed for answers to such questions as these: What about the rights and the protection of small nations? What about reparation for the spoliation of Belgium and of Serbia? What about the restitution of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to France? What about Poland and Bohemia and the Jugo-Slavs? What about the Dardanelles? These searching questions, some of which have been sleeping for centuries, have all been raised by the progress of the war. They will not down. The world must now meet and answer them with sympathy, with understanding, and with justice, or each one of them will become the seed of another war, perhaps as widespread and as destructive as this one.

Security is that for which the peace-loving world is now in search, as Lord Lansdowne clearly recognizes. That security can rest only upon justice, and justice means that these recent wrongs, which so constantly disturb the surface of the world's life, must be righted.

It is well, with Lord Lansdowne, to keep on assuring the German people that no one proposes their annihilation or their dismemberment. No one proposes to enter upon an era of reprisal and of persecution against them. They have been their own worst enemies. In a few short weeks they destroyed the laborious accomplishment of generations. The restoration of confidence in them is something which they, and they alone, can bring about. Whenever they are ready to admit the defeat of their cruel aims and to join the rest of the world in settling its problems on the basis of that justice which brings security, then, and only then, will the world hold out its hand to them.

COSMOS

November 30, 1917.

15

III

The President's Address to the Congress, December 4, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: Eight months have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you. They have been months crowded with events of immense and grave significance for us. I shall not undertake to retail or even to summarize those events. The practical particulars of the part we have played in them will be laid before you in the reports of the executive departments. I shall discuss only our present outlook upon these vast affairs, our present duties, and the immediate means of accomplishing the objects we shall hold always in view.

I shall not go back to debate the causes of the war. The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed. But I shall ask you to consider again and with a very grave scrutiny our objectives and the measures by which we mean to attain them; for the purpose of discussion here in this place is action, and our action must move straight toward definite ends. Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won?

NATION UNITED IN SPIRIT AND INTENTION

From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it. As a Nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent—who does not? I hear the criticism and the clamor of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the Nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the Nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten.

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise—deeply and indignantly impatient—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

MENACE OF COMBINED INTRIGUE AND FORCE

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a thing without conscience, or honor, or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, and if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect our enemies as well as our friends.

VOICES OF HUMANITY DAILY MORE AUDIBLE

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities." Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people

of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.

WILL BASE PEACE ON GENEROSITY AND JUSTICE

But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peacemaker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or materials, is being devoted and will continue to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enterprise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of manufacture, science, and commerce that were involved for us in her success, and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated.

The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

NO WISH TO REARRANGE AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are, in fact, fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

EXCLUSION FROM PARTNERSHIP OF NATIONS

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples,

19

not a mere partnership of governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

WRONGS OF WAR MUST BE RIGHTED

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they can not and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide-awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides.

RUSSIAN PEOPLE POISONED BY FALSEHOODS

All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I can not help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been

poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It can not be uttered too plainly or too often.

From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose, to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude toward the settlement that must come when it is over. When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways, I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations, and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient.

MUST CLEAR AWAY IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCCESS

What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success, and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is, in fact, the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools, and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary

action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others.

The financial and military measures which must be adopted will suggest themselves as the war and its undertakings develop, but I will take the liberty of proposing to you certain other acts of legislation which seem to me to be needed for the support of the war and for the release of our whole force and energy.

It will be necessary to extend in certain particulars the legislation of the last session with regard to alien enemies; and also necessary, I believe, to create a very definite and particular control over the entrance and departure of all persons into and from the United States.

Legislation should be enacted defining as a criminal offense every wilful violation of the presidential proclamations relating to alien enemies promulgated under Section 4067 of the Revised Statutes and providing appropriate punishments; and women as well as men should be included under the terms of the acts placing restraints upon alien enemies. It is likely that as time goes on many alien enemies will be willing to be fed and housed at the expense of the Government in the detention camps, and it would be the purpose of the legislation I have suggested to confine offenders among them in penitentiaries and other similar institutions where they could be made to work as other criminals do.

FAVORS FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON PRICES

Recent experience has convinced me that the Congress must go further in authorizing the Government to set limits to prices. The law of supply and demand, I am sorry to say, has been replaced by the law of unrestrained selfishness. While we have eliminated profiteering in several branches of industry it still runs impudently rampant in others. The farmers, for example, complain with a great deal of justice that, while the regulation of food prices restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the things they must themselves purchase; and similar inequities obtain on all side.

It is imperatively necessary that the consideration of the full use of the water power of the country, and also the consideration of the systematic and yet economical development of such of the natural resources of the country as are still under the control of the Federal Government, should be immediately resumed and affirmatively and constructively dealt with at the earliest possible moment. The pressing need of such legislation is daily becoming more obvious.

The legislation proposed at the last session with regard to regulated combinations among our exporters, in order to provide for our foreign trade a more effective organization and method of coöperation, ought by all means to be completed at this session.

APPROPRIATION BILLS BY SINGLE COMMITTEE

And I beg that the members of the House of Representatives will permit me to express the opinion that it will be impossible to deal in any but a very wasteful and extravagant fashion with the enormous appropriations of the public moneys which must continue to be made, if the war is to be properly sustained, unless the House will consent to return to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication as much as possible avoided.

Additional legislation may also become necessary before the present Congress again adjourns in order to effect the most efficient coordination and operation of the railway and other transportation systems of the country; but to that I shall, if circumstances should demand, call the attention of the Congress upon another occasion.

If I have overlooked anything that ought to be done for the more effective conduct of the war, your own counsels will supply the omission. What I am perfectly clear about is that in the present session of the Congress our whole attention and energy should be concentrated on the vigorous, rapid, and successful prosecution of the great task of winning the war.

ENEMY SOUGHT TO DISRUPT UNION

We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for

nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

NO IDEAL OR PRINCIPLE FORGOTTEN

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardor of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honor among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favor, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of His own justice and mercy.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

VICTORY OR DEFEAT: NO HALF-WAY HOUSE

Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at Gray's Inn, December 14, 1917.

BRITISH LABOR'S WAR AIMS

Text of a statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, on December 28, 1917.

GREAT BRITAIN'S WAR AIMS

Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918.

LABOR'S AFTER-WAR ECONOMIC POLICY

By the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P. Reprinted from the *London National Weekly*.

AMERICA'S TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

An address by President Wilson to the Congress of the United States, January 8, 1918.

BRITISH LABOR PARTY'S ADDRESS TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

January 15, 1918.



FEBRUARY, 1918
No. 123

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

SOURCES

- I. Victory or Defeat: No Half-Way House. Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at Gray's Inn, December 14, 1917—*The London Times*, December 15, 1917
- II. British Labor's War Aims. Text of a statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, on December, 28, 1917—*The New York Evening Post*, January 4, 1918
- III. Great Britain's War Aims. Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918—*The London Times*, January 7, 1918
- IV. Labor's After-War Economic Policy, by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P. (Reprinted from the *London National Weekly*.)—*The New York Evening Post*, January 8, 1918
- V. America's Terms of Settlement. An address by President Wilson to the Congress of the United States, January 8, 1918—*Official Bulletin*, January 8, 1918
- VI. British Labor Party's Address to the Russian People, January 15, 1918—*The New York Evening Post*, January 16, 1918.

I

VICTORY OR DEFEAT: NO HALF-WAY
HOUSE

Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd
George at Gray's Inn, December 14, 1917

Let me express how honored I feel to be invited to this historic building to meet representatives of the most romantic service in this war. In the House of Commons I gave what I fear must be regarded as inadequate expression to the gratitude and admiration which the nation feels for this gallant service. I have sometimes felt that the operations of the Air Service will, probably, have greater effect in determining the nations that this must be the last war than any other weapons, however terrible their effect. They bring home to the people, who in former wars dwelt in security, something of the perils and the horrors of the battlefield; and, as the war goes on, these will spread and increase and intensify. These winged messengers of death, therefore, may well be angels of peace. But we must also remember that, while all that is true, they also give a greater significance and permanence to either victory or defeat. For, however unjust or oppressive might be the peace imposed on us, the new terror added to war by this new weapon of dismay will create an increased reluctance on the part of the world to challenge the issue anew. It is, therefore, more important than ever that the peace we secure should be a just, an honorable, and a beneficent peace.

Recently a highly respected nobleman, who has rendered distinguished service to the State in many spheres, startled the nation by a letter which gave rise to very considerable apprehension on the part of those whose main anxiety is that this war should terminate in an upright and enduring peace and not in a humiliating surrender. I now understand that all our anxieties as to this epistle were groundless, that Lord Lansdowne had not intended in the least to convey the meaning which his words might reasonably bear; that all the time he was in complete agreement with President Wilson, and only meant to say exactly the same thing as the American President said in his recent great speech to Congress. Now the Government are in full agreement with that speech. Mr. Asquith, I am not surprised to see, is also in agreement with it. The British nation is undoubtedly in agreement with it, and as Lord Lansdowne has also declared that he agrees with it, things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. I, therefore, take it that the interpretation placed on Lord Lansdowne's letter, not merely by strong supporters of the Allied cause, but also by its opponents, in this country, in America, and in France, and now also, I observe, in Germany and in Austria, was not in the least that which Lord Lansdowne desired to give to it. I do not desire to force a controversy if none exists, for national unity is essential to success. But I might be forgiven for saying that if Lord Lansdowne simply meant to say exactly the same thing as President Wilson, it is a great misfortune that he did not carry out that intention. I was attending the Allied Conference in Paris at the time that his letter appeared. It was received there with painful amazement. However,

it is satisfactory to know that Lord Lansdowne was misunderstood, both by his friends and by his critics, and that the whole weight of his authority and influence may be reckoned on the side of the enforcement of what I call the Wilson policy.

THE HALF-HEARTED MAN

I shall, therefore, pass on from this letter to the view which it was supposed to advocate, but did not, to the opinions which are held and expressed by a number of people in this country. It is true they are in a minority, but they are a very active minority, and they busy themselves insidiously, persistently, skilfully, impressing these views on the people. The Lansdowne letter brought them out into the open. They thought that at last they had discovered a leader, and there is no doubt that they were prepared to take action with a view to forcing this country into a premature and vanquished peace. The danger is not the extreme pacifist. I am not afraid of him. But I warn the nation to watch the man who thinks that there is a half-way house between victory and defeat. There is no half-way house between victory and defeat. These are the men who think that you can end the war now by some sort of what they call pact of peace, by the setting up of a League of Nations with conditions as to arbitration in the event of disputes, with provision for disarmament, and with a solemn covenant on the part of all nations to sign a treaty on those lines, and not merely to abide by it themselves, but to help to enforce it against any nation that dares to break it.

That is the right policy after victory. Without victory it would be a farce. Why, we are engaged in a war

because an equally solemn treaty was treated as a scrap of paper. Who would sign the new treaty? I presume, among others, the people who have so far successfully broken the last. Who would enforce the new treaty? I presume that they would be the nations that have so far not quite succeeded in enforcing the last. To end the war entered on, to enforce a treaty without reparation for the infringement of that treaty, merely by entering into a new, a more sweeping and a more comprehensive treaty, would be, indeed, a farce in the setting of a tragedy. We must take care not to be misled by mere words—"league of nations," "disarmament," "arbitration," "security." They are all great and blessed phrases. But without the vitalizing force of victory they are nothing but words. You cannot wage war with words. You cannot secure peace with words. You cannot long cover defeat with words. Unless there are deeds behind them, they are but dead leaves which the first storm will scatter and reveal your strangled and abandoned purpose to the world.

THE OBLIGATION OF HONOR

We ought never to have started unless we meant, at all hazards, to complete our task. There is nothing so fatal to character as half-finished tasks. I can understand, although I cannot respect, the attitude of the man—and there are a few—who said from the first, "Do not interfere, whatever happens." When you said to them, "Supposing the Prussians overrun Belgium?" their answer was, "Let them overrun Belgium!" If you said, "We promised solemnly to protect Belgium against all invaders, and we ought to stand by our word," they replied, "We ought never

to have given our word." If you said to them, "What if the Germans trample in the mire our friends and neighbors, the free Republic of France?" they answered, "That is not our business." If you asked, "What if they murder innocent people, old and young, male and female, burn cities and ravage and outrage before your eyes?" in effect they said, "Let them perpetrate every crime in the calendar so long as it is not done in our land. What concern is it of ours? Are we our brothers' keepers? Let us not meddle and provoke anger which might disturb our serenity and our comfort." In fact, as one leading journalist put it with shameless candor, "Let us rather profit by manufacturing goods for both sides; for the assassins as well as for the survivors among our friends."

That is not an exalted line to take, but it is a definite and clear line of action, intelligible in consciences of a certain quality. "Ourselves first, ourselves last, ourselves all the time, and ourselves alone." It is pretty mean, but there are in every country men built that way, and you must reckon with them in the world. But the man I cannot comprehend is the sort of man who, when he first saw these outrages, called out, his generous soul aflame with righteous wrath, "In the name of Heaven let us leap in and arrest this infamy, and, if we fail, then at least let us punish the perpetrators so as to make it impossible for it to happen again." And, having said all this and having helped to commit the nation to that career of honor, now, before the task is nearly accomplished, he suddenly turns round and says: "I have had enough of this. It is time it should come to an end. Let us shake hands with the malefactor. Let us trade with him to our mutual advantage."

NO SECURITY WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

He is not to be asked for reparation for damage done. He need not even apologize. He is simply invited to enter into a bargain to join with you in punching the head of the next man who dares to imitate his villainies. And we are told that we can have peace now on these terms. Germany has said so, Austria has said so, the Pope has said so. It must, therefore, be true. Of course, it is true. Why should they refuse peace on such terms? Especially as it would leave them with some of the richest provinces and fairest cities of Russia in their pockets. There are distinguished judges present. They are often called on to administer justice for offenses not unlike those committed by Prussia. It is true that rarely have they had before them a criminal who, in his own person, has committed all these offenses—murder, arson, rape, burglary, fraud, piracy. Supposing next time they try such a case and are tired out by the insistence of the prisoners' advocate, they were to turn to the offender and say, "This is a profitless business. We are wasting a good deal of money and valuable time. I am weary of it. I want to get back to more useful work. If I let you off now without any punishment beyond that which is necessarily entailed in the expenses to which you have been put in defending your honor, will you promise me to help the police to catch the next burglar? If you agree to these terms I propose to enroll you now as a special constable. I will now formally put on your armlet, and, by the way, if you leave me your address I will promise to cement the good feeling which I wish to prevail in future between us, to deal at your store without further

inquiry as to where, or how, you got the goods. I might add that you need not worry to return the stuff you stole from your next-door neighbor on your right, as I understand he has withdrawn his claim to restoration."

Now, what do you think would be the effect on crime? It is idle to talk of security to be won by such feeble means. There is no security in any land without certainty of punishment. There is no protection for life, property, or money in a State where the criminal is more powerful than the law. The law of nations is no exception, and, until it has been vindicated, the peace of the world will always be at the mercy of any nation whose professors have assiduously taught it to believe that no crime is wrong so long as it leads to the aggrandisement and enrichment of the country to which they owe allegiance. There have been many times in the history of the world criminal States. We are dealing with one of them now. And there will always be criminal States until the reward of international crime becomes too precarious to make it profitable, and the punishment of international crime becomes too sure to make it attractive.

VICTORY IS ESSENTIAL

Let there be no doubt as to the alternatives with which we are confronted. One of them is to make easy terms with the triumphant outlaw, as men are driven to in order to buy immunity in lands where there is no authority to enforce law. That is one course. It means abasing ourselves in terror before lawlessness. It means, ultimately, a world intimidated by successful bandits. The other is to go through with our divine task of vindicating justice, so

as to establish a righteous and everlasting peace for ourselves and for our children. Surely, no nation with any regard for its interests, for its self-respect, for its honor, can hesitate a moment in its choice. Victory is an essential condition for the security of a free world. All the same, intensely as I realize that, if I thought things would get no better the longer you fought, not merely would there be no object in prolonging the war, to do so would be infamous. Wantonly to sacrifice brave lives, nay, to force brave men to endure for one profitless hour the terrible conditions of this war merely because statesmen had not the courage to face the obloquy which would be involved in agreeing to an unsatisfactory peace, would be a black crime when we remember what we owe to these gallant men. It is because I am firmly convinced that, despite some untoward events, despite discouraging appearances, we are making steady progress towards the goal we set in front of us in 1914, that I would regard peace overtures to Prussia, at the very moment when the Prussian military spirit is drunk with boastfulness, as a betrayal of the great trust with which my colleagues and I have been charged.

Much of the progress we are making may not be visible except to those whose business it is to search out the facts. The victories of Germany are all blazoned forth to the world. Her troubles appear in no Press *communiqués* or wireless messages, but we know something of these. The deadly grip of the British Navy is having its effect, and the valor of our troops is making an impression which in the end will tell. We are laying, surely, the foundation of the bridge which, when it is complete, will carry us into the new world. The river is, for the moment, in

spate, and some of the scaffolding has been carried away, and much of the progress we had made seems submerged and hidden, and there are men who say, "Let us abandon the enterprise altogether. It is too costly. It is impracticable of achievement. Let us rather build a pontoon bridge of new treaties, league of nations, understandings." It might last you some time. It would always be shaky and uncertain. It would not bear much strain. It would not carry heavy traffic, and the first flood would sweep it away. Let us get along with the pile-driving, and make a real, solid, permanent structure.

Meanwhile, let us maintain our steadiness and sanity of outlook. There are people who are too apt at one moment to get unduly elated at victories which are but incidents in the great march of events, and the same people get unwholesomely depressed by defeats which, again, are nothing more than incidents. The very persons who within the last fortnight have been organizing a nervous breakdown in the nation some weeks ago were organizing a hysterical shout over our victories in Flanders and at Cambrai. We were breaking through the enemy's barrier. We were rolling up the German armies and clearing them out of Belgium and the North of France. They remind me of a clock I used to pass at one time in my life almost every day. It worried me a great deal, for whatever the time of the day the finger always pointed at 12 o'clock. If you trusted that clock you would have believed it was either noon or midnight. There are people of that type in this war, who, one moment, point to the high noon of triumph and the next to the black midnight of defeat or despair. There is no twilight. There is no morning.

They can claim a certain consistency, for they are always at 12, but you will find that their mainspring in this war is out of repair. We must go through all the hours, minute by minute, second by second, with a steady swing, and the hour of the dawn will, in due time, strike.

RUSSIA AND AMERICA

This is not the most propitious hour. Russia threatens to retire out of the war and leave the French democracy, whose loyalty to the word they passed to Russia brought on them the horrors of this war, to shift for themselves. I do not wish to minimize in the least the gravity of this decision. Had Russia been in a condition to exert her strength this year we might now be in a position to impose fair and rational terms of peace. By her retirement she strengthens Hohenzollernism and weakens the forces of democracy. Her action will not lead, as she imagines, to universal peace. It will simply prolong the agony of the world, and it will inevitably put her in bondage to the military dominance of Prussia. But, if Russia persists in her present policy, then the withdrawal from the Eastern flank of the enemy of forces which have hitherto absorbed over a third of his strength must release hundreds of thousands of his troops and masses of material to attack Britain, France, and Italy. It is a serious addition to our task, which was already formidable enough. It would be folly to underrate the danger. It would be equally folly, on the other hand, to exaggerate it. The greatest folly of all would be not to face it.

If the Russian democracy have decided to abandon the struggle against military autocracy, the American

democracy are taking it up. This is the most momentous fact of the year. It has transposed the whole situation. The Russians are a great-hearted people, and valiantly have they fought in this war, but they have always been—certainly throughout this war—the worst organized State in Europe, and Britain, with but a third of the population of Russia, has been, for the last two years, a more formidable military obstacle to Germany. And had you asked Germany, not now, but even a year ago, which country she would prefer to see out of the war, I do not think that there would have been any doubt about her answer. But what about America? There is no more powerful country in the world than the United States of America, with their gigantic resources and their indomitable people. And, if Russia is out, America is coming in with both arms. If this is the worst moment, it is because Russia has stepped out and America is only preparing to come in. Her Army is not ready. Her equipment is not complete, her tonnage has not been built. Every hour that passes, the gap formed by the retirement of the Russians will be filled by the valiant sons of the great American Republic. Soon it will be more than filled. Germany knows it. Austria knows it. Hence the desperate efforts which they are making to force the issue before America is ready. They will not succeed. All the same, these two unfortunate circumstances—the collapse of Russia and the temporary defeat of Italy—undoubtedly cast on us a heavier share of the burden until the strength of America is ready to come underneath to share it. We must, therefore, be prepared for greater efforts, for greater sacrifices. It is not the time to cower, to falter, or to hesitate. It is the time for the nation to plant its feet more firmly

than ever on the ground and to square its shoulders to bear the increased weight cast on it by events.

When I talk of the nation I do not mean the nation in the abstract, but the millions of individuals who constitute the nation. If we are to win the security which it is the common purpose of all sections to attain, every man and every woman must be prepared for greater endeavors and greater sacrifices. A friend of mine, speaking the other day, said that there was not the enthusiasm observable which characterized the early days of the war. That may be so. If a man undertakes a long, arduous, and perilous journey you do not expect him in the fatiguing hours of the afternoon to exhibit the same ardor as when he started in the freshness of the morning. But, although he may not display the same keenness in his demeanor, if he is a man of any purpose, his ardor may be less but his resolution is greater. There is a hot zeal and a cold zeal and the greatest things of the world have been accomplished by the latter. The will of Britain is as tempered steel. There is no sign of a break in it and, although the pressure may increase and will increase, I have never doubted that it will bear it all right to the end.

TONNAGE IS VICTORY

We shall have to call on the nation for further effort, for further sacrifice, but we shall only do so because it is absolutely necessary now. Premature sacrifice is waste of *moral*. There must be a further drain on our man power to sustain, until the American Army arrives, the additional burden cast on us by the defection of Russia and the reverses in Italy. We must have enough men to defend the lines which we have held

against fierce onsets for three years, and to defend them against all comers from any quarter of the enemy front. We must also have an army of manœuvre which will enable us to appear with the least delay at any point of emergency in any part of the colossal battlefield. There is no ground for panic. Even now, after we have sent troops to the assistance of Italy, the Allies have a marked superiority of numbers in France and Flanders, and we have considerable reserves at home. Much greater progress has been made in man power, especially during the last few months, than either friends or foes realize, but it is not enough to enable us to face new contingencies without anxiety unless we take further steps to increase our reserves of trained men.

Before I leave this branch of the subject I must, however, add another important consideration. While the Cabinet are prepared with recommendations for raising more men, they are conducting a searching investigation, with the assistance of our military advisers, into the best methods of husbanding the man power already existing in our Armies, so as to reduce the terrible wastage of war.

But the problem of man power does not end with the provision of men for the Armies. It is not even the most urgent part of the problem. We need more men, not merely for the battle line across the seas, but for the battle line in this country. We, especially, need men to help us to solve the problems associated with tonnage. You can increase tonnage in two ways—by building tonnage and by saving tonnage. Victory is now a question of tonnage, and tonnage is victory. Nothing else can defeat us now but shortage of tonnage. The advent of the United States into the

war has increased the demand enormously. Tonnage must be provided for the transportation of that gigantic new army with its equipment across thousands of miles of sea. It is no use raising ten million men and equipping them unless you get them somewhere in the vicinity of the foe. Germany has gambled on America's failure to transport her army to Europe, and that is why she is still laughing at the colossal figures of soldiers in training and aeroplanes in course of construction. We know that the Prussian war lords have promised their own people, have promised their allies that these formidable masses will never find their way into the battle line, and that President Wilson's speeches, M. Clemenceau's speeches, and my speeches will thus be added to the vast collection of unredeemed rhetoric with which, according to them, democracies have always deluded themselves.

HELP FOR FRANCE AND ITALY

The Prussian claim is that autocracy alone can do things, and that democracies can only talk of doing things. The honor of democracy is at stake. I have no doubt that here, as in many other respects, those who trust the Prussian will be disillusioned; but both America and ourselves will have to strain our resources to the utmost to increase the tonnage available. The fact that American tonnage will be absorbed in the transport of their own armies makes it necessary that we should increase our responsibilities in the matter of assisting our French and our Italian Allies to transport essential commodities to their shores. We must, therefore, increase our tonnage. In spite of the fact that we have had less labor available in this, the fourth, year of the war

than we have ever had before, we have increased the shipbuilding of war and merchant vessels beyond the record of any other war years; and, as Sir Eric Geddes stated in the House of Commons, we are now turning out ships at a rate which is above that of the record year of shipbuilding in the days of peace.

But we must do more. As the whole future of this country and of the world depends on the efforts Britain and America make this next year to increase the output of ships, we are resolved that it must, and shall, be done. But we must have men; and to have men we must interfere, even to a greater extent than we have done already, with the industries which are not absolutely essential for the prosecution of the war or to the maintenance of the life of the nation. And, however great the hardships that may be inflicted by this interference on the particular trades involved, we must ask the nation to support us. And I feel certain that the trades themselves will show that patriotism which has characterized every section of the community in this great national endeavor.

INCREASED HOME SUPPLIES

I would only add one further word about shipping. As I have already pointed out, you can increase tonnage in two ways—by building tonnage and by saving tonnage. I have dealt with the first. I will say a word about the second. You save tonnage by economizing—economizing in food, economizing in dress. You save tonnage by increasing the production in this country of material formerly imported from abroad—food, timber, minerals. All this involves additional labor. As to food, this year we increased the home production by two or three million

tons. We are the only belligerents who have succeeded in increasing our food output during the war, and great credit is due to those who, by a superb feat of organization and inspiration, have achieved this result. But it is essential that we should still further increase the home supplies. We must save another three million tons in our food imports next year. This means that all those who have land, either as owners or cultivators, must help us, must without delay show their readiness to fall in with plans for increasing the produce of the land. We shall do our best to provide the necessary labor and machinery, and I am confident that we shall succeed. But all prejudices, all predilections must be swept aside. The nation must be saved. Victory must come first. Two or three million tons more food raised in this country means two or three million tons of shipping made available for strengthening the armies in the field. Every ton of food which you produce or save in this country is an increased weight hurled against the Prussian barrier.

The nation can help by giving up the things which are not essential to victory. We must strip even barer for the fight. The nation can help in another way—by discouraging “grouzers.” “Grousing” undermines *moral*, and when it is a question of holding out, the national *moral* is vital. You cannot expect things to go on smoothly in war as they do in peace. You can realize how much the ordinary life of the nation has been disturbed by the simple transposition of the figures of our War Budget into terms of the amount of national energy which its huge sums are intended to purchase. You cannot take millions of men away from the tasks of supplying the peace needs of the community without seriously interfering with the

comforts and amenities of the life of that community. The wonder is that the disturbance has not been greater, and I feel that we owe much gratitude to the experienced and able business men who, in various directions, have undertaken to organize the resources of the State for war, for the services which they have rendered not merely in increasing our efficiency for war, but in minimizing the evils and inconveniences of war.

THE DANGER OF GRUMBLING

It is a remarkable fact that, although our imports have enormously diminished, there is less hunger in the land today than in August, 1914. I ask you to help these men and not to "rattle" them. The strain on them is enormous. Make their task easier. There are some people engaged in a constant and systematic grumble. The peace propaganda is fed with grumbles. These people are anxious to break down the national nerve and then to rush us into a premature and disastrous peace. Let us beware of playing their game. We have challenged a sinister power which is menacing the world with enslavement. It would have been better never to have issued the challenge unless we meant to carry it through. A challenged power which is not overthrown always becomes stronger for the challenge. The people who think that they can begin a new era of peace while the Prussian military power is unbeaten are laboring under a strange delusion. We have all been dreaming of a new world to appear when the deluge of war had subsided. Unless we achieve victory for the great cause for which we entered this war the new world will simply be the old world with the heart out of it.

The old world, at least, believed in ideals. It believed that justice, fair play, liberty, righteousness must triumph in the end; that is, however you interpret the phrase, the old world believed in God, and it staked its existence on that belief. Millions of gallant young men volunteered to die for that divine faith. But, if wrong emerged triumphant out of this conflict, the new world would feel in its soul that brute force alone counted in the government of man; and the hopelessness of the dark ages would once more fall on the earth like a cloud. To redeem Britain, to redeem Europe, to redeem the world, from this doom must be the settled purpose of every man and woman who places duty above ease. This is the fateful hour of mankind. If we are worthy of the destiny with which it is charged, untold generations of men will thank God for the strength which He gave us to endure to the end.

II

BRITISH LABOR'S WAR AIMS

Text of a statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, on December 28, 1917.

THE WAR

The British Labor movement sees no reason to depart from the declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labor parties of the Allied nations on February 14, 1915, and it reaffirms that declaration. Whatever may have been the causes of the outbreak of war, it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting peace for the world.

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

Whatever may have been the causes for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the British Labor movement in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy.

Of all the war aims, none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there shall be henceforth on earth no more war. Whoever triumphs, the people

will have lost unless some effective method of preventing war can be found.

As means to this end, the British Labor movement relies very largely upon the complete democratization of all countries; on the frank abandonment of every form of Imperialism; on the suppression of secret diplomacy, and on the placing of foreign policy, just as much as home policy, under the control of popularly elected Legislatures; on the absolute responsibility of the Foreign Minister of each country to its Legislature; on such concerted action as may be possible for the universal abolition of compulsory military service in all countries, the common limitation of the costly armaments by which all peoples are burdened, and the entire abolition of profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in war scares and rivalry in preparation for war.

But it demands, in addition, that it should be an essential part of the treaty of peace itself that there should be forthwith established a supernational authority, or League of Nations, which should not only be adhered to by all the present belligerents, but which every other independent sovereign state in the world should be pressed to join; the immediate establishment in such League of Nations not only of an International High Court for the settlement of all disputes between states that are of justiciable nature, but also of appropriate machinery for prompt and effective mediation between states at issue that are not justiciable; the formation of an International Legislature, in which the representatives of every civilized state would have their allotted share; the gradual development, as far as may prove to be possible, of international legislation agreed to by and definitely binding upon

the several states, and for a solemn agreement and pledge by all states that every issue between any two or more of them shall be submitted for settlement as aforesaid, and that they will all make common cause against any state which fails to adhere to this agreement.

TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS

The British Labor movement has no sympathy with the attempts made, now in this quarter and now in that, to convert this war into a war of conquest, whether what is sought to be acquired by force is territory of the wealthy; nor should the struggle be prolonged for a single day, once the conditions of a permanent peace can be secured, merely for the sake of extending the boundaries of any State.

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that, not only restitution and reparation, but also certain territorial readjustments are required if a renewal of armaments and war is to be avoided. These readjustments must be such as can be arrived at by common agreement on the general principle of allowing all people to settle their own destinies, and for the purpose of removing any obvious cause of future international conflict.

A. Belgium. The British Labor movement emphatically insists that a foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government, under the direction of an International Commission, of the wrong admittedly done to Belgium; payment by that Government for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong, and the restoration of Belgium to complete and untrammelled independent sovereignty, leaving to the decision of the Belgian people the determination of their own future policy in all respects.

B. Alsace and Lorraine. The British Labor movement reaffirms its reprobation of the crime against the peace of the world by which Alsace and Lorraine were forcibly torn from France in 1871, a political blunder the effects of which have contributed in no small degree to the continuance of unrest and the growth of militarism in Europe; and, profoundly sympathizing with the unfortunate inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, who have been subjected to much repression, asks in accordance with the declarations of the French Socialists that they shall be allowed under the protection of the Supernational Authority, or League of Nations, freely to decide what shall be their future political position.

C. The Balkans. The British Labor movement suggests that the whole problem of the reorganization of the administration of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula might be dealt with by a Special Conference of their representatives, or by an authoritative International Commission, on the basis of (a) the complete freedom of these people to settle their own destinies, irrespective of Austrian, Turkish, or other foreign dominion; (b) the independent sovereignties of the several nationalities in those districts in which these are largely predominant; (c) the universal adoption of religious tolerance, the equal citizenship of all races, and local autonomy; (d) a Customs Union embracing the whole of the Balkan States; and (e) the entry of all the Balkan National States into a Federation for the concerted arrangement by mutual agreement among themselves of all matters of common concern.

D. Italy. The British Labor movement declares its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian blood and speech who have been left outside the inconvenient

and indefensible boundaries that have as a result of the diplomatic agreements of the past been assigned to the kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue. It realizes that arrangements may be necessary for securing the legitimate interests of the people of Italy in the adjacent seas, but it has no sympathy with the far-reaching aims of conquest of Italian imperialism, and believes that all legitimate needs can be safeguarded without precluding a like recognition of the needs of others or an annexation of other peoples' territories.

E. Poland, etc. With regard to the other cases in dispute, from Luxemburg on the one hand, of which the independence has been temporarily destroyed, to the lands now under foreign domination inhabited by other races—the outstanding example being that of the Poles—the British Labor movement relies, as the only way of achieving a lasting settlement, on the application of the principle of allowing each people to settle its own destiny.

F. The Jews and Palestine. The British Labor movement demands for the Jews of all countries the same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence and trade, and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. But it further expresses the hope that it may be practicable by agreement among all the nations to set free Palestine from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that the country may form a free state, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation, free from interference by those of alien race or religion.

G. The Problem of the Turkish Empire. The whole civilized world condemns the handing back to the universally execrated rule of the Turkish Government any subject people which has once been freed from it. Thus, whatever may be proposed with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, they cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his pashas.

The British Labor movement disclaims all sympathy with the imperialist aims of governments and capitalists who would make of these and other territories now dominated by the Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or militarism. If in these territories it is impracticable to leave it to the peoples to settle their own destinies, the British Labor movement insists that, conformably with the policy of "no annexations," they should be placed for administration in the hands of a commission acting under the super-national authority or League of Nations. It is further suggested that the peace of the world requires that Constantinople should be made a free port, permanently neutralized, and placed (together with both shores of the Dardanelles and possibly some or all of Asia Minor) under the same impartial administration.

H. The Colonies of Tropical Africa. With regard to the colonies of the several belligerents in tropical Africa from sea to sea—whether including all north of the Zambesi River and south of the Sahara Desert, or only those lying between fifteen degrees north and fifteen degrees south latitude, which are already the subject of international control—the British Labor movement disclaims all sympathy with the imperialist idea that these should form the booty of any nation, should be exploited for the profit of the capitalist, or should be used for the promotion of the militarist aims

of governments. In view of the fact that it is impracticable here to leave the various peoples concerned to settle their own destinies, it is suggested that the interests of humanity would be best served by the full and frank abandonment by all the belligerents of any dreams of an African empire; the transfer of the present colonies of the European Powers in tropical Africa, however the limits of this area may be defined, to the proposed supernational authority or League of Nations herein suggested, and their administration under the legislative council of that authority as a single, independent African state, with its own trained staff, on the principles of (1) taking account in each locality of the wishes of the people when these can be ascertained; (2) protection of the natives against exploitation and oppression and the preservation of their tribal interests; (3) all revenues raised to be expended for the welfare and development of the African state itself, and (4) the permanent neutralization of this African state and its abstention from participation in international rivalries or any future wars.

I. Other Cases. The British Labor movement suggests that any other territories in which it is proposed that the future safeguarding of pacific relations makes necessary a transfer of sovereignty should be made the subject of amicable bargaining, with an equivalent exchange, in money or otherwise.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The British Labor movement declares against all the projects now being prepared by Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an economic war after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation, or against

all foreign nations, as such an economic war, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defense be driven.

It realizes that all such attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the British workmen see in the alliance between the military Imperialists and the fiscal Protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace.

On the other hand, if unfortunately a genuine peace cannot be secured, the right of each nation to the defense of its own economic interests, and, in face of the world shortage hereinafter mentioned, to the conservation for its own people of a sufficiency of its own supplies of foodstuffs and raw material, cannot be denied.

The British Labor movement accordingly urges upon the Labor parties of all countries the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the Government towards commercial enterprises, along with the necessary control of supplies for its own people, on the principle of the open door, on customs duties being limited strictly to revenue purposes, and on there being no hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But it urges equally the importance, not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development by appropriate Government action of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the

legislation on factory conditions, hours of labor, and the prevention of sweating and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression.

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

To make the world safe for democracy involves much more than the prevention of war, either military or economic. It will be a device of the capitalist interests to pretend that the treaty of peace need concern itself only with the cessation of the struggle of the armed forces and with any necessary territorial readjustments. The British Labor movement insists that in view of the probable world-wide shortage after the war of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries in proportion not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs, and that within each country the Government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market mainly to the richer classes in proportion to their means, but systematically to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community on the principle of "No cake for any one until all have bread."

Moreover, it cannot but be anticipated that in all countries the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition

workers and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of soldiers—in face of the scarcity of industrial capital, the shortage of raw materials, and the insecurity of commercial enterprise—will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment more or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the British Labor movement holds that it is the duty of every government to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unemployed when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment.

It, therefore, urges upon the labor parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads and railways, the erection of schools and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings, and the reclamation and afforestation of land) that will be required in the near future, not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed, but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level, year by year, and throughout each year, the aggregate demand for labor, and thus prevent there being any unemployed. It is now known that in this way it is quite possible for any government to prevent, if it chooses, the very occurrence of any widespread or pro-

longed involuntary unemployment, which, if it is now in any country allowed to occur, is as much the result of government neglect as is any epidemic disease.

RESTORATION AND PREPARATION

The British Labor movement holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries, immediately peace is declared, will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communication in France, Belgium, Tyrol, and North Italy, East Prussia, Poland, Galicia, Russia, Rumania, the Balkans, Greece, Armenia, Asia Minor, and Central Africa; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings, and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage-earners and peasants themselves in homes and employments; and that to insure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation so far as the cost is contributed by any international fund should be made under the direction of an international commission.

But the British Labor movement will not be satisfied without a full and free judicial investigation into the accusations so freely made on all sides that particular governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence and theft against individual victims for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of the war. It draws attention in particular to the loss of life and property of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including women and children) resulting from this inhuman and ruthless conduct.

It should be part of the conditions of peace that there should be forthwith set up a court of claims and accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or Government to answer the complaint, to pronounce judgment and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or Government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong, or to their dependents. The several governments must be responsible, financially and otherwise, for the presentation of the cases of their respective nationals to such a court of claims and accusations.

III

GREAT BRITAIN'S WAR AIMS

Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918

When the Government invite organized labor in this country to assist them to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives are entitled to ask that any misgivings and doubts which any of them may have about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied should be definitely cleared, and what is true of organized labor is equally true of all citizens in this country, without regard to grade or avocation.

When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and die, and vast populations are being subjected to sufferings and privations of war on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world, they are entitled to know for what cause or causes they are making the sacrifice. It is only the clearest, greatest, and justest of causes that can justify the continuance, even for one day of this unspeakable agony of the nations. And we ought to be able to state clearly and definitely not only the principles for which we are fighting, but also their definite and concrete application to the war map of the world.

We have arrived at the most critical hour in this terrible conflict, and before any Government takes a

fateful decision as to the conditions under which it ought either to terminate or to continue the struggle, it ought to be satisfied that the conscience of the nation is behind these conditions, for nothing else can sustain the effort which is necessary to achieve a righteous end to this war. I have, therefore, during the last few days, taken special pains to ascertain the view and the attitude of representative men of all sections of thought and opinion in the country. Last week I had the privilege not merely of perusing the declared war aims of the Labor Party, but also of discussing in detail with Labor leaders the meaning and intention of that declaration. I have also had opportunity of discussing this same momentous question with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey. Had it not been that the Nationalist leaders are in Ireland, engaged in endeavoring to solve the tangled problem of Irish self-government, I should have been happy to exchange views with them, but Mr. Redmond, speaking on their behalf, has, with his usual lucidity and force, in many of his speeches made clear what his ideas are as to the object and purpose of the war. I have also had an opportunity of consulting certain representatives of the Great Dominions Overseas.

I am glad to be able to say, as a result of all these discussions, that, although the Government are alone responsible for the actual language I purpose using, there is a national agreement as to the character and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions, and in what I say to you today, and through you to the world, I can venture to claim that I am speaking not merely the mind of the Government, but of the nation and of the empire as a whole.

WHAT WE ARE NOT FIGHTING FOR

We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are *not* fighting for. We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations, bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day. Most reluctantly, and, indeed, quite unprepared for the dreadful ordeal, we were forced to join in this war in self-defense, in defense of the violated public law of Europe, and in vindication of the most solemn treaty obligations on which the public system of Europe rested and on which Germany had ruthlessly trampled in her invasion of Belgium. We had to join in the struggle or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force triumph over public right and international justice.

It was only the realization of that dreadful alternative that forced the British people into the war, and from that original attitude they have never swerved. They have never aimed at a break-up of the German people or the disintegration of their State or country. Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination and to see her devote all her strength to the great beneficent tasks of the world. Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia

Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.

Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the Imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination has, indeed, died in this war and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad, democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

COUNT CZERNIN'S PRONOUNCEMENT

It is now more than a year since the President of the United States, then neutral, addressed to the belligerents a suggestion that each side should state clearly the aims for which they were fighting. We and our allies responded by the note of January 10, 1917.

To the President's appeal the Central Empires made no reply and in spite of many adjurations, both from their opponents and from neutrals, they have maintained complete silence as to the objects for which they are fighting. Even on so crucial a matter as their intention with regard to Belgium they have uniformly declined to give any trustworthy indication.

On December 25, last, however, Count Czernin, speaking on behalf of Austria-Hungary and her allies, did make a pronouncement of a kind. It is, indeed, deplorably vague. We are told that it is not the intention of the Central Powers to appropriate forcibly any occupied territories or to rob of its independence any nation which has lost its political independence during

the war. It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge.

Does it mean that Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as Germany or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economical, incompatible with the status and dignity of free and self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention, then there will be one kind of independence for the great nation and an inferior kind of independence for the small nation. We must know what is meant, for equality of right among the nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her allies are fighting to establish in this war. Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages and their inhabitants is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called offer of the Central Powers is almost entirely a refusal of all concessions. All suggestions about the autonomy of subject nationalities are ruled out of the peace terms altogether. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to the Arabs, Armenians, or Syrians is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte. A pious wish for the protection of minorities, "in so far as it is practically realizable," is the nearest approach to liberty which the Central statesmen venture to make.

GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT

On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the German demand for the restoration of the whole of Germany's

colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or, as our earlier phrase goes, government by the consent of governed, here vanish into thin air.

It is impossible to believe that any edifice of permanent peace could be erected on such a foundation as this. Mere lip-service to the formula of no annexations and no indemnities or the right of self-determination is useless. Before any negotiations can even be begun the Central Powers must realize the essential facts of the situation.

The days of the treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators, striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared, at whatever sacrifices, to honor the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

BELGIUM AND ALSACE-LORRAINE

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. This is no demand for a war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in

1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of war-like operations from one belligerent to another, which may or may not be defensible. It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired. Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is recognized by insistence on payment for injury, done in defiance of its canons, it can never be a reality.

Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. The complete withdrawal of the alien armies, and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and, until it is cured, healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right.

I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories, now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be discussed. Russia accepted war with all its horrors because, true to her

traditional guardianship of the weaker communities of her race, she stepped in to protect Serbia from a plot against her independence. It is this honorable sacrifice which not merely brought Russia into the war, but France as well. France, true to the conditions of her treaty with Russia, stood by her ally in a quarrel which was not her own. Her chivalrous respect for her treaty led to the wanton invasion of Belgium, and the treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land brought us into the war.

The present rulers of Russia are now engaged, without any reference to the countries whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations with their common enemy. I am indulging in no reproaches. I am merely stating facts with a view to making it clear why Great Britain cannot be held accountable for decisions, taken in her absence, and concerning which she has not been consulted or her aid invoked. No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to delude Russia, she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another (and the name hardly matters) those Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality a part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of the Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an impotent army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany. We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country mean to stand to the last

by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side by the new democracy of Russia. So will America and so will France and Italy. But if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people.

We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe.

AUSTRIA, ITALY, TURKEY

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace.

On the same grounds we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled, Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe instead of being merely an instrument to the pernicious military autocracy of Prussia that uses the resources of its allies for the furtherance of its own sinister purposes.

Outside of Europe we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.

Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our allies on this and on other subjects. I can only say that as the new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies.

THE GERMAN COLONIES

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases, must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments. The

natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal.

The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of the occupied European territories. The German declaration that the natives of the German colonies have through their military fidelity in war shown their attachment and resolve under all circumstances to remain with Germany is applicable, not to the German colonies generally, but only to one of them, and in that case, German East Africa, the German authorities secured the attachment, not of the native population as a whole, which is and remains profoundly anti-German, but only of a small warlike class, from whom their Askaris, or soldiers, were selected. These they attached to themselves by conferring on them a highly privileged position, as against the bulk of the native population, which enabled these Askaris to assume a lordly and oppressive superiority over the rest of the natives. By this and other means they secured the attachments of a very small and insignificant minority, whose interests were directly opposed to those of the rest of the population and for whom they have no right to speak. The German treatment of the native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves.

REPARATION

Finally, there must be reparation for the injuries done in violation of international law. The peace con-

ference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered to and the outrages they have suffered for the common cause of freedom.

One omission we notice in the proposal of the Central Powers which seems to us especially regrettable. It is desirable and essential that the settlement after this war shall be one which does not in itself bear the seed of future war. But that is not enough. However wisely and well we may make territorial and other arrangements, there will still be many subjects of international controversy. Some, indeed, are inevitable.

The economic conditions at the end of the war will be in the highest degree difficult. Owing to the diversion of human effort to warlike pursuits, there must follow a world shortage of raw materials, which will increase the longer the war lasts, and it is inevitable that those countries which have control of raw materials will desire to help themselves and their friends first.

"JUST AND LASTING PEACE"

Apart from this, whatever settlement is made will be suitable only to the circumstances under which it is made, and as those circumstances change, changes in the settlement will be called for.

So long as the possibility of a dispute between nations continues—that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by passionate ambition and war is the only means of settling a dispute—all nations must live under the burden, not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak. The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing evil of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation—these are

blots on our civilization, of which every thinking individual must be ashamed.

For these and other similar reasons we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish, by some international organization, an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. After all, war is a relic of barbarism, and, just as law has succeeded violence as the means of settling disputes between individuals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied, "We are fighting for a just and a lasting peace, and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for, three conditions must be fulfilled: First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war." On these conditions the British Empire would welcome peace; to secure these conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.

IV

LABOR'S AFTER-WAR ECONOMIC
POLICY

BY THE RT. HON. ARTHUR HENDERSON, M.P.

Reprinted from the London *National Weekly*

The man of Cabinet rank who cuts most ice is Mr. Henderson. He speaks and acts with vigor, has a policy, pursues it, advances it, says nothing intangible or extreme, and yet is gradually leading the nation back to those conceptions which burned clear in men's minds when the war began. And this superficial movement springs from the working of the unseen spiritual forces in our life.—The London *Nation*, December 15.

The speeches and declarations of our leading statesmen, delivered in the early months of the war, provide ample evidence to show that this country became an active participant in the gigantic world-struggle from only the highest and best motives. Speaking in the House of Commons as Prime Minister, within a week of the declaration of war, Mr. Asquith said:

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation. . . Secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interests, but that it is fighting in defense of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world.

Such, then, in broad outlines, were the principal objects for which the British people unsheathed the sword. We assumed the rôle of champion of the sanctity of international treaties and of the rights of small nations, and sought to impress upon the world that we desired neither territorial expansion nor artificial economic advantage. This high conception of national duty inspired the entire population of the British Empire and its Dependencies, and produced an unparalleled display of unity and determination.

British labor is convinced, as it has been from the beginning, that a victory for German Imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe. In the peace settlement, practical provision must be made against any future recurrence of the present terrible world-calamity by the elimination of aggressive militarism from the entire world, and, what is equally important, by the removal of all the old-standing menaces and the prevention of new provocations to war—political or economic. This desirable end can best be secured by the establishment of a federation of free democracies, which is the surest guarantee of a permanent peace. The workers feel that if the present world-conflict is a war to end war, its settlement must be based upon the will of all the peoples, and such as will permit the nations, large and small, to dwell together in amity and concord.

If the suggested Federation of Nations is to have any prospect of real and permanent success, and if the present struggle is to be looked back upon as the war which ended all war, everything must be done to prevent the division of Europe into two separate and hostile economic camps after the war. It may safely be said that the latter eventuality would be fatal to all

our hopes of a permanent peace, and a great betrayal of a righteous and noble cause. Instead of securing the abolition of war, it would perpetuate international suspicion, jealousy, and greed, the evil products of economic antagonisms which contributed so largely to the general causes of the present European conflict, and would, within a few short years, lead inevitably to a bitter and devastating repetition of all the losses, sorrow, suffering, and sacrifice mankind is now enduring.

It cannot be too clearly understood that this is not the policy of organized labor in this country, nor of the Socialists of France, Russia, Belgium, or Italy, all of whom have declared emphatically that they do not pursue the political and economic crushing of Germany. These representatives of the working classes and those in close association with them know full well that all attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalistic trusts or monopolies, lead inevitably to the exploitation of the working classes. They cannot regard with any other feeling than one of deep hostility any proposal or policy which seeks utterly to destroy the economic position of the German people after the war; and if this is to be the intention or possible effect of the Paris Conference resolutions, then it would be well to understand at once that organized labor in this country is determined not to allow the normal economic relations of nations to be founded on a policy of oppression and ostracism, producing, as it must, hostility and hatred after the war.

British labor is out to strangle and stamp under foot Kaiserism and militarism, and to substitute for them good-will and fraternity; it is not at war with the

peoples of Germany and Austria, except in so far as they support the war policy of their autocratic rulers. That it appreciates the danger of an economic struggle was clearly indicated in a decision reached at the recent Trade Union Congress by 2,339,000 votes to 278,000, or a majority of more than eight to one. The resolution was as follows:

That the economic conditions created by the war have in no way altered the fundamental truth that free trade among the nations is the broadest and surest foundation for world prosperity and international peace in the future, and that any departure from the principle of free trade would be detrimental to the prosperity of the nation as a whole.

This overwhelming majority shows clearly that British industrial democracy, as represented by Congress, will decline to subscribe to a policy prejudicial to the economic interests of our own working folk, and one that is calculated to prevent the definite and essential reconciliation of free democracies. Therefore, the proposal to cripple Germany financially, and to render her impotent commercially by a ruthless trade war may be expected to receive the determined opposition of the British Labor and Socialist movement. Once the British people as a whole realize the true inwardness of such a policy, how far it is out of accord with their own cherished aims in this war as declared by Mr. Asquith in his Guildhall, Dublin, and Cardiff speeches, and opposed to the spirit of international coöperation and good-will, they will reject it as one inspired by a spirit of revenge, and, consequently, a fatal impediment to the attainment and maintenance of world peace.

It is clear, therefore, that the Paris resolutions, so far as they are intended to form the basis of a policy of

organized systematic and commercial and economic boycotting which aims at the destruction of German commerce, must be strenuously opposed. They would provide a new standing menace to a healthy internationalism and to the future peace of the world.

If this policy of economic repression is to be persisted in, it may prove to be the rock on which the unity of the nation will be broken, for it must be remembered that no more potent argument has been used by the leaders of all the political parties throughout this great conflict in order to secure and retain the active support and coöperation of the workers than that the war must be fought to a successful conclusion, so as to safeguard the future for the people, and, especially, for their children. In responding, as they did, with such striking unanimity and courage, they were influenced by high ideals and great principles, but not by any desire for economic and commercial domination.

If we have among us a section of politicians who regard the German people as rightful spoils, to be economically exploited and oppressed after the conclusion of hostilities, let them cease talking of a fight to a finish, for no mere military victory can ever be the final stage of the struggle; it would only mean a transfer of the venue, with a change of weapons from the military to the economic. But British labor, and especially the organized section, will refuse to regard the German and Austrian Socialists in that light.

The fundamental purpose of British labor in continuing its support of the war is the hope that it may influence the development of world democracy. In order that this may be accomplished, it is determined that the peace terms shall be just and honorable, and

such as shall erect no barriers that will prevent the realization of these high ideals. A spirit of revenge, if introduced, would vitiate the findings of any peace conference, and make a democratic peace an impossibility. Moreover, British labor appreciates the difficulty that has arisen already by the promulgation of the suggested policy of commercial repression and its effect in prolonging the war.

France, Russia, and America all provide evidence that the objects and aims of England are suspected; consequently, we have persistent demands for a restatement of our position, both politically and economically.

What is the use of saying to the German people that if they want peace they must at once become masters in their own house; that they must destroy the Kaiser's power for evil, and that they must come into line with the free democracies of the world, if we increase their already serious difficulties by intimating that when they have succeeded they are not to be a free people, but are to be commercially and economically isolated? What is to be thought of a statesmanship which invites the German people to form part of a federation of nations for the maintenance of a world peace and at the same time proclaims the intention of constructing a federation of Allies for no other object than the setting up of a commercial boycott of Germany? Such a proposal, under all the terrible experiences of the war, may appeal to a section of the people influenced by the wounded feelings of today, without regard to the consequences of the morrow; but when the full effects are realized they will be found to be not only dangerous but criminal, and the sooner they are officially repudiated the better it will be for the Allied cause.

Labor is convinced that a world peace which is broadly based on the expressed will of free democracies cannot be assisted by a temporary or perpetual economic war. And a peace which does not properly recognize the natural economic rights of all peoples will be neither democratic nor lasting.

V

AMERICA'S TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

An address by President Wilson to the Congress
of the United States, January 8, 1918

Gentlemen of the Congress:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all, either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the population with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had

occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

INCIDENT FULL OF SIGNIFICANCE

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective Parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan States, which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and

parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

ISSUES OF LIFE AND DEATH INVOLVED

But whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the

least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

DAY OF CONQUEST GONE BY

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All of the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program, and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace must be arrived at, after which

there will surely be no private international action or rulings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will reduce to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore con-

fidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right, we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the Governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen

speaking for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle, and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

VI

BRITISH LABOR PARTY'S ADDRESS
TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE
JANUARY 15, 1918

We have reached a crisis in the war. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have been interrupted because the Germans have refused to admit the principle of self-determination of peoples and the doctrine of no annexations. In thus acting, the Central Powers are speaking clearly in the name of a militarist state.

In this crisis the British people must speak, because the Russians can only succeed in their great and perilous task if supported by the people everywhere. The British people must proclaim to Russia and the Central Powers that its aim is identical with Russia's; that we, too, see no solution for the evils of militarism except self-determination and no indemnities.

In applying this Russian principle to our own case we are conscious of the problems raised, but we do not shrink therefrom. The British people accepts the principle of no annexations for the British Empire. This applies in our case to the Middle East, Africa, and India.

We wish to remind the Russian people that Great Britain, taught by the loss of the American colonies in the eighteenth century, was the first modern state to grant complete self-determination to any group of its inhabitants, for example, the Dominions of

Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. We accept the principle, also, for India and other dependencies of the British Empire, though we believe that the record of the British Government here gives little occasion for reproach.

We intend to meet this by more rapid development of self-government. We respect the sovereign independence of the Turkish people in their national home, but we believe that the domination of their Government over other peoples is a hindrance to their own national development. Our Government is pledged to some of those peoples—Arabs, Palestinians, Armenians—that the Ottoman rule shall not again be imposed on them. This responsibility should be undertaken by the peace conference and a permanent international organization that we hope will be there constituted.

In tropical Africa we repeat our renunciation of annexations. Nobody contends that the black races can govern themselves. They can only make it known that the particular government under which they have been living is bad in some or all respects, and indicate the specific evils from which they desire liberation. We believe that the peace conference would be well advised to place all tropical Africa under uniform international control.

We adjure the peoples of Central Europe to declare themselves or make their Governments speak for them in answer to Russia and ourselves. We call on them to renounce annexations in Europe with the same good faith in which we are renouncing them in Asia. We call on them to give the same self-determination to the French, Alsatian, Italian, Polish, and Danish members of their states as Russia has

given to Finland, Courland, Lithuania, and Russian Poland.

The family interests of dynasties or the desire of the German, Austrian, and Magyar governing classes to dominate other classes and nationalities must no more be suffered to prevent self-determination in central Europe, and thereby imperil it in Europe as a whole, than the interests of British imperialism or British capitalism must be suffered to do elsewhere.

Peoples of Central Europe, this catastrophe of the human race, this fatal schism in the civilized world, can only be ended by the defeat of militarism on both sides, and by the victory on both sides of moral and intellectual fair dealing. If the world is to be saved, it must be saved by good faith and reciprocity on the part of all. Do not fail us now. Do not let your Governments drive the British people, as they are driving the Russian people, into the terrible choice between continuing the war and abandoning the only principles that can save the world.

If this choice is forced upon us, we shall choose as Russia chose. We shall continue, but the responsibility will be yours.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

- I. The Text of the Root-Takahira Understanding of November 30, 1908
- II. The Text of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 3, 1917
- III. Japan and The United States. Address at a luncheon in honor of the Imperial Japanese Mission, New York, October 1, 1917, by the Honorable Elihu Root
- IV. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Address to the Liberal Club of San Antonio, Texas, November 15, 1917, by the Honorable James L. Slayden
- V. What of Our Fears of Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette



MARCH, 1918

No. 124

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

I

The Text of the Root-Takahira Understanding

IMPERIAL JAPANESE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1908

Sir:

The exchange of views between us, which has taken place at the several interviews which I have recently had the honor of holding with you, has shown that Japan and the United States holding important outlying insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, the Governments of the two countries are animated by a common aim, policy, and intention in that region.

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, and intention would not only tend to strengthen the relations of friendship and good neighborhood, which have immemorially existed between Japan and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preservation of the general peace, the Imperial Government have authorized me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that common aim, policy, and intention:

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the main-

tenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the Government of the United States, I shall be gratified to receive your confirmation.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. TAKAHIRA

Honorable ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 30, 1908

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today setting forth the result of the exchange

of views between us in our recent interviews defining the understanding of the two Governments in regard to their policy in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression of mutual understanding is welcome to the Government of the United States as appropriate to the happy relations of the two countries and as the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy respecting the Far East which the two Governments have so frequently declared in the past.

I am happy to be able to confirm to Your Excellency, on behalf of the United States, the declaration of the two Governments embodied in the following words:

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned, and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal

opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

ELIHU ROOT

His Excellency

Baron KOGORO TAKAHIRA,

Japanese Ambassador

II

The Text of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement

*[The Secretary of State to the
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Japan, on Special Mission]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 2, 1917

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the

commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'Open Door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

ROBERT LANSING

His Excellency

Viscount KIKUJIRO ISHII,

Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary of Japan, on Special Mission

*[The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Japan, on Special Mission,
to the Secretary of State]*

THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN,

Washington, November 2, 1917

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today, communicating to me your under-

standing of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'Open Door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I take this opportunity to convey to you, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

K. ISHII,
*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of Japan, on Special Mission*

Honorable ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State

III

Japan and the United States. Address by the Honorable Elihu Root at a Luncheon in Honor of the Imperial Japanese Mission, New York, October 1, 1917

I am under great obligation to the hosts of this luncheon for giving me the opportunity to join in testifying to respect and admiration and warmth of friendship for the gentlemen who have come so far across the Pacific to extend to us assurances of the friendship of the great and wonderful nation which they represent.

I find myself, without any aid or suggestion on my part, put down upon the program to speak to the formal toast, "International Friendship." But neither the time nor the character of such a meeting as this, would justify a long discussion of that rather broad subject. We are in midst of a transition which is deeply affecting international friendship. We are passing out of one condition of international relation into another and widely differing condition. We recall the maxim of Frederick the Great, that a ruler should never be ashamed to make an alliance which was entirely for his own advantage, and should never hesitate to break it when it ceased to be for his advantage. And the further maxim, that it was the duty of a ruler, when he found that a treaty was no longer beneficial to his people, to break it; for, he said, "Is it not better that a ruler should break his

word than that his people should suffer?" A fine altruistic view of a ruler's duty, which regarded a treaty as being merely a matter between himself and another ruler, so that only his conscience was involved in the breaking of it and not at all the conscience of his people; so that if he would do that violence to his own nature which was involved in breaking a treaty for the benefit of his people, it was a noble self-sacrifice.

Now that illustrates the old condition of international relation. The relation was between rulers, between sovereigns, not between the peoples; and the sovereigns were pursuing their own settled policies,—policies continued from generation to generation, always involving the possibility of aggrandizement, of increasing power, of increasing dominion; and the people were not interested in the slightest. All the great wars that have convulsed the world since the Peace of Westphalia have been, down to very recent days, wars in which some ruler was attempting to increase his power and his dominion, and other rulers were attempting to prevent him from increasing it. Now, however, the business of foreign affairs is passing into the hands of democracies; and in the hands of democracies the old evil of dynastic policies is disappearing; for democracies are incapable of maintaining or following the kind of policy which has involved the world in war so many, many times during the past centuries. A democracy cannot in its very nature pursue such a policy. The mere necessity of discussion, public discussion, in order to secure the appropriations, the expenditure of money, and the action of public representatives, the mere necessity for discussion, is destructive of such policies.

But we are running into other difficulties. Democracies have their dangers, and they have their dangers in foreign affairs; and those dangers arise from the fact that the great mass of people have not the time or the opportunity, or in most cases, the capacity to study and understand the intricate and complicated relations which exist necessarily between nations. And being so situated that they cannot study the relations, cannot become familiar with the vast mass of facts which they involve, cannot become familiar with the characters and purposes of other nations, they are peculiarly open to misrepresentation and misunderstanding. The great danger to international relations with the democracies is misunderstanding,—a misunderstanding of one's own rights; a misunderstanding of one's own duties, and of the rights and duties of other peoples.

Now we are peculiarly open to that danger in this country. We have been so isolated from other nations that we have, in general, but very slender information regarding them, and we are peculiarly liable to be misled. It is only a very few years since the people of the United States really regarded the department of foreign relations as a perfectly useless bureau, and ambassadors and ministers as of no practical value at all. You would get a very large degree of assent ten years ago to the proposition that we might better abolish the whole childish folly, with all its fuss and feathers. Now we are passing out of that condition, and we are finding antidotes for that evil. This great war is teaching the people of every country, even the dullest and the most self-centered, that no nation can live unto itself alone. It is teaching the interdependence of mankind; it is teaching the unity of

civilization; it is teaching the singleness of purpose that goes with duty and love of humanity, and the idealism that pervades all noble natures, whatever the language be and whatever the country be. In fact, more and more this war grows to be a conflict—not between nations, not between this, that, and the other people, but between certain principles of modern civilization and the principles of a dark and dreadful past.

There never has been in this country, so far as my observation and reading go, any more dangerous and persistent misrepresentation regarding the relations, the purposes, the character of another country with which we have relations, than in the case of the relations between the United States and Japan. I have not the slightest doubt that the misrepresentations and the attempts to create bad feeling among the people who have it all in their hands now,—the attempts to create bad feeling between the United States and Japan, have been very largely the result of a fixed and settled purpose; and it is growing day by day more plain that this purpose has formed a part of the policy of that great ruling caste of Germany which is attempting to subjugate the world today. It goes back again to a maxim of the great Frederick, who advised his successors that it was wise to create jealousies among the nations of Europe, in order that they might not be an aid to each other when the opportunity came for a *coup*. That policy has been pursued everywhere in the civilized world. While Germany has been incapable of estimating the great moral forces that move mankind; while she has been incapable of forming a judgment as to what were the real temper and spirit of England, of the British colonies, of the American republic, of the French

republic, of the Italian constitutional monarchy, she has had a chemical affinity for everything that is base in every country. She has appealed to all the baser feelings and conditions; she has appealed to cupidity; she has appealed to prejudice, and to all the lower passions of men everywhere in the world. Wherever she could array evil against good; wherever she could destroy content and neighborliness and respect for law, and the desire for the better things of life, there she has been working to subjugate. All the baser passions received impetus, fuel, encouragement from her, and a part of her effort has been, I have no doubt whatever, to create estrangement, if possible, between the United States and Japan.

Now I wish in the first place to express my own most grateful appreciation of the fine and noble way in which the Viscount Ishii and his Mission, inspired and commissioned by the Government of Japan, have come to America to dispel all this cloud of misunderstanding and suspicion and doubt. The frank and sincere utterances of the Viscount are like rays of sun dispelling the cloud. There is very great virtue in speaking face to face. There is great virtue in letting in the light. There is a good quality in human nature which makes men like each other and trust each other the more, when they meet each other face to face; and I think it certain that the visit of this Mission to America begins a new era of understanding and friendship between these two great nations that look at each other across the Pacific, which will revive memories of the days past, of those early years in which this great republic served its part in introducing the new Japan to the nations of the world.

I wish to say one other thing. For many years I

was very familiar with our own department of foreign affairs, and for some years I was specially concerned in its operation. During that time there were many difficult, perplexing, and doubtful questions to be discussed and settled between the United States and Japan. During that time the thoughtless or malicious section of the press was doing its worst. During that time the demagogue, seeking cheap reputation by stirring up the passions of the people to whom he appealed, was doing his worst. There were many incidents out of which quarrels and conflict might have arisen; and I hope you will all remember what I say of them: I say that during all that period there never was a moment when the Government of Japan was not frank, sincere, friendly, and most solicitous, not to enlarge but to minimize and do away with all causes of controversy. No one who has any familiarity at all with life can be mistaken in a negotiation as to whether the one with whom he is negotiating is trying to prevent or trying to bring about a quarrel. That is a fundamental thing that you cannot be mistaken about. And there never was a more consistent and noble advocacy of peace, of international friendship, and of real good understanding, in the diplomacy of this world, than was exhibited by the representatives of Japan, both here and in Japan, during all these years in their relations to the United States. I wish for no better, no more frank and friendly intercourse between my country and any other country than the intercourse by which Japan in those years illustrated the best qualities of the new diplomacy between nations, as distinguished from the old diplomacy between rulers.

And in the most delightful recollection of those years, and most agreeable appreciation for what you have now done, I beg you, my dear Viscount, when you return to your home, that you will say to the Government and to the people of Japan: The people of America, who now hold their foreign affairs in their hands, wish to be forever friends and brethren of the people of Japan.

IV

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Address to the Liberal Club of San Antonio by the Honorable James L. Slayden, November 15, 1917

The cause of peace and justice and the orderly, fair development of commerce were distinctly advanced by the agreement and declaration of policy recently published to the world by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Special Ambassador Viscount Ishii of Japan. It is a simple, understandable document, as all State papers should be, but it will clear the atmosphere of international politics of the murky doubts and suspicions that have been so sedulously cultivated for years by trouble-makers.

For years certain wicked and selfish people have been trying to provoke a war between Japan and the United States. Inspired by greed, or ambition, or both, they have persevered in their wickedness and more than once have brought us to the verge of a needless war. From a recurrence of that danger the President and the Secretary of State appear to have saved us, at least for the time being. These greedy and ambitious mischief-makers had a happy hunting ground for trouble in the unsettled questions of immigration, citizenship, and land owning rights of aliens, each of which was a point of friction.

War with Japan was an obsession with a former Member of Congress from Alabama. I heard him say on the floor of the House of Representatives four or

five years ago that we would have war with Japan in a short time. He was rash enough to fix the time limit, within which it would come. That time has long since passed.

All these things caused great concern to thoughtful and peaceably inclined people. Many suggestions were made to meet the situation but the friction continued. Our State and Diplomatic officers did their best to keep the peace but a threat hung over us all the time. A radical treatment was necessary and the wisdom of the present administration has provided it. Just, fair, and honorable conduct on the part of one nation towards another is the best plan yet found for keeping the peace. Robert Lansing and Viscount Ishii merely applied to international politics a rule laid down many centuries ago which says, "do unto others as you would they should do unto you." It's a mighty good rule of international, as well as personal conduct.

This agreement does not quite rise to the dignity of a treaty, for that would require the approval of the Senate. But it points the way to peace and certainly amounts to a policy that will surely last through one administration, thus giving us security for four years, anyway. Will not the wisdom and 'sweet reasonableness' of it appeal to succeeding administrations?

The Chinese question, like the poor, is always with us. The relations of China to Japan are always to the fore and always causing uneasiness and it is most gratifying to know that at last it is having statesman-like treatment. The trade of the 300,000,000 people in China is coveted by the merchants of all countries, our own included, and was behind the 'open door' policy so vigorously pressed by John Hay, when Sec-

retary of State. It was a simple demand for equal trade rights for all and is covered in the Lansing-Ishii understanding. It leaves no excuse for quarrels between nations or merchants, so far, at least, as concerns China and Manchuria.

But, on the other hand, Japan has claimed, and the Lansing-Ishii agreement admits, the validity of the claim, that because of proximity she has a special interest in, or what Secretary Lansing calls 'special relations' with, the affairs of China. Japan has made this claim for years. Sometimes it has been contested by Americans, to which contest the reply has been made that the United States claims 'special relations' with Mexico and that if our claim, which is based on geography, is good, hers also based on geography must be good. Americans who think honestly must admit the force of the Japanese argument. Somewhat flamboyantly and always aggressively we shout our shibboleth of America for the Americans. How can we, then, challenge the Japanese reply of Asia for the Asiatics? By his agreement with Japan's Ambassador, Viscount Ishii, Robert Lansing says we can not.

By far the most impressive feature of the agreement between the two ministers is the plain declaration that there is no purpose on the part of either country to trespass on the sovereign or territorial rights of China. That is as it should be, for if the peace of the world is to be maintained the equality and sanctity of sovereignty must be recognized. Half the world's wars come from the failure to do so and the failure of the big, strong nations to respect the rights of the smaller countries.

Mr. Lansing frankly tells the world that the agreement was made to get rid of the mutual distrust of

the purposes of Japan and the United States that has been fostered by the trouble-makers, and I believe it will have that effect. He names Germany, whose motives are obvious, as the chief trouble-maker.

After the American Secretary of State had conceded to Japan 'special relations' with China that country, with a large generosity, pledges herself not to take advantage of her nearness to China to press for commercial or political advantages. That may not be a relief to the Hobsons and others who have striven so persistently to involve us in war with Japan but it will be to the average American.

What has come to be known as 'secret diplomacy' has been an undoubted menace to the peace of the world. Secret treaties, or agreements only partially revealed to the world, have been made by monarchs for dynastic and selfish reasons, have been kept in abeyance for years and finally when the opportune moment comes, have been executed in the blood and anguish of their people who were not consulted. To promote these designs of ambitious kings and emperors, millions of men have died on the field of battle and are in fact so dying at this moment. These are the conditions that have made the half-crazed people of Russia demand that all things governmental shall be done in the open by workmen and socialist delegates, an impossible thing, as they are trying to do it, but it is a reaching-out for the right thing. The Lansing-Ishii agreement is not an example of secret diplomacy. It is open to the world, absolutely above board. All the world is informed of its terms and conditions in the moment it is signed and, in my judgment, only good can come from it.

V

What of Our Fears of Japan?

By KENNETH S. LATOURETTE

Are we to have a war with Japan? Of late years there has been much talk of the possibility. For at least a decade one well-known congressman has been telling us in season and out that war is inevitable. By sheer force of reiteration he has made us wonder at times whether he might not be right. Seven or eight years ago a book of fiction was circulated which described in some detail a sudden attack on the United States by Japan, an attack in which Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Pacific Coast were quickly captured, and won back only after a long, exhausting struggle. Of late, with the spectacle before us of the Japanese expansion in the Pacific and in China that has taken place since 1914, there has been in some quarters a renewed cry that war is coming and is even at hand.

We expect such a note from the hysterical members of the daily press whose circulation is kept up by sensation mongering. But it is heard as well in magazines that are usually conservative. One of our oldest monthlies warns us editorially that our Pacific fleet is much weaker than the Japanese navy, with the implication that it must be kept strong against very possible contingencies. An American resident in China, well known as an authority on Far

Eastern affairs, warns us in another prominent monthly: "Japan is making deliberate preparation in anticipation, if not actually in expectation, of a collision with the United States. Japanese popular thought and feeling have been deliberately prepared for this eventuality by the Japanese Government and now are extremely hostile toward the United States." An American writer on international relations whose books and articles have been widely read by thoughtful Americans says in a work published in 1915: "To secure those islands [Hawaii and Guam] war is regarded in Japan as inevitable . . . To occupy all of them is obviously an easy task." He asserts that Japan desires the Philippines as well and that the capture of a few ports on the Pacific Coast would force the United States to cede all its Pacific islands as a ransom. A series of articles in one of our most widely read weeklies has within the year been portraying in vivid language the Japanese advances in China and warning us that while we are in no immediate danger of attack from this quarter, unless we preserve China's independence, we will eventually be confronted with a united Far East. Mastered and organized by Japanese officials, that, we are told, would be a menace to our own and to all western civilization. A book of last year, written by a newspaper correspondent who knows the Far East rather intimately, recounts this same Japanese advance on China, and assures us in no uncertain words that we must prepare to fight with the doughty islanders if we are not "to become a coolie power . . . not outranking Portugal or Mexico in foreign influence in East Asia," or if we are not entirely to surrender the Pacific to Tokio. The alleged discovery by the Bolsheviki last Decem-

ber of secret articles supplementary to the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1916 was heralded in one of our influential Middle Western dailies, under the bold headlines, "Japan and Russia entered into secret treaty aimed at Great Britain and the United States." Many similar quotations could be given from scores of books and articles but are already too familiar to all readers of current literature on international relations to need repetition. It is of ominous significance that even our entry into the war on the side of Japan and her allies and the Lansing-Ishii agreement have only partially allayed the suspicions of our press. An enemy could scarcely be treated more rudely than is Japan by some of our editorial writers.

It is not only on this side of the water that rumors of war are afloat. In Japan a note of warning has been sounded. Not long before our declaration of war on Germany, a Japanese writer alleged that the Washington naval program is "proof of a policy of aggression in the Pacific. . . . While Japan is concerned chiefly with the outcome of the war in Europe, dangerous movements are on foot in America, bent on enormous increase of national defenses. This revolution in the organization of the American navy is no doubt intended to cope with the Japanese navy which America holds as its hypothetical enemy." Within the last two years another Japanese has written: "It requires but little consideration to see that in the future the most formidable racial opponents of Japan will be Germany and the United States." Not long since still another Japanese twice warned us through the columns of our own press that our attitude toward his nation has been aggravating and inconsiderate, although perhaps innocently so, and that it will re-

quire careful action on our part to avoid an armed conflict. Our opposition to Japanese immigration and enterprise, not only in our own land, but in both the Americas, and our treatment of Japanese already on our shores, have seemed to our island neighbors an unwarranted and discriminatory exclusion of a friendly people from legitimate rights of migration and trade. The rapid American expansion in the Pacific in the past two decades with its annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines, American insistence on the open door in China, and the beginnings of the investment of American capital in that same rich, unhappy land, and the active American influence that was a strong factor in Peking's break with Germany, have set Japanese to wondering how much further imperialism will lead us. We have seemed to them to have barred the western hemisphere against them, and now to be seeking to obstruct them in their natural expansion in their own Far East. The Lansing-Ishii agreement was a most timely document and did much to restore the confidence of the Japanese in our good intentions, but it was not greeted by their press with unalloyed cordiality. We must do still more if the Japanese public is to be convinced of our disinterestedness.

There has been then insistent talk of war. Two great growing powers have been looking askance at each other across the Pacific, each distrustful of the other's ambitions. It is high time that we in the United States tried to know Japan and Japan's motives. If she has a definite policy of aggression against which American interests are destined to clash and to clash in war, we ought by all means to be aware of it and to prepare. If not, if the seeming Japanese de-

signs against America are a bogie born of misunderstanding and of a feverish imagination heightened by dwelling overmuch on the great war, the sooner we see things straight the better. If we have been guilty of wanton insults to our neighbor, if we have had selfish motives in the Pacific and the Far East which could give just cause for complaint against us, we ought to cease from them and make such amends as are possible. If our policies have been misunderstood we ought to make a special effort to see that they are so no longer. We want no war with an old-time friend because we have misunderstood her or she us, or because we have wronged her.

To begin with, we need to remember that it would be an expensive matter for Japan to go to war with the United States. She would probably need to attempt an invasion of the Philippines and even of Hawaii and the Pacific Coast. This would be costly and of doubtful outcome and unless America were overwhelmed by a coalition of the powers, even successful invasion would be followed by a long and expensive struggle against the vastly superior resources of the United States. After peace had been declared there would be added the cost of increased armaments against a possible renewal of the conflict. Japan is still a poor country in spite of her great increase in wealth in recent years. As we have been told many times by our Japanese friends, her population already struggles under a heavy debt and is taxed nearly to the limit. She would certainly not undertake the expense of a great war unless she were thoroughly convinced of its advisability or necessity or were swept away by an unreasoning popular demand. Moreover, America is Japan's best customer, holding first place

as a buyer of her exports, and there is an historic friendship between the powers which even frequent exploitation by after-dinner speakers has not exhausted. Difficulty, poverty, commerce, and even friendship, it is true, will not deter from war if the desire or the provocation is strong enough, but they help to insure against a hasty or an ill-considered conflict. There must be what seem to her adequate reasons before Japan will declare war on us.

The reasons which are given for a war between Japan and America can be grouped under three heads: first, a conflict of interests in China; second, rivalry for the control of the Pacific; third, the denial to the Japanese of the privilege of establishing themselves on the western hemisphere, either by immigration to the Pacific slope of the United States or by acquiring land in South or Central America.

China has for the past twenty years been increasingly the center of Japan's interests and of her foreign policy. The reasons are familiar. Until the last generation Japan was economically self-sufficient. Foreign trade was practically non-existent and all the food needed was found within her own borders. The amount of arable land in Japan is not great, however, and is rapidly approaching the limit of productive capacity. For the past forty years or more population has been increasing at the rate of about one per cent. per year. Between 1891 and 1907 it jumped from 272 to 330 per square mile. This density is greater than that of France or Germany, although less than that of Belgium or England. Under such conditions the Japanese are forced to get some of their food from without. They can do this either by becoming a manufacturing nation and exchanging their products for

food, or by emigration. They are using both methods. Their natural field for emigration is to a slight extent Formosa and Sakhalin, but principally Hokkaido, Korea, and the relatively unoccupied plains of fertile Manchuria. Not only are these lands conveniently near, but emigrants can still form a solid military unit with the parent stock. There is none of that loss of military strength by emigration that pan-Germanists have bewailed. Japan's natural market, and the sources of much of the raw materials for her developing industries are on the adjacent continent. In China there is a great population of over three hundred millions just awaking to foreign trade, just beginning to be industrialized, as vast a potential market for the varied products of modern industry as is to be found in the world. Of much the same culture, and near at hand, what wonder that Japan has dreamed of the Chinese as her future customers and has seen in the development of their desire and ability to purchase her own industrial future. China's fields and mines can provide the raw materials for Japan's factories. China's newly developing industries may prove a field for Japanese supervision. China has great deposits of iron, so essential to success in our industrial age. Japan is but poorly supplied with iron and must insist that her free access to China's ores be kept open.

Japan feels then that for better or for worse she is inextricably tied up with China. Were the latter to fall into the possession of hostile powers or alien capitalists, and her doors become shut to Japanese enterprise, the ruin of the island empire would be certain. To keep the door of the neighboring continent open, Japan has fought with China, with Russia, and with Germany; she has burdened herself with the expense

of a vast armament, and has loaded herself with a great debt. Her diplomacy has centered around Peking. She concluded the Anglo-Japanese alliance to strengthen herself on the continent and the agreement of 1916 with Russia had the same object. In the present weak state of China's government she has but little faith, perhaps too little, in that nation being able unaided to keep its doors open or to resist the encroachments of European powers. She has taken the opportunity given by the great war so to strengthen herself in China that she cannot be easily dislodged when once that conflict is over and the powers are again free to give their attention to the Far East. She has done this even at the cost of the bitter hatred of the Chinese people. She has constantly in mind the development of China to Japanese advantage, although, it must be added in all fairness, her best men have believed that this would be also to the advantage of the Chinese. She has suggested that American and English capital be combined with Japanese brains to develop China industrially. There is, naturally, an imperialist group in Japan which talks of manifest destiny and of Japanese glory and desires a more active policy in China. This group may in time lead the nation to back up a program of increasing interference in Peking looking to actual control of the great Asiatic republic by Tokio. Just now, however, most thoughtful Japanese believe that they cannot expect to conquer China politically. They merely hope to perfect a close alliance with her, to help her in her reorganization, and to keep her markets open or at most, to control them until she shall have found herself. For these objects, however, they feel that they must increasingly strive, and if need be,

fight. The entire nation is a unit here: Japan's very life is at stake.

It is not strange that Japan should view with unfriendly eye any threatened American aggression in China. She has seen with apprehension the rapid expansion of the United States toward Asia. Hawaii, the Philippines, and intervening islands have come into our hands in the past twenty years. We may feel ourselves to be innocent of imperialistic intent, but Japan cannot forget our heartless spoliation of Mexico in the eighteen-forties. We need to remember that our actions when viewed by an outsider are not as guileless as when seen by ourselves. Our championship of the open door in China may be from the American standpoint the disinterested act of a friend, but to the outsider it may appear to be dictated by designing selfishness. It may well seem that not content with reserving our own hemisphere to ourselves by our Monroe Doctrine, we are reaching out toward Asia. We have vast amounts of accumulated capital which heretofore have been almost exclusively occupied in the development of our immense virgin resources. This capital is now beginning to seek investment abroad, and it is not strange if Japan suspects it of sinister designs on China. As one Japanese has said, "American wealth is likely to seek investment in the Orient and it will be backed by immense power." From the Japanese standpoint it would be but natural if our increased armaments on the Pacific should seem to be designed to further a policy of aggression in China.

There is no question that if Japan believed the United States was seriously, persistently, and aggressively threatening her interests in China, she would

go to war with us, although perhaps not as readily as she went to war with Russia and Germany. However, there seems to be no immediate likelihood that America would willingly go to war over China. It is true that our capitalists have a few millions invested there and that they are probably to invest more, and that a number of publicists, principally newspaper men, are urging us on to a more aggressive policy. Public opinion in the United States looks with unfriendly eye, however, on a war to defend money. We refused to intervene in Mexico if it were to be merely for the purpose of protecting American investments, and Mexico is at our very door. We have much larger investments there than we are probably to have in China for decades; and we could find in the obligations imposed on us by our Monroe Doctrine an excuse for intervention far more plausible than our Chinese policy could ever give us. It is true that we have stood for the open door in China and that if Japan were to close it strained relations might follow, but the open door has not yet sufficiently become a part of the thinking of the average American to lead him to back his government in a war to enforce it. We cannot, of course, foresee events of half a century hence. It is within the range of possibility, although hardly of probability, that China will then be organized and controlled by Japan and that these two powers together will become so great a menace that we will seek by force to break up the combination. It may be that American public opinion will eventually be ready to resort to arms to defend the open door. At present, however, there seems no possibility of America following so aggressive a policy in China that war will result.

War over China in the near future is conceivable only in case our diplomats take a position which the nation, if it understood, would not indorse, but which would rouse Japanese popular resentment to the point where it would force the ministry to attack us before we had time to realize our plight. Such a diplomatic move may be possible, especially since the American public is ignorant and even indifferent on Far Eastern affairs, but it is not probable that it will be made in the near future. The Lansing-Ishii agreement has proved that our state department is better informed than the mass of the nation. There would be real danger if we insisted too strenuously on the right of our capitalists to avail themselves of the open door and to invest money in zones that the Japanese have marked out for their own. That, if backed up by threats of force, might lead to war, but at present the nation as a whole has no thought of endorsing such a policy. One must recognize frankly that there are serious possibilities for conflict in China, especially since Japan is so vitally interested there, and since at times, under the press of circumstances, she seems to violate the open door for which we have stood and which she has frankly agreed to observe. There is, however, no immediate likelihood of war, and a wise diplomacy backed and guided by an intelligent public opinion can in all probability avoid it. We could achieve but little in China by fighting; we would be too far removed from our base of supplies to succeed single-handed against the Japanese. As firmly as we believe in the open door and the right of China to work out her own salvation without the domination of any one power, we stand a far better chance of attaining those

ends through diplomacy and a frank understanding with Japan than through war.

The predominating place of China in Japan's foreign policy is an insurance against war with America on other grounds. Japan's statesmen have been accused of many crimes but seldom of stupidity. They are too astute to risk their position in China in an armed conflict of doubtful outcome over less important issues. Even now, after having been given free leeway during the European war, Japan's leadership in China is precarious. She faces the hostility of the awakening Chinese people. The great new republic may not always be as weak as it is now. She faces the jealousy of Europe. The alliance with the entente powers, like most international arrangements, is one of mutual self-interest. Only thirteen years ago Japan fought Russia. Last year the two powers were allies. Today that alliance seems half shattered. Japan has no assurance that after the war is over the turn of the wheel will not bring into power in Russia a government that will gladly take advantage of trouble between Japan and America to seize the territory lost in 1905. There are already mutterings in England and among English merchants in the Far East against Japanese competition in China and against Japanese encroachments in the Yangtze Valley, the British sphere of influence. The Anglo-Japanese alliance might not stand the strain of hostile pressure were Japan to become seriously embarrassed with a power friendly to Great Britain. Germany might well take advantage of a Japanese-American war to win back her lost holdings in China. Japan cannot lightly risk a war with us even over our policy in China, and certainly not over other issues.

If war comes it will only be because she is thoroughly convinced that a supreme question of national life or honor is at stake.

A second possible cause for war is rivalry for the dominion of the Pacific. Each of the two countries certainly considers that ocean to be a natural field for commercial expansion. Across it lies the East for whose commerce the Occident has always striven, and Americans have hoped and still hope to have a large share in that commerce. Our annexation of Hawaii and our retention of Guam and the Philippines were influenced in no small degree by that hope. Japan desires even more earnestly than we to be the predominant commercial power of the Pacific. Her very geographical position invites to it. It seems to fit her to be to Eastern Asia and the Pacific what Great Britain has been to Europe and the Atlantic. She has exerted every effort to build up her commerce and her shipping, and she has magnificently succeeded. The Japanese flag backed by liberal subsidies and the energies of her great financial magnates is becoming an increasingly familiar sight in the ports of the world. Great Britain is today her only serious competitor in the Pacific. The American flag has practically disappeared from all but the coasting trade. It was but natural that the Japanese should gladly help seize the German possessions in the Pacific. Some Japanese have gone so far as to cast covetous eyes on Hawaii and the Philippines and have even talked of occupying them, but we need to discriminate between them and the level-headed statesmen who control Japan's foreign policies. Japan has achieved some remarkable successes during the past generation. Within the memory of men still in middle life

she has risen from obscurity to world prominence. Scarcely sixteen years ago a scholarly, widely read American book on world politics hardly mentioned her. Today she is the dominant power in Eastern Asia. It is not strange that some Japanese have had their heads turned and that they talk easily of their national destiny, of mastering China, and of annexing the islands of the Pacific. We in America have but to remember our own exuberant self-confidence in the middle of the last century and the speeches of some of our public men even of today to realize that we cannot be the first to cast a stone at our island neighbors. We need also to remember that America as a whole is not back of those who talk of annexing everything from the Rio Grande to the Isthmus and from the forty-ninth parallel to the North Pole. Japan's foreign policies are in the hands of remarkably level-headed, far-sighted men, who are not to be hustled into hasty action by loud-mouthed expansionists. They realize that Japan's position is still precarious, that she is still regarded by many in Europe as an upstart and an interloper, and even a possible leader of the yellow race in a life and death struggle with the Occident. War with the United States might well afford some of the powers an opportunity to pay off old scores and to down her once for all. The excuse would be easily found. Japan's statesmen realize too that her trade is thriving without the possession of Hawaii and the Philippines. Their ownership by America has certainly not prevented our merchant marine from declining. Were there any desire in America to attack Japan from the vantage point of these possessions and by sheer brute force to drive her flag from the Pacific she would of

course fight. But such an action by America is unthinkable. Were the Philippines or Hawaii in the possession of a weak power it is within the range of possibility that an aggressive cabinet in Japan might find an excuse for seizing them. But the attempt to take them from the United States, even if crowned with initial success, could only lead to a prolonged war or a series of wars with a power potentially much stronger than Japan. The doubtfulness of the outcome and the uncertainty of the attitude of Europe are sufficient to prevent any coolly planned war of aggression. Japan is not going to attack us wantonly and America is certainly not going to attack Japan for any fancied gain in trade.

Alarmists have seen a third possible cause for war in Japanese immigration to America. We are reminded of the differences in the wage scale and the standard of living between the two countries. We are told that the Japanese will not emigrate in large numbers as laborers or farmers to Manchuria and Korea because they there must compete with a people who are willing to accept a still lower standard of living. The picture is drawn of hordes of Japanese wishing to descend upon our Pacific Coast, or to go to South or Central America. It is probably true that very large numbers of Japanese would come to our coast states if the restrictions were withdrawn. It is certainly true that prejudice against the Japanese and differences in culture and race make it difficult to assimilate them rapidly and wise to maintain the present restrictions on immigration. We need to remember, however, that these restrictions have been placed not by America but by Japan, that for nearly ten years the Japanese government has voluntarily

made its passport requirements so high that more have returned from America to Japan than have come in. Tokio has shown every disposition to meet us more than half way and has made unnecessary any such laws of exclusion as have been passed against the Chinese. She has been prompted not alone by her eagerness for continued friendship with America but by the desire to keep her population compactly around her in Eastern Asia for purposes of military strength. We need to remember, too, that any attempt by Japan to force immigration on us by war would be the height of folly. She might possibly break through our navy and our coast defenses, capture our chief Pacific ports, and by a large army of invasion hold our West coast in subjection for a time. However, the difficulty of maintaining the long line of communication with the home base, the hostility of the virile population of the Pacific coast, the probability of European complications, and the certainty of a long, sturdy resistance of a powerful people fighting for their homes would make the outcome so certainly a victory for the United States, that Japan recognizes that she would be mad to make the attempt. For Japan to seize the Philippines and Hawaii or to prey on our commerce in the Pacific with the hope of forcing upon us immigration or even better treatment of her nationals would be equally foolish. Racial and cultural differences are at the bottom of American irritation and Japanese statesmen are certainly wise enough to know that war would aggravate it, not remove it.

It seems clear then, that a war with America at the present time or in the near future would be contrary to all the rational interests of Japan. Japan does

not seek it, and from a material and selfish viewpoint she would be mad to go into it. There is such a thing, however, as national honor and although at times it seems hard to define it, it is held and in its ideal form should rightly be held dearer than life. The sense of national honor is particularly keen in Japan. All her past history, all the teachings of *bushido*, all her intense devotion to the person and institution of her emperor, have bred in her people a degree of patriotism which is probably without an equal. Life is held cheap when compared with honor and to the Japanese there is no greater glory than to die for his country. Japan is unusually sensitive to all slights. If once she were to be convinced that America was rudely and insistently insulting her or threatening her honor, it is doubtful whether any cabinet or all the dictates of prudence could prevent her from plunging into war. It is always possible that a persistently mistaken diplomacy or short-sighted legislation may lead to such an outburst, and it is possible that actions on both sides, quite innocent in purpose, may be misunderstood and prepare the way by creating friction. If war ever comes it will probably be very largely because of a series of blunders and misunderstandings.

One cannot escape the fact that some blunders have been made and that some misunderstandings have arisen. The school question and land legislation in California, the threatened legislation in Oregon and Idaho, and the proposed restriction of immigration by national law, have all been marked by disregard for the feelings of Japan and by impatience with the ordinary means of diplomacy. We have failed too often to regard the ordinary canons of courtesy and

have seemed to discriminate against the Japanese as though they were an inferior race. The situation is delicate at best, but we have made it more so by tactless disregard for the feelings of a high-spirited, sensitive people. Our actions have in turn been misunderstood. Our open-door policy in China, especially in Manchuria, has at times been interpreted as gratuitous and selfish interference. Our incipient attempts to invest capital in that land have been viewed with alarm. Our mediation at the end of the Russo-Japanese War for a time caused popular resentment. To many Japanese who were ignorant of the real state of affairs it seemed to have robbed them of part of the fruits of their victory. Our note to China last summer created suspicion in Japan, a suspicion that has fortunately been largely allayed by the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

We in turn have failed to understand Japan. A large section of our press has insisted on interpreting every innocent move on the American coast as the first step of a designing aggression, and has given currency to rumors of the gravest nature. Ignorant as we are of Japan we have at times been half deceived. One cannot deny that relations have been strained, strained to such a point that if the mutual misunderstanding were to be continued for many years a chance spark might set off a war; a war which would be entirely unnecessary and which could scarcely result in anything but evil for both antagonists. We need and need profoundly a deliberate effort to understand Japan, a determination to be patient, a willingness to believe the best about her, and above all, courtesy and consideration in our treatment of her, the courtesy and consideration that are

the due of an old friend. We need to read more widely what is said about her by Americans who really understand her, and not to trust to the yellow press. We need more study in our schools of her history and institutions and of the Far East in general. For the most part our curricula blissfully ignore Japan and China, and the average American is allowed to grow up with a conception of them that is grotesque in the extreme. We need to discount the talk of Japanese jingoes as we wish Japan to discount that of ours. We need a greater willingness to exhaust the efforts of diplomacy before resorting to legislation to settle our difficulties. Our public speakers and our journalists must learn a greater respect for the truth. We must see that no hysterical legislation is passed by our Pacific coast states which will violate either the letter or the spirit of our treaties and endanger the peace of the entire nation. We must be sure that our policy in China is free from the slightest taint of selfish ambition, and that Japan and the Japanese public are convinced of our disinterestedness. That will require a change in the tone of many of our journalists, men who are often supposed to speak for us, and self-restraint on the part of our capitalists. We have certainly not always been free from ulterior motives in the past, even though we have been much more nearly so than has Europe. If the time comes when in the interests of justice we need to speak against Japanese aggressions on China our protests must be freed from any selfish bias. It is within the range of possibility that such protests will need to be made and that, even when uttered with the best of motives, they will lead to war. If so, our cause would be strengthened and beneficial results more nearly assured if we

could enter the conflict with a conscience void of offense. If war comes in the near future we will have ourselves largely to blame for it. It need not come. Japan does not want it. We still have ample time for repentance. Will we avail ourselves of it and bring forth fruits meet for repentance? If we do not, our sins may be visited and visited heavily upon our children.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE



BY
OTFRIED NIPPOLD

APRIL, 1918

No. 125

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE¹

Before the beginning of the present war, little account had been taken of the formidable rôle which suggestion may play in the life of nations, a part more powerful even than in the life of individuals. Until then, only a few writers had discussed mass suggestion.² At that time the systematic propaganda which had been carried on for many years in Germany by the war party, and which was designed to influence the German people by means of certain formulas, had not been noticed, at least not by the public at large. In my book on *German Chauvinism*, published in 1913, I tried to present documentary evidence of this systematic activity on the part of the forces in Germany making for war. I placed in the category of 'Chauvinists' not merely the militarists who desired war for war's sake, but also the Pangermanist politicians and the imperialists, who, for political or other reasons, were pleased to represent war as desirable and inevitable. I showed what formulas were made use of in these circles to make the German people, who are by nature really peace-loving, 'ripe' for war. The

¹ A translation of Part I of *Das Erwachen des deutschen Volkes und die Rolle der Schweiz* (Art. Institut Orell Füssli in Zürich, 1917), by Dr. Otfried Nippold, an eminent Swiss authority on international law.

² Among the works published before the war, I will mention only the following: Le Bon, *Psychologie des Foules*; Christensen, *Politik und Massenmoral*; Adolf Friedländer, *Die Bedeutung der Suggestion im Völkerleben*, a lecture given in 1913 at Nuremberg, at the congress of the Union for International Conciliation. Works published during the war: Robert Gaupp, *Wahn und Irrtum im Leben der Völker*; Nicolai, *Die Biologie des Krieges*.

slogan of 'encirclement' had been used from the beginning, as well as such expressions as 'the desire of the French for revenge', 'the jealousy of the English', and the pretended danger of 'Panslavism'. All these formulas had served the purpose of persuading the German people that war was inevitable.

The promoters of war did not rest there. During the last years before the war they invented the theory of preventive war, and they made open propaganda in favor of a war of offense. To the strategic argument, deduced from the necessity for choosing the most favorable moment for commencing the war, they added the political argument, which justified aggression on the grounds of the expediency of an 'active' policy, and of Germany's need for expansion. It was by such means that these agitators actually succeeded in upholding a war of aggression without having to fear the indignant protests of German public opinion. More than that, their agitation in favor of these views was greeted with universal approval by the mob and more especially by the press.

Unfortunately the German people were not conscious of the moral danger which was threatening them. The number of victims of this evil influence increased steadily. In my book, *German Chauvinism*, I was constrained to state that by 1913 the Pangerman formulas had found credence in the widest circles. Not that the number of conscious propagandists for imperialism, properly speaking, had increased; before the war they never constituted more than a small minority, even among the Germans with Pangermanist tendencies. But the diffusion of the war formulas had blinded and demoralized the German people to the point where they began to hope for the

catastrophe. "If the war is inevitable," they said, "let the bomb burst at once." The war propaganda, continued for several years, had indeed made the German people 'ripe' for war, so much so that even peace-loving people actually longed for the war, though still dreading it. Only a relatively small part of the population, composed of eminent intellectuals, democrats of the middle class, and socialists, had succeeded in preserving their immunity and in resisting the suggestions of the war party.

Such was the situation in the first months of the year 1914. I will not recall here the symptoms which, many months beforehand, gave warning of the impending catastrophe to every attentive observer. This would furnish material for an interesting chapter, which I shall perhaps have occasion to write some other time. The machinations of the war party had excited the sensibility and nervousness of the German people to a state of paroxysm. The war party felt that it was approaching its goal. In an article in the review, *März*, for July 18, 1914, I felt called upon to address a last warning to the German government:³ "How can they hope in government circles that at the decisive hour they will be able to cope with the evil, if they let it become steadily aggravated without taking any of the measures necessary to check it? Today the danger is not yet immediate, but it may become so tomorrow." A few days later the decisive hour had struck. Not only was the German govern-

³ Before publishing this article, entitled "Desire for War in Germany," I had tried several times to warn German public opinion. Note particularly in the *Deutsche Revue* an article of June, 1913, "Where is the Danger to the Peace of Europe?" and an article of January, 1914, "Political Dilettantism in Europe."

ment powerless to check the disease, but it surrendered to it.

Nevertheless they did not dare to tell the German people the truth, no matter how well prepared it might be to hear it. The people might have lacked enthusiasm when the time came to go to war. So a new formula was added to those which had been used to influence the masses: 'criminal aggression' (*ruchloser Überfall*) or, in other words, 'the defensive war which has been forced upon us'. In the eyes of an impartial observer the invention of this formula was not very ingenious: the political situation in Europe being what it was, it could be accepted only by people ignorant of politics. But the German people had really been brought to such a pass that it believed everything blindly. The Germans, then, accepted the fable of 'criminal aggression'; they accepted it as gospel truth, and to the last man. Before the outbreak of the war a part of the population had not yet come under the spell of the slogans, but now all that was suddenly changed. Even the socialist party succumbed to this newest slogan. That last barrier swept aside, militarism and Pangermanism submerged all Germany, people and government alike.

Militarism now ruled supreme, and with it nationalism, in which imperialist tendencies manifested themselves more openly. The *Post*, a conservative Berlin paper, was quite right when it said on September 19, 1916, with reference to my controversy with von Sybel in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, that imperialistic aspirations in Germany had been, before the war, the doctrine of a very narrow circle, and that this doctrine had on occasion been officially disavowed. "Imperialism," continues the *Post*, "can have expansive

force only when it has penetrated into the great mass of the people and becomes firmly established there; each individual must have become so accustomed to imperialistic ideas that he will no longer be conscious of the imperialistic trend of his actions. Now it is only during the war that Germany has become favorable soil where the imperialist idea could take root and bear fruit." That is indeed true. With the outbreak of the war the *whole* German people succumbed to the suggestions of the war party.

Since that time the German people have been sleeping and dreaming a beautiful dream. They dream of victories and of glory, of the respect with which German heroism and German devotion have inspired the whole world, of the privileged position which Germany will have among the nations, and of peace. They dream and do not, cannot, see the cruel reality. For their masters take pains to prevent an awakening. Every day the papers announce fresh victories. Consequently, the peace of the future will be a victorious peace, the sacrifices will not have been endured in vain. Infinite precautions are taken to keep the truth from the German people in order that they may not awake. The frontier is closed to all information that might disturb the beautiful dream. And in Germany itself nothing is published which could deprive the people of their illusion. Thus it is that the nation as a whole does not yet know by what means it was driven into this conflict. All that took place before the war it has forgotten. The German people are not to blame for this war. They did not desire it, they did not provoke it, they have done nothing but defend themselves and struggle for their existence as a nation. They are not to blame for the outbreak of the war, neither are they

responsible for its continuation. They have been victorious and are ready to make peace. What more does anyone want? That there are people who attribute to Germany the blame for the war and the responsibility for its continuation, that is what they cannot understand. Only the enemies of the German people could do such a thing. The enemies—they are the wicked English and French, Russians, Japanese, and Americans, and unfortunately, many neutrals. In truth, the whole world seems to be conspiring against Germany! She is surrounded by enemies. They are everywhere, except in Germany itself, where they continue to take pains to prevent the people from awakening.

When this awakening does come, what will it show the German people? How will the stern reality appear when the dream has come to an end? That is a bitter thought. Every dream has an end, every sleep its awakening, when at last things appear as they are. Then the German people will see that the rest of the world has a different opinion about the causes and the responsibilities of this war than is represented in German official circles. It will discover that the German armies have often been victorious, but not always; that the other side has had its victories too; that there was a battle of the Marne, the outcome of which destroyed the German plan of campaign; and that one may indeed dream of a German victory, but that one will never see it. They will recognize that, even if Germany is perhaps invincible, she nevertheless must renounce all hope of conquest: an unpleasant discovery for an aggressor, and bound to destroy all dreams of victory. And what will be left of those other dreams of glory, of prestige, and of honor? Has

the German conduct of the war increased the prestige of the German name? Have not rather the methods of frightfulness, employed in order to gain some slight temporary advantage, tarnished the German name for centuries to come? Has not the German General Staff, in agreement with the government, violated the neutrality of Belgium, and on many another occasion trodden under foot the rights of nations? Has not German science declared itself in accord with all these exploits, and thereby deprived itself of the prestige which it enjoyed throughout the world? And has not the German press done its utmost to keep alive the fires of hatred? I speak, of course, of the hatred directed against other nations, innocent of all these things, not of hatred for the real enemy who dwells in Germany, in the very heart of the German people.⁴

The German people will find themselves, then, at the hour of their awakening, facing a world of enemies, and they will have to recognize that instead of honor and glory they have reaped a harvest of hatred and contempt for years to come. Yes, the thought of the awakening of the German people is a terribly bitter one! One cannot help but be profoundly moved, when one thinks of these industrious and capable people and of their enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure, and then imagines their awakening from this dream. No wonder that those responsible for the catastrophe, realizing that their plan has failed and that a German

⁴ One must agree with what Professor Förster writes in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, No. 944: "May the German people soon understand that the worst enemies of a really lasting peace are found in their own midst." I have already written to the same effect in an article in *Wissen und Leben*, of August 15, 1916. The real enemies of Germany are not the French and the English, but the men who have brought the soul of Germany to the condition in which it is today.

victory is no longer to be expected, fear this awakening and try to postpone the day of reckoning. To postpone it, for they will not be able wholly to prevent it. But to postpone it is possible—and then: “*Après nous le déluge!* What must be, must be. Let us take refuge in fatalism.”

But is this policy of temporization still practicable? Have not a part at least of the German people already realized the true state of affairs? Signs are not lacking that the truth is beginning to dawn upon the population of Germany. The attitude of the Labor Union, a socialistic organization, shows that in the world of labor they are beginning to recognize cause and effect. Among the German intellectuals, too, voices are beginning to be heard, which seem to point to a gradual awakening in these circles also. Moreover, there are a small number of Germans—and I do not hesitate to say that they represent the true élite of Germany—who from the very beginning have resisted the machinations of the war party, who have held aloof from the passions of the crowd, who have recognized the truth and have seen the sad condition of their people, and whose hearts have trembled in anguish at the thought of their awakening. All honor to these Germans! They represent whatever hope there is for the future of the German people, whom surely no one would hate if they would recognize their guilt and be converted to reason. Here in Switzerland we have had the good fortune to listen to some of these German voices. The articles of Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe and of Professor Förster in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* show that in spite of the influence of mass suggestion, there still are clear-sighted, upright Germans who recognize the truth and have the courage to speak it.

Thus signs of a gradual awakening are not lacking. A rebirth of the German soul, a transformation of the German mentality are foreshadowed. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to attribute for the present great significance to these portents. I have pointed out the danger of such exaggeration in No. 1161 of the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*. It is only a very small fraction of the German people whose eyes have been opened; the great majority are still fast asleep. To be sure, a great number of Germans desire a new orientation, a democratization of Germany; I shall return to that point presently. But the truth, the fact that the German people have been and still are being led astray, they have not yet recognized. How can they, since the truth is not allowed to penetrate to them? All that one can say at present is that truth is on the march and the dread hour of awakening is approaching, but it has not yet struck.

Besides these symptoms of an approaching awakening of the German people which I have pointed out, there are a number of indirect symptoms that may be interpreted in the same manner. One of the most significant of these, to my mind, is the recent feverish activity of the Pangerman party. No day passes without their holding mass meetings. Enormous sums are spent in subsidizing the press in order to propagate the Pangerman idea throughout Germany. All this indicates that the Pangerman party realize the precarious nature of their domination and seek to arm themselves against the contingency of a popular awakening.

What are the main obstacles to such an awakening? First and foremost, there is the regrettable, but incontestable fact that the present rulers of Germany still

hope not only to postpone but perhaps to prevent altogether the awakening of the German people. They seem not to understand, or rather they will not understand, that at the same time they postpone and prevent peace. Such is nevertheless the case. All the pacific assurances of the German government avail nothing in the face of this fact. If one asks what is the real obstacle to the conclusion of peace today, only one answer is possible: this attitude of the German government and the resulting state of mind of the German people. It is needless to dwell further upon this state of mind: we have seen that the German people is asleep. Its awakening would bring peace, but it is just this awakening which the German leaders fear and which they seek to prevent. Let us then examine the attitude of the German government.

It is possible that Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg⁵ did not invent the slogan of 'shameful aggression', but he was the first to use it. In any case, he was in the eyes of the world the representative of a government which had undertaken to deceive public opinion at home and abroad, by shifting the burden of its guilt upon others. The Chancellor has clung to this legend throughout the war; he has constantly renewed his efforts to deceive public opinion in Germany and also in neutral countries. In a series of articles signed 'Europæus', published in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, the anonymous author called this persistence in error "the moral obstacle to the conclusion of peace." With irreproachable logic he showed that all talk of German readiness for peace is useless, as long as the

⁵ These pages were written before the last crisis in Germany. Since my observations still hold good, I have left the text unaltered and have confined myself to making a few additions which recent events rendered necessary.

Germans persist in attributing the guilt to their opponents and in representing the military situation as if they were already the victors. As long as the Chancellor clings to these fictions, as long as he cannot make up his mind to yield to truth and to give up the moral struggle, just so long there will be no peace conferences. The obstacle to the conclusion of peace is found nowhere else than with the German Chancellor. When one considers all that is at stake—namely, that the war might last for years and might cost millions more of human lives, one would indeed think that such a consideration would bring a conscientious government to a change of tactics. But that which ‘Europæus’ called ‘civil courage’ was lacking. They were not capable of placing the safety and well-being of the German people and of the rest of the world above the interests of a clique.

The events of the last months have amply confirmed the correctness of this judgment. The German offer of peace, which came in December, 1916, again made the assertion that Germany had been attacked, and again sought to give the impression that Germany had been victorious. On that account the reply of the Entente characterized the German offer of peace as ‘insincere’ and made this comment upon the assertions of the German government: “The enemy powers attempt to put the responsibility for the war upon the Allies, and they proclaim the victory of the Central Powers. The Allies cannot accept such a doubly incorrect statement, which makes any attempt at negotiations a failure.” If one puts oneself in the place of the Allies, this answer is by no means incomprehensible. The Entente is asked to conclude with the German government a ‘paper treaty’, upon which the

future of Europe would have to rest. But the essential condition of such a treaty is confidence. Now the German Chancellor, who would be one of the signatories of such a treaty, had not only permitted the violation of Belgium's neutrality and designated the treaty of neutrality as 'a scrap of paper', but at the very moment when he extends the olive branch, he repeats the assertion that Germany was attacked. He assumes the mask of innocence and makes the gesture of a conqueror into the bargain. Is it to be wondered at that the allied governments had no confidence in von Bethmann-Hollweg and refused to negotiate with him?

Truth is the foundation of all confidence. This fact will have to be reckoned with in the future as well as in the past and can be disregarded only by governments which ignore the imponderabilia in politics and therefore underestimate the moral factors in national life, governments that respect force and nothing else. The first requisite for a treaty which shall insure a durable peace is confidence. No chancellor will be able to inspire this confidence in his adversaries as long as he clings to the official German version of the origin of the war,⁶ as long as he proclaims himself the victor and does not make known his war aims. By such an attitude he will prevent not only the awakening of the German people, but also the conclusion of peace.⁷

⁶ Which, by the way, contradicts the German *White Book*.

⁷ In the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, No. 1270, R. Said-Reute remarks that every move of the Chancellor has had the opposite effect from that desired. "Instead of gaining sympathies which would prove much more valuable for the future than any partial military victories, and instead of restoring confidence in the foreign and domestic policies of their governments, the Central Powers, thanks to their complete lack of psychological understanding, have incurred the aversion of the whole world."

This moral judgment passed upon Bethmann-Hollweg outside of Germany is a factor which has unfortunately not been reckoned with sufficiently in Germany itself. Konrad Haussmann, a member of the Reichstag, wrote in the *Berliner Tageblatt* for December 14, 1916: "The confidence in the honesty of the Chancellor is a capital which has quietly accumulated, until now it is beginning to bear interest." That is a capital error. In the eyes of Germany's adversaries the former chancellor was the representative of the system which they wished to combat by fighting Germany, and he could have inspired confidence only if he had acted with perfect frankness. The events have shown that this confidence was lacking not only among his adversaries but also among his own people.

The reasons for the attitude of the Chancellor are not hard to guess. It is clear that he, as well as the other leading men of Germany, was well aware of the real situation. But for that very reason he would not speak openly. For if he had, he would have opened the eyes of the German people and awakened them from their slumber. The German people would then have learned just what their rulers wanted to prevent them from learning. The Chancellor did indeed want peace, but *peace without awakening*. And naturally, for the awakening of the German people might have consequences detrimental to the Chancellor and his government. It was just because the population had trusted so blindly in the formulas given out by the government up to this time, that the government feared the effect of the truth. Proofs are not lacking that this fear has been and still is present in the ruling circles of Germany.

I shall quote only one example here. The Pangermanist paper, the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, wrote in an article entitled 'Overzealous Friends', May 25, 1917: "There is a rumor that the Chancellor does not believe that the future peace will correspond to the expectations of a large part of the people. He is said to fear that the resulting disappointment, together with the unavoidable financial burdens, will cause a profound discontent. It is of the highest importance to protect the crown from the results of such a dissatisfaction. That would be a task beyond the power and the authority of the ruling statesmen who would bear the responsibility of the future peace. Therefore this burden of responsibility must be shifted upon other shoulders. The German people will accept the future peace if it bears part of the responsibility through its chosen representatives, through the great parties. Therefore, without going so far as to accept the parliamentary system, it would be advisable to appoint the leaders of the great parties as secretaries of state and thus make them partly responsible for the imperial policy and for the future peace. In this way the political and economic reconstruction of Germany after the war could be accomplished without seriously compromising the crown, as would otherwise have to be expected."

It goes without saying that the Pangermanist paper from which I have quoted the above passage by no means approves the political doctrine therein expressed: "Hindenburg promises us victory; then why should we bother our heads about the pessimists who have been active ever since the beginning of the war?" But that makes no difference. The above words are of value as showing the prevailing state of mind in

Germany. They show plainly that the awakening has already taken place at least among the leading circles of Germany and their immediate surroundings.⁸ And with the awakening comes the distress of the 'morning after'. They begin to look around for accomplices who shall have to take their part of the punishment when the evil hour comes; for they are afraid of the moment when the German people shall at last call its government to account. They can think of but one way of escape: democracy! Even that must be good for something, like pacifism. If they can only get out of their scrape by means of democracy, all right. Later, some way can be found to get rid of it again. Pacifism has already been tried, unfortunately without result. On November 9, 1916, the Chancellor announced to an astonished world that he was ready to place himself at the head of a league of nations, to punish any disturber of the peace. Think of it! In the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* for November 18, 1916, I urged caution as to these very unexpected pacifist desires of the Chancellor. The events have shown that my skepticism was well founded.

After the failure of pacifism they tried democracy. Everybody spoke of democracy; it was a case of much ado about nothing. Then came the Russian revolution and inspired the leading men of Germany with a wholesome terror. They made a great effort, the result of which was the imperial Easter Message. But nothing came of it. One can read in the German papers how the government itself did all in its power to prevent the realization of its promises. The com-

⁸ According to a letter from Professor Harnack, published in the *Bayerischer Kurier*, Bethmann-Hollweg considers those people most dangerous who still believe in a German victory. The very best that can be expected is a deferred game.

mittee on constitutional reforms which had been appointed anxiously evaded every attempt at genuine democratic reform, and finally adjourned. The fear of the Russian revolution had been dissipated; they realized that there was no danger of a German revolution, so they sent democracy packing.

In order to show in their true light the steps of the German government toward democracy, and to show the irony of history in this war, I must say a few words about the motives which, on their own confession, actuated the members of the war party before the war. I wish to emphasize particularly the fact that I do not refer to mere hypotheses, to information obtained from the press, or from the statements of a third person; I refer to historical facts which can be easily verified. For many years the government had watched with growing anxiety the progress of socialism. War was recommended as the most effective antidote. By means of a victorious war they hoped to restore the socialists to their allegiance to the Hohenzollerns and thus avert the 'democratic peril', that is, to enjoy once more unlimited power. Of all the motives which actuated the war party, this was really the most important, although they naturally did not cry it from the housetops. When one recalls this fact and then reflects that this war has had just the opposite effect from that which its authors had hoped for, that democracy throughout the whole world has made great progress on account of this war and that it has forced even Germany to contemplate a 'new orientation', then one cannot help speaking of the 'irony of history'. This case of irony is surpassed in one instance only—namely, by the conduct of the German socialists led by

Scheidemann, who humbly serve a government which is waging war in order to destroy them.

Remembering these facts, of course it behooves us not to expect too much from the measures that are being discussed in Germany as I am writing. The German government will never voluntarily do anything in the spirit of democracy. Democratic reform is merely the means by which the government seeks to attain its ends in the present crisis.⁹ The only question is, whether public opinion will exert sufficient pressure to insure serious progress. But I doubt it.¹⁰ The

⁹ According to information at hand, the Crown Council is said to have decided not to oppose the principle of parliamentary participation in the government of the Empire and of Prussia. In that case the brilliant plan of the 'friends of the Chancellor' would really be carried out. This is now confirmed by the speech of the new Chancellor, according to which those men will be given positions of responsibility who have not only the necessary personal qualifications but also the full confidence of the great parties in the Reichstag. If there had only been in the Crown Council at least *one* man courageous enough to tell the Kaiser the truth! Then much might have been gained. But who does not remember the meeting of the War Council in Potsdam, in July, 1914? It would be vain to believe that opinion has changed much in these circles. Fear alone can cause a change there, never a sincere conviction.

¹⁰ The reader will perhaps recall Prince Bülow's conversation with Althoff about the political education of the Germans, in which Althoff said: "As a people we excel all others in philosophy, music and lyric poetry. No one surpasses us in courage before the enemy. In science and technique, in commerce and industry we have made enormous progress. Since it is not possible to do and be everything at the same time, Your Excellency ought not to wonder that in politics we are fools." I would not be so impolite as to subscribe to this judgment, although I have always had a certain liking for Althoff in spite of his many faults. But this much is certain, that we must not estimate too highly the political sense of the German citizen nor expect him to throw off easily the yoke of the militarists and the imperialists, and achieve political liberty. Only 'the great awakening' could change all that. Therefore it is hardly reassuring to hear the Germans repeat again and again that they need no outside help to bring about reforms. That is just the question. Without pressure from within, or without, or both, no change will take place in Germany.

excessive modesty of the Reichstag is well known. There is little chance of its changing. In the Zabern case it actually had the temerity to pass a vote of no confidence, but immediately made right about face. And Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg swallowed this vote of no confidence without winking an eyelid; his seat as chancellor was not in the least shaken by it. The members of the Reichstag are too loyal subjects to inflict upon the German government anything that might really savor of democracy.

I would be very glad to find that I had been mistaken in my prophecy. Yet I am confirmed in my skepticism by a notice in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, No. 1266. It says that the Reichstag in plenary session is about to pass by an overwhelming majority a resolution affirming that the war was forced upon Germany, expressly stating that the German people wages only a defensive war and disclaiming any intention of violence toward independent nations.¹¹ This proves conclusively that even the members of the

¹¹ This peace resolution of the Reichstag has since been published. It is a little more cautiously expressed than appeared at first. It reads as follows:

"At the threshold of the fourth year of the war, just as on August 4, 1914, the words of the speech from the throne remain true for the German people: We are not impelled by desire for conquest! Germany took up arms in defense of her liberty, her independence, and the integrity of her territorial possessions. The Reichstag strives for a peace by agreement and for the permanent reconciliation of the nations. Forcible annexation, political, economic or financial oppression are incompatible with such a peace. The Reichstag rejects all plans having for their object economic isolation and international enmity after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace will prepare the way for friendly relations between the nations. The Reichstag will actively further the creation of international organizations of justice. As long as the enemy governments do not agree to such a peace, as long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and oppression, so long will the

Reichstag with democratic tendencies are not yet awake. The purpose of this resolution appears praiseworthy enough—namely, to oppose the annexationists. But annexation is impossible without victory, and as long as this postulate is lacking, the fear of annexations is quite superfluous. These German deputies, then, are fighting against an illusion of which they themselves are also the victims. Besides, the means that they employ are ineffective, for they postpone indefinitely the possibility of peace negotiations. It takes two to conclude peace; but it is clear that the Allies will never accept the German version of a defensive war. For them it is by no means a matter of indifference whether Germany wages an offensive or a defensive war. If Germany is merely defending herself, the German government can say: "You have not been able to conquer us, therefore we are the victors." But if she is the aggressor and cannot beat the others, then the German government cannot rightly claim the victory. The author of the pamphlet signed 'Germanicus' is therefore quite right in calling this the main point at issue. If even the 'future democrats' of Germany cling to this version, peace may yet be a long way off. For it must be clear to every reasonable person that the future destiny of Europe and of the German people cannot possibly be founded upon a lie.

In fact, under the present conditions in Germany, real democratic reforms must not be looked for in the near future. Any such event would have to be pre-

German people stand together as one man and firmly endure and fight until the right to live and develop is assured Germany and her allies. The united German people is indomitable. In this the Reichstag feels itself one with the men who in heroic battle protect the Fatherland. They are assured of the imperishable gratitude of the whole nation."

ceded by a complete change of system,¹² and first of all by a change of chancellor. On this last point I can publish unchanged what I wrote before the ministerial crisis of July, 1917: "As long as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is at the head of affairs, the government will confine itself to half-measures and will yield still further to militarism and Pangermanism, and these are things which are incompatible with a real democracy. Apparent concessions will perhaps be granted, since the demands of the parties in the Reichstag, the speech of Lloyd George declaring that he would more readily enter into peace negotiations with a democratic German government, and also the Austrian emperor's desire for peace have made such concessions appear opportune. But the German government will not take these reforms seriously any more than it did the Easter Message. Serious reform can come in Germany only after a change of system, and the ruling class will agree to a change only when forced to do so. It is not absolutely impossible that such 'pressure' is already making itself felt there. But an actual change of system will not come in Germany *until the German people awakes!* In the meantime, perhaps the most effective of all reforms would be a change of chancellor. A chancellor who would not appear burdened with the former words and deeds of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would presumably inspire more confidence abroad. Now, if ever, the German people needs a man of strong character. That, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has never been. Above all, he was no statesman. Posterity will have

¹² It is unnecessary to point out that the announcement of 'the right of equal suffrage' in Prussia has nothing to do with a change of system. Once again, as was to be expected, the mountain has brought forth a mouse.

for him neither tears nor laurels. He will go down in history as a swaying reed, at a time when the German people needed a firm rock.¹³ His name will be linked with the most disastrous chapter in German history."

I wrote these words just last week. Since then Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has actually resigned, and Herr Michaelis has succeeded him. This calls for a commentary.

The man who has just retired from office is that statesman whom history will consider responsible for the present catastrophe. On this account he might be characterized as the most pitiable of mortals. But pity would really be out of place in this case. Weakness is no excuse for a statesman in view of such a calamity. It is true that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not belong to the war party. He personally did

¹³ Theodor Wolf remarks in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 9, 1917, that the Chancellor could never be accused of too much energy. "Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has been obliged, during the war, to take a decided stand against Pangerman chauvinism, but he has recognized the danger of this widespread epidemic far too late. He wanted to correct the faults of his predecessors, but after a few attempts at improvements he continued them. Always retreating, he yielded inch by inch the power which was his, until very little was left him. He deplored many abuses, yet persevered in them.

. . . Has Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg contributed anything to the realization of domestic reform in Germany, except empty words? Promises, the fulfilment of which he postponed, high-sounding phrases about 'utilizing the men of ability', while he continued to conform to the most venerable traditions in the choice of his collaborators . . . If Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg should leave us, it will be said of him that he often knew the right way but generally took another." In the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 13, 1917, Theodor Wolf demands that the successor of Bethmann must guarantee by his person and by his acts, that that which B. could not carry through, shall now be accomplished without compromise and without delay. "He must not be an instrument in the hands of those who still desire to subjugate the world and who oppose with blind hatred every radical change in the political system of the Empire."

not want war. But from the very beginning his opposition to the activities of the war party was so feeble—for instance his justification of the armament proposal of 1913—that he finally succumbed to them and thereby brought disaster upon the German people. And after he had once yielded to the militarists and the Pangermanists, and had later realized whither this path must lead, he showed himself so weak that the Pangermanists themselves became his bitterest enemies.¹⁴ Thus this 'leader' of German policy finally became a mere weathercock, agreeing to everything and submitting to everything, no matter how much it might conflict with his personal conviction.¹⁵ His weakness is rendered all the more unpardonable by the fact that this statesman evidently did not recognize his own incompetence and therefore felt obliged to cling to his office. Finally he did not dare to express himself openly in any direction, and by this very lack of frankness he became the greatest obstacle to the

¹⁴ The *Kreuzzeitung* wrote with reference to his retirement: "The patriotic circles throughout the land will draw a breath of relief at the dismissal of the man who for eight years has guided the destinies of Prussia and of Germany with a rare amount of incompetence and mischance." No one can contradict this judgment.

¹⁵ Erich Dombrowski writes in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 14, 1917: "Bethmann busied himself with the study of democratic ideas, but his thoughts did not crystallize into deeds, only into words. He contented himself with small payments on account. The Easter Message and the promise of equal suffrage were the last attempts to pacify the spirits of democracy. Schmoller once called him a modern Fabius Cunctator. This word has become more and more true. He did not find the way to action, he overestimated the obstacles, and now he has fallen because his policy of palliation, of postponement and irresolution had brought him up against a blank wall. In politics it is not enough to have good intentions; only results count. And that is just where Bethmann failed the German people." See also the article by Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe in No. 1309 of the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*.

conclusion of peace. The Allies would never have trusted him, any more than his compatriots did: a fact which is surely not without interest to the multitudes who yearn for peace.¹⁶

Bethmann's successor is my former colleague in Tokio, Dr. Michaelis. I doubt whether he is to be congratulated. But the question whether the German people is to be congratulated is more important. I have grave doubts of that too. The fact that Michaelis is conservative has already been emphasized by the press; that, however, is only a matter of course in a Prussian government official. On the other hand, he has always been an energetic personality and has recently given proof of his energy in the capacity of food dictator. But can the energy of one single man, even if he were a genius, suffice to save the present system in Germany? I doubt it, and I doubt it all the more in the case of Michaelis, because the environment from which he comes is hardly such as to enable him to solve the problems with which he will be confronted. He is not capable of saving the present system in Germany, neither is he the man to usher in the new Germany. That he has hardly any notion of foreign politics has already been widely commented upon. As far as domestic affairs is concerned, a man who has no idea what democracy really means and who has only a theoretic conception of the reforms which he is to introduce is hardly qualified to guide the

¹⁶ Lately, this fact seems to have been realized in Germany also, as is shown by the following quotation from the *Germania* of July 12, 1917: "The directing committee of the party, taking into account the opinion that prevails in the party and in other non-socialist circles, believes that the Chancellor is not qualified to take part in the peace negotiations, especially on account of the fact that the declaration of war occurred while he was in office."

German people toward liberty. His first speech in the Reichstag, the text of which I have just received, proves that my doubts whether he is the right man to save Germany and bring peace to the world were indeed well founded.

To be quite frank, I doubt whether the man who is to establish Free Germany has yet been born. The great misfortune of the German people is just this, that at this fateful period of her history it has lacked and still does lack a leader. Where could such a man be found? Among the German democrats? Would His Excellency von Payer, the leader of the former South-German People's Party, be qualified for such a rôle? The ambition to play the clever statesman and thus curry favor with the powers that he has long ago killed the democrat in him. Or perhaps Herr Scheidemann, the handy man of Herr von Bethmann? At present the German socialist majority is just as unfit for this task as any of the bourgeois parties. The German bureaucracy is certainly incapable of producing the creator of a new, free Germany, but alas, so are the German political parties.

It is to be feared, then, that the true leaders of Germany are not yet at hand. They will not appear until after the awakening of the German people. It is to be hoped that then there will appear in Germany the modern type of politician and statesman, the man who is at the same time a good patriot and a man of the world, who combines love of country with international vision, refinement of mind with democratic conviction. Where is this type to be found in present-day Germany? We see in the case of Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe how his compatriots treat representatives of this type. The German people is not yet capable

of recognizing the qualities with which its future leaders must be endowed—because it has not yet awakened.

These are the comments called forth by the events of the last week.¹⁷ In addition let me emphasize once more that a change of person does not necessarily imply a change of system, which is just what the German people is in pressing need of. Oh, that it might soon awaken to real democracy! That, having recognized the truth, it might at last throw off the yoke of the military caste and of Pangermanism and take its destinies into its own hands! And if this change in the system of government is to be accomplished, as it seems, without revolution, that it might at least be followed by a *spiritual* revolution; that the German people, awakened at last, might win a moral victory over itself and not shrink from a confession of its own guilt. Such a moral victory would carry infinitely more weight than all the military victories taken together.¹⁸ That Germany might arrive at this important realization is the wish of all true friends of the German people. Many, who are estranged from the

¹⁷ This and the preceding paragraphs were, of course, written before the crisis in October, 1917, which resulted in the removal of Michaelis and established von Hertling as Chancellor. The delay which would necessarily be incurred in having the author bring this part of his paper up to date would probably offset any advantage which might be gained. At any rate, events since that time make it fairly safe to venture the opinion that Dr. Nippold would not consider his conclusions affected by this change.—EDITOR.

¹⁸ Would a German victory really have been fortunate for the German people? Would not that have meant complete supremacy for those same groups which already in 1914 had gotten the upper hand and which I have described above as the real enemies of the German people? Would not that have meant a Europe permanently armed to the teeth, to say nothing of the moral and other consequences? And would not this war, in the words of the German his-

German people today, are indeed waiting only for this awakening before extending once more the hand of friendship.

I believe I have shown in the preceding pages how much depends upon this awakening, not only for the German people but also for the rest of the world; it will bring us nothing less than peace! That is why we neutrals also have the right to wish those obstacles removed which stand in the way of this awakening. When the peace of Europe is at stake, there ought to be no hesitation. The peoples have a right to demand the truth from their governments. If there is a road to peace, they have the right to demand that this road be taken and that all obstacles be removed. And therefore they have the right to demand, and we neutrals have the right to join in this demand: Away with official representations and lies which stand in the way of peace negotiations!

But not only the conclusion of peace, but also that which is to come afterward depends upon a change in the present German state of mind, upon an awakening of the German people from the hypnotic sleep induced by the suggestions of the war party. It is to be hoped that after the war it will be possible for the nations to resume economic and intellectual intercourse with one another, and to take up once more their former relations, that they will cease to hate each other and instead try to understand each other. In other words, peace must be followed by international conciliation.

torians, have been followed by other 'Punic wars'? It is easy to understand that it is very hard for a good German patriot to realize this. And yet they must realize it, the sooner the better. Let us hope that the German people will soon recognize the road to true happiness!

But such a consummation cannot be thought of until the German state of mind has been completely changed. I believe I may say this without fear of being misunderstood. For before the war I was one of the leaders of the movement having for its object a better understanding between Germany on the one hand and France and England on the other; for years I had struggled against the rising tide of Pangermanism and chauvinism, and even formed an organization to combat them. And in *Wissen und Leben* for August 15, 1916, I expressly stated that my friends and I hope to be able to continue our work after the war. But as things are now, the difficulties in the way of such an undertaking must not be underestimated. One must measure the depth of the chasm of hatred, of distrust and antipathy, before one thinks of bridging it. It is of no use to erect a hollow structure. Just as I consider a premature peace inimical to the future interests of Europe, just so would I refrain from attempting to force a reconciliation between individuals and nations who still distrusted and hated each other, without first trying to understand and to remove the cause of this distrust and hate. And therefore I repeat once more: The possibility of a durable peace and of a future reconciliation between the peoples depends upon the awakening of the German people!

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

- I. An address delivered by President Wilson
at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918
- II. An article written for *The Daily Chronicle*
of London by Professor Gilbert Murray



MAY, 1918
No. 126

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

I

An Address delivered by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918.

FELLOW CITIZENS: This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The Nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men and, if need be, all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means because the Cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who

knows least can now see plainly how the cause of Justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great Nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen, and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it

was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said,—in indefinite and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent,—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done,—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Roumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere

impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy,—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe,—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That programme once carried out, America and all

who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the World, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind!

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with unpitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed,—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow

countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honor and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

II

An Article written for *The Daily Chronicle* of London
by Professor Gilbert Murray.¹

It is a year today since America entered the war. We have seen as yet comparatively little actual effect on the battlefield. America has not yet struck her first blow, but that must not dull our appreciation of the greatest event that has occurred on the side of the Allies since the opening of the war, and one of the greatest in the whole realm of recorded history.

America is a nation, or a continent, built up by refugees, refugees of all creeds and types, and sprung from all the races of Europe, though one type and one race has from the outset predominated, the English non-conforming Puritans. They fled from persecution, civil and religious. They fled from the tyrannies and the intrigues of old Europe, from corruption and class government and militarism, and after three centuries and three great wars for freedom, having established their nationhood and built up the largest and strongest free society in the world, they have returned to strike again at the ripened fruit of the same tyrannies, the same tangle of deep-rooted evil from which they themselves fled when the Mayflower sailed from Plymouth. Their ancestors, who were also our ancestors, fought, to the historian's eye, only another phase of the same battle that we are now fighting. The emphasis, of course, was different in their days.

¹ Reprinted from *The New York Times* of April 7, 1918.

It lay more on religion. Now it lies on international politics, but in the long stretch of time the story is a plain one. It is a return of the Mayflower.

America is fully conscious of this policy and its momentous responsibilities. The first thing the refugees needed was isolation. They were determined that the bad social order from which they had fled should not pursue them across the ocean. No European power should have any finger in the affairs of the two American continents. This principle, embodied in the famous statement of President Monroe, has been for generations the guiding star of American politics, but by this time it has served its purpose. America is strong enough and now she has boldly accepted her position as a great world power to whom no interest affecting the human race can remain indifferent, and whose own peace and national freedom are insecure as long as any great mass of civilized humanity remains war-driven and not free.

The Americans will help our battle in two separate ways. In the first place, in actual physical fighting they have brought to our aid in time of dire necessity inexhaustible resources, immense manufacturing power, and an army not indeed trained before but, like our own new army, multiplied.

People ask questions about the quality and value of the American troops. The best rough answer is to say that they are like the Canadians and Australians. They have the same fine physique, the same independent intelligence, the same dash and endurance. They will not, of course, have the disciplined skill of the German Army, much less that of our own old contemptibles, but there can be little room for doubt that in a year or two, if the war continues so long, the

American army will be the finest, as well as the largest in the world.

The flower of German manhood, like our own, lies under the battlefields of France and Flanders. It is not wise to speak confidently about the future. Many unpleasant things may happen. It is not wise to say even that the present German offensive may not succeed in its full aim, but if we can hold out, if we can still keep a large enough tract of Northern France free for the Americans to land and manoeuvre in, it seems almost a mathematical certainty that ultimately the Germans must lose the war.

It would have been very easy for America to avoid whole-hearted entrance into this war, even after the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare. Germany would have been only too pleased to have peace with her or only a war of limited liability. American ships could have been armed. There could have been arrangements about routes, compromises and agreements, and damages when agreements were broken. It would have been easy. It would have been on the surface, at least, obviously prudent. America would have continued to drive a gigantic trade. She would have been courted by both sides. She would have been left in a position of colossal strength in the world where all the other great powers were weakened and ruined. She could in the end have dictated, so far as her own interests were involved, the terms of peace and have stood out as confessedly the first power in the world.

President Wilson had all this policy laid before him and weighed the arguments for and against it before he deliberately committed his nation to what Mr.

Asquith has described as the most unselfish act in history. Those who long ago escaped into freedom have returned at an enormous sacrifice to fight for the freedom of those left behind.

That is the first help that America brings to us. In the second place, if Germany loses the war and America is a decisive factor in winning it, we may be reasonably certain that the victory will be a real victory for freedom and peace. Americans instinctively believe in these things, in freedom, peace, democracy, arbitration, and international good-will. The average American in the street believes in them as our man in the street believes in cricket and football, or, let us say, in free trade and the Magna Charta. They are not merely the doctrines of idealists or intellectuals, as they are in most of the countries of Europe.

Faith in these principles depends chiefly on security and on the distance that separates you from your probable enemies. America, protected by the Atlantic, believes in them most. Great Britain, protected by the Channel and the North Sea, comes next in faith. The countries which border on Germany are more skeptical than Thomas. They would like to believe, but the difficulties in faith are too great. And last comes the enemy, with his firm conviction that all such faith is a delusion of the devil, that to talk of freedom, humanity, internationalism, arbitration, democracy, disarmament, and the like is merely a wicked attempt to undermine the foundations of the blessed German State.

Yet when the war is over there will be a world to rebuild, and the only principles on which to rebuild it are these principles. Of course men may fail or may refuse to rebuild it at all.

In that case even if Germany is defeated no one will have won the war. The war will be a pure loss, unmitigated ruin. In fine, there are two things beyond all others needed by a nation like ours, caught in the last embittered death struggle of the fight for freedom, of civilization. We need help in the battle, and we need help in the upholding of our true faith, and in both of these matters America answers to our need.

The only necessity is that America shall be true to herself and her great traditions, and on that point I have no fear. We hear of mistakes and delays in material preparations for war, of occasional friction and disappointment in the vast organization. Of course, we do. It is always the one thing that goes wrong that is talked about, the thousands that go smoothly are seldom mentioned. It is just what happened with ourselves, and while America has to some extent the benefit of our experience, she starts from much further back, and she has vaster numbers and magnitudes to grapple with. We had our expeditionary force and our territorial system, and we are an island, not a continent. America has shown her enthusiasm, her disinterestedness, her magnificent power of spring and initiative. She has shown her common sense in spending full time on preparation and not sending her troops into battle unprepared. She has shown it equally in her readiness now, at the moment of need, to let them serve by battalions mixed with the French and English, and not to wait till they have the full dignity of their own divisions and army corps.

Even in diplomacy, where America is comparatively unskilled compared with the great European powers, she has helped us by her straightforward faith and

her good counsel. She has stated our cause better than any one of the Allies. She has answered the enemy's proposals more calmly and more searchingly. She has shown more balance of mind and more sympathetic insight in her attitude towards Russia.

Americans are not angels and not supermen. They are extremely like ourselves, only more so; but they are wonderful Allies in the crisis that threatens us, and should remain hereafter, unless some strange folly supervenes, our closest friends and fellow-workers in the restoration of the wounded world.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

LABOR'S WAR AIMS

- I. Memorandum on War Aims, adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, February 22, 1918.
- II. The Allied Cause is the Cause of Socialist Internationalism: Joint Manifesto of the Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist League.



JUNE, 1918

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)

NEW YORK CITY

MEMORANDUM ON WAR AIMS

ADOPTED BY THE INTER-ALLIED LABOUR AND
SOCIALIST CONFERENCE IN LONDON

FEBRUARY 22, 1918

Reprinted from the London Times, February 25, 1918

THE WAR

I. The Inter-Allied Conference declares that whatever may have been the causes of the outbreak of war it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting peace for the world.

The Conference sees no reason to depart from the following declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations on February 14, 1915:

"This Conference cannot ignore the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society and of the policy of Colonial dependencies and aggressive Imperialism, against which International Socialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every government has its share of responsibility.

"The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the very existence of indepen-

dent nationalities and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In these circumstances a victory for German Imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Russia do not pursue the political and economic crushing of Germany; they are not at war with the peoples of Germany and Austria, but only with the governments of those countries by which they are oppressed. They demand that Belgium shall be liberated and compensated. They desire that the question of Poland shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another state, or in that of complete independence. They wish that throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by force shall receive the right freely to dispose of themselves.

"While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved to accomplish this task of liberation, the Socialists are none the less resolved to resist any attempt to transform this defensive war into a war of conquest, which would only prepare fresh conflicts, create new grievances and subject various peoples more than ever to the double plague of armaments and war.

"Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles of the International, the members of the Conference express the hope that the working classes of all the different countries will before long find themselves united again in their struggle against militarism and capitalist Imperialism. The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, and autonomy of

the nations in the peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the world."

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

II. Whatever may have been the objects for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the Inter-Allied Conference in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy.

Of all the conditions of peace none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war.

Whoever triumphs, the peoples will have lost unless an international system is established which will prevent war. What would it mean to declare the right of peoples to self-determination if this right were left at the mercy of new violations, and was not protected by a super-national authority? That authority can be no other than the League of Nations, in which not only all the present belligerents, but every other independent state, should be pressed to join.

The constitution of such a League of Nations implies the immediate establishment of an International High Court, not only for the settlement of all disputes between states that are of justiciable nature, but also for prompt and effective mediation between states in other issues that vitally interest the power or honour of such states. It is also under the control of the League of Nations that the consultation of peoples for purposes of self-determination must be organized. This popular right can be vindicated only by popular vote. The League of Nations shall establish the procedure of international jurisdiction, fix

the methods which will maintain the freedom and security of the election, restore the political rights of individuals which violence and conquest may have injured, repress any attempt to use pressure or corruption, and prevent any subsequent reprisals. It will be also necessary to form an International Legislature, in which the representatives of every civilized state would have their allotted share and energetically to push forward, step by step, the development of international legislation agreed to by, and definitely binding upon, the several states.

By a solemn agreement all the states and peoples consulted shall pledge themselves to submit every issue between two or more of them for settlement as aforesaid. Refusal to accept arbitration or to submit to the settlement will imply deliberate aggression, and all the nations will necessarily have to make common cause, by using any and every means at their disposal, either economical or military, against any state or states refusing to submit to the arbitration award, or attempting to break the world's covenant of peace.

But the sincere acceptance of the rules and decisions of the super-national authority implies complete democratization in all countries; the removal of all the arbitrary powers who, until now, have assumed the right of choosing between peace and war; the maintenance or creation of legislatures elected by and on behalf of the sovereign right of the people; the suppression of secret diplomacy, to be replaced by the conduct of foreign policy under the control of popular legislatures, and the publication of all treaties, which must never be in contravention of the stipulation of the League of Nations, with the absolute

responsibility of the Government, and more particularly of the foreign minister of each country to its Legislature.

Only such a policy will enforce the frank abandonment of every form of Imperialism. When based on universal democracy, in a world in which effective international guarantees against aggression have been secured, the League of Nations will achieve the complete suppression of force as the means of settling international differences.

The League of Nations, in order to prepare for the concerted abolition of compulsory military service in all countries, must first take steps for the prohibition of fresh armaments on land and sea and for the common limitation of the existing armaments by which all the peoples are burdened; as well as the control of war manufactures and the enforcement of such agreements as may be agreed to thereupon. The states must undertake such manufactures themselves, so as entirely to abolish profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in the war scares and progressive competition in the preparation for war.

The nations, being armed solely for self-defence and for such action as the League of Nations may ask them to take in defence of international right, will be left free, under international control either to create a voluntarily recruited force or to organize the nation for defence without professional armies for long terms of military service.

To give effect to the above principles, the Inter-Allied Conference declares that the rules upon which the League of Nations will be founded must be included in the Treaty of Peace, and will hence-

forward become the basis of the settlement of differences. In that spirit the Conference expresses its agreement with the propositions put forward by President Wilson in his last message:

1. That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case, and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

2. That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game now forever discredited of the balance of power; but that

3. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.

4. That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and, consequently, of the world.

TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

III. The Inter-Allied Conference considers that the proclamation of principles of international law accepted by all nations, and the substitution of a regular procedure for the forceful acts by which states calling themselves sovereign have hitherto adjusted their differences—in short, the establishment of a League of Nations—gives an entirely new aspect to territorial problems.

The old diplomacy and the yearnings after domination by states, or even by peoples, which during the whole of the nineteenth century have taken advantage of and corrupted the aspirations of nationalities, have brought Europe to a condition of anarchy and disorder which have led inevitably to the present catastrophe.

The Conference declares it to be the duty of the Labour and Socialist Movement to suppress without hesitation the Imperialist designs in the various states which have led one Government after another to seek, by the triumph of military force, to acquire either new territories or economic advantage.

The establishment of a system of international law and the guarantees afforded by a League of Nations, ought to remove the last excuse for those strategic protections which nations have hitherto felt bound to require.

It is the supreme principle of the right of each people to determine its own destiny that must now decide what steps should be taken by way of restitution or reparation, and whatever territorial readjustments may be found to be necessary at the close of the present war.

The Conference accordingly emphasizes the importance to the Labour and Socialist Movement of a clear and exact definition of what is meant by the right of each people to determine its own destiny. Neither destiny of race nor identity of language can be regarded as affording more than a presumption in favor of federation or unification. During the nineteenth century, theories of this kind have so often served as a cloak for aggression that the International cannot but seek to prevent any recurrence

of such an evil. Any adjustments of boundaries that become necessary must be based exclusively upon the desire of the people concerned.

It is true that it is impossible for the necessary consultation of the desires of the people concerned to be made in any fixed and invariable way for all the cases in which it is required, and that the problems of nationality and territory are not the same for the inhabitants of all countries. Nevertheless, what is necessary in all cases is that the procedure to be adopted should be decided, not by one of the parties to the dispute, but by the super-national authority.

Upon the basis of the general principles herein formulated the Conference proposes the following solutions of particular problems:

(a) BELGIUM

The Conference emphatically insists that a foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government, under the direction of an International Commission, of the wrong admittedly done to Belgium; payment by that Government for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong; and the restoration of Belgium as an independent sovereign state, leaving to the decision of the Belgian people the determination of their own future policy in all respects.

(b) ALSACE AND LORRAINE

The Conference declares that the problem of Alsace and Lorraine is not one of territorial adjustment, but one of right, and thus an international problem, the solution of which is indispensable if peace is to be either just or lasting.

The Treaty of Frankfort at one and the same time mutilated France and violated the right of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to dispose of their own destinies, a right which they have repeatedly claimed.

The new Treaty of Peace, in recognizing that Germany, by her declaration of war of 1914, has herself broken the Treaty of Frankfort, will make null and void the gains of a brutal conquest and of the violence committed against the people.

France, having secured this recognition, can properly agree to a fresh consultation of the population of Alsace and Lorraine as to its own desires.

The Treaty of Peace will bear the signatures of every nation in the world. It will be guaranteed by the League of Nations. To this League of Nations France is prepared to remit, with the freedom and sincerity of a popular vote, of which the details can be subsequently settled, the organization of such a consultation as shall settle forever, as a matter of right, the future destiny of Alsace and Lorraine, and as shall finally remove from the common life of all Europe a quarrel which has imposed so heavy a burden upon it.

(c) THE BALKANS

The Conference lays down the principle that all the violations and perversions of the rights of the people which have taken place, or are still taking place, in the Balkans must be made the subject of redress or reparation.

Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Albania and all the territories occupied by military force should be evacuated by the hostile forces. Wherever any population of the same race and tongue demands to be united this must be done. Each such people must be accorded full liberty to settle its own destiny, without regard to the Imperialist pretensions of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, or other state.

Accepting this principle, the Conference proposes that the whole problem of the administrative reorganization of the Balkan peoples should be dealt with by a special conference of their representatives or in case of disagreement by an authoritative international commission on the basis of (a) the concession within each independent sovereignty

of local autonomy and security for the development of its particular civilization of every racial minority; (b) the universal guarantee of freedom of religion and political equality for all races; (c) a Customs and Postal Union embracing the whole of the Balkan States with free access for each to its natural seaport; (d) the entry of all the Balkan States into a Federation for the concerted arrangement by mutual agreement among themselves of all matters of common interest.

(d) ITALY

The Conference declares its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian blood and speech who have been left outside the boundaries that have, as a result of the diplomatic agreements of the past, and for strategic reasons, been assigned to the Kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue. It realizes that arrangements may be necessary for securing the legitimate interests of the people of Italy in the adjacent seas, but it condemns the aims of conquest of Italian Imperialism and believes that all legitimate needs can be safeguarded, without precluding a like recognition of the deeds of others or annexation of other people's territories.

Regarding the Italian population dispersed on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, the relations between Italy and the Yugo-Slav populations must be based on principles of equity and conciliation, so as to prevent any cause of future quarrel.

If there are found to be groups of Slavonian race within the newly defined Kingdom of Italy, or groups of Italian race in Slavonian territory, mutual guarantees must be given for the assurance of all of them, on one side or the other, of full liberty of local self-government and of the natural development of their several activities.

(e) POLAND AND THE BALTIC PROVINCES

In accordance with the right of every people to determine its own destinies, Poland must be reconstituted in unity and independence with free access to the sea.

The Conference declares further, that any annexation by Germany, whether open or disguised, of Livonia, Courland or Lithuania would be a flagrant and wholly inadmissible violation of international law.

(f) THE JEWS AND PALESTINE

The Conference demands for the Jews in all countries the same elementary rights of freedom of religion, education, residence and trade and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. It further expresses the opinion that Palestine should be set free from the hard and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion.

(g) THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE

The Conference condemns the handing back to the systematically cruel domination of the Turkish Government any subject people. Thus, whatever may be proposed with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia, they cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his Pashas.

The Conference condemns the Imperialist aims of Governments and capitalists who would make of these and other territories now dominated by the Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or militarism. If the peoples of these territories do not feel themselves able to settle their own destinies, the Conference insists that, conformably with the policy of "no annexations," they should be placed for administration in the hands of a Commission acting under the Super-National Authority or League of Nations. It is further suggested that the peace of the world requires that the Dardanelles should be permanently and effectively neutralized and opened like all the main lines of marine communication, under the control of the League of Nations, freely to all nations, without hindrance or customs duties.

(h) AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The Conference does not propose as a war aim dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or its deprivation of economic access to the sea. On the other hand, the Conference cannot admit that the claims to independence made by the Czechoslovaks and the Yugo-Slavs must be regarded merely as questions for internal decision. National independence ought to be accorded, according to rules to be laid down by the League of Nations, to such peoples as demand it, and these communities ought to have the opportunity of determining their own groupings and federations according to their affinities and interests. If they think fit they are free to substitute a free federation of Danubian states for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(i) THE COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES

The International has always condemned the colonial policy of capitalist Governments. Without ceasing to condemn it, the Inter-Allied Conference nevertheless recognizes the existence of a state of things which it is obliged to take into account.

The Conference considers that the treaty of peace ought to secure to the natives in all colonies and dependencies effective protection against the excesses of capitalist colonialism. The Conference demands the concession of administrative autonomy for all groups of people that attain a certain degree of civilization, and for all the others a progressive participation in local government.

The Conference is of opinion that the return of the colonies to those who possessed them before the war, or the exchanges or compensations which might be effected, ought not to be an obstacle to the making of peace.

Those colonies that have been taken by conquest from any belligerent must be made the subject of special consideration at the Peace Conference, as to which the communities in their neighbourhood will be entitled to take part.

But the clause in the treaty of peace on this point must secure economic equality in such territories for the peoples of all nations, and thereby guarantee that none are shut out from legitimate access to raw materials; prevented from disposing of their own products, or deprived of their proper share of economic development.

As regards more especially the colonies of all the belligerents in Tropical Africa, from sea to sea, including the whole of the region north of the Zambesi and south of the Sahara, the Conference condemns any imperialist idea which would make these countries the booty of one or several nations, exploit them for the profit of the capitalist, or use them for the promotion of the militarist aims of the governments.

With respect to these colonies the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, established by international agreement under the League of Nations and maintained by its guarantee, which, whilst respecting national sovereignty, would be alike inspired by broad conceptions of economic freedom and concerned to safeguard the rights of the natives under the best conditions possible for them, and in particular:

(1) It would take account in each locality of the wishes of the people, expressed in the form which is possible for them.

(2) The interests of the native tribes as regards the ownership of the soil would be maintained.

(3) The whole of the revenues would be devoted to the well-being and development of the colonies themselves.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

IV. The Inter-Allied Conference declares against all the projects now being prepared by Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an economic war, after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations, as such an economic war, if begun by any country, would inevi-

tably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defence be driven. The main lines of marine communication should be open without hindrance to vessels of all nations under the protection of the League of Nations. The Conference realizes that all attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the working class see in the alliance between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal Protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace. On the other hand, the right of each nation to the defence of its own economic interests, and in face of the world-shortage hereinafter mentioned, to the conservation for its own people of a sufficiency of its own supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, cannot be denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Labour and Socialist Parties of all countries, the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the Government toward commercial enterprise, along with the necessary control of supplies for its own people, on the principle of the open door, and without hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But it urges equally the importance, not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development, by appropriate Government action, of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, a maximum eight-hour day, the prevention of "sweating" and unhealthy

trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression, and the prohibition of night work by women and children.

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

V. To make the world safe for democracy involves much more than the prevention of war, either military or economic. It will be a device of the capitalist interests to pretend that the Treaty of Peace need concern itself only with the cessation of the struggles of the armed forces and with any necessary territorial readjustments. The Inter-Allied Conference insists that in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships, and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries, in proportion, not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs; and that, within each country, the Government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities, in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market mainly to the richer classes in proportion to their means, but, systematically, to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community on the principle of "no cake for anyone until all have bread."

Moreover, it cannot but be anticipated that, in all countries, the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition makers and workers in war trades, and the

demobilization of millions of soldiers—in the face of the scarcity of industrial capital, the shortage of raw materials, and the insecurity of commercial enterprise—will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several Governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment more or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the Conference holds that it is the duty of every Government to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unemployed, when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. It therefore urges upon the Labour Parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their Governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads, railways and waterways, the erection of schools, and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings and the reclamation and afforestation of land) that will be required in the near future, not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed, but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level year by year, and throughout each year, the aggregate demand for labour; and thus prevent there being any unemployed. It is now known that in this way it is quite possible for any Government to prevent, if it chooses, the occurrence of any widespread or

prolonged involuntary unemployment; which if it is now in any country allowed to occur, is as much the result of Government neglect as is any epidemic disease.

RESTORATION OF THE DEVASTATED AREAS AND REPARATION OF WRONGDOING

VI. The Inter-Allied Conference holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries immediately peace is declared will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communication whatever destroyed by war operations; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage earners and peasants themselves in homes and employment; and that to ensure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so far as the cost is contributed by any international fund, should be made under the direction of an International Commission.

The Conference will not be satisfied unless there is a full and free judicial investigation into the accusations made on all sides that particular Governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence and theft against individual victims, for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of war. It draws attention in particular to the loss of life and property of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including women and children) resulting from this inhuman and ruthless conduct. It should be part of the conditions

of peace that there should be forthwith set up a Court of Claims and Accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or Government to answer the complaint, pronounce judgment, and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or Government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong, or to their dependents. The several Governments must be responsible, financially and otherwise, for the presentation of the cases of their respective nationals to such a Court of Claims and Accusations, and for the payment of the compensation awarded.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

VII. The Inter-Allied Conference is of opinion that an International Conference of Labour and Socialist organizations, held under proper conditions, would at this stage render useful service to world democracy by assisting to remove misunderstandings, as well as the obstacles which stand in the way of world peace.

Awaiting the resumption of the normal activities of the International Socialist Bureau, we consider that an International Conference, held during the period of hostilities, should be organized by a committee whose impartiality cannot be questioned. It should be held in a neutral country, under such conditions as would inspire confidence; and the Conference should be fully representative of all the Labour and Socialist movement in all the belligerent countries accepting the conditions under which the Conference is convoked.

As an essential condition to an International Conference, the Commission is of opinion that the or-

ganizers of the Conference should satisfy themselves that all the organizations to be represented put in precise form, by a public declaration, their peace terms in conformity with the principles "no annexations or punitive indemnities, and the right of all peoples to self-determination," and that they are working with all their power to obtain from their Governments the necessary guarantees to apply those principles honestly and unreservedly to all questions to be dealt with at any official peace conference.

In view of the vital differences between the Allied countries and the Central Powers, the Commission is of opinion that it is highly advisable that the Conference should be used to provide an opportunity for the delegates from the respective countries now in a state of war to make a full and frank statement of their present position and future intentions, and to endeavour by mutual agreement to arrange a programme of action for a speedy and democratic peace.

The Conference is of opinion that the working classes, having made such sacrifices during the war, are entitled to take part in securing a democratic world peace, and that M. Albert Thomas (France), M. Emile Vandervelde (Belgium), and Mr. Arthur Henderson (Great Britain) be appointed as a Commission to secure from all the governments a promise that at least one representative of Labour and Socialism will be included in the official representation at any Government Conference, and to organize a Labour and Socialist representation to sit concurrently with the official Conference; further, that no country be entitled to more than four representatives at such conference.

The Conference regrets the absence of representatives of American Labour and Socialism from the Inter-Allied Conference, and urges the importance of securing their approval of the decisions reached. With this object in view, the Conference agrees that a deputation, consisting of one representative from France, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain, together with Camille Huysmans (Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau), proceed to the United States at once, in order to confer with representatives of the American democracy on the whole situation of the war.

The Conference resolves to transmit to the Socialists of the Central Empires and of the nations allied with them the memorandum in which the Conference has defined the conditions of peace, conformably with the principles of Socialist and international justice. The Conference is convinced that these conditions will commend themselves on reflection to the mind of every Socialist, and the Conference asks for the answer of the Socialists of the Central Empires, in the hope that these will join without delay in a joint effort of the International, which has now become more than ever the best and the most certain instrument of democracy and peace.

THE ALLIED CAUSE IS THE CAUSE OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM

*Joint Manifesto of the Social Democratic League of America
and the Jewish Socialist League**

I

On the first anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the world war, those sections of the American Socialist movement which have given their loyal and whole-hearted support to their government and to the Allied cause address their comrades in all lands, and state their position with greater detail and precision than they have heretofore attempted.

Nearly four years have elapsed since the outbreak of the most cruel and bloody war in all human history. For forty-four months the world has been strained and torn by the great struggle between the ideals and aspirations of modern democracy and the ideals

*EDITOR'S NOTE. The absence of representatives of American Labor and Socialism at the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference raises the question of the degree to which the labor elements in this country support the war aims adopted by the Conference. The significance of their absence was recognized by the Conference, which, in its memorandum, "urged the importance of securing their approval of the decisions reached." Moreover, a statement made recently in the Berlin *Vorwärts* to the effect that American Labor and Socialism is not supporting the war makes it extremely desirable to give prominence to the following article. The joint manifesto of the Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist League expressly endorses the peace terms defined in the memorandum, which it recognizes to be practically identical with the war aims of President Wilson. It was prepared by John Spargo, Chairman and J. G. Phelps Stokes, Secretary of the Social Democratic League; and William Edlin, Chairman and Henry L. Slobodin, Secretary, of the Jewish Socialist League.

and aspirations of mediæval autocracy. All the genius and technical equipment of the twentieth century have been drawn upon by both sides of the conflict; whole provinces have been devastated; nations have been destroyed and millions of lives have been sacrificed. To the destructive work of war the nations have given treasure and toil, which, had it been otherwise used, would have freed them from the curse of involuntary poverty and its myriad attendant evils.

We declare it to be the first duty of all Socialists everywhere—a duty implicit in our internationalist faith—to find the causes of this war and to place the responsibility for its occurrence where it justly belongs. We cannot evade the challenge and be loyal to Socialist internationalism. With our comrades of the Socialist party of France, we declare that we cannot accept the hypocritical statement that all the governments of the belligerent nations are equally responsible for the war. That formula, like the declaration of the American Socialist party that the war was not caused “by the policy or institutions of any single nation,” is a stupid and fatuous contradiction of history and an affront to the intelligence.

Nor can we stultify ourselves by offering as an explanation of the war the silly hypothesis that it came as the logical and inevitable result of the capitalist system. The facts do not support this theory. We are not unmindful that capitalism tends to the development of national commercial rivalries, which provoke hatred and thus sow seeds of war. Nevertheless, remembering this fact, we insist that the outbreak of the present war in 1914 was not due to the capitalist system, but to the madness of dynastic imperialism.

We assert that the statement that the war "was caused by the conflict of capitalist interests in the European countries," with which statement the Socialist Party of this country has attempted to justify its reactionary position, is absurdly untrue. It had long been realized by the leaders of international commerce and finance that war must be unprofitable to the capitalist classes of all nations, those of the victorious nations as well as those of the defeated. The capitalist classes of all lands were, as a whole, as much opposed to war, and as earnest in their efforts for peace, as were the workers. They had no interests which could be better served by war than by peace. They knew that war must mean for them heavy burdens of taxation, risking of the loss of profitable markets and the perils of social revolution. Certain sections of the capitalist class in each country doubtless desired war; but nowhere were these in a position to dominate the capitalist class as a whole or the government. Even in Germany, as reference to the newspapers of the time will prove, there was just as much opposition to the idea of war among the capitalists as there was among the proletariat. Obliquity to the plain record of history is not a Socialist virtue!

We assert that the war was caused by the imperialist vision of the Hohenzollern dynasty, using the worm-eaten Hapsburg dynasty as its wretched tool. This is the verdict likewise of the Socialists of all lands. Thus declared the Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium, France and Russia, at the conference of the Socialist and Labor Parties of the allied nations on February 14, 1915. The United Socialist party of France so declared in its reply to the Dutch and Scandinavian comrades in connection with the abortive German-

inspired Stockholm Conference last year. The Italian Socialist party, in its memorable rebuke to the German Socialist "comrades" who sought to corrupt them, squarely placed the responsibility for war upon the Austrian and German Empires—"the rampart of European reaction." It is well known that on the very eve of the actual outbreak of hostilities, *Vorwärts*, the leading organ of the German Social Democratic party, took the same view. Finally, the Proclamation issued by the German Social Democratic party, on the 25th of July, 1914, plainly declared that the war fury was unchained by Austrian imperialism, and that its demands upon Serbia, "more brutal than have ever been put to an independent state in the world's history," were "intended deliberately to provoke war."

There is abundant evidence, freely accessible to all mankind, that the German Emperor and his satellites had long cherished the imperial vision of a vast empire stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, and dominating the whole world. The real reason for the brutal ultimatum to Serbia, and the summary rejection of the conciliatory policy of the government of Serbia by Austria-Hungary, was the fact that a free and independent Serbia was necessarily an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of that dynastic vision.

The strengthening of a free and independent Serbia has long been regarded by internationalists as a necessary condition for the development of European democracy. Every growth of Serbian power and independence of necessity increased the influence of western European democracy and culture in southeastern Europe, and brought the leaven of that influence to the gates of the three great autocracies—Austria-

Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. As far back as the middle of the last century the great leaders of European democracy—among them Karl Marx—recognized that fundamental fact.

The Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 greatly strengthened the power and influence of Serbia among the Balkan nations, and to that extent menaced the *mittel-europa* dream of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Serbia's territory was extended as was her prestige among the Balkan peoples, and thus strengthened she blocked the road from Berlin to Bagdad. So far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, Serbia's ascendancy in the Balkans had another meaning; it inspired the seven and a half millions of South Slavs in that artificial "ramshackle Empire" to new struggles for liberation from the thralldom they so bitterly hated. It was, therefore, a menace to the Empire. It was to the interest of the Hapsburg dynasty to humble Serbia and break her power at the first opportunity. And because it was to its interests to remove Serbia from its pathway to world-empire, the Hohenzollern dynasty used the Hapsburg fears for its own purposes and incited the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary.

These are the historic political factors which explain the readiness with which Austria-Hungary seized upon the assassination at Serajevo in June, 1914, as an excuse for presenting its brutal ultimatum. That the object of this ultimatum was to provoke war, there can be no question. The testimony of the German White Book on this point is conclusive. From the same source we learn that the German Imperial Government forced its vassal, the Government of

Austria-Hungary, to reject the reply of Serbia, which was a noble bid for peace.

The demands made upon Serbia were intended to be rejected. Austria-Hungary, instigated by Germany, wanted war. If Serbia had abjectly conceded every demand made upon her, Austria-Hungary would still have made war against her because German imperial plans required it. As it was, Serbia conceded all the demands made upon her save two, and these she did not reject; but proposed, as an alternative, that they be submitted to an international court of arbitration. Humility could not go farther without reaching the abject surrender of craven cowardice. Serbia took her stand upon the basis of civilization and morality. Her foes took their stand upon the basis of barbarism and brute force.

As a matter of historical justice it may be well to remind ourselves that the assassination at Serajevo was an incident in the revolution of the South Slavs against Austrian oppression. Until the outbreak of the great war there was no doubt among the Socialists of the world as to where our sympathies lay in that revolution. If we withheld our support from the Serbs and Croats in Austria-Hungary in their threats of revolution, it was only because we feared that a revolution to establish the political independence of Serbs, Croats, and other South Slavs would lead to a European war. Certainly, we had no sympathy for Austria-Hungary. Certainly, also, once the war issue had been raised by Austria-Hungary there could be no question that the sympathies of all sincere Socialists must be with the Serbs. Their national aspirations might not justify plunging the civilized world into war, but once war became inevitable the

whole logic of our Socialist position compelled us to take the side of the Serbs and to hope for the realization of their national aspirations. A victory by Austria-Hungary would be a calamity.

The Central Empires deliberately provoked the war for the furtherance of their own selfish purposes. The admitted facts are capable of no other interpretation for which sincerity and intelligence can be claimed. The triumph of these imperialistic powers would mean disaster to the whole of Europe, and, indeed, the entire civilized world. We agree with our comrades of the Italian Socialist Party that such a result of the war would necessarily mean "the triumph of military absolutism in its most brutal expression." We agree also with the declaration of the Conference of the Socialist and Labor parties of the Allied nations that "a victory for German imperialism would be the defeat and destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe."

From the first beginnings of Socialist internationalism the Central Empires have been its special and particular enemies. Even more than the brutal and corrupt Romanoffs have we feared the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. As soon as the war clouds gathered over Europe following the tragedy of Serajevo it became evident that the Central Empires were bent upon the destruction of the internationalism already achieved and incorporated into the political life of the world.

Germany, acting as the ally of Austria-Hungary, her vassal and tool, did not hurl her legions against Serbia, nor even against Serbia's ally, Russia. With wanton and brutal disregard of the laws and conventions which she herself had helped to make, she threw

her forces against a small and weak friendly nation, which was no party to the quarrel, which had no belligerent purpose or intentions, and which desired only to be left alone to live in peace as a neutral.

The invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg by the German armies, and the savage barbarism with which the heroic defenders of Belgian neutrality and independence were crushed, rank among the greatest crimes of history. For these crimes, which menaced the whole fabric of internationalism, no one worthy of being called a Socialist can find palliation or excuse. If the power responsible for the crimes should triumph, the cause of Socialist internationalism would be crushed to earth.

II

The conduct of the Socialist parties of Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot be passed over in silence. We must demand that at the first general International Socialist Congress which is convened that conduct be exposed and fittingly condemned. By their support of their governments the Socialist parties of the Central Empires became the co-partners of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, accessories to their infamous crimes against mankind. They betrayed the cause of international Socialism, betrayed all the small nations to the despotism of the arrogant sword-rattling autocracies, and constituted themselves part of the most brutal, reactionary and lawless imperialism in modern history. Such men cannot rightly hold any place in the Socialist International.

The part played by the German Social Democracy cannot be described as other than infamous. The only Germans worthy to bear the name of Socialists

are the members of the small but courageous minority represented by such comrades as Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and George Ledebour. For the majority, led by such men as Scheidemann, Sudekum, David, Legien, and others, no condemnation can be too severe. This majority has been the willing and servile tool of the government, and the accomplice of the assassins of Potsdam.

Its leaders have even stooped so low as to play the despicable part of bribing and corrupting agents of their government. The attempt to buy the support of the Italian Socialists, indignantly exposed and condemned by the Italian comrades, is one example of the depth to which they have descended. The despicable role of "Comrade Helfand," internationally famous under his pseudonym, "Parvus," is likewise well known. German imperial autocracy found its most unscrupulous agents among the trusted leaders of German Social Democracy!

Even more sinister than such conduct as we have referred to has been the part which the German Socialists have played as propagandists of anti-militarism. For years they have urged upon the Socialists of other lands, particularly of England, France and Russia, the duty of vigorously opposing militarism and military preparedness. Never have they seriously asserted themselves against these things in Germany, however. On the eve of the outbreak of the war when the issue of war or peace hung in the balance, the German party sent Herr Muller, of the *Partie-Vorstand* at the head of a delegation to the French Socialist parliamentary group to beg the French comrades to vote against all military appropriations, or

at least absent themselves and thus manifest their opposition to their government.

The French Socialists—be it said to their eternal honor—readily pledged themselves not to vote any war credits until the French Government should provide them with absolutely satisfactory proof of its sincere efforts to maintain peace and prevent war. They undertook not to vote for any appropriation for offensive war of any kind. They made it quite clear to Muller and his associates, and to Comrade Huysmans, secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, who accompanied the delegation, that they would not withhold their support from their Government if France were attacked by Germany and invaded. In that case they would fight. The French comrades thus took their stand upon the established and cherished principles of Socialist internationalism.

Muller and his colleagues could not meet satisfactorily the demand of the French comrades for a similar pledge on behalf of the German Social Democrats. In vain did the French comrades urge that the German Social Democrats were in honor bound to give reciprocal assurances. It was evident then, before the declaration of war, that the German Social Democrats would support their Government, even in a war of aggression and invasion. Already they were assisting their military masters by using the Socialist movement and its idealism to divide France, weaken her morale and so prepare the way for her defeat. They did not hesitate to prostitute the Socialist organization of Germany by making it an adjunct to the German military machine.

It is well known that when Jaures returned to Paris from the extraordinary meeting of the Inter-

national Socialist Bureau, held at Brussels on the 29th of July, 1914, he was heartbroken because of his failure to obtain from the German leaders a satisfactory pledge that they would refuse to support their Government in the event of its making an aggressive war on Belgium or France. He realized then that his heroic efforts for peace, his wonderful campaigns against military preparedness, had served only too well the cause of Prussian militarism—thanks to the treachery of the German “comrades.”

In every country the German Socialist propagandists have gone, insidiously serving military absolutism. Their intrigues in Switzerland, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries have been notorious. They have undermined the new Socialist Republic of Russia, delivering it as a prize to their Kaiser. Long before the war started they were engaged in this nefarious work; there is little reason to doubt that the visit of Scheidemann to this country the year before the war began had for its real object an “understanding” with prominent members of the Socialist Party on the subject of the attitude to be taken by the party in the event of a war in which Germany would be engaged. The German Crown Prince, General von Hindenburg and Admiral von Tirpitz have as much right to participate in the congresses of the Socialist International as have such “Socialists” as Scheidemann, Sudekum, and David.

In all the cynical and brutal literature of Prussian imperialism there is nothing more shameful than the speech by David in the Reichstag, soon after the war began, in which he stated the function of the Socialists. He said:

"Germany must squeeze her enemies with a pair of pincers, namely, the military pincer and the pacifist pincer. The German armies must continue to fight vigorously *whilst the German Socialists encourage and stimulate pacifism among Germany's enemies.*"

For such "Socialists" we have only an inexpressible contempt and loathing.

III

That disregard of international law and morality which characterized Germany's conduct in beginning the war has continued throughout. Each month has made increasingly manifest her determination to destroy every vestige of internationalism other than the brutal internationalism of imperialism. Armed with the science and technical efficiency of the twentieth century, Germany's moral attitude has been that of the fourteenth century. Every restriction which the will and conscience of civilized mankind had imposed upon the makers of war, she has repudiated and assailed. "Be as terrible as Attila's Huns," was the command of the German Emperor to his Chinese Expeditionary Forces in 1900; in this war Germany has been guilty of brutality to which even Attila never descended. We do not refer to the barbarous acts of individuals, the inevitable products of war madness, but to the systematic organized "frightfulness" deliberately planned by the German general staff.

German forces on sea and land have made war upon non-combatants as savagely as upon combatants. The peaceful peasant following the plow has been attacked exactly as the armed soldier is attacked. The fisherman in his little trawler, peacefully pursuing his

vocation has been attacked by Germany's naval forces and treated as though he were a combatant. Non-combatants, even women and children, passengers on neutral ships, have been subject to the perils of destruction which humanity and international law have long restricted to the armed forces of belligerents. The inhabitants of unfortified cities have been slaughtered and denied the rights of evacuation and surrender long respected by civilized nations. The mother nursing her baby has been denied the immunity from attack which the conscience of civilized mankind provided. In a word, Prussianism has waged war against internationalism in all its essential forms.

The United States of America was forced into the war by Germany's wanton assaults. We did not want war. The Government and the people of this Republic strove to remain outside the conflict long after the real aim of Germany's rulers was manifest, and even after the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* made it apparent to all the world that Germany would not permit us to remain neutral and free. She demanded that we depart from the usages and laws of nations, and, by refusing to permit the Entente Allies to purchase arms and ammunition from our manufacturers, become in fact her ally and make her victory certain.

When our Government refused to commit this infamous crime against internationalism, Germany, without the formality of declaring war upon our nation, in fact made war upon it. Our ships were sunk at sea without warning, and our citizens—civilians pursuing their lawful and peaceful business—were foully murdered on the high seas by German naval forces. Our land was filled with spies and plotters; industrial

plants were wrecked and the lives of many working people were destroyed. Even while professing friendship for this nation, and pretending to be desirous of peace, Germany was in fact waging war against us in the same brutal, barbarous and lawless manner as she had from the beginning made war against her avowed and acknowledged enemies.

Many of us, while realizing that the triumph of the Central Empires would be a great blow to the cause of international Socialism, struggled, nevertheless, to keep this nation from entering the war. We believed that by refusing to be drawn into the conflict the Government of the United States could render a great service to the cause of peace. When, however, the repeated acts of aggression by Germany caused our Congress to recognize that a state of war existed between this republic and the German Empire, we could not fail to support our Government for precisely the same reasons as the Socialists of Belgium and France supported their Governments. To have done otherwise would have been a betrayal of our Socialist faith.

With entire confidence we assert that the action of the United States Congress in authorizing war against Germany was a great service to the cause of human liberty. No nobler statement of democratic ideals can be found in all our international Socialist literature than the great address of the President of the United States on April 2, 1917. Historic justice demands that Socialists of the entire world acknowledge that President Wilson has been a better spokesman of Internationalism than the Socialist International itself. Never in all human history has a man occupying a position of equal eminence and

influence so bravely and eloquently championed the cause of democracy, the rights of oppressed nationalities and the ideals of Internationalism. We rejoice that this fact has been so fully recognized by our comrades of other lands, notably by the recent Conference of the Socialist and Labor Parties of the Allied Nations. This is in striking contrast to the characterization of President Wilson by the official organ of the Socialist Party of America, as "that maniac in the White House." For us, as American Socialists, there is no other means of serving the cause of Internationalism than supporting with all our moral and material might the splendid efforts of the President of the United States. To our comrades of other lands we send the assurance that the exalted idealism of President Wilson is shared by the entire nation.

The Socialist Party of the United States cannot justly claim to speak for American Socialists generally. It represents only the sectarian and sterile dogmatism, corrupted and dominated by all that Prussianism represents. It has, from the beginning of the great world war, sometimes openly and more often covertly condoned and defended the betrayal of Internationalism by the German Social Democracy. With a degree of uniformity as significant as it is remarkable, it has upheld the contentions of the German Imperial Government in the long controversy with the Government of the United States, it has accepted every miserable evasion and excuse of the German Socialist majority, and has been silent concerning the outrages committed by the German barbarians. Whatever their intent, the responsible spokesmen of the So-

cialist Party of America have been in fact the allies of German militarism and autocracy.

Because of these things many thousands of sincere Socialists have been compelled to withdraw from the party and to establish new organizations. They cannot and will not acknowledge the Socialist Party as representing their views, their ideals, and their faith. Therefore it is that the organizations we represent and other Socialist bodies in this country must claim, and must in justice receive, a place in the Socialist International and the right to oppose in the Socialist International the reactionary and stupid policies of the American Socialist Party.

IV

We believe that the Socialists of the Allied Nations are under moral obligations to strive with united energy for such a peace as will insure the safety of mankind from future aggressions on the part of the Central Empires or other despotic powers. We approve the peace terms contained in the program adopted by the Inter-Allied Socialist and Labor Conferences. That program, as its authors have pointed out, is substantially identical with that outlined by the President of the United States in his address to Congress on January 8, 1918. We hold it to be self-evident that the Labor and Socialist organizations of the Allied Nations are in logic and morale bound to give their whole-hearted support to any and all governments adopting these war aims. For so in America loyalty to the Socialist cause requires us to give our whole-hearted support to President Wilson and to our Government. Our first duty is to win the war. There can be no peace until the Prussian mil-

itary system has been definitely and completely defeated.

In his great address President Wilson said

What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program, and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind; but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will reduce to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safe-guarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories accorded free and secure access to

the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.*

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right, we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the Governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does re-

* NOTE. Karl Marx advocated in 1853 in the New York Tribune a federation of the Slavonic and Hellenic nationalities of the Balkans into one State as a solution of the Balkan problem. This plan should be given serious consideration.

move. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

There is one important part of the war aims which requires a clearer elucidation—the self-determination of nationalities. The Inter-Allied program states: “Any adjustment of boundaries that becomes necessary must be based *exclusively* upon the desire of the people concerned,” meaning, apparently, the people within these boundaries. There is another principle of international justice which should be given recognition. A people occupying the narrow strip of a coast bordering on a great sea which serves as an outlet for a continent cannot claim exclusive sovereignty over the coastal territory. A people occupying a territory of great natural resources cannot claim jurisdiction over them to the exclusion of the rest of mankind. Whether in relations within a state or international relations, all rights of groups or even

of nations must be held in harmony with the rights of mankind. It will devolve on the Labor and Socialist International to advance and maintain this principle as a doctrine of International Law—that the original and ultimate title to all natural wealth and resources, no matter where situated, is a right in which all mankind equally share.

There is another important phase in the self-determination of nationalities which should be given recognition in the interests of permanent peace. It is not in the interest of democracy and peace, not in the interest of progress of mankind, to see the large states broken up into a great number of smaller states. The endless multiplication of boundaries and frontiers with the resultant cultivation of local prejudices and the spirit of exclusion, is against every idea of internationalism. Merely because a certain small nationality clamors for a Chinese Wall round the territory which it inhabits is no reason why the much greater interests of mankind, including the true interest of the nationality in question, should not be considered. Should we recognize the claims of Esthonia, Livonia and Lithuania, altogether numbering five million people, to exclusive sovereignty over the territory of the Baltic coast of what was heretofore Russia and thereby deprive a nation of one hundred and fifty million people from access to the sea? Indeed, the principle of freedom of the seas should be supplemented by the no less important principle of freedom of access to the sea. This is another principle of International Law which the Labor and Socialist International should vigorously urge and defend.

When closely examined, it will be found that the principle of self-determination will apply in its full meaning to states, natural or historical. Applied to nationalities or territories within the state, the principle of self-determination would mean a relation to the state somewhat similar to the relation of the American States to the Federal Government.

Though unutterable wrongs suffered by the Armenian race will never be repaid, the atrocities and cruelties inflicted on this unfortunate people will forever remain a heavy weight on the conscience of mankind; that such wrongs should have been perpetrated by the connivance of a civilized nation makes indeed all the boasts of our civilization seem sham and empty. The Labor-Socialist International should leave nothing undone or unmoved to atone at least partially for the wrongs inflicted on the Armenians. Armenia should be placed under International protectorate, independent of Turkey. Effective measures should be taken to secure to the Armenian people within the territory of Armenia safety from interference by the Turks and other fanatical peoples.

A similar protectorate should be extended over Palestine, which should be formed into a free state, securing an opportunity to those of the Jewish people that desire to do so to work, in coöperation with the other inhabitants, for the restoration of Palestine as a Jewish home land. And the Jews in all countries should, for all time, be guaranteed equal rights with all other citizens in all matters of individual and social life.

V

For reasons already set forth, we cannot approve of any conference with representatives of the German

or Austrian Socialist organizations until the end of the war. We whole-heartedly approve of the action of the executive council of the American Federation of Labor in this particular. The German and Austrian Socialists are such in name only. They are not our comrades. They are traitors to our cause. When the war is ended and Kaiserism overthrown, there must be a frank judgment of the German and Austrian Socialist movements by the International. Judged by its conduct during the war, and especially by its base betrayal of the Russian Revolution, the German Social Democracy must be branded as an enemy of the working class of the world, including the working class of Germany. We are compelled to judge it by its deeds and not by its declarations. Indeed, the German Social Democracy was a full and active partner of the Hohenzollerns and the junkers in all their crimes against mankind. This applies with full force to the Austrian Social Democracy also, except that the oppressed non-German nationalities of Austria are free from guilt. Neither the German nor the Austrian Socialist parties should be admitted to a Socialist International until they have emancipated themselves and given satisfactory evidence of loyalty to Socialist internationalism. By admitting them earlier and giving them countenance the International would become a sharer in their treason.

We believe that there should be a constant interchange of opinion by the Socialists of the Allied Nations through conferences and otherwise; but not with those who have betrayed our common cause. We believe that there should be consistent energetic action for the furtherance of our Socialist aims in our respective countries as far as that can be done without

impairing our military efficiency. We send our fraternal salutations to our comrades in all the Allied Nations and to the faithful battling minority comrades in the enemy countries and pledge ourselves that we will not withhold from the Allied cause any service or sacrifice that may be required of us as our part of the price of human freedom.

April 6, 1918.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894.

THE DISCLOSURES FROM GERMANY

- I. The Lichnowsky Memorandum
- II. The Reply of Herr von Jagow



JUNE, 1918

No. 127

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

INTRODUCTION

The Lichnowskys are a family of Upper Burgundian origin, a branch of the house of Granson. They have held estates both in Austrian and in Prussian Silesia since the 17th century. In the *Almanach de Gotha* for 1849 they were described as "possessing" one town and forty-five villages with 21,620 inhabitants. The title of prince was first conferred by the King of Prussia toward the close of the 18th century. Early in the 19th century the Lichnowskys became princes in Austria also.

I

Karl Maximilian, sixth Prince Lichnowsky, was born in 1860. He served for a time in the Prussian army, in which he holds the rank of major, and then entered the diplomatic service. In 1885 he was attached to the German embassy in London; later he held diplomatic positions in Constantinople, in Bucharest, and in Vienna. During the latter part of his residence at Vienna he was first secretary of the embassy. Transferred in 1899 to the Berlin Foreign Office, he served there, as he tells us in his memorandum, for several years (1899-1904). After eight years of retirement from the diplomatic service, he was sent to London in 1912 as German ambassador.

As his memorandum shows, Prince Lichnowsky is in many respects a diplomat of the older school. He is not of that oldest school, described as men sent abroad to lie for their country's good, for he is obvi-

ously a truthful man; nor is he of the Frederician school, cynically described by the Great Frederick himself as spies, for he is clearly an honorable gentleman. He tells us, in fact, that he had no espionage fund. That fund was expended in England by other agents, with whom he had no relations. The Prince is old-school in his belief that the relations between states, and even the great issues of peace and of war, are mainly determined by the relations established between their diplomatic representatives and the persons who play leading rôles, in society as well as in politics, in the countries to which the representatives are accredited. He is, on the other hand, a modern diplomat in his recognition of the importance of keeping in touch with the leading men in commerce, industry, and finance, and of influencing general opinion, at least so far as this can be done by public speeches reported in the daily press.

In his general view of German foreign policy, Lichnowsky is distinctly of the Bismarckian school. He declares indeed that Bismarck made a mistake in allying Germany with Austria and with Italy; but, given the situation created by those alliances, the policy which Lichnowsky steadily advocated and still defends is that which Bismarck consistently followed in the later years of his chancellorship and insistently recommended, after his retirement from office, in public speeches, in the press and in his posthumous memoirs. Germany's duty to Austria-Hungary, according to Bismarck, was limited to defending the integrity of the Dual Empire. Germany had not undertaken and should not undertake to support Austrian schemes of expansion in the Near East, for Germany had no interests in the Balkans.

In all collisions of interests and of ambitions between Austria and Italy, Germany's rôle was that of the disinterested friend, and therefore of a possible umpire. Similarly, in all collisions of interests and ambitions between either of its allies and Russia, Germany was impartial. So only could Germany maintain its traditional friendship with Russia, which seemed to Bismarck, as to Lichnowsky, of the highest importance.

Bismarckian again is Lichnowsky's conviction, clearly implied although not definitely stated, that the German Empire should have been satisfied with the position it held in Europe before the present war. He also believed, with Bismarck, that Germany's colonial expansion should be limited to such gains as could be secured without war, particularly without conflict with Great Britain. His chief efforts, during his two years in London, were directed to this end, and were attended by a degree of success which he does not overstate.

In his acceptance of these Bismarckian traditions, Lichnowsky was, at least from the point of view of Berlin, distinctly old-school. Ever since the retirement of Prince Bismarck there had been a growing conviction at Berlin that Germany had interests not only in the Balkans but also in Asia, and that these interests were to be realized by putting the whole force of the German Empire behind the wedge that Austria was driving into the Balkans and by acquiring for Germany a dominant influence in Constantinople and thus throughout the Turkish Empire. That this would mean war with Russia was fully understood, but such a war was not feared. The "Slav peril," so far as Germany was concerned, was

a bugbear that might advantageously be employed in domestic politics, but it was not taken seriously by the German General Staff or by the German Foreign Office.

In his belief that Germany should regard its position in Europe and in the world as substantially satisfactory, Lichnowsky was again, from the point of view of Berlin, hopelessly old-school. He was not in touch with the Pan-German movement. He did not understand that Germany must obtain an absolutely dominant position in Europe, in order later to oust Great Britain from its leading position in the world.

Given this complete antithesis between Lichnowsky's antiquated views and the "new course" which the German imperial authorities had followed since 1890, the Prince may well wonder why, in 1912, he was exhumed from his Silesian estates and sent to London. Quite characteristically he seeks the explanation in his personal relations with the Emperor, the chancellor, and the foreign secretary; and quite frankly he tells us that he cannot find it there. An explanation, however, does not seem difficult. Pending the outbreak of the long planned war for German hegemony on the continent, it was desirable that British suspicions of Germany's intentions should be quieted. When the war should come, it would be highly desirable that Great Britain should not intervene, at least not at the outset. British intervention, it was thought, would come more rapidly if Great Britain were already in a state of acute suspicion, less rapidly, and probably too late to be of value to France or to Russia, if Great Britain were taken by surprise. For this reason it was obviously politic

that Germany should be represented in London by an ambassador who was not aware of Germany's real purposes, who was peacefully minded and friendly to Great Britain, and whose efforts to concentrate British attention on colonial negotiations and a *rap-prochement* between the Triple Alliance and the Entente Powers might be successful precisely because they were sincere. It was to secure these advantages that the Prince was, as he complains, kept uninformed of the most important matters. In the meantime, as has been intimated both in France and in England by persons familiar with German diplomacy and its methods, the Berlin government had in Great Britain agents who were in sympathy with its real designs and who were kept fully informed of all relevant facts and events. These agents controlled the spy system and discharged all the obscure and devious duties which could not be entrusted to a diplomat of Lichnowsky's rank, traditions, and character. It has been suggested that the representative of Germany's real policy was Herr von Kühlmann, then chief counselor of the London embassy, and now (1918) imperial foreign secretary.* If this were the case, von Kühlmann was clever enough to play his part without exciting any suspicion in the mind of his chief; for Lichnowsky speaks of him always with the highest appreciation.

II

The chief value of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum lies in the fact that he rejects and helps to disprove every plea in justification of Germany's conduct that has been advanced since the outbreak of the World War by Germany's official apologists. His

* *Journal des Débats, édition hebdomadaire*, March 29, 1918.

testimony is of especial value in refuting the German assertion that, for a long period before the war, France, Russia, and Great Britain had been united in efforts to check German commercial expansion and to deny to Germany, a newcomer among the Great Powers, its just share in the exploitation of the world's undeveloped resources. By their intrigues Germany was hemmed in or, as the Germans put it, "encircled." In this conspiracy of encirclement Great Britain, as the nation most seriously menaced in its economic interests by German competition, was the arch-conspirator. For its selfish purposes it supported the French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine and the Russian desire to gain access to the Mediterranean—desires described as French lust for revenge and Russian lust for conquest.

We see today that the encirclement theory was one of the most valued drugs in Berlin's political medicine closet. It was at once an anodyne, by which the German people were made to bear more quietly the growing burden of armaments, and a stimulant adapted to fire them with a sense of wrong and a conviction that by war alone could they obtain satisfaction. Germany's encirclement could also be represented, and was represented, as a prelude to aggressive action by the encircling Powers. Failing to stifle German competition by diplomatic wiles, these Powers would sooner or later seek to crush Germany in war. Thus the German people were prepared to look upon a European war either as necessary, in order to gain a free field for their industry and trade, or as inevitable for the defense of the Fatherland. And, since these different notions were simultaneously presented to them, and were not disassociated

in their minds, the German people were adroitly prepared to regard an aggressive war, whenever it should please Berlin to start it, either as a "preventive" war—that is, a war to anticipate attack—or as a war of defense.

When war should come, the encirclement plea could of course be used, as in fact it was used, to influence neutral opinion. The theory was primarily constructed, however, for domestic use.

Lichnowsky attacks the encirclement theory on two sides. He asserts, in the first place, and adduces new evidence to prove, that the *rapprochement* between Great Britain and France and, later, between Great Britain and Russia was no offensive conspiracy, but a defensive *entente*. The provocative policy pursued by Germany during the years preceding the World War had awakened general distrust of Germany's intentions. It was this distrust, more than anything else, that brought Great Britain into closer touch with France and with Russia. Germany was not isolated by the wiles of its neighbors; it isolated itself by its own conduct.*

* In his preface to an edition of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum printed in Zurich, the Swiss Professor Nippold puts this point very clearly and very neatly: "Public opinion is regarded in Germany as a thing that is made from above; and since the press and the people consciously or unconsciously accept this situation as a matter of course, it is precisely those views which are regarded as desirable by the powers that be that are dominant in Germany in all questions of foreign policy. Under these circumstances it was of course not difficult to divert the attention of the German public from the mistakes which its own statesmen had made in the last decades. This of course was most easily done by rolling off these mistakes upon others. Thus the self-*ex*circlement of Germany, for which German policy was responsible, was artfully converted into an *encirclement* (so wurde aus der Selbstauskreisung Deutschlands die eine Schuld der deutschen Politik war, künstlich eine Einkreisung gemacht)."

Lichnowsky shows, in the second place—and here his testimony is of the greatest value because of the position he held in London during the two years immediately preceding the war—that English jealousy of Germany's commercial and industrial development had come to be outweighed, in the minds of English manufacturers and merchants, by their recognition that Germany had become England's best customer. He testifies that Sir Edward Grey's policy, supported by the English premier, did not aim to exclude Germany from competition in the world's markets or even to arrest Germany's colonial development. On the contrary, Grey was anxious to adjust all disputes between Great Britain and Germany in the field of world politics, as he had previously adjusted all such disputes between Great Britain and France and, later, between Great Britain and Russia. He was ready to accord to Germany spheres of economic influence and of eventual political control in those parts of the world in which the competition of the Great Powers was keenest. Not only was he willing to meet Germany half way, but he was even disposed to accord to Germany, notably as regards the Congo, opportunities and expectancies which, to the German ambassador's surprise, Berlin hesitated to grasp.

The African and the Bagdad treaties which Lichnowsky negotiated gave substantial advantages, as he points out, to German commerce, industry, and finance. They also gave the German Empire important colonial expectations. Why were these treaties not welcomed in Berlin? Why was the Bagdad treaty not concluded? Why was the African treaty accepted only after long delay, and only on the eve of war, when its ratification was no longer possible? Lichnowsky's explana-

tion, that his rivals in German governmental circles grudged him successes so conspicuous, is equally characteristic and unconvincing.

The chief point in controversy, he tells us, was (at least as regards the African treaty) that of publication. Sir Edward Grey insisted that the treaty should be published; Berlin insisted that it should be kept secret. The most plausible argument for secrecy advanced by Berlin, namely, that the partition of the Portuguese colonies into spheres of influence and of pre-emption would so offend Portuguese feeling that German *entrepreneurs* would be unable to obtain concessions, is rightly characterized by Lichnowsky as a pretext. England, as he points out, held Portugal in the hollow of its hand. He might have added that, under the circumstances, any Portuguese resentment would probably direct itself primarily against Great Britain, and that, if Great Britain could take the risk, Germany surely could. Even more absurd (although von Jagow still endorses it) is the pretext that, if the German people had learned that Great Britain was conceding rights of pre-emption in the colonies of Portugal, there would have been an outcry against British "perfidy" which would have embarrassed the German government and (as von Jagow now suggests) would have vitiated the "good atmosphere" which the Berlin Foreign Office desired to create in Anglo-German relations. It is, however, not easy to believe that in the Germany of the 20th century there would have been a general ethical revolt against any British action that was advantageous to Germany.

The probable explanation—the probable reason why Berlin was willing to ratify the treaty but unwilling

to publish it—was that its publication would have shaken, and might even have destroyed, the fiction of encirclement. If the German people had been permitted, in 1913 or in 1914, to read treaties by which Great Britain accorded to Germany the economic control of Mesopotamia and of important parts of Africa, the belief in Germany's encirclement which the German government had created, and which it needed for the coming war, would have been seriously undermined.

Von Jagow's reply to Lichnowsky shows that the opposition on which the African and Bagdad treaties were wrecked was neither made nor supported in the Berlin Foreign Office. The Berlin foreign secretary also desired a *rapprochement* with Great Britain and favored the ratification of the Grey-Lichnowsky treaties. This leaves but one possible conclusion. The opposition was higher up, in the militarist-Junker *entourage* of the Emperor. That in these circles there could be little enthusiasm for arrangements which would primarily subserve the interests of German commerce is quite intelligible. For decades the Junkers had witnessed with growing distaste and apprehension the rapidly increasing wealth of the middle classes. This new wealth was lessening the relative power and the prestige of their own order. Least of all were they disposed to welcome arrangements which would further enrich German merchants, manufacturers, and bankers, if these arrangements tended to avert or even to postpone war; for it was to war they looked to re-establish their threatened prestige and to assure their dominant influence in Prussia and in the Empire.

When Lichnowsky reviews the fateful events of July, 1914, he rejects with the same candor the construction which his government has given to these events and which the German people have, for the most part, blindly accepted.

For the official German theory that Serbia had inflicted upon Austria's honor a stain that could be washed out only by blood, he substitutes the statement that Serbia had to be "massacred" because it stood in the way of Austria's ambitions.

The official German statement that Russian mobilization was an act of war he dismisses with contempt. He does not attempt to disprove it, because it is a purely military theory that has never had the least recognition in the diplomatic world. He reminds us only that the Czar had pledged his word that no Russian soldier should march so long as negotiations continued.*

Against the theory formally advanced by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech of December 2, 1914, before the Reichstag, that Great Britain was responsible for the war because it assured France, and therefore Russia also, of unconditional support against Germany—a theory fully disproved by the documents—Lichnowsky insists upon Grey's earnest desire and persistent efforts to prevent the outbreak of a European war. He expresses his own conviction that Grey's proposed conference with the German, Italian, and French ambassadors in London, for the purpose of devising an adjustment of the issue raised

* Telegram of the Czar to King George August 1, 1914: "I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued." *Collected Diplomatic Documents* (London, 1915), part ix, no. 2, page 537.

between Austria and Russia, would undoubtedly have averted the war, had Germany wished to avert it.

To justify Germany's refusal to take part in such a conference, von Jagow now argues that "Italy was Serbophil and, with its Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria." Has Herr von Jagow forgotten that, when he first heard of the proposed conference, he told the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, that he was "disposed to join in," and that it was only when he was instructed, from above, that the conference would be "a court of arbitration," that he changed his attitude? If the conference were to have been a court, Germany might properly have challenged Italy's participation on the ground now first suggested by von Jagow. In fact, however, it was not proposed that the conference should attempt to decide anything; it was simply to suggest a settlement; and Bethmann-Hollweg's deliberate misconstruction of Grey's proposal was simply a link in the chain of lies with which Berlin dragged Europe into war. Von Jagow's record is so much better than that of his superiors that it is painful to find him still countenancing a misrepresentation for which he was not primarily responsible.

On the more important question of Great Britain's alleged responsibility for the war, von Jagow supports Lichnowsky's view. Britain did not contrive the war; "on the contrary," von Jagow writes, "I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us."

Perhaps the most valuable feature of Lichnowsky's memorandum for the future historian, certainly its most interesting feature for us today, is his characterization of Sir Edward Grey. After two years' close

association, Lichnowsky was assuredly in a position to form a just estimate of the man as well as of the statesman. Not only is he thoroughly convinced of Grey's love of peace, he is also profoundly impressed by Grey's complete honesty and unmistakable sincerity. Seldom, if ever, in the history of the world has a diplomat of one nation paid such a tribute to a colleague of another nation as Lichnowsky pays to Grey. Never has such a tribute been paid at a moment when the two nations concerned were locked in a desperate struggle.

In the light of subsequent events, many Englishmen have found that Grey was too peaceful. They have criticized him for his readiness to make concessions to a rival power which, as we now see, was unlikely to be satisfied with any concessions, because its appetite was insatiable. Grey has also been criticized because in his negotiations with predatory Balkan principalities, after the outbreak of the war, he was too scrupulous to be successful. There remains, however, to his credit one achievement that far outweighs any errors or failures, an achievement that was due to his love of peace, his honesty, and his scrupulous honor. He carried Great Britain into the greatest of all its wars with spotlessly clean hands.

III

The value of such evidence as Prince Lichnowsky gives us depends of course not alone on the witness's knowledge of men and of events, but also on his personal characteristics.

It would be an exaggeration to describe the Prince as a subtle man or even as a very acute man. He is possessed, however, of good sound understanding.

His description of the public men with whom he came in contact in England shows discernment. His analysis of the relations between society and government in England, as England was before this war, is substantially correct. His truthfulness is apparently beyond question; he is too much of a grand seigneur to say anything that he does not believe.

His chief foible is that to which the grand seigneur is most liable, an exaggerated sense of his own importance. It is because he is so self-centered that he is inclined to ascribe to the envy of rivals all opposition to his policies. This illusion finds an extreme expression in his belief that one reason, at least, why the authorities in Berlin clung to a policy that must lead to war was their disinclination to give to him and to Grey the credit of keeping the peace.

It is on this weakest point that the German press, taking its cue as always from the German government, dwells with especial insistence. It should be noted, however, that Lichnowsky's vanity appears to mislead him only in the explanation of facts. It does not anywhere appear that it has led him to misstate the facts themselves. He is very proud of his African and Bagdad treaties, but his summary of their provisions is confirmed by other testimony. In general, so far as his assertions can be controlled by other evidence—and most of them can—that evidence is confirmatory.

If we accept the statement which Lichnowsky made to the imperial chancellor, in his letter of March 15, 1918, that he wrote his memorandum "with regard to the future" and for the sake of "noting the details of my experiences and impressions before they van-

ished from my memory"—that is, that he wrote for his family archives and for history—the trustworthiness of the document is enhanced. There is, apparently, no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement. The Prince had, indeed, urgent motives to desire that the living world as well as the future historian should appreciate his diplomatic activity. Even a more modest and more judicious man might well have found it unendurable to be made, as Lichnowsky was made from the moment Great Britain entered the war, the chief scapegoat for the disastrous results of a policy which he had consistently opposed. Even such a man would probably have defended himself with equal energy and frankness in private conversation with his friends. Such a man, however, would hardly have put his defense into writing, much less have put several typewritten copies into circulation, as Lichnowsky did, while the war was still raging. A less self-centered and more judicious man would have seen clearly that a document of such interest, thus made current, could hardly be kept secret; and he would not have characterized as "unprecedented" the breach of confidence through which it became public. That Lichnowsky foresaw such an outcome and was not unwilling that his defense should be published, provided this happened without his sanction, is conceivable indeed but highly improbable. Such a hypothesis is improbable, not only because so underhand a way of attaining an object would have been repugnant to a man of his rank and character, but also because the inconveniences which even an unauthorized publication would draw upon the writer would have been fully realized.

IV

Lichnowsky's memorandum was written in the summer of 1916. According to German statements which have reached neutral and allied countries, and which, in spite of minor variations, are in the main accordant, a copy of the memorandum was lent by Privy Councillor Witting, a brother-in-law of Maximilian Harden, to Captain von Beerfelde, who was employed in the political section of the General Staff. Von Beerfelde is described as an idealist and a pacifist. A man who was neither might well desire, in the interest of Germany itself, an early conclusion of peace. Such a man might well have thought, as Captain von Beerfelde is said to have thought, that one great obstacle to peace was the conviction prevailing in Germany that Great Britain was responsible for the war, and might well have believed that the publication of Lichnowsky's memorandum would tend to remove this misconception and lessen the resulting hatred. Since the publication of the memorandum a similar view has been expressed by Captain Persius, military expert of the Berlin *Tageblatt*, who is apparently neither an idealist nor a pacifist. Captain von Beerfelde, without the authorization of Prince Lichnowsky, had a number of copies made and sent them to some of his friends and acquaintances. Early in February, 1918, the New Fatherland Alliance (a society formed in the autumn of 1914, which is neither socialist nor pacifist but is opposed to autocracy and has protested eloquently against annexations) had 2,000 copies printed in South Germany and sent to Berlin, where they were seized by the police. Such a seizure, of course, is seldom complete: there are usually copies, or at least proof sheets,

which the police do not find. About the middle of March, 1918, a portion of the memorandum appeared at Stockholm in *Politiken*, the leading organ of the Swedish socialists. Publication of further instalments was temporarily arrested by the Swedish government; but on March 21, 1918, the complete text of the memorandum was published in the Berlin *Börsen-Courier*. After this, the German government ceased to oppose further publication in Germany. Efforts were still made, however, to prevent printed copies from passing the frontier, and not until May was any copy of the German text available in this country.

Captain von Beerfelde was placed under arrest and, according to the Bernese *Freie Zeitung*, which usually is well informed, he has been confined in an insane asylum. No such measures have been taken against the author of the memorandum. At a meeting of the main committee of the Reichstag, on March 16, Vice-Chancellor von Payer read to the deputies Lichnowsky's letter of explanation, already cited, and stated that as the Prince had been guilty of imprudence only and had resigned his diplomatic rank, no further steps would be taken against him. Since that time many German writers have demanded that he be placed on trial and be sent either to prison or to a sanatorium; and a movement was started in the Prussian Upper House to expel him from membership in that body. The most vehement demands for Lichnowsky's punishment very naturally came from leading militarists and annexationists who knew that his statements were substantially true. The imperial and Prussian governments, however, evidently wish to leave the matter where von Payer left it. Under

governmental suggestion the German press has almost unanimously treated the memorandum as unimportant. Not only is the Prince described as a discredited diplomat, but his narrative and his conclusions are alleged to be so colored by his extreme vanity as to be valueless.

As far as the German people are concerned, this view seems to be generally accepted. Upon some intelligent German readers the memorandum has undoubtedly made a strong impression; but most of these were already fully aware that the official explanations of the causes of the war were false. The effect of the memorandum was doubtless sensibly lessened by the absorbing anxiety with which all Germans were following their great offensive movement on the western front. This, it will be remembered, was started at the very moment when the memorandum began to circulate freely in Germany.

In a Germany sobered by defeat, the Lichnowsky memorandum, with the Mühlen letters and many other pieces of evidence that demonstrate the guilt of Berlin, will doubtless attract increasing attention, and it may be anticipated that the truth will slowly filter into the German mind, as it seems already to be filtering into the minds of many Americans of German descent who have heretofore accepted the German official legends. In the social-political struggles that will follow the conclusion of peace, all this mass of evidence will be re-examined, if only because it will be valuable campaign material.

Among the peoples of the allied countries and among neutrals the importance of the memorandum was promptly appreciated. Its revelations did not surprise them nor change their views, for they had

long known the truth. Nearly all intelligent Americans had understood the events of July, 1914, before the end of that year, as soon as the evidence then accessible was laid before them. We and our allies, however, welcome every new piece of corroborative testimony, and we rightly attach the highest importance to evidence that comes from Germany itself. Especial value attaches, of course, to the testimony given by men of political standing, like Lichnowsky, or of prominence in the industrial world, like Mühlton. From a lawyer's point of view, perhaps the greatest importance is to be attached to the admissions of the chief witness called by the German government for its defense, its former foreign secretary, von Jagow.

The German text that follows is that published in the Berlin *Börsen-Courier*, March 21, 1918, with no changes except corrections of typographical errors. Every such change is indicated. For control of the accuracy of the Berlin text, the editor has had at his disposal a text published in Germany in pamphlet form and reproduced in photographic facsimile in London, and a text published in Zurich, also in pamphlet form. These three texts are identical, except for typographical errors. As no one of the errors occurs in all three texts, it has been easy, with the aid of an excellent French translation published in the Paris *Journal des Débats*, to establish in every case the correct reading. The French translation, which is faithful as well as felicitous, is of value for this purpose, because it is based on a fourth German text, published in the *Münchener Post*.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
June, 1918

MUNROE SMITH

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., on June 26, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917.

MEINE LONDONER MISSION

1912-1914

VON

FÜRST LICHNOWSKY

ehemaliger deutscher Botschafter in England¹

Meine Berufung

Im September 1912 starb Baron Marschall, der nur wenige Monate auf dem Londoner Posten gewesen war. Seine Ernennung, die wohl hauptsächlich wegen seines Alters und der nach London gerichteten Wünsche seines jüngeren Beamten erfolgte, gehörte² zu den vielen Missgriffen unserer Politik.

Trotz eindrucksvoller Persönlichkeit und grossem Ansehen zu alt und zu müde, um sich noch in die ihm völlig fremde angelsächsische Welt einzuleben, war er mehr Beamter und Jurist als Diplomat und Staatsmann. Er war sofort eifrig bestrebt, die Engländer von der Harmlosigkeit unserer Flotte zu überzeugen, wodurch natürlich nur der gegenteilige Eindruck erstarkte.

Zu meiner grossen Überraschung wurde mir im Oktober der Posten angeboten. Ich hatte mich nach mehrjähriger Tätigkeit als Personalreferent auf das Land zurückgezogen, da auch ein geeigneter Posten nicht zu meiner Verfügung war, und die Zeit zwischen

¹ *Börsen-Courier* heading reads: "Die Aufzeichnungen des Fürsten Lichnowsky: Die vollständige Denkschrift."

² B.-C. has "gehören."

MY LONDON MISSION

1912-1914

By

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY

Former German Ambassador in England

My Nomination

Baron Marschall, who had held his post in London for a few months only, died in September, 1912. His appointment, which was due, probably, mainly to his age and the desire of a younger subordinate to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made in our foreign policy.

In spite of his impressive personality and great reputation, he was too old and too tired to adapt himself to the Anglo-Saxon world, with which he was wholly unfamiliar. He was rather an official and lawyer than a diplomat and statesman. He made prompt and earnest efforts to convince the English of the harmless character of our fleet—efforts which naturally had no result except to strengthen the opposite impression.

To my great surprise the post was offered me in October. After several years' service in draughting despatches [in the Foreign Office], I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me; and I spent my time between flax and beets, or on horseback in the fields, reading much also, and occasionally publishing political articles.

Flachs und Rüben und auf Pferden und Wiesen verbracht, dabei auch manches gelesen und gelegentlich politische Aufsätze veröffentlicht.

So waren acht Jahre vergangen und dreizehn, seitdem ich Wien als Gesandter verliess. Meine letzte politische Wirksamkeit war eigentlich dort gewesen, da man damals im Amte zu keiner Betätigung³ gelangen konnte, ohne nach den Weisungen eines Mannes, der an Wahnvorstellungen litt, schrullenhafte Erlasse mit krausen Instruktionen zu verfassen.

Auf wen eigentlich meine Berufung nach London zurückzuführen war, weiss ich nicht. Auf S. M. allein keinesfalls, denn ich gehörte nicht zu seinen Intimen, wenn er mir auch stets mit Wohlwollen begegnete. Aus Erfahrung weiss ich auch, dass seine Kandidaten meist mit Erfolg bekämpft werden. Herr von Kiderlen wollte eigentlich Herrn von Stumm nach London schicken! Er begegnete mir sofort mit unverkennbarem Übelwollen und suchte mich durch Unhöflichkeit einzuschüchtern. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg brachte mir damals freundschaftliche Gesinnungen entgegen und hatte mich kurz vorher in Grätz besucht. So glaube ich, dass man sich auf mich einigte, weil kein anderer Kandidat augenblicklich zur Verfügung stand. Wäre nicht Baron Marschall unerwartet gestorben, so wäre ich damals ebensowenig hervorgeholt worden, wie in den vielen vergangenen Jahren.

Marokkopolitik

Der Augenblick war zweifellos günstig für einen neuen Versuch, um mit England auf besseren Fuss zu gelangen. Unsere rätselhafte Marokkopolitik hatte wiederholt das Vertrauen in unsere friedlichen Gesin-

³ B.-C.: "Bestätigung."

Thus eight years passed—thirteen since I had left Vienna with the title of envoy. That was my last really political employment, for in the [Foreign] Office there was at that time no chance to do anything, unless one drew up crotchety orders with crabbed instructions, in accordance with the directions of a man who was subject to insane delusions.¹

To whom my appointment in London was really due, I do not know. Certainly not to His Majesty alone, for I was not one of his intimate associates, although he always gave me a cordial reception. I know, too, by experience that in most instances his candidates were successfully opposed. Herr von Kiderlen's real desire was to send Herr von Stumm to London! He met me at once with unmistakable ill-will, and tried to intimidate me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at that time on friendly terms with me; he had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am therefore inclined to think that they settled on me because, at the moment, no other candidate was available. Had Baron Marschall not died unexpectedly, I should have been left where I had lain for many years, on the shelf.

The Morocco Question

The moment was undoubtedly favorable for a new effort to establish better relations with England. Our enigmatic policy in Morocco² had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful intentions; it had at least

¹ See Appendix, note i.

² *Ibid.*, note vii.

nungen erschüttert, zum mindesten aber den Verdacht erregt, dass wir nicht recht wussten, was wir wollten, oder dass wir beabsichtigten, Europa in Atem zu erhalten und die Franzosen gelegentlich zu demütigen. Ein österreichischer Kollege, der lange in Paris war, sagte mir: „Wenn die Franzosen anfangen, die Revanche zu vergessen, dann habt Ihr sie regelmässig durch kräftige Tritte dran erinnert.“

Nachdem wir die Versuche des Herrn Delcassé, sich mit uns über Marokko zu verständigen, zurückgewiesen und vorher feierlich erklärt hatten, keine politischen Interessen dort zu besitzen—eine Haltung, die wohl den Überlieferungen der Bismarckschen Politik entsprach—entdeckten wir plötzlich in Abdul Asis einen zweiten Krüger. Auch ihm verhiessen wir, wie den Buren, den Schutz des mächtigen deutschen Reiches mit demselben Aufwand und dem gleichen Erfolge. Denn beide Kundgebungen endeten, wie sie enden mussten: mit dem Rückzug, falls wir nicht entschlossen waren, schon damals den Weltkrieg zu führen. Daran vermochte auch der traurige Kongress in Algieras nichts zu ändern, noch weniger der Sturz des Herrn Delcassé.

Unsere Haltung förderte die russisch-japanische und später die russisch-britische Annäherung. Gegenüber der deutschen Gefahr—*“the German peril”*—traten alle anderen Gegensätze in den Hintergrund. Die Möglichkeit eines neuen deutsch-französischen Krieges war augenfällig geworden, und ein solcher konnte, anders wie anno 70, weder Russland noch England unberührt lassen.

Die Wertlosigkeit des Dreibundes hatte sich bereits in Algieras gezeigt, die der dortigen Vereinbarungen aber bald danach durch den Zusammenbruch des

aroused the suspicion that we did not quite know what we wanted or that our purpose was to keep Europe on edge and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who had been long in Paris, said to me: "If the French begin to forget *la revanche*, you regularly remind them of it by a good hard kick or two."

After we had repelled M. Delcassé's efforts to come to an understanding with us regarding Morocco and, before that, had solemnly declared that we had no political interests there—an attitude which was in harmony with the traditions of Bismarckian policy—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a second Krüger.³ To him, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, at the same cost to ourselves and with the same outcome. Both demonstrations ended, as they were bound to end, in a retreat, so long as we had not yet decided to wage the World War at that time. The pitiable Congress of Algeciras could not modify this fact; still less could the fall of M. Delcassé.⁴

Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and, later, the Russo-British *rapprochement*. In face of "the German peril" all other antagonisms slid into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave either Russia or England unconcerned.

The worthlessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras. The equal worthlessness of the agreements there made was

³ See Appendix, note v.

⁴ *Ibid.*, note vii.

Sultanats, der natürlich nicht zu verhindern war. Im deutschen Volke jedoch verbreitete sich der Glaube, dass unsere Auslandspolitik schwächlich sei und vor der „Einkreisung“ zurückweiche, und dass hochtönenden Gebärden kleinstmütige Nachgiebigkeit folge.

Es bleibt das Verdienst des Herrn von Kiderlen, der als Staatsmann sonst überschätzt wird, dass er die marokkanische Erbschaft liquidierte und sich mit den Tatsachen abfand, an denen nichts mehr zu ändern war. Ob freilich die Welt durch den Coup von Agadir erschreckt werden musste, lasse ich dahingestellt. In Deutschland wurde das Ereignis lebhaft begrüßt, in England aber hatte es um so mehr beunruhigt, als die Regierung durch drei Wochen vergeblich auf Aufklärung über unsere Absichten wartete. Die Rede Mr. Lloyd Georges, die uns warnen sollte, war die Folge. Vor dem Sturze Delcassés und vor Algeciras wären Hafen und Gebiet an der Westküste zu haben gewesen, nachher aber nicht mehr.

Sir Ed. Greys Programm

Als ich nach London kam im November 1912, hatte man sich über Marokko beruhigt, da inzwischen in Berlin eine Vereinbarung mit Frankreich erfolgt war. Die Mission Haldanes war zwar gescheitert, da wir die Zusage der Neutralität verlangten, statt uns mit einem Verträge zu begnügen, der uns vor britischen Angriffen und vor Angriffen mit britischer Unterstützung sichern sollte.

Sir Ed. Grey aber hatte den Gedanken, mit uns zu einer Verständigung zu gelangen, nicht aufgegeben und versuchte es zunächst auf kolonialen und wirtschaft-

shown soon afterward, by the collapse of the sultanate—a result which it was of course impossible for us to prevent. Among the German people, however, the belief was spreading that our foreign policy was feeble, that we were yielding ground to the “encirclement,” and that ringing assertions were followed by pusillanimous concessions.

It stands to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he liquidated the Moroccan inheritance and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether, indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir *coup* is a question I leave unanswered.⁵ In Germany this occurrence was warmly welcomed; in England, on the other hand, it aroused the more uneasiness because the government waited in vain for three weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George’s speech, intended to warn us, was the consequence. Before Delcassé’s fall and before Algeciras we could have obtained harbors and territory on the West Coast, but not afterwards.

Sir Edward Grey’s Program

When I came to London in November, 1912, anxiety regarding Morocco had subsided, for in Berlin, in the meantime, an agreement had been reached with France. Haldane’s mission had indeed failed, because we demanded a promise of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which was to insure us against British attacks and against attacks with British support.⁶

Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made

⁵ See Appendix, note viii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, note xvi.

lichen Gebieten. Durch Vermittelung des befähigten und geschäftskundigen Botschafrats ⁴ von Kühlmann waren Besprechungen über eine Erneuerung des portugiesischen Kolonialvertrages und über Mesopotamien (Bagdadbahn) im Gange, die das unausgesprochene Ziel verfolgten, sowohl die genannten Kolonien, wie Kleinasien in Interessensphären zu teilen.

Der britische Staatsmann wollte, nachdem sowohl mit Frankreich wie mit Russland die alten Streitfragen geregelt waren, auch mit uns zu ähnlichen Abmachungen gelangen. Nicht uns zu vereinsamen, sondern uns möglichst zu Teilnehmern an der bestehenden Genossenschaft zu machen, war seine Absicht. Wie es gelang, britisch-französische und britisch-russische Gegensätze zu überbrücken, so wollte er auch die britisch-deutschen möglichst beseitigen und durch ein Netz von Verträgen, zu denen schliesslich wohl auch eine Vereinbarung über die leidige Flottenfrage gehört hätte, den Weltfrieden sichern, nachdem unsere frühere Politik zu einer Genossenschaft, der Entente, geführt hatte, die eine gegenseitige Versicherung gegen Kriegsgefahr darstellte.

Das war das Programm Sir Ed. Greys. In seinen eigenen Worten: unbeschadet der bestehenden Freundschaften (zu Frankreich und Russland), die keinerlei aggressive Zwecke verfolgen und keinerlei bindende Verpflichtungen für England in sich schliessen, mit Deutschland zu einer freundschaftlichen Annäherung und Verständigung zu gelangen. "*To bring the two groups nearer*" (die beiden Gruppen einander näher bringen).

Es gab damals in England wie bei uns in dieser Hinsicht zwei Richtungen: die der Optimisten, die an

⁴ B.-C.: "Botschafters."

such an attempt first in the colonial and economic fields. Through the agency of the capable and experienced counselor of the embassy, von Kühlmann, discussions were under way concerning a renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and concerning Mesopotamia (Bagdad railway). The tacit aim of these negotiations was to divide not only the above-mentioned colonies but also Asia Minor into spheres of interest.

It was the desire of the British statesman, now that the old matters of dispute had been settled both with France and with Russia,⁷ to come to similar arrangements with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in the association already established. Just as he had succeeded in bridging over British-French and British-Russian differences, so he wished as far as possible to get rid of causes of controversy between Great Britain and Germany, and by a network of treaties—which in the end would probably have included an agreement on the troublesome naval question—to secure the peace of the world. Our previous policy had already led to the formation of an association, the Entente, which represented a mutual assurance against the risk of war.

This was Sir Edward Grey's program. As he himself put it: Without impairing the existing friendships (with France and Russia), which have no aggressive purposes and involve no binding obligations for England, to attain a friendly *rapprochement* and understanding with Germany—"to bring the two groups nearer."

In this matter there were then in England, as with us, two currents of opinion: that of the optimists, who

⁷See Appendix, notes vi and ix.

die Verständigung glaubten, und die der Pessimisten, die den Krieg früher oder später für unvermeidlich hielten.

Zur erstern gehörten die Herren Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane und die meisten Minister des radikalen Kabinetts, sowie die führenden liberalen Organe, wie "Westminster Gazette", "Manchester Guardian", "Daily Chronicle." Zu den Pessimisten namentlich konservative Politiker, wie Mr. Balfour, der mir dies wiederholt zu verstehen gab, dann führende Militärs, wie Lord Roberts, die auf die Notwendigkeit der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht hinwiesen. (*"The Writing on the Wall."*) Ferner die Northcliffepresse und der bedeutende englische Journalist Mr. Garvin ("Observer"). Während meiner Amtszeit haben sie sich jedoch aller Angriffe enthalten und persönlich wie politisch eine freundliche Haltung eingenommen. Unsere Flottenpolitik und unsere Haltung in den Jahren 1905, 1908 und 1911 hatten bei ihnen aber den Glauben erweckt, dass es doch einmal zum Kriege kommen werde. Erstere werden heute in England gerade so, wie es auch bei uns geschieht, der Kurzsichtigkeit und Einfalt geziehen, letztere gelten als die wahren Propheten.

Albanische Frage

Der erste Balkankrieg hatte damals zum Zusammenbruch der Türkei und damit zu einer Niederlage unserer Politik geführt, die sich mit den Türken seit Jahren identifizierte. Nachdem die Türkei in Europa nicht mehr zu retten war, gab es zwei Möglichkeiten gegenüber der Regelung ihrer Hinterlassenschaft: entweder wir erklärten unser völliges Desinteressement an der Gestaltung der Grenzen auf dem Balkan und

believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable, sooner or later.

In the first group were Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as the leading Liberal organs, such as the *Westminster Gazette*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Daily Chronicle*. In the pessimist group were, in particular, Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly indicated to me that this was his attitude; also leading military men, like Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of universal military service ("The Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe press, and that influential English journalist, Mr. Garvin of the *Observer*. During my term of office, however, they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911⁸ had, however, convinced them that some day or other it would come to war. Just as with us, so in England today, those who belonged to the first group are censured as shortsighted and simple-minded, while the others are regarded as the true prophets.

The Albanian Question

At that time, the First Balkan War⁹ had led to the collapse of Turkey and, consequently, to a defeat of our policy, which for years had tied itself up with the Turks. Now that European Turkey was past saving, two possible courses were open to us as regarded the settlement of its estate. Either we declared that we were in no wise interested in the determination of

⁸ See Appendix, notes vii, iv (last paragraph), and viii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, note xi.

überliessen die Regelung den Balkanvölkern, oder aber wir unterstützten unsere „Bundesgenossen“, trieben Dreibundpolitik im Orient und traten dadurch aus der Rolle des Vermittlers heraus.

Ich befürwortete von Anfang an die erstere Lösung, das Auswärtige Amt aber vertrat um so entschiedener die letztere.

Der springende Punkt war die albanische Frage. Unsere Bundesgenossen wünschten die Gründung eines selbständigen Staates Albanien, da Österreich die Serben nicht an die Adria und Italien die Griechen nicht nach Valona, ja, nicht einmal nördlich von Korfu gelangen lassen wollte. Im Gegensatz hierzu förderte bekanntlich Russland die serbischen und Frankreich die griechischen Wünsche.

Mein Rat ging nun dahin, diese Frage als ausserhalb des Bündnisses stehend zu betrachten und weder die österreichischen noch die italienischen Wünsche zu unterstützen. Ohne unsere Förderung aber wäre die Errichtung Albaniens, dessen Lebensunfähigkeit vorauszusehen war, unmöglich gewesen. Serbien wäre an das Meer gelangt und der jetzige Weltkrieg vermieden. Frankreich und Italien hätten sich über Griechenland ernstlich entzweit und die Italiener, falls sie nicht gegen Frankreich allein kämpfen wollten, sich mit der Ausdehnung Griechenlands bis nördlich von Durazzo abfinden müssen. Die Zivilisation in dem grössten Teil Albaniens ist griechisch. Die Städte sind es im Süden vollkommen, und während der Botschafterkonferenz kamen Abordnungen aus grösseren Städten nach London, um die Angliederung an Griechenland durchzusetzen. Auch im heutigen Griechenland leben albanische Volksteile und die sogenannte griechische Nationaltracht sogar ist al-

boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left their adjustment to the Balkan peoples, or we supported our allies, pursued a Triple Alliance policy in the East, and thus abandoned the rôle of mediator.

I advocated from the outset the first of these solutions, but our Foreign Office gave its support all the more decidedly to the second.

The salient point was the Albanian question. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent state of Albania, because Austria was unwilling to permit the Serbs to gain access to the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to push their boundary to Valona, or even to the north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favored the Serbian, and France the Greek desires.

My advice was to consider this question as one lying outside the alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian desires. Without our support, however, the Albanian state, whose incapacity to exist might have been foreseen, could not possibly have been established. Serbia would have pushed forward to the sea, and the present world war would have been avoided. Between France and Italy there would have been a serious dispute as to Greece, and unless the Italians had been willing to fight France singlehanded, they would have been obliged to accept the expansion of Greece to a point north of Durazzo. In the greater part of Albania the civilization is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and when the conference of ambassadors was in session, deputations from the larger towns came to London for the purpose of securing annexation to Greece. In Greece today there are still Albanian groups, and the so-called Greek national dress itself is of Albanian origin.

banischen Ursprungs. Die Einverleibung der überwiegend orthodoxen und islamitischen Albaner in den griechischen Staat war daher die beste Lösung, die natürlichste wenn man etwa Skutari und den Norden den Serben und den Montenegrinern überliesse. Für diese Lösung war auch S. M. aus dynastischen Gründen. Als ich den Monarchen brieflich in dieser Richtung bestärkte, erhielt ich vom Reichskanzler erregte Vorwürfe, ich gälte als „Gegner Österreichs“ und er müsste sich solche Eingriffe und die direkte Korrespondenz verbitten.

Orient und Dreibundpolitik

Wir mussten uns von der verhängnisvollen Überlieferung endlich lossagen, Dreibundpolitik auch im Orient zu treiben, und den Irrtum erkennen, der darin lag, uns im Süden mit den Türken und im Norden mit den Austro-Madjaren zu identifizieren. Denn die Fortsetzung dieser Politik, die wir beim Berliner Kongress begonnen und seither mit Eifer gepflegt hatten, musste mit der Zeit und namentlich, wenn die nötige Gewandtheit an leitender Stelle fehlte, zum Zusammenstoss mit Russland und zum Weltkriege führen. Statt uns mit Russland auf Grundlage der Unabhängigkeit des Sultans, den man auch in Petrograd nicht aus Konstantinopel entfernen wollte, zu einigen und uns, unter Verzicht auf militärische und politische Eingriffe, auf wirtschaftliche Interessen im Orient zu beschränken und mit der Zerlegung Kleinasiens in Interessensphären zu begnügen, ging unser politischer Ehrgeiz dahin, am Bosphorus zu dominieren. In Russland entstand die Meinung, der Weg nach Konstantinopel bzw. ins Mittelländische Meer führe

The incorporation of the Albanians, of whom the great majority are either Orthodox Christians or Mussulmans, in the Greek state was, therefore, the best solution. It was also the most natural, if, let us say, Skutari and the northern part had been assigned to the Serbs and Montenegrins. His Majesty also was in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I wrote to the monarch in support of these views, I received from the imperial chancellor agitated reproaches: I was taken to be an "enemy of Austria," and he must beg me to refrain from such interferences and from all direct correspondence.

The East and the Triple Alliance Policy

We should have abandoned definitively the fatal tradition of pushing Triple Alliance policies in the Near East; we should have recognized that it was a mistake to make ourselves solidary with the Turks in the south and with the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of this policy, which we had started at the Berlin Congress and had afterwards zealously developed,¹⁰ was bound in time, and particularly in case the requisite adroitness should be found wanting in the supreme directing agencies, to lead to the collision with Russia and the World War. Instead of coming to an understanding with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom even the St. Petersburg government did not wish to drive out of Constantinople; instead of renouncing military and political interference, confining ourselves to economic interests in the Near East, and contenting ourselves with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, our political ambition was directed to the

¹⁰ See Appendix, notes iii and iv.

über Berlin. Statt die kräftige Entwicklung der Balkanstaaten zu fördern, die, einmal befreit, alles eher sind als russisch, und mit denen wir die besten Erfahrungen machten, stellten wir uns auf Seite der türkischen und madjarischen⁵ Unterdrücker.

Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum unserer Dreibund- und Orientpolitik, die Russland, unseren naturgemässen besten Freund und Nachbar, in die Arme Frankreichs und Englands gedrängt und von der asiatischen Ausbreitungspolitik abgedrängt hatte, war umso augenfälliger, als ein russisch-französischer Überfall, die *einzig*e Hypothese, die eine Dreibundpolitik rechtfertigte, aus unserer Berechnung ausscheiden konnte.

Über den Wert des italienischen Bündnisses erübrigt sich ein weiteres Wort. Italien braucht unser Geld und unsere Touristen auch nach dem Kriege mit oder ohne Bündnis. Dass letzteres im Kriegsfall versagen würde, war vorauszusehen. Das Bündnis war daher *wertlos*. Österreich braucht unseren Schutz in Krieg und Frieden und hat keine andere Anlehnung. Die Abhängigkeit von uns beruht auf politischen, nationalen und wirtschaftlichen Erwägungen und ist umso grösser, je intimer unsere Beziehungen zu Russland sind. Das hat die bosnische Krise gelehrt. Seit dem Grafen Beust ist noch kein Wiener Minister so selbstbewusst gegen uns aufgetreten, wie Graf Ährenthal in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens. Bei richtig geleiteter deutscher Politik, die die Fühlung mit Russland pflegt, ist Österreich-Ungarn unser Vasall und auf uns angewiesen, auch ohne Bündnisse und Gegenleistungen, bei falsch geleiteter sind wir auf Österreich angewiesen. Das Bündnis war daher *zwecklos*.

⁵ B.-C.: "majarischen."

attainment of a dominant position on the Bosphorus. In Russia the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and so into the Mediterranean ran *via* Berlin. Instead of furthering the development of strong Balkan states, which, once set free, are anything but Russian, and with which our experiences were most satisfactory, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.

The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Eastern policy, by which Russia, naturally our best friend and neighbor, was driven into the arms of France and England, and diverted from the policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more obvious, as a Franco-Russian attack, the sole hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, could be eliminated from our calculations.

As to the value of the Italian alliance, words may be spared. Italy needs our money and our tourists, and will need them after the war, with or without an alliance. That the alliance would fail to hold in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance, consequently, was worthless. Austria needs our protection both in war and in peace, and there is no other Power on which it can lean. Its dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds. This dependence increases in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust,¹¹ no Vienna minister has assumed toward us so independent an attitude as was displayed by Count Ährenthal during the last years of his life. Given a properly conducted German policy, which keeps us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and must

¹¹ See Appendix, note ii.

Ich kannte Österreich zu genau, um nicht zu wissen, dass eine Rückkehr zur Politik des Fürsten Felix Schwarzenberg ⁶ oder des Grafen Moritz Esterhazy dort undenkbar war. So wenig die dortigen Slawen uns lieben, so wenig wollen sie in ein deutsches Kaiserreich zurückkehren, selbst mit Habsburg-Lothringer Spitze. Sie streben den Föderalismus innerhalb Österreichs an auf nationaler Grundlage, ein Zustand, der im Rahmen des Deutschen Reiches noch viel weniger Aussicht auf Verwirklichung hätte wie unter dem Doppeladler. Die Deutschen Österreichs aber erkennen in Berlin den Mittelpunkt deutscher Macht und Kultur, und wissen, dass Österreich niemals wieder Präsidialmacht werden kann. Sie wünschen einen möglichst intimen Anschluss an das Reich, nicht aber eine antideutsche Politik.

Seit den siebziger Jahren hatte sich die Lage von Grund aus verändert in Österreich wie etwa in Bayern. Wie hier eine Rückkehr zum grossdeutschen Partikularismus und zur altbayerischen Politik nicht zu befürchten ist, so war dort ein Wiederaufleben der Politik des Fürsten Kaunitz und Schwarzenberg nicht zu gewärtigen. Unsere Interessen aber würden durch einen staatsrechtlichen Anschluss Österreichs, das auch ohne Galizien und Dalmatien nur etwa zur Hälfte von Germanen bewohnt ist, also etwa ein grosses Belgien darstellt, ebenso leiden wie andererseits durch Unterordnung unserer Politik unter Wiener und Pester Gesichtspunkte—*d'épouser les querelles de l'Autriche* (sich mit den österreichischen Zwistigkeiten zu vermählen).

⁶ B.-C.: "Schwanenberg."

come our way even without an alliance and without reciprocal services. Under a misdirected policy, we must go Austria's way. Consequently the alliance served no purpose.

I was too thoroughly acquainted with Austria not to know that a return to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. The Slavs living there have little love for us, and equally little desire to come back into a German Empire, even with a Hapsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving to develop in Austria a federal system based on nationality—a state of things which there would be far less chance of establishing within the framework of the German Empire than under the two-headed Eagle. The Germans in Austria, on the other hand, recognize that Berlin is the center of German power and culture, and they know that Austria can never recover the presidency of the German states. They desire as close a connection as possible with the Empire but do not favor a policy directed against [the existing organization of] the German Empire.

Since the seventies there has been a radical change of position in Austria—a change resembling that which has taken place in Bavaria. Just as here a return to the particularism of the Great German party and to the old Bavarian policy is not to be apprehended, so in Austria there was no prospect of a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg.¹² Our interests, however, would be as injuriously affected by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited only to the extent of, say, one-half by Germans, and which accord-

¹² See Appendix, note ii.

Wir brauchten daher keine Rücksichten auf die Wünsche unserer „Bundesgenossen“ zu nehmen, sie waren nicht nur unnötig, sondern auch gefährlich, weil sie zum Zusammenstoss mit Russland führten, wenn wir orientalische Fragen durch österreichische Brillen betrachteten. Die Ausgestaltung des Bündnisses aus einem unter einer einzigen Voraussetzung geschlossenen „Zweckverbande“ zu einer „Gesamtgemeinde“, zu einer Interessengemeinschaft auf allen Gebieten, war geeignet, eben dasjenige herbeizuführen, was das Rechtsgeschäft verhindern sollte—den Krieg. Eine solche Bündnispolitik musste ausserdem den Verlust der Sympathien junger, kräftiger, aufstrebender Gemeinwesen auf dem Balkan nach sich ziehen, die bereit waren, sich an uns zu wenden und uns ihre Märkte zu öffnen.

Der Gegensatz zwischen Hausmacht und Nationalstaat, zwischen dynastischer und demokratischer Staatsidee musste zum Austrag kommen, und wir standen wie gewöhnlich auf falscher Seite.

König Karol hat zu einem unserer Vertreter gesagt, er habe das Bündnis mit uns unter der Voraussetzung geschlossen, dass *wir* die Führung behielten, ginge diese aber an Österreich über, so ändere das die Grundlage des Verhältnisses, und er werde unter solchen Umständen nicht weiter mitmachen können.

Ähnlich lagen die Dinge in Serbien, wo wir gegen unsere eigenen wirtschaftlichen Interessen die österreichische Erdrosselungspolitik unterstützten.

Wir haben stets auf das Pferd gesetzt, dessen Niederbruch vorauszusehen war, auf Herrn Krüger, auf Abdul Asis, auf Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm Wied und—

ingly is something like a larger Belgium, as, on the other hand, by a subordination of our policy to the points of view of Vienna and Budapest, with the obligation "*d'épouser les querelles de l'Autriche.*"

We, therefore, had no need to consider the desires of our allies. Such considerations were not only unnecessary but also dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian glasses. The development of our alliance from a partnership with a definite purpose, formed in view of a single contingency, into a solidary union, with community of interests in every field, was adapted to produce the very result which the original treaty¹³ was intended to prevent—war. Moreover, an alliance policy of this sort could not but entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open to us their markets.

The conflict between family power and the national state, between the dynastic and the democratic theory of the state, had to be definitively settled, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side.

King Charles [of Rumania] told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on the assumption that we were to keep the control of affairs. If that control passed to Austria, the basis on which his relations with us rested would be changed, and under such conditions he could no longer act with us.

The situation was similar in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation.

¹³ Literally, "legal transaction."

der verhängnisvollste von allen Irrtümern—schliesslich den grossen *plunge* auf den Stall Berchtold gemacht!

Botschafterkonferenz

Bald nach meiner Ankunft in London Ende 1912 regte Sir Ed. Grey eine zwanglose Besprechung an, um zu vermeiden, dass aus dem Balkankriege sich ein europäischer entwickelt, nachdem wir leider die Aufforderung der französischen Regierung, einer Desinteressementserklärung beizutreten, bei Ausbruch des Krieges abgelehnt hatten. Der britische Staatsmann nahm von Anfang an die Haltung ein, dass England an Albanien kein Interesse habe, wegen dieser Frage also nicht gewillt sei, es auf einen Krieg ankommen zu lassen. Er wollte als „ehrlicher Makler“ lediglich zwischen den beiden Gruppen vermitteln und Schwierigkeiten beilegen. Er stellte sich daher keineswegs auf Seite der Ententegenossen und hat während der Dauer der etwa achtmonatlichen Unterhandlungen durch guten Willen und seinen massgebenden Einfluss nicht unwesentlich zur Einigung beigetragen. Statt dass wir eine der englischen analoge Haltung einnahmen, vertraten wir ohne Ausnahme den Standpunkt, der uns von Wien aus vorgeschrieben wurde. Graf Mensdorff führte den Dreibund in London, ich war sein „Sekundant“. Meine Aufgabe bestand darin, seine Vorschläge zu unterstützen. In Berlin schaltete der kluge und erfahrene Graf Szögyenyi. Sein Refrain war: „Und dann tritt der *casus fæderis* (der Bündnisfall) ein“, und als ich die Richtigkeit dieses Schlusses einmal anzuzweifeln

We have always bet on the horse whose breakdown might have been foreseen, on Krüger, on Abdul Aziz, on Abdul Hamid, on Wilhelm of Wied,¹⁴ and—the most disastrous of all our mistakes—we finally made our great plunge on the Berchtold stable!

*The Conference of Ambassadors*¹⁵

Soon after my arrival in London, at the close of the year 1912, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal discussion to prevent a European war from growing out of the Balkan war. We had unfortunately already declined the request of the French government, made at the outbreak of the war, to join in a declaration of disinterestedness. From the outset the British statesman took the position that England had no interest in Albania and therefore did not mean to let war come on this issue. It was his purpose simply to act as a mediator, an "honest broker," between the two groups and to try to smooth away difficulties. Accordingly, he by no means placed himself on the side of his Entente associates; and during the negotiations, which lasted some eight months, by force of his good will and his controlling influence he made no slight contributions to an understanding. Instead of taking a position like the English, we invariably defended the point of view which was prescribed to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London, I was his second. My task was to support his proposals. In Berlin it was the shrewd and experienced Count Szögyenyi who ran the affair. His refrain was: "Here the *casus foederis* comes in"; and when on one occasion I ventured to dispute the correctness of this conclu-

¹⁴ See Appendix, notes v, vii and xi.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, note xi.

wagte, wurde ich wegen „Austrophobie“ ernstlich verwarnt. Unter Anspielung auf meinen Vater hiess es auch, ich sei „erblich belastet!“

Bei allen Anlässen: Albanien, serbischer Adria-hafen, Skutari, ferner bei der Bestimmung der Grenzen Albaniens stellten wir uns auf den Standpunkt Österreichs und Italiens, während Sir Ed. Grey fast niemals den französischen oder den russischen unterstützte. Er trat vielmehr meist für unsere Gruppe ein, um keinen Vorwand zu schaffen, wie ihn später ein toter Erzherzog liefern sollte. So gelang es mit seiner Hilfe, den König Nikita aus Skutari wieder herauszulocken. Schon über diese Frage wäre es sonst zum Weltkrieg gekommen, da wir sicher nicht gewagt hätten, „unseren Bundesgenossen“ zur Nachgiebigkeit zu veranlassen.

Sir Ed. Grey leitete die Verhandlungen mit Umsicht, Ruhe und Takt. Wenn eine Frage sich zu verwickeln drohte, entwarf er eine Einigungsformel, die das Richtige traf und auch stets Annahme fand. Seine Persönlichkeit genoss bei allen Teilnehmern gleiches Vertrauen.

Wir hatten tatsächlich wieder einmal eine der vielen Kraftproben, die unsere Politik kennzeichnen, glücklich überstanden. Russland hatte überall vor uns zurückweichen müssen, da es niemals in der Lage war, den serbischen Wünschen Erfolg zu verschaffen. Albanien war als österreichischer Vasallenstaat errichtet und Serbien vom Meere verdrängt. Der Verlauf der Konferenz war daher eine neue Demütigung für das russische Selbstbewusstsein. Wie 1878 und 1908 hatten wir uns schon dem russischen Programm entgegengestellt, ohne dass *deutsche* Interessen im Spiele waren. Bismarck wusste den Fehler des Kongresses durch den geheimen Vertrag und durch seine

sion, I received a serious warning on the ground of my "Austrophobia." It was also asserted, alluding to my father, that I was under an "hereditary burden."

On every issue—Albania, a Serbian harbor on the Adriatic, Skutari, also in drawing the boundaries of Albania—we took the point of view of Austria and of Italy, while Sir Edward Grey almost never supported that of France or of Russia. On the contrary, in most instances he lent his support to our group, in order to give no pretext for war, such as was subsequently furnished by a dead archduke. It was thus with his help that we succeeded in coaxing King Nikita out of Skutari. Otherwise the World War might have been started on this question, since we surely would not have ventured to urge our ally to make any concession.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with prudence, calmness and tact. As often as a question threatened to become complicated, he suggested a formula of agreement that met the case and was invariably accepted. His personality won him equal confidence among all who took part in the conference.

So far as [immediate] results were concerned, we had again passed successfully through one of those many tests of power which were characteristic of our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line; in no instance was it able to attain satisfaction of the Serbian desires. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal state, and Serbia was thrust back from the sea. The outcome of the conference was therefore a new humiliation of Russian national sentiment. As in 1878 and in 1908 we had placed ourselves in opposition to the Russian program, although no German interests were involved. Bismarck contrived to minimize the mistake made at the Congress [of

Haltung in der Battenbergfrage zu mildern; die in der bosnischen Frage wieder betretene abschüssige Bahn wurde in London weiter verfolgt und später, als sie zum Abgrund führte, nicht rechtzeitig verlassen.

Die Misstimmung, die damals in Russland herrschte, kam während der Konferenz durch Angriffe gegen meinen russischen Kollegen und die russische Diplomatie in den russischen Blättern zum Ausdruck. Seine deutsche Herkunft und katholische Konfession, sein Ruf als Deutschenfreund, und der zufällige Umstand, dass er sowohl mit dem Grafen Mensdorff, wie mit mir verwandt ist, kamen den unzufriedenen Kreisen zu statten. Ohne eine sehr bedeutende Persönlichkeit zu sein, besitzt Graf Benckendorff eine Reihe von Eigenschaften, die einen guten Diplomaten kennzeichnen: Takt, gesellschaftliches Geschick, Erfahrung, verbindliches Wesen, natürlichen Blick für Menschen und Dinge. Er war stets bestrebt, eine schroffe Stellungnahme zu vermeiden und wurde durch die Haltung Englands und Frankreichs auch darin bestärkt.

Ich sagte ihm später einmal: Die Stimmung in Russland ist wohl sehr antideutsch. Er entgegnete: Es gibt auch sehr starke und einflussreiche prodeutsche Kreise, man ist aber allgemein antiösterreichisch!

Es erübrigt sich, hinzuzufügen, dass unsere *Austrophilie à outrance* (Österreich-Freundschaft bis zur äussersten Grenze) nicht gerade geeignet war, die Entente zu lockern und Russland seinen asiatischen Interessen zuzuführen!

Balkankonferenz

Gleichzeitig tagte in London die Balkankonferenz, und ich hatte Gelegenheit, mit den Leitern der Balkan-

Berlin] through the secret treaty [with Russia] and through the attitude he took in the Battenberg question; the dangerous slope down which we started again in the Bosnian question was followed further in London and was not abandoned later in time to save us from falling into the abyss.¹⁶

The dissatisfaction which prevailed at the time in Russia found expression during the conference in attacks in Russian journals upon my Russian colleague and upon the Russian diplomacy. Count Benckendorff's German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of the Germans, and the accidental circumstance that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to me, were exploited in the discontented circles. Although not a man of great force, Count Benckendorff possesses a number of qualities that are essential to a good diplomatist: tact, social adaptability, experience, pleasant manners and an instinctive appreciation of men and of things. It was always his effort to avoid taking an uncompromising position, and this disposition on his part was strengthened by the attitude of England and of France.

I said to him once, on a later occasion: "The feeling in Russia, I suppose, is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, but everybody is anti-Austrian."

It is almost needless to add that our extreme Austrophil attitude was not precisely adapted to loosen the Entente or to direct Russia's attention to its Asiatic interests!

*The Balkan Conference*¹⁷

At the same period the Balkan conference was sitting in London, and I had opportunity to get in touch

¹⁶ See Appendix, notes iii and iv.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, note xi.

staaten in Fühlung zu treten. Die bedeutendste Persönlichkeit war wohl Herr Venizelos. Er war damals nichts weniger als deutschfeindlich, besuchte mich wiederholt und trug mit Vorliebe und sogar auf der französischen Botschaft das Band des Roten Adlerordens. Von gewinnender Liebenswürdigkeit, mit weltmännischem Auftreten, wusste er sich Sympathien zu verschaffen. Neben ihm spielte Herr Danew, der damalige bulgarische Ministerpräsident und Vertrauensmann des Grafen Berchtold, eine grosse Rolle. Er machte den Eindruck eines verschlagenen und energischen Mannes, und es ist wohl nur dem Einfluss seiner Wiener und Pester Freunde zuzuschreiben, über deren Huldigungen er sich gelegentlich belustigte, dass er sich zu der Torheit des zweiten Balkankrieges verleiten liess und die russische Vermittelung ablehnte.

Auch Herr Take Jonescu war öfters in London und besuchte mich dann regelmässig. Ich kannte ihn von der Zeit her, da ich Sekretär in Bukarest war. Er gehörte auch zu den Freunden des Herrn von Kiderlen. In London war er bestrebt, durch Verhandlungen mit Herrn Danew Zugeständnisse für Rumänien zu erreichen und wurde dabei von dem sehr befähigten rumänischen Gesandten Nisu unterstützt. Dass diese Verhandlungen an dem Widerstande Bulgariens scheiterten, ist bekannt. Graf Berchtold (und wir natürlich mit ihm) war ganz auf Seiten Bulgariens, sonst wäre es wohl gelungen, den Rumänen die gewünschte Genugtuung durch einen Druck auf Herrn Danew zu verschaffen und uns Rumänien zu verpflichten, das durch die Haltung Österreichs während des zweiten Balkankrieges und danach den Mittelmächten endgültig entfremdet wurde.

with the leading men of the Balkan states. Quite the most significant personality was that of M. Venizelos. At that time he was anything but hostile to Germany. He paid me repeated visits, and he wore by preference, even at the French embassy, the ribbon of the order of the Red Eagle. With winning and kindly ways and the manners of a man of the world, he made himself generally liked. M. Danef, at that time prime minister of Bulgaria and confidant of Count Berchtold, also played a leading rôle. He impressed one as a subtle and energetic man; and the mistake he made in permitting himself to be drawn into the unwise venture of the Second Balkan War, refusing Russian mediation, is probably to be ascribed solely to the influence of his friends at Vienna and at Budapest, by whose homage he sometimes showed himself amused.

M. Take Jonsescu also was frequently in London and on such occasions always called on me. I had known him since the time when I was secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was trying to gain concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Danef, and he was supported in these efforts by the very able Rumanian envoy, M. Nisu. These negotiations, it is known, failed in consequence of the resistance of Bulgaria. Count Berchtold—and we of course with him—was altogether on the side of Bulgaria. But for this it would probably have been possible, by putting some pressure on M. Danef, to obtain for the Rumanians the concessions they desired, and thus to place Rumania under obligations to us. As it was, in consequence of the attitude of Austria during the Second Balkan War and afterwards, Rumania was completely estranged from the Central Powers.

Zweiter Balkankrieg

Die Niederlage Bulgariens im zweiten Balkankriege und der Sieg Serbiens sowie der rumänische Einmarsch bedeuteten naturgemäss für Österreich eine Blamage. Der Gedanke, diese durch einen Waffengang gegen Serbien auszugleichen, scheint bald in Wien Eingang gefunden zu haben. Die italienischen Enthüllungen beweisen es, und es ist anzunehmen, dass Marquis San Giuliano, der den Plan als eine „pericolosissima aventura“ (äusserst gefährliches Abenteuer) sehr treffend kennzeichnete, uns davor bewahrt hat, schon im Sommer 1913 in einen Weltkrieg verwickelt zu werden.

Bei der Vertrautheit der russisch-italienischen Beziehungen wird die Wiener Anregung auch wohl in Petersburg bekannt geworden sein. Jedenfalls hat Herr Sasonow in Konstanz, wie Herr Take Jonsescu mir erzählte, offen gesagt, dass ein Angriff Österreichs auf Serbien für Russland den Kriegsfall bedeutet.

Als einer meiner Herren im Frühjahr 1914 von Urlaub aus Wien zurückkehrte, erzählte er, Herr von Tschirschky erklärte, es gäbe bald Krieg. Da ich aber über wichtige Vorgänge stets in Unkenntnis gelassen wurde, hielt ich diesen Pessimismus für unbegründet.

Seit dem Bukarester Frieden scheint tatsächlich in Wien die Absicht bestanden zu haben, eine Revision dieses Vertrages auf eigene Faust durchzuführen, und man wartete anscheinend nur auf einen günstigen Anlass. Auf unsere Unterstützung konnten die Wiener Staatsmänner selbstverständlich rechnen. Das wussten sie, denn es war ihnen schon wiederholt „Schlappheit“ vorgeworfen worden. Man drängte in Berlin sogar auf eine „Rehabilitierung“ Österreichs.

*The Second Balkan War*¹⁸

The defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War the victory of Serbia and the Rumanian march into Bulgaria meant for Austria a loss of prestige. The idea of offsetting this loss by a campaign against Serbia seems to have been entertained in Vienna shortly afterward. This is proved by the Italian revelations; and it is to be assumed that Marquis di San Giuliano, who quite appropriately characterized the plan as a "very risky adventure," saved us from being involved in a world war in the summer of 1913.¹⁹

In view of the intimacy of the relations between Italy and Russia, it may be assumed that the Viennese overture was known in St. Petersburg. At all events, M. Sazonof declared openly in Constanza, as M. Take Jonescu informed me, that an attack of Austria on Serbia would amount to a *casus belli* for Russia.

When, in the spring of 1914, one of the members of my embassy returned from a leave of absence in Vienna, he told me that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that there would soon be war. But as I was systematically kept in ignorance of important occurrences, I regarded this pessimistic view as baseless.

Ever since the Peace of Bucharest, Vienna seems really to have intended to secure a revision of this treaty by its own independent action and to have been waiting only for a favorable occasion. On our support the Vienna statesmen could reckon as a matter of course. They knew this, for they had been repeatedly reproached for "flabbiness." In Berlin there was actual insistence that Austria be "rehabilitated."

¹⁸ See Appendix, note xii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, note xiv.

Liman von Sanders

Als ich im Dezember 1913 nach längerem Urlaub nach London zurückkehrte, hatte die Frage Liman von Sanders zu einer neuen Verschärfung unserer Beziehungen zu Russland geführt. Sir Edward Grey machte mich nicht ohne Besorgnis auf die Erregung aufmerksam, die darüber in Petersburg herrsche! "*I have never seen them so excited*" (ich habe sie niemals so aufgeregt gesehen).

Ich wurde von Berlin aus beauftragt, den Minister zu bitten, in mässigendem Sinne in Petersburg zu wirken und uns bei Beilegung des Streites behilflich zu sein. Sir Edward war hierzu gern bereit, und seine Vermittlung hat nicht wenig dazu beigetragen, die Angelegenheit zu ebnen. Meine guten Beziehungen zu Sir Edward und sein grosser Einfluss in Petersburg wurden auf ähnliche Weise wiederholt benutzt, wenn es galt, dort etwas durchzusetzen, da unsere Vertretung sich hierzu als völlig ungeeignet erwies.

In den kritischen Tagen des Juli 1914 sagte mir Sir Edward: „Wenn Sie etwas in Petersburg erreichen wollen, wenden Sie sich regelmässig an mich, wenn ich aber einmal Ihren Einfluss in Wien anrufe, so versagen Sie mir Ihre Unterstützung.“

Kolonialvertrag

Die guten und vertrauensvollen Beziehungen, die es mir gelang, nicht nur in der Gesellschaft und mit den einflussreichsten Persönlichkeiten, wie Sir Ed. Grey und Mr. Asquith, sondern auch bei *public dinners* (bei öffentlichen Dîners) mit der Öffentlichkeit anzuknüpfen, hatten eine merkliche Besserung unseres Verhältnisses zu England herbeigeführt. Sir Edward

Liman von Sanders ²⁰

When, after a lengthy leave of absence, I returned to London in December, 1913, the Liman von Sanders question had led to renewed tension in our relations with Russia. Sir Edward Grey called my attention, not without anxiety on his part, to the widespread agitation which this matter had aroused in St. Petersburg, saying: "I have never seen them so excited."

I received instructions from Berlin to ask the minister to work in favor of moderation in St. Petersburg and to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward was quite willing to do this, and his mediation contributed in no small degree to smoothing the matter over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg were repeatedly utilized in a like manner when it was a question of carrying any point there; for our representative proved quite unfit for any such purpose.

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "If you wish to get anything in St. Petersburg, you always come to me, but if once I ask for your influence in Vienna, you refuse me your support."

Colonial Treaty

The excellent and confidential relations I succeeded in establishing, not only in society and with the most influential personalities, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also at public dinners with [the agencies of] publicity, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. It was

²⁰ See Appendix, note xv.

war aufrichtig bemüht, diese Annäherung weiter zu befestigen, und seine Absichten traten besonders in zwei Fragen hervor: dem Kolonial- und dem Bagdadvertrag.

Im Jahre 1898 war zwischen dem Grafen Hatzfeld und Herrn Balfour ein geheimes Abkommen unterzeichnet worden, das die portugiesischen Kolonien in Afrika in wirtschaftspolitische⁷ Interessensphären zwischen uns und England teilte. Da die portugiesische Regierung weder die Macht noch die Mittel besass, ihren ausgedehnten Besitz zu erschliessen oder sachgemäss zu verwalten, hatte sie sich früher bereits mit dem Gedanken getragen, ihn zu veräussern und ihre Finanzen dadurch zu sanieren. Eine Einigung zwischen uns und England war zustande gekommen, welche die beiderseitigen Interessen begrenzte, und die um so grösseren Wert besass, als Portugal sich bekanntlich in völliger Abhängigkeit von England befindet.

Dieser Vertrag sollte wohl äusserlich die Unversehrtheit und Unabhängigkeit des portugiesischen Reiches sichern, und er sprach nur die Absicht aus, den Portugiesen finanziell und wirtschaftlich behilflich zu sein. Er stand daher dem Wortlaut nach nicht im Widerspruch zu dem alten englisch-portugiesischen Bündnis aus dem 15. Jahrhundert, das zuletzt unter Karl II. erneuert wurde und den gegenseitigen Besitzstand verbürgte.

Trotzdem war auf Bestreben des Marquis Soveral, der vermutlich über die deutsch-englischen Abmachungen nicht in Unkenntnis blieb, ein neuer Vertrag, der sogenannte Windsorvertrag, im Jahre 1899, zwischen England und Portugal geschlossen worden,

⁷ B.-C.: "wirtschaftspolitischen."

Sir Edward's honest endeavor to place this *rapprochement* on a firmer basis. His aims were most clearly manifested in two matters: the colonial and the Bagdad treaties.

In the year 1898 a secret convention had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa²¹ into economic-political spheres of interest as between us and England. As the Portuguese government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up its extensive possessions or to administer them suitably, it had already at an earlier date entertained the idea of selling them and thereby putting its finances on a sound basis. An agreement had been reached between us and England, delimiting the interests of the two parties. Its value was enhanced by the fact that Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England.

On its face, of course, this treaty was designed to secure the integrity and independence of the Portuguese realm, and the only purpose it expressed was to give to the Portuguese financial and economic assistance. In its wording, accordingly, it did not contravene the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II and which contained a reciprocal guaranty of existing territorial possessions.²²

Nevertheless, at the instance of Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not left uninformed regarding the Anglo-German agreements, a new treaty, the so-called Windsor Treaty, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal, confirming the old agreements, which had never been put out of force.

²¹ See Appendix, note xvii.

²² *Ibid.*, note xviii.

welcher die alten, niemals ausser Kraft gesetzten Vereinbarungen bestätigte.

Die Unterhandlungen zwischen uns und England, die bereits vor meiner Ankunft begonnen hatten, bezweckten, unseren Vertrag von 1898, der auch hinsichtlich der geographischen Abgrenzung manche Unzuträglichkeiten aufwies, umzugestalten und zu verbessern. Dank der entgegenkommenden Haltung der britischen Regierung gelang es mir, dem neuen Vertrag eine unseren Wünschen und Interessen durchaus entsprechende Form zu geben. Ganz Angola bis an den 20. Längengrad wurde uns zugesprochen, so dass wir an das Kongogebiet von Süden gelangten, ausserdem noch die wertvollen Inseln San Thomé und Principe, die nördlich des Äquators liegen und dadurch eigentlich dem französischen Interessengebiet zufielen, eine Tatsache, die meinen französischen Kollegen zu lebhaften, wenn auch vergeblichen Gegenvorstellungen veranlasste.

Ferner erhielten wir den nördlichen Teil von Mosambik; der Licango bildete die Grenze.

Unseren Interessen und Wünschen wurde seitens der britischen Regierung das grösste Entgegenkommen gezeigt. Sir Ed. Grey beabsichtigte, uns seinen guten Willen zu bekunden, er wünschte aber auch unsere koloniale Entwicklung überhaupt zu fördern, da England die deutsche Kraftentfaltung von der Nordsee und von Westeuropa nach dem Weltmeer und Afrika abzulenken hoffte. *"We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development"* (Wir wollen Deutschland seine koloniale Entwicklung nicht missgönnen), sagte mir ein Mitglied des Kabinetts.

Der Kongostaat sollte auf britische Anregung ursprünglich auch in den Vertrag einbezogen werden,

The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to revise and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained a number of impracticable provisions, even as regarded geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely corresponded to our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover the valuable islands of San Thomé and Príncipe, which lie north of the equator and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic but unavailing protests.

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed the boundary.

The British government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development as a whole, because England hoped to divert the German output of energy from the North Sea and Western Europe to the ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me.

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State also was to have been included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of preëmption and would have enabled us to penetrate it economically. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? Furthermore, as regarded the

was uns ein Vorkaufsrecht und die Möglichkeit gegeben hätte, ihn wirtschaftlich zu durchdringen. Angeblich mit Rücksicht auf belgische Empfindlichkeiten lehnten wir aber dieses Angebot ab! Vielleicht sollte mit Erfolgen gespart werden? Auch hinsichtlich der praktischen Verwirklichung des eigentlichen unausgesprochenen Zweckes des Vertrages, der späteren tatsächlichen Teilung des portugiesischen Kolonialbesitzes, bot die neue Fassung wesentliche Vorteile und Fortschritte gegen die alte. Es waren nämlich Fälle vorgesehen, die es uns ermöglichten, zur Wahrung unserer Interessen auf den uns zugewiesenen Gebieten einzuschreiten. Diese Voraussetzungen wurden so weit gefasst, dass es eigentlich uns überlassen blieb, selbst zu bestimmen, wenn „vitale“ Interessen vorlagen, so dass es bei der völligen Abhängigkeit Portugals von England nur darauf ankam, die Beziehungen zu England weiter zu pflegen, um mit englischer Zustimmung unsere beiderseitigen Absichten später zu verwirklichen.

Die Aufrichtigkeit der britischen Regierung in ihrem Bestreben, unsere Rechte zu achten, zeigte sich darin, dass Sir Ed. Grey, noch ehe der Vertrag fertiggestellt oder unterzeichnet war, englische Unternehmer, die in dem uns durch den neuen Vertrag zugewiesenen Gebieten Kapitalanlagen suchten, und dafür die britische Unterstützung wünschten, an uns verwies, mit dem Bemerkens, dass das betreffende Unternehmen in unsere Interessensphäre gehöre.

Der Vertrag war schon zur Zeit des Königsbesuches in Berlin, also im Mai 1913, im wesentlichen fertig. In Berlin fand damals unter dem Vorsitz des Herrn Reichskanzlers eine Besprechung statt, an der auch ich teilnahm, und bei der noch einzelne Wünsche

practical execution of the real but unexpressed purpose of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new formulation, as compared with the old, offered us important advantages and represented a distinct advance. Thus it was provided that in certain cases we should be authorized to intervene in the territories assigned to us for the protection of our interests. These conditional clauses were so broad that it was really left to us to decide whether “vital” interests were concerned; so that, Portugal being completely dependent on England, it was necessary only to cultivate further our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our respective intentions.

The sincerity of the British government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that, even before the treaty was completed or signed, English *entrepreneurs* who wished to invest capital in the districts assigned to us under the new treaty, and who desired British support for their undertaking, were referred by Sir Edward Grey to us, with the information that the enterprise in question belonged in our sphere of interest.

The treaty was substantially complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a discussion took place in Berlin, under the presidency of the imperial chancellor, in which I took part, and at which some further desires of ours were defined. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of the counselor of the embassy, Herr von Kühlmann, who was working with Mr. Parker upon the details of the treaty, in putting through our last proposals also; so that in August, 1913, before I

festgelegt wurden. Bei meiner Rückkehr nach London gelang es mir mit Hilfe des Botschaftsrats, Herrn von Kühlmann, der mit Mr. Parker die Einzelheiten des Vertrages bearbeitete, auch unsere letzten Vorschläge durchzusetzen, so dass der ganze Vertrag schon im August 1913, vor Antritt meines Urlaubs, von Sir Ed. Grey und mir paragraphiert werden konnte.

Nun sollten aber neue Schwierigkeiten entstehen, die die Unterzeichnung verhinderten, und erst nach einem Jahre, also kurz vor Kriegsausbruch, konnte ich die Ermächtigung erhalten zum endgültigen Abschluss. Zur Unterzeichnung aber ist es nicht mehr gekommen.

Sir Ed. Grey wollte nämlich nur unterzeichnen, *falls der Vertrag mitsamt den beiden Verträgen von 1898 und 1899 veröffentlicht würde*. England besitze sonst keine geheimen Verträge, und es sei gegen die bestehenden Grundsätze, bindende Abmachungen zu verheimlichen. Er könne daher keinen Vertrag eingehen, ohne ihn zu veröffentlichen. Über Zeitpunkt und Art der Veröffentlichung sei er aber bereit, unseren Wünschen Rechnung zu tragen, vorausgesetzt, dass die Veröffentlichung in längstens Jahresfrist nach Unterzeichnung erfolge.

Im Auswärtigen Amt aber, wo meine Londoner Erfolge zunehmendes Missvergnügen erregten, und wo eine einflussreiche Persönlichkeit, die die Rolle des Herrn von Holstein spielte, den Londoner Posten für sich in Anspruch nahm, erklärte man, die Veröffentlichung gefährde unsere Interessen in den Kolonien, da die Portugiesen uns alsdann keine Konzessionen mehr geben würden.

Die Nichtigkeit des Einwandes erhellt aus der Erwägung, dass der alte Vertrag den Portugiesen höchst wahrscheinlich ebenso längst bekannt war, wie

went on leave, Sir Edward Grey and I were able to paragraph the entire treaty.

At this point, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signing of the treaty; and it was only a year later, shortly before the outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for its definite conclusion. But it never reached the point of being signed.

The difficulty was that Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty were published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899. England, he said, had no other secret treaties, and it was contrary to existing principles that binding agreements should be kept secret. He could therefore conclude no treaty without publishing it. As regarded time and manner of publication, however, he was ready to take account of our wishes, provided publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signing.

In our Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, who had taken over the rôle previously played by Herr von Holstein,²³ was claiming for himself the post at London, it was explained that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would then give us no more concessions.

That there was nothing in this objection becomes clear when we consider that in all probability, in view of the intimacy of the Portuguese-English relations, the old treaty had long been known, and the new agreements had likewise been made known, to the Portuguese. It is also to be remembered that, with the influence England has in Lisbon, the Portu-

²³ See Appendix, note i.

unsere neuen Abmachungen, angesichts der Intimität der portugiesisch-englischen Beziehungen, und dass bei dem Einfluss, den England in Lissabon besitzt, die dortige Regierung einem deutsch-britischen Einverständnisse gegenüber völlig willenslos ist.

Es galt also, einen anderen Vorwand zu finden, um den Vertrag scheitern zu lassen: Die Bekanntgebung⁸ des Windsorvertrages, der zur Zeit des Fürsten Hohenlohe geschlossen wurde, und der nur eine Erneuerung des niemals ausser Kraft getretenen Vertrags Karls II. war, könne die Stellung des Herrn von Bethmann Hollweg gefährden, als Beweis britischer Heuchelei und Perfidie!

Ich wies darauf hin, dass die Einleitung zu unseren Verträgen ganz dasselbe besage, wie der Windsorvertrag und wie andere ähnliche Verträge, nämlich, dass wir die souveränen Rechte Portugals wahren, und die Unversehrtheit seines Besitzes schützen wollten. Vergebens! Trotz wiederholter Unterredungen mit Sir Ed. Grey, bei denen der Minister immer neue Vorschläge machte, für die Veröffentlichung, beharrte das auswärtige Amt auf seinem Standpunkt, und verabredete schliesslich mit Sir Ed. Goschen, dass alles so bleiben sollte, wie es bisher gewesen!

Der Vertrag, der uns ausserordentliche Vorteile bot, das Ergebnis einer mehr als einjährigen Arbeit, war somit gefallen, weil er für mich ein öffentlicher Erfolg gewesen wäre.

Als ich im Frühjahr 1914 gelegentlich eines Diners⁹ auf der Botschaft, an dem Mr. Harcourt teilnahm, den Gegenstand berührte, erklärte mir der Kolonialminister, er befinde sich in Verlegenheit und wisse nicht,

⁸ B.-C.: "Bekanntgabe."

⁹ B.-C.: "Diner."

guese government could not think of opposing a German-British understanding.

Consequently, another pretext had to be found for wrecking the treaty. It was urged that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe—though it was only a renewal of the treaty of Charles II, which had never gone out of force—might jeopard the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, because it would be proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy!

I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that it was our purpose to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions. In vain! Although Sir Edward Grey, in repeated conversations, kept making fresh proposals concerning publication, our Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir Edward Goschen that everything should be left as it was before.

So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages and was the result of more than a year's work, perished because it would have been a public success for me.

When in the spring of 1914 I had an opportunity, at a dinner in the embassy at which Mr. Harcourt was present, to touch upon the matter, the colonial secretary explained that he found himself in a perplexing position and did not know what attitude he should take. The present state of affairs was intolerable, because he, Mr. Harcourt, wished to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he was to be guided by the old treaty or the new. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear

wie sich zu verhalten. Der gegenwärtige Zustand sei unerträglich, da er, Mr. Harcourt, unsere Rechte berücksichtigen wolle, andererseits aber im Zweifel sei, ob er sich nach dem alten Vertrage oder dem neuen zu richten habe. Es sei daher dringend erwünscht, Klarheit zu schaffen und die Sache, die sich nun schon so lange hinziehe, zum Abschluss zu bringen.

Auf einen diesbezüglichen Bericht erhielt ich einen sehr wenig höflichen, aber um so erregteren Erlass, demzufolge ich mich jeder weiteren Einmischung in der Sache zu enthalten hätte.

Ich bedauere es heute, dass ich nicht daraufhin nach Berlin gefahren bin, um dem Monarchen meinen Posten zur Verfügung zu stellen, und dass ich immer noch den Glauben an die Möglichkeit einer Verständigung zwischen mir und den leitenden Persönlichkeiten nicht verloren hatte, ein verhängnisvoller Irrtum, der sich wenige Monate später in so tragischer Weise rächen sollte!

So wenig ich auch damals das Wohlwollen des obersten Reichsbeamten noch besass, da er fürchtete, ich strebe nach ¹⁰ seinem Posten, so muss ich ihm die Gerechtigkeit widerfahren lassen, dass er bei unserer letzten Unterredung vor Kriegsausbruch, Ende Juli 1914, auf die ich später noch zurückkomme, seine Zustimmung zur Unterschrift und Veröffentlichung erteilte. Trotzdem bedurfte es noch wiederholter Anregungen meinerseits, die von Herrn Dr. Solf in Berlin unterstützt wurden, um endlich Juli 1914 die Genehmigung zu erwirken. Da aber die serbische Krisis damals schon den Frieden Europas bedrohte, musste die Vollziehung des Vertrages verschoben werden. Auch er gehört zu den Opfern dieses Krieges.

¹⁰ B.-C.: "nach nach."

matters up and to bring the affair, which had dragged on so long already, to a conclusion.

In reply to a report on this subject I received a dispatch that was far from courteous but was correspondingly excited, to the effect that I was to abstain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not go at once to Berlin and place my position at the Emperor's disposal; and that I still clung to the belief that an understanding was not impossible between me and the persons who were directing our policies—a fatal mistake, and one for which vengeance was to be exacted, a few months later, in so tragic a fashion!

Although at that time I was no longer in favor with the highest official of the Empire, since he feared that I aspired to his position, I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war—a conversation to which I shall again refer later—he gave his consent to the signing and publication [of the treaty]. In spite of this, it still required repeated applications on my part, which were supported in Berlin by Dr. Solf, to obtain finally, in July, 1914, the [necessary formal] approval. Since, however, the Serbian crisis was then already threatening the peace of Europe, the execution of the treaty had to be postponed. It too is one of the victims of this war.

Bagdadvertrag

Gleichzeitig unterhandelte ich in London, dabei wirksam unterstützt durch Herrn von Kühlmann, über den sog. Bagdadvertrag. Dieser bezweckte tatsächlich die Einteilung Kleinasiens in Interessensphären, obwohl dieser Ausdruck mit Rücksicht auf die Rechte des Sultans ängstlich vermieden wurde. Sir Ed. Grey erklärte auch wiederholt, dass keine Abmachungen mit Frankreich und Russland beständen, die die Aufteilung Kleinasiens bezweckten.

Unter Zuziehung eines türkischen Vertreters, als welcher Hakki Pascha erschien, wurden alle wirtschaftlichen Fragen, die mit den deutschen Unternehmungen in Verbindung standen, im wesentlichen den Wünschen der Deutschen Bank entsprechend geregelt. Das wichtigste Zugeständnis, das Sir Ed. Grey mir persönlich gemacht hatte, war die Verlängerung der Bahnstrecke bis Basra. Dieser Standpunkt war nämlich unsererseits aufgegeben worden zugunsten des Anschlusses nach Alexandrette; Bagdad bildete bisher den Endpunkt der Bahn. Für die Schifffahrt auf dem Schatt-el-Arab sollte eine internationale Kommission sorgen. Auch an den Hafenbauten in Basra wurden wir beteiligt und erhielten ferner Rechte an der Tigrisschifffahrt, die bisher ein Monopol des Hauses Lynch war.

Durch diesen Vertrag wurde ganz Mesopotamien bis Basra unser Interessengebiet, unbeschadet älterer britischer Rechte an der Tigrisschifffahrt und den Wilcox-Bewässerungsanlagen, ferner das ganze Gebiet der Bagdad- und Anatolischen Eisenbahn.

Als britischer Wirtschaftsbereich galten die Küsten des Persischen Busens und die Smyrna-Aidin-Bahn,

*The Bagdad Treaty*²⁴

During the same period I was carrying on negotiations in London, with the efficient support of Herr von Kühlmann, in reference to the so-called Bagdad Treaty. The real purpose of this treaty was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this expression was anxiously avoided, out of regard for the rights of the Sultan. Sir Edward Grey repeatedly stated, moreover, that no agreements existed with France and with Russia aiming at the dismemberment of Asia Minor.

After we had drawn into conference a representative of Turkey, Hakki Pasha, all the economic questions connected with the German enterprises were regulated, in substantial accord with the desires of the German Bank. The most important concession made to me personally by Sir Edward Grey was the prolongation of the railway to Basra. This particular object had been abandoned, on our part, in favor of a connection with Alexandretta. Up to this time Bagdad formed the terminus of the line. Navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab was to be placed under an international commission. We were also admitted to participation in the Basra harbor works and, in addition, we obtained rights in the navigation of the Tigris, which had been previously a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By virtue of this treaty all Mesopotamia as far as Basra became our sphere of interest, without prejudice to older British rights in the navigation of the Tigris and in the Wilcox irrigation works. Our sphere further included the whole region of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway.

²⁴ See Appendix, note xix.

als französischer Syrien, als russischer Armenien. Würden beide Verträge vollzogen und veröffentlicht, so war damit eine Verständigung mit England erreicht, die allen Zweifeln an der Möglichkeit einer "*Anglo-German coöperation*" (eines englisch-deutschen Zusammenwirkens) für immer ein Ende machte.

Flottenfrage

Die heikelste aller Fragen war und blieb die Flottenfrage. Sie wird nicht immer ganz richtig beurteilt.

Die Schaffung einer mächtigen Flotte am anderen Ufer der Nordsee, die gleichzeitige Entwicklung der bedeutendsten Militärmacht des Festlandes zur bedeutendsten Seemacht desselben musste in England zum mindesten als Unbequemlichkeit empfunden werden. Hierüber kann billigerweise kein Zweifel bestehen. Um den nötigen Vorsprung zu behalten und nicht in Abhängigkeit zu geraten und die Herrschaft der Meere zu sichern, die Britannien benötigt, um nicht zu verhungern, musste es zu Rüstungen und Ausgaben schreiten, die schwer auf dem Steuerzahler lasteten. Eine Bedrohung der britischen Weltstellung ergab sich jedoch, wenn unsere Politik die Möglichkeit kriegesischer Entwicklungen gewärtigen liess. Diese Voraussetzung war bei den Marokkokrisen und der bosnischen Frage in sichtbare Nähe getreten.

Mit unserer Flotte *nach den bestehenden Festlegungen* hatte man sich abgefunden, sie war den Briten gewiss nicht willkommen und bildete einen der Gründe, aber nicht den einzigen und vielleicht auch nicht den wichtigsten, für den Anschluss Englands an Frankreich und Russland; aber wegen der Flotte *allein* hätte England ebensowenig zum Schwerte gegriffen, wie

The British economic domain was to include the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin line; the French, Syria; the Russian, Armenia. Had these two treaties been executed and published, an understanding with England would have been reached which would forever have dissipated all doubts as to the possibility of an Anglo-German coöperation.

*The Naval Question*²⁵

The naval question was and remained the thorniest of all the questions at issue. It is not always quite rightly appreciated.

The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea, the development of the most important military power of the continent into its most important naval power as well, could not but arouse in England a sense at least of discomfort. On this point there can be no reasonable doubt. In order to keep the lead it had gained and needed and not to lose its independence, in order to secure the rule of the sea, which Great Britain requires to avoid starvation, it was forced to proceed to armaments and outlays that weighed heavily on the tax-payer. The British position in the world, however, was threatened if our policy caused possible warlike complications to be anticipated. This anticipation had been brought into the immediate field of vision in the Moroccan crisis and in the Bosnian question.

The development of our fleet in accordance with the plans existing at that time had been accepted. It was certainly not welcome to the Britons, and it was one of the motives, although not the only and perhaps not the most important motive, that had

²⁵ See Appendix, note xvi.

etwa wegen unseres Handels, der angeblich den Neid und schliesslich den Krieg gezeitigt hat.

Ich vertrat von Anfang an den Standpunkt, dass es trotz der Flotte möglich ¹¹ sei, zu freundschaftlicher Verständigung und Annäherung zu gelangen, wenn wir keine Novelle brächten und eine zweifelsfreie *Friedenspolitik trieben*. Auch vermied ich es, von der Flotte zu sprechen, und zwischen Sir Ed. Grey und mir ist das Wort überhaupt nicht gefallen. Sir Ed. Grey erklärte gelegentlich in einer Kabinettsitzung: "*The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me*" (Der gegenwärtige deutsche Botschafter hat vor mir nie die Flotte erwähnt).

Während meiner Amtszeit regte bekanntlich Mr. Churchill, der damalige Erste Lord der Admiralität, den sogenannten "*naval holiday*" (Flottenfeiertag) an und schlug aus finanziellen Gründen und wohl auch um der pazifistischen Richtung in seiner Partei entgegenzukommen, eine einjährige Rüstungspause vor. Amtlich von Sir Ed. Grey wurde der Vorschlag nicht unterstützt, zu mir hat er nie davon gesprochen, Mr. Churchill redete mich aber wiederholt darauf an.

Ich bin überzeugt, dass seine Anregung aufrichtig gemeint war, wie überhaupt Winkelzügigkeit nicht im Wesen des Engländers liegt. Es wäre für Mr. Churchill ein grosser Erfolg gewesen, dem Lande mit Ersparnissen aufzuwarten und den Rüstungsalp, der auf dem Volke lastete, erleichtern zu können.

Ich entgegnete, es würde aus technischen Gründen schwer sein, auf seinen Gedanken einzugehen. Was sollte aus den Arbeitern werden, die für diese Zwecke geworben seien, was aus dem technischen Personal? Unser Flottenprogramm sei einmal festgelegt und

¹¹ B.-C.: "unmöglich."

led England to establish closer relations with France and with Russia; but England would no more have grasped the sword on account of our fleet alone than on account, say, of our trade, which is alleged to have bred envy and finally war.

From the outset I took the position that, in spite of the fleet, it was possible to reach a friendly understanding and a *rapprochement*, provided we introduced no new naval bill and conducted our policy on indubitably peaceful lines. I also avoided any mention of the fleet and, in the conversations between Sir Edward Grey and me, the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared incidentally, at a cabinet meeting: "The present German ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."

During my term of office Mr. Churchill, at that time first lord of the admiralty, suggested, as is known, the so-called "naval holiday" and, for financial reasons and probably also in order to meet the pacifist tendency in his party, proposed a stay of armaments for one year. This proposal was not officially supported by Sir Edward Grey; he never spoke of it to me; Mr. Churchill, however, repeatedly addressed me on the subject.

I am convinced that his suggestion was honestly intended. Chicane is not natural to the Englishman. It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill if he could have come before the country with reductions of expenditure and lightened the burden of armament that weighed like a nightmare on the people.

My answer was that for technical reasons it would be difficult to accept his idea. What was to become of the workmen who had been hired for these purposes?

darin liesse sich schwer etwas ändern. Wir beabsichtigten es andererseits auch nicht zu überschreiten. Er kam aber wieder darauf zurück und machte geltend, dass die für ungeheure Rüstungen aufgewendeten Mittel auch besser für andere, nutzbringende Zwecke Verwendung fänden. Ich entgegnete, dass auch diese Ausgaben der heimischen Industrie zugute kämen.

Es gelang mir auch durch Unterredungen mit Sir W. Tyrrell, dem Kabinettschef Sir Edwards, die Frage von der Tagesordnung ¹² abzusetzen, ohne zu verstimmen, obwohl sie im Parlamente wiederkehrte, und zu verhindern, dass ein amtlicher Vorschlag erging. Es war aber ein Lieblingsgedanke Mr. Churchills und der Regierung, und ich glaube, dass wir durch Eingehen auf seine Anregung sowie auf die Formel 16:10 für Grosskampfschiffe einen greifbaren Beweis unseres guten Willens geben und die bei der Regierung vorherrschende Tendenz, mit uns in nähere Fühlung zu kommen, wesentlich befestigen und fördern könnten.

Aber wie gesagt, es war möglich, *trotz der Flotte* und auch ohne "*naval holiday*" zu einer Verständigung zu gelangen. In diesem Sinne hatte ich meine Mission von Anfang aufgefasst, und es war mir auch gelungen, mein Programm zu verwirklichen, als der Ausbruch des Krieges alles Erreichte vernichtete.

Handelsneid

Der Handelsneid, von dem bei uns so viel die Rede ist, beruht auf unrichtiger Beurteilung der Verhältnisse. Gewiss bedrohte das Emporkommen Deutsch-

¹² B.-C.: "Tagesordnung."

What was to be done with the technical personnel? Our naval program was definitely fixed, and it would be difficult to make any change in it. On the other hand, we did not mean to go beyond it. Nevertheless he came back to the matter and urged that the sums expended for enormous armaments might better be applied to other useful purposes. I answered that even these outlays were of advantage to our home industry.

As a result of conversations with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, I succeeded in eliminating this question from the order of the day, and this without provoking any dissatisfaction, although it came up again in Parliament; and I was able to prevent the submission of any official proposal. It was, however, an idea strongly favored by Mr. Churchill and by the government; and I believe that by accepting his suggestion, and also the rate of sixteen to ten for large steam vessels, we might have given tangible evidence of our good will and sensibly strengthened and furthered the tendency that was dominant in the government to bring the two countries into closer touch.

However, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding in spite of the fleet and also without a naval "holiday." I had viewed my mission in this sense from the outset, and I had succeeded, too, in carrying out my program, when the outbreak of the war swept away all that had been gained.

Commercial Jealousy

The [theory of] commercial jealousy, of which there has been so much talk in our country, rests on an erroneous view of the situation. Germany's growing importance as a commercial power, after the war of

lands als Handelsmacht nach dem siebziger Kriege und in folgenden Dezennien die Interessen der britischen Handelskreise, die mit ihrer Industrie und mit ihren Exporthäusern eine Art Monopolstellung besaßen. Der zunehmende Warenaustausch mit Deutschland aber, das an der Spitze aller britischen Exportländer in Europa ¹³ stand, eine Tatsache, auf die ich in meinen öffentlichen Reden immer hinwies, hatte den Wunsch, mit dem besten Kunden und Geschäftsfreund in guten Beziehungen zu bleiben, gezeitigt und alle andern Erwägungen allmählich zurückgedrängt.

Der Brite ist *matter of fact*, er findet sich mit Tatsachen ab und kämpft nicht gegen Windmühlen. Gerade in den kaufmännischen Kreisen fand ich das lebhafteste Entgegenkommen und das Bestreben, die gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen zu fördern. Tatsächlich interessierte sich niemand dort für den russischen, italienischen, österreichischen, ja nicht einmal für den französischen Vertreter, trotz seiner bedeutenden Persönlichkeit und seiner politischen Erfolge. Nur der deutsche und der amerikanische Botschafter erregte die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit.

Ich habe, um mit den wichtigen Handelskreisen Fühlung zu bekommen, den Einladungen der vereinigten Handelskammern sowie der Londoner und Bradford'scher Kammer entsprochen und war Gast der Städte Newcastle und Liverpool. Überall war ich der Gegenstand herzlicher Huldigungen. Manchester, Glasgow und Edinburg hatten mich gleichfalls geladen und ich wollte später dorthin gehen.

Es wurde mir von Leuten, die britische Verhältnisse nicht kennen, und die Bedeutung der "*public dinners*" nicht würdigen, und auch von solchen, denen meine

¹³ B.-C.: omits "in Europa."

1870 and in the following decades, undoubtedly menaced the interests of British trade circles, since with their industry and their export houses these had a sort of monopoly. On the other hand, the increasing exchange of goods with Germany, to which Great Britain exported more merchandise than to any other country in Europe—a fact to which I invariably alluded in my public speeches—had created a desire to maintain good relations with their best customer and business friend and had gradually supplanted all other considerations.

The Briton is a matter-of-fact person, he adjusts himself to conditions and does not tilt against wind-mills. It was precisely in commercial circles that I found the liveliest disposition to establish good relations and to promote common economic interests. As a matter of fact there was in these circles no particular interest in the Russian, the Italian, the Austrian or even the French representative, in spite of the latter's marked personality and political successes. Only the German and the American ambassadors attracted public attention.

In order to get in touch with the most important trade circles, I accepted invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce and also from the London and Bradford Chamber. I was also entertained by the cities of Newcastle and of Liverpool. I received everywhere cordial tributes of respect. Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh had also sent me invitations, and I intended to visit these cities later.

People who do not understand British conditions and who do not appreciate the importance of "public dinners," and also persons to whom my successes were unwelcome, accused me of doing harm by my

Erfolge unerwünscht waren, der Vorwurf gemacht, ich habe durch meine Reden geschadet. Ich glaube vielmehr, dass mein öffentliches Auftreten und die Betonung gemeinsamer wirtschaftlicher Interessen nicht unwesentlich zur Besserung der Beziehungen beigetragen hat, abgesehen davon, dass es ungeschickt und unhöflich gewesen wäre, alle Einladungen abzulehnen.

Auch in allen andern Kreisen habe ich die liebenswürdigste Aufnahme und ein warmes Entgegenkommen gefunden, bei Hof wie in der Gesellschaft und bei der Regierung.

Hof und Gesellschaft

Der König, wenn auch nicht gerade sehr gebildet und bedeutend, aber ein harmloser und wohlwollender Mann mit einfachem, gesundem Sinn, *common sense*, war bestrebt, mir Wohlwollen zu zeigen und aufrichtig gewillt, meine Aufgabe zu fördern. Trotz der geringen Macht, die die englische Verfassung der Krone lässt, vermag der Monarch, kraft seiner Stellung, die Stimmung doch sehr zu beeinflussen, sowohl in der Gesellschaft, wie auch bei der Regierung. Die Krone ist die Spitze der Gesellschaftspyramide, von ihr geht der Ton aus. Die Gesellschaft, überwiegend unionistisch (konservativ), befasst sich, mit Einschluss der Damen, von jeher eifrig mit Politik. Sie ist im *House of Lords* (Oberhaus), wie bei den *Commons* (Haus der Gemeinen), und daher auch im Kabinett vertreten. Der Engländer gehört entweder zur *Society* (Gesellschaft) oder möchte zu ihr gehören. Sein Streben ist und bleibt: ein vornehmer Mann, ein *Gentleman* zu sein, und selbst Leute bescheidener Herkunft, wie Mr. Asquith, verkehren mit Vorliebe in der Gesellschaft und mit schönen, eleganten Damen.

speeches. I am convinced, on the contrary, that my public appearances and my insistence on common economic interests contributed in no slight degree to improving our relations, apart from the fact that it would have been awkward and discourteous to refuse all invitations.

In all other circles I was most kindly received and warmly welcomed, at court as well as in society and on the part of the government.

Court and Society

The King, although not highly educated or of very marked personality, but yet an inoffensive and kindly man, with simple, sound sense—common sense—made a point of indicating his good will to me and was honestly desirous to further the accomplishment of my task. However slight the power that the English constitution leaves in the crown, the King is still able, by virtue of his position, to exercise much influence on opinion, not only in society but also within the government. The crown is the apex of the social pyramid; it sets the fashion. Society, which is for the most part Unionist (conservative) has always taken a very active interest, the women no less than the men, in politics. It is represented not only in the House of Lords, but also in the Commons, and for this reason in the Cabinet as well. The Englishman is either in society or wishes to get into society. It is his constant effort to be a man of distinction, a gentleman; and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, wish to move in society and prefer to meet handsome and fashionable women.

Der britische Gentleman beider Parteien genießt die gleiche Erziehung, besucht dieselben Colleges und Universitäten, betreibt die nämlichen Sports, sei es nun Golf, Cricket, Lawn-Tennis oder Polo. Alle haben in der Jugend Cricket und Fussball gespielt, sie haben dieselben Lebensgewohnheiten und verbringen das *week-end* (Ende der Woche) auf dem Lande. Keine soziale Kluft trennt die Parteien, sondern nur eine politische, die sich in den letzten Jahren nur insofern zu einer sozialen entwickelte, als die Politiker beider Lager sich gesellschaftlich mieden. Man durfte selbst auf dem neutralen Boden einer Botschaft beide Lager nicht mischen, da die Unionisten seit der Veto- und Homerulebill die Radikalen ächteten. Als wenige Monate nach meiner Ankunft das Königspaar bei uns speiste, verliess Lord Londonderry nach Tisch das Haus, um nicht mit Sir Ed. Grey zusammen zu bleiben. Aber es ist kein Gegensatz, der in der Kaste und Erziehung liegt, wie in Frankreich; es sind nicht zwei getrennte Welten, sondern dieselbe Welt, und das Urteil über einen Ausländer ist ein gemeinsames und nicht ohne Einfluss auf seine politische Stellung, ob nun Mr. Asquith regiert oder Lord Lansdowne.

Ein Gegensatz der Kaste besteht in England nicht mehr, seit der Zeit der Stuarts und nachdem die Welfen und die Whigoligarchie im Gegensatz zu dem toristischen Landadel die bürgerlich-städtischen Kreise emporkommen liessen. Es ist vielmehr ein Gegensatz der politischen Meinungen über staatsrechtliche Fragen oder über Steuerpolitik. Gerade Aristokraten, die sich der Volkspartei, den Radikalen anschliessen, die Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, wurden von der unionistischen Aristokratie am meisten gehasst. Niemals begegnete man einem dieser Herren in den

The British gentleman, no matter to which party he belongs, enjoys the same education, goes to the same colleges and universities, engages in the same sports, whether it be golf, cricket, tennis or polo. They have all played cricket and football in their youth; they have the same habits of life, and they spend the week-end in the country. The cleavage between the parties is not social but purely political. In the last few years it has become a social cleavage only in so far as the politicians of the two camps avoid social intercourse with one another. Even on the neutral territory of an embassy the two camps could not be brought together, for, since the Home Rule and Veto Bills, the Unionists have put the Radicals under a ban. When, a few months after my arrival, the King and Queen dined with us, Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to remain in company with Sir Edward Grey. There is, however, no barrier based on caste and education, such as exists in France. There are not two separate worlds, it is the same world, and its judgment regarding a foreigner is a common judgment and is not without influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith is governing or Lord Lansdowne.

There has been no barrier of caste in England since the time of the Stuarts, since the Guelphs and the Whig oligarchy, in opposition to the Tory landed gentry, promoted the rise of the urban middle classes. There is rather a difference of political opinions regarding constitutional questions or regarding tax policies. The bitterest hatred of the Unionist aristocracy is directed precisely against aristocrats, such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt and Crewe, who attach themselves to the popular party, to the Radicals. One never

grossen aristokratischen Häusern, ausser bei den wenigen Parteifreunden.

Wir wurden in London mit offenen Armen aufgenommen und beide Parteien überboten sich in Zuvorkommenheit. Es wäre fehlerhaft, gesellschaftliche Beziehungen bei dem engen Verhältnis, das in England zwischen Politik und Gesellschaft besteht, zu unterschätzen, selbst wenn die grosse Mehrheit der obern Zehntausend sich in Opposition zur Regierung befindet.

Zwischen Herrn Asquith und dem Duke of Devonshire ¹⁴ besteht eben nicht die unüberbrückbare Kluft wie etwa zwischen Herrn Briand und dem Duc de Doudeauville. Sie verkehren zwar in Zeiten erregter Spannung nicht miteinander, sie gehören zwei gesonderten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen an, es sind aber doch Teile *derselben* Gesellschaft, wenn auch verschiedener Stufen, deren Mittelpunkt der Hof ist, sie haben gemeinsame Freunde und Lebensgewohnheiten, sie kennen sich meist von Jugend an und sind auch oft verwandt und verschwägert.

Erscheinungen wie Mr. Lloyd George, der Mann des Volkes, kleiner Advokat und Selfmademan, sind Ausnahmen. Selbst Mr. Burns, Sozialist, Arbeiterführer und Autodidakt, suchte Fühlung in der Gesellschaft. Bei dem verbreiteten Bestreben, als Gentleman zu gelten, als dessen unerreichtes Vorbild der grosse Aristokrat noch immer erscheint, ist das Urteil gerade der Gesellschaft und ihre Haltung nicht zu unterschätzen.

Nirgends spielt daher die gesellschaftliche Eignung eines Vertreters eine grössere Rolle wie in England. Ein gastreiches Haus mit freundlichen Wirten ist

¹⁴ B.-C.: "Devoshire."

met any of these gentlemen in the great aristocratic houses, except in those of their few party friends.

We were received in London with open arms, and the two parties outbid each other in attentions. Given the close relation that exists in England between politics and society, it would be a mistake to undervalue social connections, even though the great majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the government.

Between Mr. Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire there is nothing like the unbridgeable gulf that exists, let us say, between M. Briand and the Duc de Doudeauville. In periods of acute tension, indeed, they do not meet each other. They are members of two separate social groups; but these, although on different levels, are nevertheless parts of the same society, of which the court is the center. They have common friends and common ways of living. For the most part they have known each other from their youth and are often related or connected by marriage.

Phenomena such as Mr. Lloyd George, a man of the people, a lawyer in a small way and a self-made man, are exceptional. Even Mr. Burns, a socialist, a labor leader, and a self-educated man, tried to get in touch with society. Given the general desire to rank as a gentleman, whose unattained prototype is still the great aristocrat, the judgment of society and its attitude are by no means to be undervalued.

Nowhere in the world, accordingly, does the social adaptability of a [diplomatic] representative play a more important part than in England. An open house with friendly hosts counts for more than the profoundest scientific attainments, and a savant with

mehr wert als die profundesten wissenschaftlichen Kenntnisse, und ein Gelehrter mit provinziellem Wesen und allzu kargen Mitteln würde trotz alles Wissens keinen Einfluss gewinnen.

Was der Brite hasst, ist *a bore*, *a schemer*¹⁵ *a prig* (ein langweiliger Kerl, ein Ränkeschmied, ein Fant), was er liebt, ist *a good fellow* (ein guter Gesell)!

Sir Edward Grey

Sir Ed. Greys Einfluss war in allen Fragen der auswärtigen Politik nahezu unbeschränkt. Zwar sagte er bei wichtigen Anlässen: *"I must first bring it before the Cabinet"* (Ich muss das erst im Ministerrat vorbringen), doch schloss dieses sich seinen Ansichten regelmässig an. Seine Autorität war unbestritten. Obwohl er das Ausland gar nicht kennt und ausser einer kurzen Reise nach Paris niemals England verlassen hatte, beherrschte er alle wichtigen Fragen durch langjährige parlamentarische Erfahrung und natürlichen Überblick. Französisch versteht er, ohne es zu sprechen. In jungen Jahren in das Parlament gewählt, hatte er bald angefangen, sich mit Auslandspolitik zu befassen. Unter Lord Rosebery parlamentarischer Unterstaatssekretär des Auswärtigen, wurde er 1906 unter Mr. Campbell-Bannermann Staatssekretär und bekleidet diesen Posten nunmehr seit zehn Jahren.

Aus einer alten, im Norden Englands begüterten Familie stammend, die bereits den bekannten Staatsmann Grey geliefert hatte, schloss er sich dem linken Flügel seiner Partei an und sympatisierte mit Sozialisten und Pazifisten. Man kann ihn einen Sozialisten im idealsten Sinne nennen, denn er überträgt die Theorie auch auf sein Privatleben, das sich durch die

¹⁵ B.-C.: "Shemer."

provincial manners and too limited means would, despite all his knowledge, gain no influence.

What the Briton hates is a bore, a schemer, a prig; what he loves is a good fellow.

Sir Edward Grey

In all questions of foreign policy Sir Edward Grey's influence was almost unlimited. On important occasions he used indeed to say: "I must first bring it before the Cabinet," but this body regularly accepted his views. His authority was undisputed. Although he was wholly unacquainted with foreign countries and, except for one short journey to Paris, had never left England, he was competent to deal with all important questions by reason of many years of parliamentary experience and a natural breadth of vision. He understands French, although he does not speak it. Elected to parliament at an early age, he soon began to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs under Lord Rosebery, he became secretary of state under Mr. Campbell-Bannermann, and has now [1916] held this post for ten years.

Sprung from an old family, possessing estates in the north of England—a family which had already produced the well-known statesman Earl Grey—he attached himself to the left wing of his party and exhibited sympathy with socialists and pacifists. He may be described as a socialist in the most ideal sense of the term; for he carries the theory of socialism even into his private life, which is marked by the

grösste Einfachheit und Anspruchslosigkeit auszeichnet, obwohl er über reichliche Mittel verfügt. Jede Repräsentation liegt ihm fern. Er hatte in London nur ein kleines Absteigequartier, gab niemals Dîners, ausserdem einen amtlichen im *Foreign Office* (Auswärtigen Amt). zu Königs Geburtstag. Wenn er ausnahmsweise einige Gäste bei sich sah, so war es zu einem einfachen Essen oder Frühstück in ganz kleinem Kreise und mit weiblicher Bedienung. Auch mied er grosse Geselligkeiten und Feste.

Das *week-end* verbringt er, wie seine Kollegen, regelmässig auf dem Lande, doch nicht mit eleganten, grossen Parties. Meist bleibt er allein in seinem *Cottage* im Newforest, wo er lange Spaziergänge macht, um Vögel zu beobachten als leidenschaftlicher Naturfreund und Ornithologe. Oder aber er ging nach Norden auf sein Gut, wo er Eichhörnchen fütterte, die den Weg durch das Fenster fanden, und verschiedene Arten Wasservögel züchtete.

Mit Vorliebe setzte er sich gelegentlich nach Norfolk in die Sümpfe, um seltene Reiherarten beim Brüten zu beobachten, die nur dort nisten.

In seiner Jugend ein berühmter Cricket- und Racketspieler, treibt er jetzt als Hauptsport das Angeln nach Lachs und Forellen in den schottischen Gewässern—in Begleitung seines Freundes Lord Glenconner, des Bruders von Mr. Asquith. "*All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it*" (Das ganze Jahresende warte ich darauf). Er hat ein Buch über den Angelsport herausgegeben.

Als wir ein *week-end* mit ihm allein bei Lord Glenconner in der Nähe von Salisbury verbrachten, kam er auf dem Zweirad angefahren und kehrte ebenso

greatest simplicity and absence of all pretension, although he is possessed of ample means. Display of any sort is foreign to him. He had in London modest quarters only, and gave no dinners except the one official dinner in the Foreign Office on the King's Birthday. If, exceptionally, he asked a few people to his house, it was to a simple meal or to a small luncheon served by a maid. He shunned large gatherings and celebrations.

Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends in the country, but not at large, fashionable house parties. For the most part he lives alone, in his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks to watch the ways of birds, being a devoted lover of nature and an ornithologist. Or, on the other hand, he goes north, to his property, where he feeds squirrels that make their way in through the window and breeds different kinds of water-fowl.

He was specially fond of occasional excursions to the Norfolk marshes, to watch during the breeding season some rare varieties of heron that nest only in that region.

In his youth he was a noted cricketer and tennis player. Now his chief sport is salmon and trout fishing, in Scotch waters, in the company of his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. "All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has published a book on fishing.

When on one occasion we spent a week-end with him alone, at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle and returned in the same way to his cottage, some thirty miles distant.

The simplicity and sincerity of his character won for him the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be

nach seinem etwa dreissig englische Meilen entfernten *Cottage* zurück.

Die Einfachheit und Lauterkeit seines Wesens verschafften ihm auch die Achtung seiner Gegner, die mehr auf dem Gebiete der innern als der auswärtigen Politik zu suchen waren. Lügen und Intrigen sind ihm gleichmässig fern.

Seine Frau, die er zärtlich liebte, trotzdem sie angeblich nicht eigentlich seine Gattin war, und von der er sich niemals trennte, starb infolge eines Sturzes aus einem Wagen, den sie selbst lenkte. Einer seiner Brüder wurde bekanntlich durch einen Löwen getötet.

Wordsworth ist sein Lieblingsdichter, und er konnte ihn auswendig vortragen.

Der kühlen Ruhe seines britischen Wesens fehlt nicht der Sinn für Humor. Als er bei uns frühstückte in Gesellschaft der Kinder, und deren deutsche Unterhaltung hörte, meinte er: "*I can't help thinking how clever these children are to talk German so well*" (Ich muss immer denken, wie klug sind diese Kinder, dass sie so gut deutsch sprechen) und freute sich über den Witz.

So sieht der Mann aus, der als Lügen-Grey und als Anstifter des Weltkrieges verschrien wird.

Mr. Asquith

Mr. Asquith ist ganz anderer Art. Jovialer Lebemann, Freund der Damen, namentlich der jungen und hübschen, liebt er heitere Gesellschaft und gute Küche, und wird dabei von seiner lebenslustigen Gattin unterstützt. Ehemals bekannter Advokat mit reichem Einkommen und langjähriger Parlamentarier, dann Minister unter Mr. Gladstone, Pazifist wie sein Freund Grey, und Freund einer Verständigung mit Deutschland, behandelte er alle Fragen mit der

found rather in the field of domestic politics than in that of foreign affairs. Falsehood and intrigue are equally foreign to him.

His wife, whom he loved tenderly (in spite of gossip that they did not live as man and wife) and from whom he was inseparable, was killed by being thrown from a trap which she herself was driving. One of his brothers, as is known, was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth is his favorite poet, and he is able to recite long passages from memory.

Under the cool repose of his British manner there is no lack of a sense of humor. When, on one occasion, he took lunch in our house in the company of the children and heard their German conversation, he said: "I can't help thinking how clever these children are to talk German so well," and he showed himself pleased with the joke.

This is a true picture of the man who is denounced as "Liar Grey" and as instigator of the World War.

Mr. Asquith

Mr. Asquith is quite a different sort of man. Jovial, a *bon vivant*, a friend of the ladies, especially of those who are young and good looking, he loves cheerful society and good cooking. His social tastes are shared by his vivacious wife. Formerly a well-known barrister, with a large income, he was for many years a member of Parliament and then, under Mr. Gladstone, a minister. Like his friend Grey, a pacifist and inclined to an understanding with Germany, he

heiteren Ruhe und Sicherheit eines erfahrenen Geschäftsmannes, dessen gute Gesundheit und vortreffliche Nerven durch fleissiges Golfspiel gestählt sind.

Seine Töchter gingen in deutsche Pensionate und sprachen fließend Deutsch. Wir waren nach kurzer Zeit mit ihm und seiner Familie befreundet und seine Gäste auf dem Lande in dem kleinen Hause an der Themse.

Um auswärtige Politik kümmerte er sich nur in seltenen Fällen, wenn wichtige Fragen vorlagen; dann war natürlich die letzte Entscheidung bei ihm. In den kritischen Tagen des Juli kam Mrs. Asquith wiederholt zu uns, um zu warnen, und war schliesslich ganz verzweifelt über die tragische Wendung. Auch Herr Asquith war am 2. August, als ich ihn besuchte, um einen letzten Versuch im Sinne einer abwartenden Neutralität zu machen, ganz gebrochen, wenn auch vollkommen ruhig. Die Tränen liefen ihm über die beiden Wangen hinunter.

Nicolson

Im *Foreign Office* (Auswärtigen Amt) hatten neben dem Minister Sir A. Nicolson und Sir W. Tyrrell ¹⁶ den stärksten Einfluss.

Ersterer war nicht unser Freund, aber seine Haltung gegen mich war immer durchaus korrekt und zuvorkommend. Unsere persönlichen Beziehungen waren die besten. Auch er wollte den Krieg nicht, als wir aber gegen Frankreich zogen, hatte er zweifellos im Sinne des sofortigen Anschlusses gearbeitet. Er war der Vertrauensmann meines französischen Kollegen, mit dem er in dauernder Fühlung stand; auch wollte er Lord Bertie in Paris ablösen.

¹⁶ B.-C.: "Tyrrell."

treated all questions with the cheerful calmness and the sure touch of an experienced man of affairs. His sound health and excellent nerves are strengthened by assiduous golf-playing.

His daughters studied in German boarding schools and spoke German fluently. We were soon on friendly terms with him and with his family, and visited him in the country, at his little house on the Thames.

With foreign affairs he occupied himself only on rare occasions, when important questions came up; at such times naturally the final decision lay with him. During the critical days of July Mrs. Asquith came repeatedly to our house to warn us, and in the end she was quite in despair over the tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith, also, when on the second of August I called on him to make a last attempt to obtain a neutral and waiting attitude, was completely broken, although quite calm. Tears were rolling down his cheeks.

Nicholson

In the Foreign Office the men of greatest influence, aside from the minister, were Sir Arthur Nicholson and Sir William Tyrrell.

Nicholson was not our friend, but his attitude towards me was always perfectly correct and courteous. Our personal relations could not have been better. He also had no desire for war; but when we marched against France, he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, with whom he kept in constant touch; he hoped, moreover, to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris.

Bekanntlich war Sir Arthur vorher Botschafter in Petersburg und hatte den Vertrag des Jahres 1907 abgeschlossen, der es Russland ermöglichte, sich dem Westen und dem nahen Orient wieder zuzuwenden.

*Tyrrell*¹⁶

Viel grösseren Einfluss als der permanente Unterstaatssekretär besass der Kabinettschef oder "*private secretary*" Sir Edwards: Sir Tyrrell.¹⁶ Dieser hochintelligente Mann hatte in Deutschland das Gymnasium besucht und sich nachher der Diplomatie zugewandt, war aber nur kurze Zeit im Ausland gewesen. Zunächst schloss er sich der damals unter den jüngeren britischen Diplomaten modernen antideutschen Richtung an, um später ein überzeugter Befürworter der Verständigung zu werden. In diesem Sinne hat er auch Sir Ed. Grey beeinflusst, mit dem er sehr intim war. Seit Ausbruch des Krieges hat er das Amt verlassen und im *Home Office* (Ministerium des Innern) Anstellung gefunden, wohl infolge der gegen ihn wegen seiner germanophilen Richtung erhobenen Kritik.

Haltung des Amtes

Die Wut gewisser Herren über meine Londoner Erfolge und über die Stellung, die ich mir in kurzer Zeit machen konnte, war unbeschreiblich. Schikanöse Erlasse wurden ersonnen, um mein Amt zu erschweren; ich blieb in völliger Unkenntnis der wichtigsten Dinge und wurde auf die Mitteilung belangloser, langweiliger Berichte beschränkt. Geheime Agentennachrichten über Dinge, die ich ohne Spionage und die nötigen Fonds nicht erfahren konnte, waren mir niemals

¹⁶ B.-C.: "Tyrell."

Sir Arthur, as everyone knows, was formerly ambassador in St. Petersburg. He concluded the treaty of 1907, which enabled Russia to direct its attention again to the West and the Near East.

Tyrrell

An influence much greater than that of the permanent under-secretary of state was exercised by Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell. This exceptionally intelligent man had studied in a German preparatory school and had then entered the diplomatic service, but was abroad for only a short time. At the outset, he associated himself with the anti-German tendencies which at that time were up-to-date among the younger British diplomats; later, he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. His influence with Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was on a very intimate footing, was exercised in this direction. After the outbreak of the war he left the Foreign Office and obtained a position in the Home Office. This change was probably made on account of the criticism directed against him on account of his Germanophil tendencies.

Attitude of the Berlin Foreign Office

The rage excited among certain gentlemen by my successes in London, and by the position which I had been able to gain for myself in a short time, was indescribable. Captious orders were devised to make my position difficult; I was kept in complete ignorance of the most important matters; and I was restricted to sending unimportant and tiresome reports. The information acquired by secret agents, regarding things which I could not ascertain without spies

zugänglich, und erst in den letzten Tagen des Juli ¹⁷ 1914 erfuhr ich zufällig durch den Marine-attaché die geheimen englisch-französischen Abmachungen über das Zusammenwirken beider Flotten im Falle eines Krieges. Auch andere wichtige und dem Amt längst bekannte Vorgänge wie der Briefwechsel Grey-Cambon wurden mir vorenthalten.

Kriegsfall

Ich hatte bald nach meiner Ankunft die Überzeugung gewonnen, dass wir unter *keinen* Umständen einen englischen Angriff oder eine englische Unterstützung eines fremden Angriffes zu befürchten hätten, dass aber *unter allen Umständen England die Franzosen schützen würde*. Diese Ansicht habe ich in wiederholten Berichten und mit ausführlicher Begründung und grossem Nachdruck vertreten, ohne jedoch Glauben zu finden, obwohl die Ablehnung der Neutralitätsformel durch Lord Haldane und die Haltung Englands während der Marokkokrise recht deutliche Winke waren. Dazu kamen noch die bereits erwähnten und dem Amte bekannten geheimen Abmachungen.

Ich wies immer darauf hin, dass England als Handelsstaat bei jedem Kriege zwischen europäischen Grossmächten ausserordentlich leiden, ihn daher mit allen Mitteln verhindern würde, andererseits aber eine Schwächung oder Vernichtung Frankreichs im Interesse des europäischen Gleichgewichts und um eine deutsche Übermacht zu verhindern niemals dulden

¹⁷ B.-C.: "Jahres."

and the necessary funds, was never placed at my disposal; and it was not until the last days of July, 1914, that I learned by chance from the naval attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreements concerning the coöperation of the two fleets in case of a war. Moreover, other important correspondence, long known to the Foreign Office, such as the Grey-Cambon correspondence, was withheld from me.²⁶

The Casus Belli

Soon after my arrival I became convinced that under no circumstances had we to apprehend an English attack or any English support of an attack by a third power, but that under any circumstances England would protect the French. I advanced this opinion in repeated reports, with detailed statement of my reasons and with great emphasis, but without obtaining any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal of the proposed neutrality clause²⁷ and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis gave us very clear hints. Besides all this, there were those secret agreements which I have already mentioned and which were known to the Foreign Office.

I always pointed out that, in any war between European Great Powers, England, as a commercial state, would suffer enormously, and that it would therefore make every effort to prevent such a war, but that, on the other hand, because of its interest in maintaining the European balance of power and in preventing Germany from gaining a dominant position, England could never tolerate a weakening or annihila-

²⁶ See Appendix, note x.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, note xvi.

könne. Das hatte mir bald nach meiner Ankunft Lord Haldane gesagt. In ähnlichem Sinne äusserten sich alle massgebenden Leute.

Serbische Krise

Ende Juni begab ich mich auf Allerhöchsten Befehl nach Kiel, nachdem ich wenige Wochen vorher in Oxford Ehrendoktor geworden war, eine Würde, die vor mir kein deutscher Botschafter seit Herrn von Bunsen bekleidet hatte. An Bord des „Meteor“ erfuhren wir den Tod des Erzherzogthronfolgers. S. M. bedauerte, dass dadurch seine Bemühungen, den hohen Herrn für seine Ideen zu gewinnen, vergeblich waren. Ob der Plan einer aktiven Politik gegen Serbien schon in Konopischt festgelegt wurde, kann ich nicht wissen.

Da ich über Wiener Ansichten und Vorgänge nicht unterrichtet war, mass ich dem Ereignisse keine weitgehende Bedeutung bei. Ich konnte später nur feststellen, dass bei österreichischen Aristokraten ein Gefühl der Erleichterung andere Empfindungen überwog. An Bord des „Meteor“ befand sich auch als Gast S. M. ein Österreicher, Graf Felix Thun. Er hatte die ganze Zeit wegen Seekrankheit, trotz herrlichen Wetters, in der Kabine gelegen. Nach Eintreffen der Nachricht war er aber gesund. Der Schreck oder die Freude hatte ihn geheilt!

In Berlin angekommen, sah ich den Reichskanzler und sagte ihm, dass ich unsere auswärtige Lage für sehr befriedigend hielt, da wir mit England so gut ständen, wie schon lange nicht. Auch in Frankreich sei ein pazifistisches Ministerium am Ruder.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg schien meinen Optimismus nicht zu teilen und beklagte sich über rus-

tion of France. Lord Haldane had told me this shortly after my arrival. All the influential people expressed themselves in the same sense.

The Serbian Crisis

At the end of June I went to Kiel, by command of the Emperor. A few weeks earlier I had received an honorary doctorate at Oxford, a distinction which had not been conferred on any German ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the *Meteor* we learned of the death of the archducal heir to the throne. His Majesty regretted that his efforts to win that prince's support for his ideas had thus been rendered vain. Whether the plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt, I am not in a position to know.

As I was not kept posted regarding views and proceedings in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this event. All that I could ascertain later was that among Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board the *Meteor*, also as a guest of His Majesty, was an Austrian, Count Felix Thun. In spite of the splendid weather, he had remained in his cabin all the time, suffering from sea-sickness. After receiving the news, however, he was well. Alarm or joy had cured him!

On my arrival in Berlin I saw the imperial chancellor. I told him that I considered our foreign situation very satisfactory, since we were on better terms with England than we had been for a long time. In France, too, a pacifist ministry was at the helm.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism and complained about Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, emphasizing in particular

sische Rüstungen. Ich suchte ihn zu beruhigen und betonte namentlich, dass Russland gar kein Interesse habe, uns anzugreifen, und dass ein solcher Angriff auch niemals die englisch-französische Unterstützung finden würde, da beide Länder den Frieden wollten. Darauf ging ich zu Herrn Dr. Zimmermann, der Herrn von Jagow vertrat, und erfuhr von ihm, dass Russland im Begriff sei, 900,000 Mann neuer Truppen aufzustellen. Aus seinen Worten ging eine unverkennbare Misstimmung gegen Russland hervor, das uns überall im Wege sei. Es handelte sich auch um handelspolitische Schwierigkeiten. Dass General von Moltke zum Krieg drängte, wurde mir natürlich nicht gesagt. Ich erfuhr aber, dass Herr von Tschirschky einen Verweis erhalten, weil er berichtete, er habe in Wien Serbien gegenüber zur Mässigung geraten.

Auf meiner Rückreise aus Schlesien auf dem Wege nach London hielt ich mich nur wenige Stunden in Berlin auf und hörte, dass Österreich beabsichtigte,¹⁸ gegen Serbien vorzugehen, um unhaltbaren Zuständen ein Ende zu machen.

Leider unterschätzte ich in dem Augenblick die Tragweite der Nachricht. Ich glaubte, es würde doch wieder nichts daraus werden und, falls Russland drohte, leicht beizulegen sein. Heute bereue ich, nicht in Berlin geblieben zu sein und sogleich erklärt zu haben, dass ich eine derartige Politik nicht mitmache.

Nachträglich erfuhr ich, dass bei der entscheidenden Besprechung in Potsdam am 5. Juli die Wiener Anfrage die unbedingte Zustimmung aller massgebenden Persönlichkeiten fand, und zwar mit dem Zusatze, es werde auch nichts schaden, wenn daraus ein Krieg mit Russland entstehen sollte. So heisst

¹⁸ B.-C.: "beabsichtige."

[my belief] that Russia had no interest whatever in attacking us, and that such an attack would in no case receive Anglo-French support, since both countries desired peace. Next I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow, and learned from him that Russia was about to raise 900,000 additional troops. His words revealed unmistakable dissatisfaction with Russia, which he found everywhere in our way. There was question also of difficulties in the field of trade policy. Of course I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky had received a reprimand, because he reported that in Vienna he had counselled moderation toward Serbia.

On my return from Silesia, on my way to London, I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia in order to put an end to an untenable situation.

At the moment, unfortunately, I underestimated the significance of the news. I thought that nothing would come of it, this time either, and that in case Russia made threats the matter would be easily adjusted. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I would not coöperate in a policy of this kind.

Subsequently I learned that, at the decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5th,²⁸ the Vienna inquiry received the unqualified assent of all the controlling authorities, with the further suggestion that it would not be a bad thing if war with Russia should result. At least this statement was made in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London

²⁸ See Appendix, note xx.

es wenigstens im österreichischen Protokoll, das Graf Mensdorff in London erhielt. Bald darauf war Herr von Jagow in Wien, um mit Graf Berchtold alles zu besprechen.

Dann bekam ich die Weisung, darauf hinzuwirken, dass die englische Presse eine freundliche Haltung einnehme, wenn Österreich der grossserbischen Bewegung den „Todesstoss“ versetze, und durch meinen Einfluss möglichst zu verhindern, dass die öffentliche Meinung gegen Österreich Stellung nähme. Die Erinnerungen an die Haltung Englands während der Annexionskrise, wo die öffentliche Meinung für die serbischen Rechte auf Bosnien¹⁹ Sympathie zeigte, sowie auch an die wohlwollende Förderung nationaler Bewegungen zur Zeit Lord Byrons und Garibaldi's, dieses und anderes sprach so sehr gegen die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Unterstützung der geplanten Strafexpedition gegen die Fürstenmörder, dass ich mich veranlasst sah, dringend zu warnen. Ich warnte aber auch vor dem ganzen Projekt, das ich als abenteuerlich und gefährlich bezeichnete, und riet, den Österreichern *Mässigung* anzuempfehlen, da ich nicht an Lokalisierung des Konfliktes glaubte.

Herr von Jagow antwortete mir, Russland sei nicht bereit, etwas Gepolter würde es wohl geben, aber je fester wir zu Österreich ständen, um so mehr würde Russland zurückweichen. Österreich beschuldigte uns schon so der Flaumacherei und so dürften wir nicht kneifen. Die Stimmung in Russland würde anderseits immer deutschfeindlicher, und da müssten wir es eben riskieren.

Angesichts dieser Haltung, die, wie ich später erfuhr, auf Berichten des Grafen Pourtalès fusste, dass

¹⁹ B.-C.: „Bosniens.“

Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna, to talk everything over with Count Berchtold.

Next I received instructions to try to induce the English press to adopt a friendly attitude, should Austria administer the "death blow" to the Pan-Serbian movement, and to use my influence so far as possible to prevent public opinion from becoming hostile to Austria. Recollections of the English attitude during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the rights of Serbia to Bosnia, and of the benevolent furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and of Garibaldi—these and other considerations argued so strongly against the probability of any support of the intended punitive expedition against the regicides that I found myself moved to give an urgent warning. I added a warning against the whole plan, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous; and I advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized.

Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready. There would probably be some blustering, but the more firmly we stood by Austria the more certainly would Russia give way. Already Austria was accusing us of flabbiness, and for this reason we must not hold back. Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we must just risk it.

In view of this attitude (which, as I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtalès that Russia would not move under any circumstances—[reports] that caused us to incite Count Berchtold to the utmost energy) I hoped for rescue through English mediation,

Russland unter keinen Umständen sich rühren werde, und die uns veranlassten, den Grafen Berchtold zu möglichster Energie anzufeuern, erhoffte ich die Rettung von einer englischen Vermittlung, da ich wusste, dass Sir Ed. Greys Einfluss in Petersburg im Sinne des Friedens zu verwerthen war. Ich benutzte daher meine freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zum Minister, um ihn vertraulich zu bitten, in Russland zur Mässigung zu raten, falls Österreich, wie es schien, von den Serben Genugthuung verlangte.

Zunächst war die Haltung der englischen Presse ruhig und den Österreichern freundlich, da man den Mord verurteilte. Allmählich aber wurden immer mehr Stimmen laut, welche betonten, dass, so sehr eine Ahndung des Verbrechens nötig sei, eine Ausbeutung desselben zu politischen Zwecken nicht zu rechtfertigen wäre. Österreich wurde eindringlich zur Mässigung aufgefordert.

Als das Ultimatum erschien, waren alle Organe, mit Ausnahme des stets notleidenden und von den Österreichern anscheinend bezahlten "Standard" einig in der Verurteilung. Die ganze Welt, ausser in Berlin und Wien, begriff, dass es den Krieg, und zwar den Weltkrieg bedeutete. Die britische Flotte, welche zufällig zu einer Flottenschau versammelt war, wurde nicht demobilisiert.

Ich drängte zunächst auf eine möglichst entgegenkommende Antwort Serbiens, da die Haltung der russischen Regierung keinen Zweifel mehr an dem Ernst der Lage liess.

Die serbische Antwort entsprach den britischen Bemühungen, denn tatsächlich hatte Herr Paschitsch alles angenommen, bis auf zwei Punkte, über die er sich bereit erklärte zu unterhandeln. Wollten Russ-

as I knew that Sir Edward Grey's great influence in St. Petersburg could be utilized in favor of peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia, in case Austria, as seemed likely, should demand satisfaction from Serbia.

At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly to the Austrians, because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more voices were raised, insisting that, however much the crime merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was earnestly exhorted to show moderation.

When the ultimatum was published, all the papers, with the exception of the *Standard*, which was always in financial difficulties and was apparently paid by the Austrians, were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, realized that it meant war, and what was more, world war. The British fleet, which by chance was assembled for a naval review, was not demobilized.

I urged, in the first place, that as conciliatory a reply as was possible be obtained from Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian government left room for no further doubt as to the gravity of the situation.

Serbia's answer was in accord with the British efforts; M. Pashitch in fact agreed to everything, except two points, about which he declared his willingness to negotiate. Had Russia and England wished for war, in order to fall upon us unawares, a hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the unprecedented [Austrian] note would have been left unanswered.

land und England den Krieg, um uns zu überfallen, so genügte ein Wink nach Belgrad, und die unerhörte Note blieb unbeantwortet.

Sir Ed. Grey ging die serbische Antwort mit mir durch und wies auf die entgegenkommende Haltung der Regierung in Belgrad. Wir berieten dann seinen Vermittlungsvorschlag, der eine beiden Teilen annehmbare Auslegung dieser beiden Punkte vereinbaren sollte. Unter seinem Vorsitz wären Herr Cambon, Marquis Imperiali²⁰ und ich zusammengetreten, und es wäre leicht gewesen, eine annehmbare Form für die strittigen Punkte zu finden, die im wesentlichen die Mitwirkung der k. u. k. Beamten bei den Untersuchungen Belgrad betrafen. In einer oder zwei Sitzungen war alles bei gutem Willen zu erledigen, und schon die bloße Annahme des britischen Vorschlages hätte eine Entspannung bewirkt und unsere Beziehungen zu England weiter verbessert. Ich befürwortete ihn daher dringend, da sonst der Weltkrieg bevorstehe, bei dem wir alles zu verlieren und nichts zu gewinnen hätten. Umsonst! Es sei gegen die Würde Österreichs, auch wollten wir uns in die serbische Sache nicht mischen, wir überliessen sie unserem Bundesgenossen. Ich solle auf „Lokalisierung des Konfliktes“ hinwirken.

Es hätte natürlich nur eines Winkes von Berlin bedurft, um den Grafen Berchtold zu bestimmen, sich mit einem diplomatischen Erfolg zu begnügen und sich bei der serbischen Antwort zu beruhigen. Dieser Wink ist aber nicht ergangen. Im Gegenteil, es wurde zum Kriegegedrängt. Es wäre ein so schöner Erfolg gewesen.

Nach unserer Ablehnung bat Sir Edward uns, mit einem Vorschlag hervorzutreten. Wir bestanden auf

²⁰ B.-C.: „Imperioli.“

Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade government. Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to establish by agreement an interpretation of the two points which should be acceptable to both parties. M. Cambon, Marquis Imperiali and I were to meet under his presidency; and it would have been easy to find an acceptable formula for the points at issue, which in substance concerned the coöperation of Austrian officials in the investigations at Belgrade. Given good will, everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the tension and would have further improved our relations with England. I therefore strongly supported the proposal, because otherwise the World War was in sight, in which we would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. In vain! It was declared to be derogatory to the dignity of Austria; moreover we did not intend to interfere in the Serbian affair; we were leaving this to our ally. I was to work for the "localization of the conflict."

It would of course have required only a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and quietly accept the Serbian answer. This hint, however, was not given. On the contrary, pressure was exercised in favor of war. It would have been so fine a success.

After our refusal, Sir Edward Grey begged us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply except that Austria was showing itself enormously "concili-

dem Kriege. Ich konnte keine andere Antwort erhalten, als dass es ein kolossales „Entgegenkommen“ Österreichs sei, keine Gebietserwerbungen zu beabsichtigen.

Sir Edward wies mit Recht darauf hin, dass man auch ohne Gebietserwerbung ein Land zum Vasallen erniedrigen kann; und dass Russland hierin eine Demütigungserblicken und es daher nicht dulden werde.

Der Eindruck befestigte sich immer mehr, dass wir den Krieg unter allen Umständen wollten. Anders war unsere Haltung in einer Frage, die uns doch direkt gar nichts anging, nicht zu verstehen. Die inständigen Bitten und bestimmten Erklärungen des Herrn Sasnow, später die geradezu demütigen Telegramme des Zaren, die wiederholten Vorschläge Sir Edwards, die Warnungen des Marquis San Giuliano und des Herrn Bollati, meine dringenden Ratschläge, alles nützte nichts, in Berlin blieb man dabei, Serbien muss massakriert werden!

Je mehr ich drängte, um so weniger wollte man einlenken, schon weil ich nicht den Erfolg haben sollte, mit Sir Edward Grey den Frieden zu retten!

Da entschloss sich letzterer am 29. zu der bekannten Warnung. Ich entgegnete, dass ich stets berichtet hätte, wir würden mit der englischen Gegnerschaft rechnen müssen, falls es zum Kriege mit Frankreich käme. Wiederholt sagte mir der Minister: *“If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen”* (wenn ein Krieg ausbricht, gibt es die grösste Katastrophe, die die Welt je erlebt hat).

Die Ereignisse überstürzten sich bald darauf. Als endlich Graf Berchtold, der bis dahin auf Berliner Weisungen den starken Mann spielte, sich zum Einlenken entschloss, beantworteten wir die russische

atory" in that it aimed at no annexation of territory.

Sir Edward rightly pointed out that, without annexation of territory, it was possible to reduce a country to vassalage, and that Russia would see in this a humiliation and therefore would not suffer it.

The impression grew continually stronger that we desired war under any circumstances. In no other way was it possible to interpret our attitude on a question which, after all, did not directly concern us. The urgent requests and explicit declarations of M. Sazonof, followed by the Czar's positively humble telegrams; the repeated proposals of Sir Edward Grey; the warnings of Marquis di San Giuliano and of Signor Bollati; my own urgent counsels—all were of no avail. Berlin would not budge; Serbia must be massacred.

The more I pressed, the less inclination there was to turn back, if only that I might not have, together with Sir Edward Grey, the credit of preserving peace.

Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided to give his famous warning.²⁹ I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

Soon after this events were precipitated. Until this time, following the directions he received from Berlin, Count Berchtold had played the part of the strong man. When at last he decided to change his course, and after Russia had negotiated and waited

²⁹ See Appendix, note xxi.

Mobilmachung, nachdem Russland eine ganze Woche vergeblich unterhandelt und gewartet hatte, mit dem Ultimatum und der Kriegserklärung.

Englische Kriegserklärung

Noch immer sann Sir Edward Grey nach neuen Auswegen. Am 1. August vormittags kam Sir W. Tyrrell²¹ zu mir, um zu sagen, sein Chef hoffe noch immer, einen Ausweg zu finden. Ob wir neutral bleiben wollten, falls Frankreich es auch täte? Ich verstand, dass wir dann bereit sein sollten, Frankreich zu schonen, er hatte aber gemeint, dass wir überhaupt, also auch gegen Russland, neutral bleiben. Das war das bekannte Missverständnis. Sir Edward hatte mich für den Nachmittag bestellt. Da er sich gerade in einer Kabinettsitzung befand, rief er mich an das Telephon, nachdem Sir W. Tyrrell²¹ gleich zu ihm geeilt war. Nachmittags aber sprach er nur mehr von der belgischen Neutralität und von der Möglichkeit, dass wir und Frankreich uns bewaffnet gegenüber ständen, ohne uns anzugreifen.

Es war also überhaupt kein Vorschlag, sondern eine Frage ohne Verbindlichkeit, da, wie ich früher schon gemeldet, bald darauf unsere Besprechung stattfinden sollte. Die Nachricht wurde aber in Berlin, ohne erst die Unterredung abzuwarten, zur Grundlage einer weitgehenden Aktion gemacht. Dann kam der Brief des Herrn Poincaré, der Brief Bonar Laws, das Telegramm des Königs Albert. Die Schwankenden wurden im Kabinett bis auf drei Mitglieder, die austraten, umgestimmt.

Ich hatte bis zum letzten Augenblick auf eine abwartende Haltung Englands gehofft. Auch mein französischer Kollege fühlte sich keineswegs sicher,

²¹ B.-C.: "Tyrell."

a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian mobilization with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.

The English Declaration of War

Even then Sir Edward Grey continued to search for new expedients. On the morning of August 1st, Sir William Tyrrell called on me, to tell me that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral in case France did the same? I understood that we were to declare ourselves ready, in such case, to spare France; but his meaning was that we should remain altogether neutral, that is, toward Russia also. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had an appointment with me for that afternoon. At the moment he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, and, Sir William Tyrrell having hurried to him at once, he called me up on the telephone. In the afternoon, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and the possibility that we and France might face one another in arms without attacking.

There was accordingly no proposal at all, but a question that carried with it no binding engagement, since, as I have already stated, our interview was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made the news the basis of far-reaching [diplomatic] activity. Then came M. Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's telegram.³⁰ The waverers in the Cabinet—excepting three members who resigned—were converted.

Till the very last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague, too, as I learned from a private source, felt far

³⁰ See Appendix, notes xxii-xxiv.

wie ich aus privater Quelle erfuhr. Noch am 1. August hatte der König dem Präsidenten ausweichend geantwortet. In dem Telegramm aus Berlin, das die drohende Kriegsgefahr ankündigte, war aber England schon als Gegner mitgenannt. Man rechnete also bereits in Berlin mit dem Kriege gegen England.

Vor meiner Abreise empfing mich am 5. Sir Edward Grey in seiner Wohnung. Auf seinen Wunsch war ich hingegangen. Er war tief bewegt. Er sagte mir, er werde stets bereit sein, zu vermitteln: "*We don't want to crush Germany*" (Wir wollen Deutschland nicht zerschmettern). Diese vertrauliche Unterredung ist leider veröffentlicht worden. Damit hat Herr von Bethmann Hollweg die letzte Möglichkeit zerstört, über England den Frieden zu erlangen.

Unsere Abreise vollzog sich durchaus würdig und ruhig. Vorher hatte der König seinen *Equerry* (Stallmeister) Sir E. Ponsonby zu mir gesandt, um sein Bedauern über meine Abreise auszusprechen und dass er mich nicht selbst sehen könnte. Prinzess Louise schrieb mir, die ganze Familie betraue unseren Fortgang. Mrs. Asquith und andere Freunde kamen zum Abschied in die Botschaft.

Ein Extrazug brachte uns nach Harwich. Dort war eine Ehrenkompagnie für mich aufgestellt. Ich wurde wie ein abreisender Souverän behandelt. So endete meine Londoner Mission. Sie scheiterte nicht an den Tücken der Briten, sondern an den Tücken unserer Politik.

Auf dem Bahnhof in London hatte sich Graf Mensdorff mit seinem Stabe eingefunden. Er war vergnügt und gab mir zu verstehen, dass er vielleicht dort bliebe, den Engländern aber sagte er, Österreich habe den Krieg nicht gewollt, sondern wir.

from sure [that England would intervene]. As late as August 1st the King had given the President an evasive reply.³¹ In the telegram from Berlin announcing imminent danger of war,³² England however was already included in the list of adversaries. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.

Before my departure, Sir Edward Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house. I had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he would always be ready to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential interview was made public, and thus Herr von Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of gaining peace through England.

Our departure was put through in a thoroughly dignified, quiet way. The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regret that I was leaving and that he could not himself see me. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family was sorry that we were going away. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to take leave.

A special train took us to Harwich. There a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Such was the end of my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, but by the wiles of our policy.

Count Mensdorff had come with his staff to the station in London. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain there. He told the English that we, and not Austria, had desired the war.

³¹ See Appendix, note xxii.

³² July 31st. See German White Book, No. 25.

Rückblick

Wenn ich jetzt nach zwei Jahren mir alles rückwärts schauend vergegenwärtige, so sage ich mir, dass ich zu spät erkannte, dass kein Platz für mich war in einem System, das seit Jahren nur von Tradition und Routine lebte und das nur Vertreter duldet, die so berichten, wie man es lesen will. Vorurteilslosigkeit und unabhängiges Urteil werden bekämpft, Unfähigkeit und Charakterlosigkeit gepriesen und geschätzt. Erfolge aber erregen Missgunst und Beunruhigung.

Ich hatte den Widerstand gegen die wahnsinnige Dreibund politik aufgegeben, da ich einsah, dass es zwecklos war, und dass man meine Warnungen als *Austrophobie* (Feindschaft gegen Österreich), als fixe Idee hinstellte. In der Politik, die nicht Akrobatentum oder Aktensport ist, sondern das Geschäft der Firma, gibt es keine *Philie* oder *Phobie* (Freundschaft oder Feindschaft), sondern nur das Interesse des Gemeinwesens. Eine Politik aber, die sich bloss auf Österreicher, Madjaren und Türken stützt, muss in Gegensatz zu Russland geraten und schliesslich zur Katastrophe führen.

Trotz früherer Irrungen war im Juli 1914 noch alles zu machen. Die Verständigung mit England war erreicht. Wir mussten einen wenigstens das Durchschnittsmass politischer Befähigung erreichenden Vertreter nach Petersburg senden und Russland die Gewissheit geben, dass wir weder die Meerengen beherrschen, noch die Serben erdrosseln wollten. "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français*" (lasst Österreich fallen, und wir werden die Franzosen fallen lassen), sagte uns Herr Sasonow. Und Mr. Cambon sagte Herrn von Jagow: "*Vous n'avez pas besoin de*

Retrospect

When now, after two years, I review the whole course of events, I tell myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system that for years has lived on traditions and routine alone, and that tolerates no representatives save those who report what [their superiors] wish to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment arouse hostility; incapacity and want of character are praised and esteemed; successes, on the other hand, beget disfavor and awaken disquietude.

I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, because I realized that it was useless and that my warnings were attributed to an incurable Austrophobia. In politics, which are neither acrobatics nor a game played with documents, but the business of the firm, there is no "philia" or "phobia," but only the interest of the community. A policy, however, which leans only on Austrians, Magyars, and Turks, must come into conflict with Russia and finally lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in July, 1914. An understanding with England had been attained. We ought to have sent to St. Petersburg a representative who was at least of average political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither to control the Straits nor to strangle Serbia. "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français*" ("Drop Austria and we will drop the French") M. Sazonof said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "*Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout*" ("You need not follow Austria everywhere").

suivre l'Autriche partout" (Ihr braucht mit Österreich nicht alles mitzumachen).

Weder Bündnisse noch Kriege, sondern nur Verträge brauchten wir, die uns und andere schützten und einen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung sicherten, der in der Geschichte ohne Vorgang war. War Russland aber im Westen entlastet, so konnte es sich wieder nach Osten wenden, und der anglo-russische Gegensatz trat alsdann automatisch und ohne unsere Mitwirkung hervor, nicht minder aber der russisch-japanische.

Wir konnten auch der Frage der Rüstungsbeschränkung näher treten und brauchten uns um österreichische Wirrnisse nicht mehr zu kümmern. Österreich-Ungarn war dann der Vasall des Deutschen Reiches und ohne Bündnis und namentlich ohne Liebesdienste, die schliesslich zum Kriege führten für die Befreiung Polens und die Vernichtung Serbiens, obwohl die deutschen Interessen gerade das Gegenteil heischten.

Ich hatte in London eine Politik zu unterstützen, deren Irrlehre ich erkannte. Das hat sich an mir gerächt, denn es war eine Sünde wider den heiligen Geist.

Ankunft

In Berlin angekommen, sah ich sofort, dass ich zum Sündenbock für die Katastrophe gemacht werden sollte, die unsere Regierung im Gegensatz zu meinen Ratschlägen und Warnungen verschuldet hatte.

Von amtlicher Seite wurde geflissentlich verbreitet, ich hätte mich durch Sir Ed. Grey täuschen lassen, denn wenn er den Krieg nicht gewollt, würde Russland nicht mobilisiert haben. Graf Pourtalès, auf dessen Berichterstattung man sich verlassen konnte, sollte geschont werden, schon wegen seiner Verwandtschaft.

We needed neither alliances nor wars; we needed only treaties protecting us and others and affording security to an economic progress that was without precedent in history. If Russia had been freed from pressure in the West, it could again have turned to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would then have reappeared automatically and without our help, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese rivalry.

We could also have considered the question of the limitation of armaments, and we need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian complications. Austria would then have been the vassal of the German Empire, and this without an alliance and, what is most important, without the gratuitous services which finally led us into war—a war for the liberation of Poland and the annihilation of Serbia, although German interests demanded the exact opposite.

I had to support in London a policy, the heresy of which I recognized. For this I have been justly punished, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

My Arrival

As soon as I arrived in Berlin, I saw that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe which our government had brought upon itself against my counsels and warnings.

A report, proceeding from official sources, was industriously circulated, that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, since if he had not desired war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtalès, whose reports could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account of his family

Er habe sich „grossartig“ benommen, er wurde begeistert gelobt, ich um so schärfer getadelt.

„Was geht denn Serbien Russland an?“ sagte mir dieser Staatsmann nach achtjähriger Amtszeit in Petersburg. Die ganze Sache sollte eine britische Tücke sein, die ich nicht gemerkt. Im Amte erklärte man mir auch, im Jahre 1916 wäre es doch zum Kriege gekommen, dann wäre Russland „fertig“, daher sei es besser jetzt.

Schuldfrage

Wir haben, wie aus allen amtlichen Veröffentlichungen hervorgeht und auch durch unser Weissbuch nicht widerlegt wird, das durch seine Dürftigkeit und Lückenhaftigkeit eine schwere Selbstanklage darstellt,

1. den Grafen Berchtold ermutigt, Serbien anzugreifen, obwohl kein deutsches Interesse vorlag und die Gefahr eines Weltkrieges uns bekannt sein musste —ob wir den Wortlaut des Ultimatums gekannt, ist völlig gleichgültig;

2. in den Tagen zwischen dem 23. und 30. Juli 1914, als Herr Sasonow mit Nachdruck erklärte, einen Angriff auf Serbien nicht dulden zu können, die britischen Vermittlungsvorschläge abgelehnt, obwohl Serbien unter russischem und britischem Drucke nahezu das ganze Ultimatum angenommen hatte und obwohl eine Einigung über die beiden fraglichen Punkte leicht zu erreichen und Graf Berchtold sogar bereit war, sich mit der serbischen Antwort zu begnügen;

3. am 30. Juli, als Graf Berchtold einlenken wollte und ohne dass Österreich angegriffen war, auf die blosser Mobilmachung Russlands hin ein Ultimatum

connections. He had conducted himself "magnificently," he was praised enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely.

"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me, after eight years' service at St. Petersburg. The whole affair was declared to be a British trick that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office I was told that war would in any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have been ready; therefore it was better now.

The Question of Responsibility

It is shown by all official publications and is not disproved by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its omissions, constitutes a grave indictment against ourselves, that:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a World War must have been known to us. Whether we were acquainted with the wording of the ultimatum is completely immaterial.

2. During the period between the 23d and the 30th of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could easily have been reached and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold showed a disposition to change his course, we sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of

nach Petersburg geschickt und am 31. Juli den Russen den Krieg erklärt, obwohl der Zar sein Wort verpfändete, solange noch unterhandelt wird, keinen Mann marschieren zu lassen, also die Möglichkeit einer friedlichen Beilegung geflissentlich vernichtet.

Es ist nicht zu verwundern, wenn angesichts dieser unbestreitbaren Tatsachen ausserhalb Deutschlands die gesamte Kulturwelt uns die alleinige Schuld am Weltkriege beimisst.

Feindlicher Standpunkt

Ist es nicht begreiflich, dass unsere Feinde erklären, nicht eher ruhen zu wollen, bis ein System vernichtet ist, das eine dauernde Bedrohung unserer Nachbarn bildet? Müssen sie nicht sonst befürchten, in einigen Jahren wieder zu den Waffen greifen zu müssen und wieder ihre Provinzen überrannt und ihre Städte und Dörfer vernichtet zu sehen? Haben diejenigen nicht recht behalten, die weissagten, dass der Geist Treitschkes und Bernhardis das deutsche Volk beherrschte, der den Krieg als Selbstzweck verherrlicht und nicht als Übel verabscheut, dass bei uns noch der feudale Ritter und Junker, die Kriegerkaste regiere und Ideale und Werte gestalte, nicht aber der bürgerliche Gentleman, dass die Liebe zur Mensur, die die akademische Jugend beseelt, auch denen erhalten bleibt, die die Geschicke des Volkes leiten? Hatten nicht die Ereignisse in Zabern und die parlamentarischen Verhandlungen des Falles dem Ausland gezeigt, wie staatsbürgerliche Rechte und Freiheiten bei uns bewertet werden, wenn militärische Machtfragen entgegenstehen?

the Russian mobilization and though Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st of July we declared war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a single man to march as long as negotiations were still going on.³³ Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these incontestable facts, it is no wonder that the whole civilized world outside of Germany places the sole responsibility for the World War upon our shoulders.

The Enemy Point of View

Is it not comprehensible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system which constitutes a permanent menace to our neighbors is destroyed? Must they not otherwise fear that within a few years they will again be obliged to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun and their cities and villages destroyed? Have not those proved to be right who divined that the German people was dominated by the spirit of Treitschke and of Bernhardi, which glorifies war as an end in itself and does not loathe it as an evil; that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the warrior caste, still rules and shapes ideals and values, and not the civilian gentleman; that the love of the duel which animates our academic youth still persists in those who guide the destinies of the nation? Did not the occurrences in Zabern and the parliamentary discussion of this matter show to foreign countries the value we place on the rights and

³³ See *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 537; also German White Book, p. 16.

In die Worte Euphorions kleidete der geistvolle, seither verstorbene Historiker Cramb, ein Bewunderer Deutschlands, die deutsche Auffassung:

*„Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?²²
Träume wer träumen mag,
Krieg ist das Losungswort!
Sieg, und so klingt es fort.“*

Der Militarismus, eigentlich eine Schule des Volkes und ein Instrument der Politik, macht die Politik zum Instrument der Militärmacht, wenn der patriarchalische Absolutismus des Soldatenkönigtums eine Haltung ermöglicht, die eine militärisch-junkerlichen Einflüssen entrückte Demokratie nicht zulassen würde.

So denken unsere Feinde, und so müssen sie denken, wenn sie sehen, dass trotz kapitalistischer Industrialisierung und trotz sozialistischer Organisierung die Lebenden, wie Friedrich Nietzsche sagt, noch von den Toten regiert werden. Das vornehmste feindliche Kriegsziel, die Demokratisierung Deutschlands, wird sich verwirklichen!—

Bismarck

Bismarck, gleich Napoleon, liebte den Kampf als Selbstzweck. Als Staatsmann vermied er neue Kriege, deren Sinnlosigkeit er erkannte. Er begnügte sich mit unblutigen Schlachten. Nachdem er in rascher Folge Christian, Franz Joseph und Napoleon besiegt, kamen Arnim, Pius und Augusta an die Reihe. Das genügte ihm nicht. Gortschakow hatte ihn wiederholt gegergt, der sich für grösser hielt. Er wurde bis hart an den Krieg bekämpft, sogar durch Entziehung des Salonwagens. So entstand der traurige Dreibund.

²² B.-C.: „Krieg.“

liberties of the citizen, if questions of military power stand in the way?

The keen-witted historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of Euphorion:

Dream ye of peaceful day?

Dream on while dream ye may!

War is the signal cry;

*Hark! shouts of victory!*³⁴

Militarism, which is properly a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingship makes possible an attitude which a democracy, placed beyond the control of militarist-Junker influences, would not permit.

So think our enemies; and so they must think if they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still ruled by the dead. The highest war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be realized!

Bismarck

Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognized. He contented himself with bloodless battles. After he had vanquished, in rapid succession, Christian, Francis Joseph, and Napoleon III, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortschakof, who thought himself the greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the point of war. It was carried even to the point of depriving Gort-

³⁴Anna Swanwicks' translation.

Zum Schluss folgte der Kampf gegen Wilhelm, in dem der Gewaltige unterlag, wie Napoleon gegen Alexander.

Politische Ehen auf Tod und Leben geraten nur im staatsrechtlichen, nicht im völkerrechtlichen Verbande. Sie sind um so bedenklicher mit einem brüchigen Genossen. So war das Bündnis von Bismarck auch niemals gemeint.

Die Engländer aber hat er stets schonend behandelt; er wusste, dass es so klüger war. Die alte Viktoria wurde von ihm besonders ausgezeichnet, trotz des Hasses gegen die Tochter und gegen politische Engländer, der gelehrte Beaconsfield und der welterfahrene Salisbury umworben, und auch der sonderliche Gladstone, den er nicht mochte, hatte sich eigentlich nicht zu beklagen.

Das Ultimatum an Serbien war die Krönung der Politik des Berliner Kongresses, der bosnischen Krise, der Londoner Konferenz; doch noch war die Zeit zur Umkehr.

Was vor allem zu vermeiden war, der Bruch mit Russland und mit England, das haben wir glücklich erreicht.

Unsere Zukunft

Heute nach zweijährigem Kampfe kann es nicht mehr zweifelhaft sein, dass wir auf einen bedingungslosen Sieg über Russen, Engländer, Franzosen, Italiener, Rumänen und Amerikaner nicht hoffen dürfen, mit dem Niederringen unserer Feinde nicht rechnen können. Zu einem Kompromissfrieden gelangen wir aber nur auf Grundlage der Räumung der

schakof of his special railway carriage. Thus arose the lamentable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as the first Napoleon was vanquished in the conflict with Alexander.

Political marriages "until death do us part" are successful only when the union is constitutional, not when it is international. They are all the more questionable when the partner is tottering on the verge of the grave. Bismarck never intended that the alliance with Austria should be such a marriage.

The English, however, he always handled carefully; he knew that this was wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old Victoria, despite his hatred of her daughter and of political anglomania. He courted the learned Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salisbury; and even that strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, had no real ground for complaint.

The ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the Berlin Congress, of the Bosnian crisis ³⁵ and of the London Conference: but there was yet time to turn back.

What above all we should have avoided, the breach with Russia and with England, we have successfully attained.

Our Future

Today, after two years of fighting, it can no longer be doubted that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, nor count on being able to wear our enemies down. A peace by compromise, however, we can obtain only on the basis of an evacua-

³⁵ See Appendix, notes iii and iv.

besetzten Gebiete, deren Besitz für uns überdies eine Last und Schwäche und die Gefahr neuer Kriege bedeutet. Daher sollte alles vermieden werden, was denjenigen feindlichen Gruppen, die für den Kompromissgedanken vielleicht noch zu gewinnen wären, den britischen Radikalen und den russischen Reaktionären, ein Einlenken erschwert. Schon von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus ist das polnische Projekt ebenso zu verwerfen, wie jeder Eingriff in belgische Rechte oder die Hinrichtung britischer Bürger, vom wahnwitzigen U-Boot-Plane gar nicht zu reden.

Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser. Richtig, also nicht in Polen und Belgien, in Frankreich und Serbien. Das ist die Rückkehr zum heiligen Römischen Reich, zu den Irrungen der Hohenstaufen und Habsburger. Es ist dies die Politik der Plantagenets, nicht die der Drake und Raleigh, Nelson und Rhodes. Dreibundpolitik ist Rückkehr zur Vergangenheit, Abkehr von der Zukunft, dem Imperialismus, der Weltpolitik. Mitteleuropa ist Mittelalter, Berlin-Bagdad eine Sackgasse, nicht der Weg ins Freie, zu unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten, zur Weltmission des deutschen Volkes.

Ich bin kein Gegner Österreichs oder Ungarns oder Italiens und Serbiens oder irgendeines anderen Staates, sondern nur ein Gegner der Dreibundpolitik, die uns von unseren Zielen ablenken und auf die schiefe Ebene der Kontinentalpolitik bringen musste. Sie war nicht deutsche, sondern k. u. k. Hauspolitik. Die Österreicher hatten sich daran gewöhnt, das Bündnis als einen Schirm zu betrachten, unter dessen Schutz sie nach Belieben Ausflüge in den Orient machen konnten.

Und welches Ergebnis des Völkerringens haben wir zu gewärtigen? Die Vereinigten Staaten von Afrika werden britisch sein, wie die von Amerika, Australien

tion of the occupied territories. For this there is the more reason, in that their possession constitutes for us a burden and a cause of weakness and involves the risk of further wars. Therefore everything should be avoided that impedes a change of attitude on the part of those enemy groups which may perhaps still be won over to the idea of a peace by compromise, namely, the British radicals and the Russian reactionaries. Simply from this point of view the Polish scheme is as objectionable as is any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British civilians, to say nothing of the insane submarine plan.

"Our future lies on the water."³⁶ Quite right; therefore it does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the mistakes of the Hohenstaufen and the Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the Triple Alliance turns back to the past; it turns away from the future, from imperialism, from a world-policy. "Middle Europe" is of the middle ages; Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the open, to unlimited possibilities, to the universal mission of the German nation.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or of any other state; I am an enemy only of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims and bring us on the downward slope of a continental policy. It was not a German policy, but an imperial and royal [Hapsburg] house policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a screen, under cover of which they could make excursions into the East whenever they pleased.

³⁶ Emperor William II, Speech of June 18, 1901.

und Ozeanien. Und die lateinischen Staaten Europas werden, wie ich schon vor Jahren sagte, in dasselbe Verhältnis zu dem Vereinigten Königreich geraten, wie die lateinischen Schwestern Amerikas zu den Vereinigten Staaten. Der Angelsachse wird sie beherrschen. Das durch den Krieg erschöpfte Frankreich wird sich nur noch enger an Grossbritannien anschliessen. Auf die Dauer wird auch Spanien nicht widerstehen.

Und in Asien wird der Russe und der Japaner sich ausbreiten mit seinen Grenzen und Sitten, und der Süden wird den Briten bleiben.

Die Welt wird den Angelsachsen, Russen und Japanern gehören und der Deutsche allein bleiben mit Österreich und Ungarn. Seine Machtherrschaft wird die des Gedankens und des Handels sein, nicht aber die der Bureaukraten und Soldaten. Es war zu spät erschienen, und die letzte Möglichkeit, das Versäumte nachzuholen, ein Kolonialreich zu gründen, hat der Weltkrieg vernichtet.

Denn wir werden die Söhne *Jahwes*²³ nicht verdrängen, das Programm des grossen Rhodes wird sich erfüllen, der in der Ausbreitung des Britentums, im britischen Imperialismus das Heil der Menschheit erblickte.

*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.*

(Du sollst die Völker im Römerreiche regieren. Deine Kunst wird sein, Friedenssitten zu erzwingen, die Unterworfenen zu schonen und die Hochmütigen des Krieges zu entwöhnen.)

²³ B.-C.: "*Ichwes*."

And to what outcome of the struggle of nations have we to look forward? The United States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia, and Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will come into the same relation to the United Kingdom as their Latin sisters in America to the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate them. France, exhausted by the war, will attach herself all the more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain maintain, in the long run, an attitude of resistance.

In Asia, the Russians and the Japanese will extend their frontiers and diffuse their customs, while the south will remain in the hands of the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians and the Japanese, and the German will be left alone with Austria and Hungary. His dominion will be that of thought and trade, not that of the bureaucrat and the soldier. He made his appearance too late; and his last chance of making up what he had missed, of founding a colonial empire, has been destroyed by the World War.

For we shall not supplant the sons of Jehovah. The future will realize the program of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the expansion of British influence, in British imperialism.

Roman, be mindful to rule the people with orderly power.

These shall be thine arts: enforcing peace as a custom,

Warring the arrogant down, and sparing those who have yielded.

Remarks on the article of Prince Lichnowsky

“MY LONDON MISSION”

By Gottlieb Von Jagow

Former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

[From the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 23, 1918]

Translation by MUNROE SMITH *

So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from going into the statements that relate to the policy followed before my administration of the Foreign Office.

I should like to make the following remarks about particular points in the article:

When I was appointed secretary of state, in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English *rapprochement* as desirable, and I also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wished to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England intended to force us out there, it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate concerning the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favor-

* The editor wishes to acknowledge the courtesy of *The New York Times* in permitting the translation which appeared in the June, 1918, issue of *Current History*, to be used in part as a basis for Professor Munroe Smith's translation.

able disposition on the part of the English government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the World War broke out.

At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count Metternich, continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky, were under way. Further negotiations regarding other—for example, East Asiatic—problems I meant to start later, when what was in my opinion the most important question, that of the Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval question aside, as it would have been difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.

I can pass over the development of the Albanian question, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky advocates does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential character of the alliance if we had completely ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria should second us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, too, although she had no interest whatever in Morocco, stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible an adjustment of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.

It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a "Triple Alliance policy" in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each other. Had no

such policy been pursued, Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in Oriental questions, Austria would have been handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would have been unable, in the absence of any support, to safeguard our interests in the Orient. Even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had there great economic interests to represent. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests.

That St. Petersburg desired "the independence of the Sultan" is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople established by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to defend our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.

When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that it was first through "our Triple Alliance and Eastern policy that Russia, our natural friend and best neighbor, was driven into the arms of France and England," he is in conflict with the historical facts. It was because Prince Gortschakof was guiding Russian policy toward a *rapprochement* with a France lusting for revenge that Prince Bismarck was first induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred the advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces—Björki proves it—or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Moreover, Russia was

not always our "best neighbor." Under the Empress Elizabeth, as at present, Russia strove for possession of East Prussia to extend its Baltic coasts and to secure for itself the domination of the Baltic Sea. The St. Petersburg "window" has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and has stretched over toward Åland. Poland was arranged as a field in which to concentrate troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.

Nor did we divert Russia "from the policy of Asiatic expansion," but only tried to check its encroachments in European policy and its encirclement of our Austro-Hungarian ally.

Just as little as Sir Edward Grey did we wish war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experiences at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an "attitude of mediation" at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he "by no means placed himself on the side of his Entente associates" is, after all, rather an overstatement. Certainly he often advised yielding in St. Petersburg (as we did in Vienna) and found "formulas of agreement," but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because, like us, he neither would nor could abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, "uniformly defended the point of view which was prescribed to us by Vienna" is absolutely incorrect. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and in Vienna also we advised yielding and moderation far more than Prince Lichnowsky appears, or pretends, to be aware. And then Vienna made far-reaching concessions in several instances

(Dibra, Djakowa). If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wished to be cleverer than the Foreign Office, and who clearly allowed himself to be strongly impressed by the representatives of the Entente, did not know this, he ought now, at any rate, to refrain from making false assertions! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was obtained in Vienna, then of course we had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador Szögyenyi himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of the *casus foederis* is entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that in Vienna Prince Lichnowsky had been regarded, at an earlier period than this, as no friend of Austria. Nevertheless, complaints about him came oftener to my ears on the part of Marquis di San Giuliano than on the part of Count Berchtold.

King Nikita's seizure of Skutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.

Russia was by no means "obliged to give way to us all along the line;" on the contrary, it obtained "satisfaction of the Serbian desires" in several matters; to such an extent, indeed, that some towns and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely or mainly Albanian were allotted to Serbia. Prince Lichnowsky says that "the outcome of the conference was a fresh humiliation of Russian national sentiment" and that "dissatisfaction" prevailed in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to secure, at the cost of our ally, satisfaction of all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated national

sentiment of a Power by no means friendly to us. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our allies certainly had. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had completely adopted the Russian point of view, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. It seems to be Prince Lichnowsky's constant and sole anxiety that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is obviously a matter of indifference to him.

When Prince Lichnowsky says that our "Austrophil attitude" was not adapted "to direct Russia's attention to its Asiatic interests," it is not quite clear to me what this means. After a disastrous diversion towards East Asia—in the Japanese war we had favored Russia without ever being thanked for it!—Russia again took up its policy aimed directly toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople), and this with increased energy (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, *etc.*).

Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the "ribbon of the order of the Red Eagle," evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, was always pro-Entente. His present attitude shows most clearly this tendency on his part. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward St. Petersburg.

That Count Berchtold displayed certain leanings toward Bulgaria even in its differences with Rumania is true; but that we "of course went with him" is entirely false. With our support, King Charles [of Rumania] had the satisfaction of the Bucharest Peace. If then, in the case of the Bucharest Peace,

in which we favored the wishes and interests of our Rumanian ally, our policy deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it “could reckon on our support as a matter of course” in securing a revision of this treaty. That Marquis di San Giuliano, by his warning, “saved us from being involved in a world war in the summer of 1913,” because at that time “the idea of a campaign against Serbia was entertained in Vienna,” is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tchirschky—who, it is true, was naturally, rather inclined to pessimism—is said to have declared in the spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Of the “important occurrences” that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects I was accordingly just as ignorant as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey’s first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he was unwilling to believe it!

In the matter of Liman von Sanders, we made an important concession to Russia by renouncing the general’s power of command over Constantinople. I am willing to admit that this point in the agreement regarding the military mission was politically not opportune.

When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the colonial treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit is not to be denied him. Strong pressure was necessary, however, on several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.

When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received authorization definitely to conclude the colonial treaty, after previously asserting that the treaty "perished," his story contains a contradiction which we may leave to the Prince to explain. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been for him "a public success" that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can be explained only through his egocentric view of things. The treaty would have missed its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon "perfidious Albion" in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. For such attacks, in view of our internal situation at that time, the simultaneous publication of [the colonial and] the so-called Windsor Treaty would undoubtedly have furnished occasion. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have evoked could hardly have been so met as to satisfy our public opinion through the assurance of English *bona fides*. With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at a suitable moment, when the danger of hostile criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been established between us and England would have materially helped to gain for them a favorable reception and would have made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese convention. It

was consideration for the effect of the agreement, through which we wished to obtain an improvement in our relations with England—not to stir up more trouble—that caused our hesitation.

It is true that account was also taken—although in a secondary degree—of the efforts just then being made to acquire economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which would naturally have been harder to obtain if the terms of the convention had been announced. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have had confidence in our judgment as regarded matters of fact and should have acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with aspersions and insinuations of personal motives. Particularly in dealing with English statesmen, he would surely have found that our arguments were understood by the English statesmen themselves.

The ambassador's speeches gave much offense in this country. For the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the *rapprochement* we were seeking could flourish, it was necessary that confidence in our English policy and in our London representative should be widely established in our own public opinion. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this factor sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. His charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to need discussion. I think it desirable, however, to state that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the "most important things," in so far as they were pertinent to his mission. On the contrary, I gave

the ambassadors generally much fuller information than they had usually received under previous administrations. My own experiences as ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and conclusions than upon the communications and instructions of the Central Office. To disclose the sources of our information, indeed, I had not always either occasion or authority. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety not to compromise our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.

It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.

At Konopischt, on the occasion of the visit of His Majesty the Emperor to the Archduke, heir to the [Austrian] throne, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the advocate of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war.

Prince Lichnowsky's "optimism" was hardly justified, as he has probably since convinced himself through the revelations of the Sukhomlinof trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as has been said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. The mistrust voiced by the imperial chancellor and the under secretary of state was, unfortunately, well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, replying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that

"Russia would not move under any circumstances," had not considered the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtalès never made any such report.

That Austria-Hungary wished to intervene against the repeated provocations fomented by Russia (Herr von Hartwig), which reached their climax in the Serajevo assault, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all former compromises and adjustments of threatened conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally of ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents inspired by St. Petersburg, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube monarchy. It must either submit to the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a *quos ego*, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had it been intended to exclude altogether the *ultima ratio* of war, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations (for instance, the extension of railroads and reconstruction of forts in Poland), for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming constantly more evident, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We did not decide to declare war on Russia until we had to face the Russian mobilization and to defend ourselves against a Russian invasion.

I have not at hand the letters exchanged with the Prince—it was a matter of private letters. Lich-

nowsky pleaded for an abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only trustworthy ally, we should stand later entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is probable that I also wrote that "Russia was becoming more and more anti-German" and that we must "just risk it." Furthermore, it is possible that in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views in London also, I wrote that there would probably be some "blustering," and that "the more firmly we stood by Austria the more certainly would Russia give way." I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war. At that time, it is true, I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.

We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of ambassadors, for it would undoubtedly have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was Serbophil and, with its Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The "intimacy of the relations between Italy and Russia" is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we "insisted upon" the war is an unheard-of assertion, which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of His Majesty the Emperor to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books—Prince Lichnowsky chooses to speak only of "the Czar's positively humble telegram"—as well as by the instructions

we sent to Vienna. The worst distortion of facts is contained in the following sentence:

"When Count Berchtold at last decided to change his course, and after Russia had negotiated and waited a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian mobilization with the ultimatum and the declaration of war."

Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinof trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of "*O si tacuisses!*" On July 5th, I was absent from Berlin. The statement that I was "soon afterwards in Vienna to talk everything over with Count Berchtold" is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6th, from my wedding journey, and I did not stir from there until August 15th, on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As secretary of state I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the spring of 1913.

Prince Lichnowsky slides over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on August 1st—I have not the exact wording at hand—as a "misunderstanding" and even seems to intend to reproach us because "without waiting for the interview," we "made the news the basis for far-reaching activity." The question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avert the war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The content of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood in any other way than we understood it.

In matters of fact, Prince Lichnowsky's narrative presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is scarcely surprising that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. A really grotesque effect is produced when he reproaches us for sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg on July 30th, merely because of the mobilization of Russia, and for declaring war upon the Russians, on July 31st, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment. At the close, his point of view seems to become almost identical with that of our enemies.

When the ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself "with Turks and Austro-Magyars" and subordinated itself to the "viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest," he may be suitably answered by saying that he saw things only through London spectacles and exclusively from the point of view of his desired *rapprochement* with England *à tout prix*. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.

I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France pressed towards war. We were under obligations resulting from our treaty with Austria, and we too were menaced in our position as a Great Power—*hic Rhodus, hic salta*. But England, that was not tied up in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching

assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and of Belgium, seized the sword.

In saying this, I by no means accept the view that is widely held among us today, that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an understanding with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the World War—a thing that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as battle field.*

"Political marriages until death do us part" are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions, which sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer answer all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a *rapprochement* with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not sacrifice the old guarantees—even with their obligations.

The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, as was the case also at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The

* "*Schlachtfeld*." This may possibly be a misprint for *Schlachtruf* (battle-cry).

prosperity of states, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

The personal attacks contained in the article, the unheard-of aspersions and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

In closing, let me recall the memorandum of Prince Bismarck, which Hermann Oncken also has quoted in his work, *The Old and The New Middle Europe*—the memorandum which was written in the year 1879, and in which the idea is developed that the German Empire can never permit a situation to arise in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that Germany had left in the lurch.

APPENDIX TO PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM

Personal and Historical Notes

By MUNROE SMITH and HENRY F. MUNRO

I

The Berlin Foreign Office

During Prince Lichnowsky's term of service in the Foreign Office (1899-1904), Count (later Prince) von Bülow was chancellor, Baron von Richthofen was foreign secretary, and Herr von Mühlberg was under-secretary. The foreign secretary was director of the section of politics and personnel, in which Lichnowsky was employed, and it is he, presumably, who is described as laboring under insane delusions. The senior counselor in the same section was Herr von Holstein. His long service, which began in 1879, and the fact that he represented the traditions of the Bismarckian period naturally gave him a certain authority. His retirement from office, in April, 1906, was ascribed to "differences" with Prince von Bülow. It gave rise to much comment, since he had been regarded, in many circles, as the virtual director of German foreign policy since 1890. [*Schultess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1906, p. 97, citing *Zukunft*, July, 1906, and *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. 125, 3.]

In 1912, when Lichnowsky was sent to London, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was chancellor, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter was foreign secretary, and Herr von Stumm was director of the political section. Von

Stumm had previously been connected with the German embassies in London, Washington, Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Madrid, and then, a second time, with the London embassy. It is he, apparently, who is described by Lichnowsky as endeavoring to play the rôle of Herr von Holstein.

In January, 1913, Herr von Jagow was appointed foreign secretary.

II

Austro-Prussian and Austro-German Relations

The long struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns for a controlling influence in German affairs was brought to an end by the Prussian victory of Sadowa in 1866. Germany was reorganized under a Prussian hegemony.

In the 18th century, Count (later Prince) Kaunitz (1711-1794) was one of Prussia's most dangerous enemies. In retaliation for the conquest of a large part of Silesia by Frederick the Great, Kaunitz succeeded in forming an Austrian-French alliance against Prussia, to which Russia became a party. In the Seven Years' War which followed (1756-1763) Prussia was brought to the verge of destruction. It was saved only by Russia's abandonment of the Austrian cause.

After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation in 1804 and the reconstruction of Germany as a confederation in 1814, Austria remained the dominant power in Germany. On account of the large proportion of non-German elements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, many Germans began to desire a closer union of the rest of Germany under Prussian leadership. These were called "Little Germans" (*Kleindeutsche*). A more numerous party advo-

cated the retention of all Germans within a single federal union. These were the "Great Germans" (*Grossdeutsche*). Inasmuch as neither of the two leading states could be expected to submit to a superior authority exercised by the other, it was clear that any such wider union must remain decentralized. "Great German" and "particularist" thus became practically interchangeable terms. The looser union recommended itself to most of the smaller states of Germany, as preserving their independence. In order that these states might be more effectively protected against both Austria and Prussia, a closer union among them and the organization of Germany as a "triad" found many advocates. The "old Bavarian" policy, to which Prince Lichnowsky alludes, aimed at the establishment of such a union of the smaller states under the leadership of Bavaria.

The question of a greater or smaller Germany became one of the chief issues in the revolutionary Frankfort Parliament of 1848. The refusal of Austria to come into the new German Empire with its German territories only, Hungary and the Slav provinces remaining outside, gave the Little Germans the victory; and the imperial crown was offered to King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. He rejected the offer; but his ministers took steps for a narrower union of North Germany through the coöperation of the kings of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover. This plan was not really welcome either to Saxony or to Hanover, and was bitterly resisted by Austria. A conflict was averted by a complete Prussian surrender at Olmütz, in 1850, and the old confederation, as it had existed since 1814, was reëstablished.

In this period the Austrian policy was directed by

Prince Felix Schwarzenberg (1800–1852). It was under his leadership that Austria forced Prussia to submit at Olmütz. His program was, first to humiliate Prussia, then to destroy it—“*avilir puis démolir*.”

Count Moritz Esterhazy (1807–1890) was a member of the Austrian ministry from 1861 to 1866. He was of the clerical party and was bitterly hostile to Prussia. He is said to have been one of the strongest advocates of war with Prussia.

By the victory of Prussia in 1866, Austria was excluded from the new Germany. It was, of course, not reconciled to the new order of things, and its continued hostility to Prussia is shown in the selection of Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809–1886) as Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs. From 1867–1871 he held the post of Austrian premier. He had been minister of foreign affairs in Saxony since 1849 and Saxon prime minister since 1853, and had been a persistent opponent of Prussia. After 1866 he was, of course, impossible as a Saxon minister. From 1866 to 1870 there were negotiations between France and Austria for an alliance against Prussia, but these came to nothing. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, von Beust found it inadvisable to take sides with France in a war which was regarded, even in South Germany, as a national German war. Before the end of 1870 he established fairly friendly relations between Austria and Prussia.

Baron (later Count) Aloys von Ährenthal (1854–1912), whom Lichnowsky describes as more independent in his attitude than his immediate predecessors, was Austro-Hungarian foreign minister from 1907 to his death in February, 1912. In this office he was succeeded by Count Berchtold.

III

The Berlin Congress (1878)

The war of 1877-1878 between Russia and Turkey was terminated by the treaty of San Stefano. The provisions of this treaty were unsatisfactory to other Great Powers, notably to Great Britain and to Austria, and Russia agreed that the arrangements made at San Stefano should be revised by a European Congress. This met at Berlin, in July, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck, who declared that his rôle was that of an "honest broker." The Congress restored to Turkey much of the territory ceded at San Stefano and changed the status and limits assigned to the Christian Balkan states. In giving to Austria the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Congress, as we now know, simply put into execution a secret agreement made between Russia and Austria at Reichstadt before the outbreak of the war—an agreement by which Russia secured Austrian neutrality in that war (Bismarck, speech in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888; see also Hofmann, *Fürst Bismarck*, vol. ii, p. 5). This concession to Austria, however, as well as other provisions of the Berlin Treaty, aroused resentment in Russia, and this resentment was directed largely against Germany. In return for the friendly neutrality of Russia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, the Russians had expected that Germany would support their interests in the Near East. Bismarck subsequently claimed that he had given them all possible support, that he had acted almost as "the fourth Russian plenipotentiary" in the Congress; but the Russians held him largely responsible for their diplomatic defeat. Rela-

tions between the two countries became so strained that, much against the wishes of Emperor William I, who regarded friendship with Russia as the first of German political interests, Bismarck formed, in 1879, a defensive alliance with Austria.

IV

German-Russian Relations (1884-1908)

The relations between Germany and Russia, strained by the revision of the Peace of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin, were greatly improved in 1884, when Bismarck negotiated a treaty by which Germany and Russia each agreed to remain neutral in case the other should be attacked by a third Power. This is generally known as the "reinsurance treaty"; because by the treaty of 1879 with Austria Germany was assured of Austrian support in case it should be attacked by Russia, and by this new treaty it was assured of Russian neutrality in case it should be attacked by France. This treaty was renewed in 1887; but in 1890, when Bismarck was removed from office, his successor, General von Caprivi, declined to renew it, because he found the relations of Germany to Austria and to Russia "too complicated." The real reason, apparently, why it was not renewed was because William II wished to be free to support Austria against Russia in the Near East, even if it should be found advisable that Austria should attack Russia. The existence of this German-Russian treaty from 1884 to 1890 was first made known to the general public by Bismarck, after his retirement from office, in an article published in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, October 24, 1896.

It was Bismarck's desire to lessen the chance of war between Austria and Russia by inducing them to recognize that each had its special sphere of influence in the Balkans, Austria in the West, Russia in the East. Bulgaria, accordingly, was in the Russian sphere of influence.

Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, succeeded in 1885 in uniting East Rumelia with Bulgaria, thus establishing for his principality the boundaries which Russia had sought to give it in the Peace of San Stefano. Attacked by Serbia, "to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans," the Bulgarian army, under Prince Alexander's leadership, was completely victorious. Serbia was protected against loss of territory only by the diplomatic intervention of Austria. Prince Alexander, however, had accomplished all these results without the consent of Russia. He had shown himself independent of Russian influence; and in August, 1886, Russian agents stirred up a revolution, kidnapped the Prince, and carried him out of the country. Reinstated by a counter-revolution, he resigned his throne, in order, as he said, to save Bulgaria from occupation by Russian troops.

In Germany there was general sympathy with Alexander, as a German prince. Great admiration was aroused by his achievements, and extreme indignation was felt on account of the treatment he had received at the hands of Russia. Bismarck, however, supported Russia, insisting that Germany had no interests in the Balkans.

After Bismarck's retirement from office, Germany not only supported Austrian interests in the Balkans, but also sought to acquire a dominant influence in Constantinople. This was regarded in Russia as an

invasion of its special sphere of influence, justifying a counter-invasion of the Austrian sphere. When, in 1908, Austria converted its occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a formal annexation of these provinces, the protest of the Serbs was supported by Russia. The German Emperor, however, "took his stand in shining armor at the side of his ally," and Russia, weakened by its recent conflict with Japan, was forced to acquiesce.

V

The Krüger Telegram (1896)

One of the aspirations of Germany has been the creation of a great colonial empire in Africa. To that end she began, in the nineties, to cultivate intimate relations with President Krüger of the Transvaal, in the hope of controlling and, possibly, of ultimately absorbing the Boer republic. German support of Krüger, it was clearly realized, would make trouble for Great Britain, between which and the Transvaal there were serious controversies over suzerainty and over the political grievances of the Uitlanders. Early in 1895 President Krüger stated, at a celebration in honor of the Kaiser's birthday, that "the time had arrived for the establishment of the closest friendly relations between the Transvaal and Germany."

On December 29, 1895, in response to an invitation from the Uitlanders, Dr. Jameson, with 400 or 500 troopers of the British South African Company, crossed the Transvaal frontier and marched towards Johannesburg. The Reform Committee (Uitlanders) failed to coöperate, and Jameson was forced to surrender. The situation, already serious, was intensified

by the action of the Kaiser, who, on January 3, 1896, after consultation with his chancellor and other ministers, sent the following telegram to President Krüger:

I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression.

In Great Britain this telegram caused profound indignation. It was felt to be directed against Great Britain, and it was regarded as a deliberate attempt to challenge the British position in South Africa. The incident marked the beginning of, and in large part contributed to, that settled antagonism between Great Britain and Germany which is being fought out in the present war. By holding out specious hopes to President Krüger, it helped to bring on the South African War and the defeat of the Boers. In this instance, as in others, Germany, as Lichnowsky points out, "backed the wrong horse."

The English journalist, Mr. Valentine Chirol, has recently given the substance of a conversation which he, as correspondent of the London *Times*, had with Baron Marschall at the German Foreign Office concerning the Krüger telegram. See the London *Times* of May 14, 1918.

VI

The British-French Colonial Agreements (1898-1904)

The chief cause of friction between France and Great Britain during the later decades of the 19th century had been their colliding interests in Egypt, which Britain occupied in 1882. When in 1898 the control of the upper Nile was wrested from the Mahdi by the

British-Egyptian forces under Kitchener, a conflict arose over the French occupation of Fashoda. This was adjusted March 21, 1899, by a joint declaration, supplementing an earlier convention, which had been signed June 14, 1898. The convention of 1898 delimited French and British possessions and spheres of influence east and west of the Niger; the supplementary agreement of 1899 drew a boundary between the British Egyptian Soudan and the French possessions and spheres of influence in Central Africa.

A general settlement of all outstanding differences between the two countries was attained by a convention and two declarations signed at London, April 8, 1904. In this general settlement, France recognized the existing British control of Egypt, and Great Britain recognized that France was entitled to a dominant interest in Morocco (see note vii, below). France undertook to come to an understanding with Spain regarding their respective interests on the Moorish coast, and a treaty embodying such an understanding was concluded in the same year (1904). The British-French agreement contained five secret articles; and, although it was officially announced in October, 1904, that Spain had accepted the British-French arrangements and had itself signed a convention with France, this convention was not published. The only reason, apparently, why these further arrangements were kept secret was that the contingency that the Sultan of Morocco might "cease to exercise authority" was envisaged, in which event there was to be a division of his realm between France and Spain.

On the west coast of Africa minor cessions of territory were made to France by Great Britain, and in Central Africa the line drawn in 1898 was modified

to the advantage of the French. British objections to the tariff introduced by France in Madagascar were withdrawn.

In Siam the British and French spheres of influence were delimited.

Privileges in the Newfoundland fishing industry secured to France by the Treaty of Utrecht were relinquished, French citizens engaged in that industry being indemnified by Great Britain. The respective rights of British and French fishermen in the Newfoundland waters were accurately defined.

All the British-French conventions above summarized were published in *British and Foreign State Papers*. The Egypt-Morocco convention of 1904 was republished in 1911, with the secret articles, as number 24 of the *Treaty Series*. According to Bertrand Russell (*Justice in War Time*, 1916, page 144) the French-Spanish Morocco treaty was published in *Le Matin* (Paris), in November, 1911.

VII

The Moroccan Question (1905-1906)

Morocco, at the beginning of the present century, was one of the few desirable fields still open for colonial enterprise on the part of the Powers. In consequence, it was for a decade or so one of the storm centers of European diplomacy. By reason of geographical proximity (in Algeria) France had a special interest in suppressing the chronic disorder in Morocco, particularly on the Algerian border. This French interest was recognized by Great Britain in the following article of the convention of April 8, 1904:

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

Apparently this was satisfactory to Germany; for on April 2, 1904, von Bülow, the German chancellor, stated in the Reichstag that "from the point of view of German interests we have nothing to complain of."

But Germany was not satisfied, because the convention indicated that England and France were ready to compose their quarrels, which had long been a source of diplomatic profit to Germany. Nothing was done, however, until the defeat of Russia in the battle of Mukden revealed the weakness of France's ally. Suddenly, on March 31, 1905, the German Emperor appeared at Tangier, Morocco, and proceeded to pay a visit to the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, in the course of which he spoke as follows:

It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit today. I hope that under the Sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign.

This demonstrative intervention created a diplomatic crisis in Europe and was generally regarded as a challenge to the recently formed Entente. The demand of Germany that France bring the Moroccan

question before an international conference was accepted, in spite of the opposition of M. Delcassé, the French foreign minister, who was thus virtually compelled to resign at German dictation.

The Conference met at Algeciras, in Spain, in January, 1906. The participants were the twelve Powers (including the United States) who were parties to the Convention of Madrid of 1880, and Morocco. The outcome was a diplomatic defeat for Germany, which was supported by Austria-Hungary alone, even Italy, the ally of Germany, ranging itself on the side of France. The Act of Algeciras provided for the settlement of the Moroccan question upon "the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality." However, while accepting in theory the German demand for internationalization of control, the Act accorded to France and Spain a privileged position with respect to financial and police measures in Morocco.

VIII

Agadir (1911)

Germany's last card in Moroccan diplomacy was played in 1911. On July 1 of that year the German gunboat *Panther* appeared at Agadir, on the southern coast of Morocco, ostensibly to protect German interests, but in reality to test the strength of the Triple Entente. This action of Germany was the more surprising because, by the treaty of February, 1909, it had recognized the paramount position of France in Morocco. For some time Germany ignored the repeated requests of Great Britain for explanation as to

German intentions, but the positive intimation by Lloyd George, in his speech at the Mansion House, July 21, that Great Britain intended to back up France, led Germany to compromise, by withdrawing completely from Morocco in consideration of territorial concessions by France in West Africa (Franco-German treaty of November 4, 1911). With this adjustment the Moroccan question disappeared from European diplomacy.

IX

The British-Russian Convention (1907)

On August 31, 1907, a convention was signed by Great Britain and Russia, similar in its nature to that concluded by Great Britain and France in 1904. The purpose of the British-Russian agreement was to settle all outstanding differences between the two Powers with respect to their interests in Asia. It comprises three separate arrangements, as follows:

1. The two parties mutually engage to respect the integrity and independence of Persia; but, having regard to each other's special geographical or economic interests, they agree to recognize certain spheres of influence in that country: a Russian sphere in the north and a British sphere in the south, with Central Persia not directly included in either.

2. Afghanistan is recognized as lying outside of Russian influence. All Russian relations with Afghanistan are to be carried on through the British government, which declares that it has no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan is maintained.

3. Thibet is recognized as under the suzerainty of China. All negotiations with Thibet are to be conducted through the

Chinese government. Its territorial integrity is to be respected; neither party is to send representatives to Lhasa; and no concessions or other rights in Thibet are to be sought or obtained.

X

The Grey-Cambon Correspondence (1912)

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912

My dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey

French Embassy, London

November 23, 1912

Dear Sir Edward:

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

[*British Diplomatic Correspondence, relating to the outbreak of the War, No. 105, enclosures 1 and 2.*]

XI

The First Balkan War (1912-1913)

In 1912 Turkey was at war with Italy over Tripoli. In addition, Albania was in revolt, Crete was clamoring for annexation to Greece, and Macedonia, for years in a state of anarchy, became the scene of frightful massacres of Bulgarians and Serbians at the hands of the Mohammedan Turks. All this at a time when German influence was paramount at Constantinople. Early in the year, the Balkan states achieved what had been deemed impossible—a league against the common enemy. This was brought about by a series of treaties between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, supplemented by military conventions, all of which contemplated not only relief for the subject Christian populations of Turkey but also the extension of territory at Turkey's expense.

In spite of efforts by the Great Powers to preserve peace, the Balkan League mobilized in the early autumn of 1912. Montenegro declared war against Turkey on October 8, and its allies issued similar declarations ten days later. Then followed a remarkable series of campaigns, in which the Balkan Allies were uniformly successful. By the first of December, Adrianople was invested; Macedonia and, in part, Albania were occupied; Serbia had reached the Adriatic; Greeks and Bulgarians were at Saloniki, and the Montenegrins were laying siege to Skutari. An armistice was signed on December 3, and a peace conference between Turkey and the Allies was opened at London on December 16.

By this time, however, the Balkan War had raised several questions affecting the general peace of Europe

and necessitating action on the part of the European Powers to prevent a general war. Consequently, parallel with the peace conference, an ambassadorial conference sat in London under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey for the purpose of advising the belligerent parties and of taking necessary decisions on matters of European concern. The demand of Serbia for territory on the Adriatic conflicted with the foreign policies of Austria and Italy. So, also, did the desire of Montenegro to capture and retain Skutari. This town, in the opinion of Austria and Italy as well as of the other Powers, should form part of an autonomous Albania, "the independence and neutrality" of which had already been proclaimed by an Albanian assembly at Avlona on November 28. The ambassadorial conference promptly agreed that Albania should be autonomous and that Serbia should have commercial access to Adriatic ports.

The peace conference, however, found it impossible to reconcile the demands of the respective belligerents and, the armistice having expired, the war was renewed. Again Turkey was defeated and again, after much diplomatic discussion with the Great Powers, an armistice was signed by all the belligerents save Montenegro. The Balkan Allies accepted the mediation of the Powers, and the peace conference opened for a second time in London on May 20. On this occasion a treaty of peace was successfully negotiated. It was signed on May 30. By its terms the frontier of Turkey in Europe was established by a line running from Enos on the Ægean to Midia on the Black Sea. All territory west of this line was ceded to the Allies, who were left to divide it among themselves in accordance with their respective treaties of alliance.

Turkey gave up Crete, which was later apportioned to Greece; the autonomy of Albania was recognized; and the disposal of the Ægean islands was left in the hands of the Great Powers.

Meanwhile Montenegro, in defiance of the Powers, had persisted in the siege of Skutari. On April 10 a blockade of the Montenegrin coast was put in force by an international squadron. On April 22 Skutari fell, but this made the Powers only the more insistent that Montenegro should evacuate the captured fortress. Finally, faced by an intervention which would probably be entrusted to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro yielded. For its compliance, it received assurance of a loan.

At the London ambassadorial conference in 1912, it was agreed that a European prince should be nominated as ruler of Albania. Early in 1914 the new throne was offered to William of Wied. He arrived at Durazzo March 7, 1914. Early in the summer of the same year he was driven out of Albania by a successful insurrection.

XII

The Second Balkan War (1913)

The Second Balkan War arose out of disputes over the spoils of the war against Turkey. The peace conference had failed to reach agreement on this matter, and the treaty left it to the Balkan Allies to apportion the ceded territory among themselves by supplementary conventions. But there was slight prospect of settlement. Bulgaria disputed the claim of Greece to possess Saloniki and the territory to the north and east of it. Serbia challenged the arrangement made in the Bulgar-Serbian treaty of 1912, maintaining that

the creation of Albania had essentially modified the equity of that arrangement. A military convention was promptly concluded between Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. An attempt was made to avert conflict through Russian mediation, but difficulties were raised over demobilization and all parties refused to recede. Suddenly, on June 30, 1913, the Bulgarians attacked the Greek and Serbian armies, hoping to crush them separately before they could unite. In the campaign that followed the Greeks and Serbians were more than a match for the Bulgarians, but the issue was decided by the intervention of the Rumanian army. Meanwhile Turkey took advantage of Bulgaria's extremity to recover Adrianople. As a result Bulgaria was compelled to ask for an armistice. Peace was restored in the Balkans by the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913). Bulgaria, recognizing defeat, had to yield most of its new acquisitions to Greece and Serbia and a considerable portion of its former territory to Rumania. A treaty of peace with Turkey on September 29 involved further cessions on the part of Bulgaria.

XIII

Rumanian Intervention (1913)

in the negotiations following the First Balkan War, Rumania had demanded a "rectified" frontier in the Dobrudja, in return for its neutrality, which was alleged to have been maintained on the understanding that Austria-Hungary and Russia would support the Rumanian claims when the war was over. In consequence, Bulgaria ceded to Rumania the town of Silistria with some adjoining territory. This did not

satisfy Rumania; and, as already stated, it intervened in the Second Balkan War. Its reasons for intervening were set forth in its declaration of July 9:

The Rumanian Government gave due warning to the Bulgarian Government that, if the Balkan allies were to find themselves in a state of war, Rumania would not be able to maintain the reserve which it has hitherto observed in the interests of peace and would be compelled to take action. The Bulgarian Government did not consider it necessary to reply to this communication. On the contrary, war unhappily began by a series of sudden attacks by the Bulgarians against the Serbian troops, without any observance by the Bulgarians of even the elementary rules of preliminary notification, which would at least have testified to a respect for the conventions of international usage. In presence of this situation the Rumanian Government has ordered the Rumanian army to enter Bulgaria.

[*Annual Register*, 1913, p. 351.]

XIV

San Giuliano's Warning to Austria (1913)

In a speech delivered in the Italian Parliament, December 5, 1914, Signor Giolitti declared that on August 9, 1913, Austria communicated to Italy and to Germany its intention of taking action against Serbia. It described such action as defensive and stated that it hoped to receive Italian as well as German support. Signor Giolitti was at that time prime minister and, on receiving the report of the Italian minister of foreign affairs, Marquis di San Giuliano, he directed the latter to reply in the following sense:

If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a *casus foederis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account. There is no question of defense, inas-

much as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.

XV

Liman von Sanders

After its crushing defeat at the hands of the Balkan Allies, Turkey applied to Germany for a military commission to reorganize its army. In October, 1913, it was announced that General Liman von Sanders had been chosen head of such a commission, which was to include some thirty other German officers. Russia at once began to protest, and protested the more strongly when it was stated that Liman von Sanders, in addition to his advisory duties, was to command the First Army Corps at Constantinople. This created a delicate situation. According to the Russian contention, this German military command would control the capital and the Straits and would thus be in a position to affect Russian interests adversely. Besides, the German ambassador at Constantinople would, in effect, be backed up by military power to the prejudice of the other (and especially of the Entente) ambassadors. The Russian press was intensely excited over the appointment, but the Russian government worked for a compromise, suggesting that Liman's headquarters be transferred to Adrianople and that Germany support Armenian reforms. On December 14, the Russian, French and British ambassadors asked the grand vizier for information as to the scope of the powers conferred on Liman von Sanders. No official answer was given, but it was

announced in the course of a day or two that Turkey was not actuated by political motives but had merely applied for the services of an expert whose duties were to be chiefly educational. It was further stated that Liman would not command the garrisons at the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

According to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, former American ambassador to Turkey, it was asserted by the German *chargé d'affaires*, in the matter of precedence at a diplomatic dinner given by Mr. Morgenthau, that von Sanders was "the personal representative of the Kaiser and as such . . . entitled to equal rank with the ambassadors. He should have been placed ahead of the cabinet ministers and the foreign ministers" [*The World's Work*, May, 1918, p. 66]. Fortunately for Morgenthau, the order of precedence at the dinner had been arranged by Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador, who was at the time doyen of the diplomatic corps.

It may be added that after the outbreak of the war in August, 1914 (but before Turkey had become a belligerent), Liman von Sanders was appointed commander-in-chief of the Turkish army.

XVI

British-German Negotiations (1912-1914)

The rapid development of German naval power had, as Prince Lichnowsky indicates, aroused anxiety in Great Britain; and the necessity, arising from Britain's insular position, of keeping its fleet equal to the combined fleets of any two other Powers was throwing a heavy burden on the British taxpayers. Lord Haldane was sent to Berlin early in 1912, to see whether

the German plan for the creation of a third squadron could not be modified. This suggestion being negatived, he inquired whether it would not be possible to delay construction, to "spread the tempo." It was indicated, on the German side, that no concessions could be made in the matter of naval construction unless Germany could be assured that, in case it should be involved in war, Great Britain would remain neutral. It was proposed that such assurance should be given by a formal treaty. After Haldane's return to London, negotiations on this matter were continued between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador, Count Metternich. Various formulas were suggested, but no agreement was attained, because the German diplomats found the British proposals inadequate, while the British regarded the German proposals as ambiguous. The Germans wished for an agreement that, if either nation should become involved in a war "in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor," the other nation should remain neutral; but they proposed to add:

The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have already made.

This, as Lord Haldane puts it, meant that while Germany, in the case of a European conflict, would have remained free to support her friends, this country would have been forbidden to raise a finger in defense of hers. Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria.

Another clause in the German draft forbade "the making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality towards

the other." This, of course, meant that while the Triple Alliance treaties were to remain binding and Great Britain was to be pledged to neutrality if Germany should make war to support Austria, Great Britain was to make no similar treaty arrangements with Russia or with France. "In a word," as Lord Haldane observes, "there was to be a guaranty of absolute neutrality on one side, but not on the other."

In response to a request for counter-proposals, Sir Edward Grey, on March 14, 1912, gave Count Metternich the following draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet:

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and suggested two alternative additional clauses:

England will therefore observe at least a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany, or: England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is forced upon Germany.

Sir Edward Grey considered that the British proposals were sufficient. He explained that if Germany desired to crush France, England might not be able to sit still, though if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support would be given by His Majesty's government or approved by England. He eventually proposed the following formula:

The two powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Ger-

many. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Count Metternich, in accordance with instructions received from Berlin, stated that the project for a further increase of the German navy could not be abandoned except on the basis of a neutrality treaty of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to its interpretation. "He admitted," Lord Haldane writes, "that the chancellor's wish amounted to a guaranty of absolute neutrality."

At this point the negotiations for a reduction of naval armaments and for a neutrality agreement were dropped.

Sir Edward Grey, however, expressed the hope that this result would not put an end to negotiations or form an insurmountable obstacle to better relations. The British government hoped that the formula which it had suggested might be considered in connection with the discussion of territorial arrangements, even if it did not prove effective in preventing the increase of naval expenditure. Sir Edward Grey added that, if some arrangement could be made between the two governments, it would have a favorable though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as time went on; it would have, moreover, a favorable and direct effect upon public opinion in both countries.

This suggestion was taken up; and at this point the British-German negotiations entered upon their third phase, that of the adjustment of conflicting interests in Africa and in Asia. These, as Prince Lichnowsky indicates, were under way when he came to London.

Brief statements regarding the negotiations for a

neutrality agreement were made by Prime Minister Asquith, in a speech at Cardiff, October 2, 1914, and by Sir Edward Grey, in a speech at London, March 22, 1915. These statements were substantially confirmed by extracts from the correspondence of 1912, published by the German Foreign Office in July, 1915. Further documentary material was published by the British Foreign Office, August 31, 1915. The fullest account of the negotiations—an account in which the question of naval armaments is brought into connection with the question of British neutrality—is given in Lord Haldane's report, made in 1912, a large part of which was published by the British government late in May, 1918.

See *New York Times*, June 2, 1918.

XVII

The Portuguese Colonies in Africa

The African treaty negotiated by Prince Lichnowsky dealt, as he states, with German and British spheres of influence in the Portuguese colonies. The following are the Portuguese dependencies in Africa (excluding the Cape Verde Islands), with statistical data, as given in the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1915:

1. Portuguese Guinea, on the west coast of Africa, south of Cape Verde; area, 13,940 square miles; population, 820,000.
2. Islands of Principe and St. Thomas, in the Gulf of Guinea; area, 360 square miles; population, 42,103.
3. Angola, between German South-West Africa on the south and the Belgian and French Congo on the north; area, 484,800 square miles; population, 4,119,000.
4. Portuguese East Africa, bounded by British Central and South Africa and German East Africa; area, 293,400 square miles; population, 3,120,000.

XVIII

Anglo-Portuguese Treaties

According to the *British and Foreign State Papers* (vol. i, page 462) there were still subsisting in 1814 (and presumably still subsist) several ancient treaties of friendship and alliance between England and Portugal, the earliest dating back to 1373, in the reign of Edward III. The treaty of Charles II's time, referred to by Lichnowsky, was made in 1661 and constituted the marriage contract between Charles II and Catherine, Infanta of Portugal. Article 16 promised that if the King of Portugal shall be pressed in any extraordinary manner by the power of the enemies, all the King of Great Britain's ships which shall at any time be in the Mediterranean Sea or at Tangier shall have instructions in such cases to obey any orders they shall receive from the King of Portugal and shall betake themselves to his succour and relief.

Also, under Article 17, the King of Great Britain was to

afford timely assistance of men and shipping according to the exigency of the circumstances, and proportionable to the necessity of the King of Portugal.

XIX

The British-German Bagdad Agreement

In his book entitled *Obstacles to Peace* (Boston, 1917, pp. 41-42), Mr. S. S. McClure states that in 1916 he obtained from Dr. Jaeckh, who had been private secretary to von Kiderlen-Wächter, the terms of the Bagdad Treaty which was to have been signed in 1914. He took this statement, he tells us, to the German Foreign Office in Berlin, where certain slight corrections were made; and he publishes the document

"exactly as I got it from Dr. Zimmermann, the foreign minister of the imperial German government."

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is definitely left to German capital in coöperation with Turkey. In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working will not be hindered by England.

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which German capital is concerned with sixty per cent. and English capital with forty per cent. For the navigation from Basra to the Persian Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to.

3. Kuwait is excluded from the agreement between Germany and England.

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested with fifty per cent., German capital with twenty-five per cent., and Turkish with twenty-five per cent.

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be developed by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at fifty per cent. by England, at twenty-five per cent. by the German Bank, at twenty-five per cent. by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irrigation works there had been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. This society exercises south of Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab as well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the production and transport of oil.

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand to French capital for the construction of railways in southern Syria and Palestine.

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozambique.

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which established the political predominance of France in

Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" to the trade of all nations.

An analysis of the German-French agreement alluded to above, under point 6, is to be found in a dispatch dated February 20, 1914, from the Belgian minister at Berlin to the Belgian foreign minister. This dispatch is to be found in the collection of Belgian documents seized by the Germans at Brussels and published by the German imperial government. [See *American Journal of International Law*, April, 1918, page 392; or this volume, page 238.]

XX

The Potsdam Conference of July 5, 1914

In "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story," of which the first two instalments have appeared in *The World's Work*, May and June, 1918, Mr. Morgenthau, our ambassador at Constantinople during the earlier part of the World War, tells what he learned from the German ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim.

On July 4, 1914, Mr. Morgenthau was surprised to note the absence of the German ambassador from the requiem mass for the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, and also from the celebration of Independence Day at the American embassy. Afterwards Mr. Morgenthau had the explanation from Wangenheim's own lips. He had left some days before for Berlin. The Kaiser had summoned him to an imperial council, which met on July 5th at Potsdam (page 73).

The Kaiser presided; nearly all the ambassadors attended; Wangenheim came to tell of Turkey and enlighten his associates on the situation in Constantinople. Moltke, then chief of staff, was there, representing the army, and Admiral von Tirpitz spoke for the navy. The great bankers, railroad direc-

tors, and the captains of German industry, all of whom were as necessary to German war preparations as the army itself, also attended.

Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn: Was he ready for war? All replied "Yes" except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans. At that time few people had looked upon the Serajevo tragedy as something that was likely to cause war. This conference took all precautions that no such suspicion should be aroused. It decided to give the bankers time to readjust their finances for the coming war, and then the several members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The Kaiser went to Norway on his yacht, von Bethmann Hollweg left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople.

In telling me about this conference, Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Germany had precipitated the war. I think that he was rather proud of the whole performance; proud that Germany had gone about the matter in so methodical and far-seeing a way; especially proud that he himself had been invited to participate in so momentous a gathering. . . . Whenever I hear people arguing about the responsibility for this war or read the clumsy and lying excuses put forth by Germany, I simply recall the burly figure of Wangenheim as he appeared that August afternoon, puffing away at a huge black cigar, and giving me his account of this historic meeting. Why waste any time discussing the matter after that? . . .

This imperial conference took place July 5; the Serbian ultimatum was sent on July 22. That is just about the two weeks interval which the financiers had demanded to complete their plans. All the great stock exchanges of the world show that the German bankers profitably used this interval. Their records disclose that stocks were being sold in large quantities and that prices declined rapidly. At that time the markets were somewhat puzzled at this movement; Wangenheim's explanation clears up any doubts that may still remain. Ger-

many was changing her securities into cash, for war purposes. . . .

Wangenheim not only gave me the details of this Potsdam conference, but he disclosed the same secret to the Marquis Garroni, the Italian ambassador at Constantinople. Italy was at that time technically Germany's ally (pages 170, 171).

XXI

Sir Edward Grey's Warning of July 29, 1914

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
British Ambassador at Berlin*

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914

Sir:

After speaking to the German ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped

that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

That this warning was promptly transmitted to Berlin is shown by the following extract from a dispatch sent to Sir Edward Grey by Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador at Berlin, on July 30, reporting a conversation with Foreign Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that [the] telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated [the] frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

[*British Diplomatic Correspondence, relating to the outbreak of the War*, Nos. 89, 98.]

XXII

Correspondence between the President of the French Republic and King George

*The President of the French Republic to
His Majesty King George*

Paris, July 31, 1914

Dear and Great Friend:

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the

Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military preparations which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged: if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *entente* between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with your Majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that, at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed.

*His Majesty King George to the President
of the French Republic*

Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914

Dear and Great Friend:

I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon.

[*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, part ix, sec. v, pp. 542-544.]

XXIII

Bonar Law's Letter of August 2, 1914

The letter to which Lichnowsky alludes is undoubtedly that in which the Conservative leader tendered to the prime minister the support of his party.

2d August, 1914

Dear Mr. Asquith:

Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.

Yours very truly,

A. BONAR LAW

[First published in the *London Times*, December 15, 1914.]

XXIV

King Albert's Telegram

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
British Ambassador at Berlin*

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

[*British Diplomatic Correspondence*, No. 153.]

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA by JEROME LANDFIELD

THE GERMAN PEACE TREATIES AND MIDDLE EUROPE



JULY, 1918
No. 128

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

SOURCES

I. Treaties of Peace

- a. Between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian People's Republic—*The New York Times*, February 12, 1918.
- b. Between the Central Powers and Russia—*The New York Times*, March 6, 1918.
- c. Between Germany and Finland—*The New Europe*, April 4, 1918.
- d. Between the Central Powers and Rumania.
 1. Preliminary Peace Treaty—*The New York Times*, March 7, 1918.
 2. The Peace of Bucharest—*The New York Times*, May 9, 1918.
 3. Economic Conditions Imposed upon Rumania by the Central Powers (Official Summary)—*Official Bulletin*, March 30, 1918.

II. The Constitution of Middle Europe, by Dr. Friedrich Naumann—*The New York Times*, May 6, 1918.

Mr. Jerome Landfield, the author of the article "America and the Russian Dilemma," was from 1894 to 1897 a student in Petrograd. Upon the completion of his studies he spent several years in mining exploration in the Ural Mountains, the Maritime Province of eastern Siberia, the Kirghiz Steppes, and the Chukhotsk peninsula of northeastern Siberia.

The article which appears in this issue was written some time ago, but has been delayed in publication. In the meantime, Mr. Landfield has entered the service of the Government.

I

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA

By JEROME LANDFIELD

There is an unfortunate tendency in America and among our Allies to charge Russia off to profit and loss; to consider that Russia is not only out of the war but is a potential asset of our enemies, and that the decision must be won on the western front alone. But to act on this view of the situation is not only to neglect the opportunity to facilitate our military task in France and Flanders, but to complicate gravely our post-war problems. To abandon the Russian people to economic serfdom under Germany is not only to increase the present military strength of the Germans, but also to build up an economic relationship inimical to a durable peace after the war. Surely we can not contemplate with complacency a development that makes of Russia a German province or colony and places in the hands of the Teutons the exploitation of her vast resources. A peace that does not secure to Russia her absolute economic independence would be but a precursor of further wars. It is therefore imperative that the Russian problem be viewed from an intensely practical and realist standpoint.

It is the misfortune of Russia always to have been misunderstood. Her defenders have pictured her a spiritual paradise; her enemies, a dismal and cruel hell. And both misrepresented her. For a century England was tricked by Napoleon into believing that

Russia's dream was the conquest of India. In Germany the bogey of the "Slav peril" has been played up by the militarists to secure enormous grants for the army. The truth is that Russia is simply an enormous extent of flat land, sadly lacking in roads, on which dwell some 180,000,000 peasants who are kindly, provincial, superstitious, and, in point of material progress, a century behind the peoples of western Europe. This backwardness is not due to any lack of natural capacity, for in this regard they are more highly blessed than any other European people, but to historical and economic causes. So far from being a military menace, Russia had no economic and industrial structure to meet the strain of modern warfare, and was therefore, in a military sense, a mere shell. Germany knew this; the Allies were ignorant of it.

Just as we failed to understand the true military situation in Russia, so have we also misunderstood the political conditions. In fact our gravest error has been to exaggerate the importance of the political side and to ignore the economic. In times of revolution governments and political parties are transitory and of secondary importance. The vital matter is the economic conditions which determine political changes. The basic fact is that men must obtain food and clothing and the primary necessities of existence, and it is from this that parties and governments spring.

The two chief obstacles that stand in the way of a clear understanding of the Russian problem, and therefore acting wisely in relation to it, are, first, this exaggeration of the political side that makes us discuss seriously the Bolsheviki and their peace treaty with Germany, and, second, a lack of sympathy with

Russia, which is based on a misunderstanding of Russia's part in the war and the reason why she stopped fighting.

If this were understood, there would be no more cries of "Traitor," or reproaches, but rather astonishment at how much Russia has done and endured, and sympathy for her suffering and sacrifices. For Russia saved Europe from the Hun, and at a cost of more than 7,000,000 of her young men. Had it not been for the opportune offensive which the Grand Duke Nicholas made in East Prussia in the early days of the war, an offensive that caused the immediate withdrawal of 250,000 German troops from the western front, Paris would have fallen. And when one examines the conditions and knows against what difficulties of treason and espionage he struggled, the wonder grows.

Again, it was the Grand Duke's drive through western Poland to the German frontier in October, 1914, that saved Ypres and prevented the Germans from reaching Calais. Otherwise the war would in all probability have been over long before this with Germany victorious. In 1915 Germany had to divert all her energies eastward to save Austria, and while the Russian army suffered terribly and Poland was lost, a breathing space was given England and France to develop their fighting forces and their munition plants. In 1916 Brusilov, by his great drive in Galicia, relieved the pressure on Verdun and made possible the battle of the Somme. If anyone is inclined to cast a slur on Russia for her work in the war, let him remember what she really did at such a fearful cost, and what this sacrifice means to us, who realized our duty so tardily.

Then came the revolution and Russia collapsed and dropped out of the war. There is a general impression that this was due to politics, that some theories concerning imperialistic war aims and social changes had something to do with it. But Russia was out of the war months before the revolution, out of the war by reason of hunger and want. It was not the Petrograd garrison, not the Duma, not the revolutionary conspirators that brought about the overthrow of the Tsar's government; it was starvation and dire need. The reason why the old régime plotted peace with Germany was because they saw themselves unable to cope with the economic situation and saw in such a peace the only means of satisfying the needs of the people and thereby avoiding their own destruction.

A provisional government was set up, composed of many of the best men in Russia, but they could not meet the economic situation and restore living conditions and revive industry, so they had to fall. Equally futile was the Kerensky government, which tried to satisfy the people with beautiful word pictures and paper money. And when the Bolsheviki proclaimed that they would bring peace and provide bread, these hitherto despised radicals were acclaimed. But the Bolsheviki, in spite of their autocratic rule and the license they have given to the vicious mob to plunder at will, can not make good their promises.

Their overtures to Germany were a despairing effort to meet the terrible condition they saw confronting them. They were in the same position as the old régime and took the same course. They prate loudly about the revolution and the war against the bourgeoisie, but they know that they face an

economic situation which they can not meet, and that Germany can furnish something that they themselves can not provide. They know that while Germany is short of food and perhaps deficient in man power, given German factories and machinery, German organizers and engineers, the raw materials and unlimited labor of Russia, an economic transformation can be wrought, and that by this alone can they extricate themselves from their dilemma.

Herein lies the gravest danger that confronts the Allies. It is not political. It has nothing to do with social theories of the Bolsheviki or their program of government. It is simply that all industry in Russia has fallen down and that the Russian people must obtain certain things if they are to continue to live. These commodities are the necessities of existence and they must get them somewhere. The peasants on their farms have food, but nothing else. The workmen and soldiers have neither food nor anything else save depreciated paper money with which nothing can be bought, for there is nothing to buy.

The alternative is tragically simple. They must have the necessities of life at all costs, and they will obtain them from us or from Germany. If from Germany, it means that German industry, ruined by the blockade, will be revived and Germany win a victory not to be offset by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of our soldiers on the western front. If from us, it means that the Russians will fight to the death rather than relinquish them to our enemies. If you want to make a dog fight give him a bone that another dog covets.

The sympathies of the Russian people are generally with us, in spite of our failure to give active assistance,

and to counter effectively the German propaganda in Russia. Nevertheless there is such a hatred of Germany that the 1,200,000 men of the railway employees' association and the 15,000,000 men of the peasants' coöperative societies of the Moscow district sent their own commission to this country to make purchases and to enlighten us as to their needs and their good will.

The head of this commission told me that when he laid before American business men the proposition of reopening commercial relations with Russia, they asked three questions touching upon its feasibility. The first was whether, if supplies were sent to Russia, they would not fall into the hands of the Germans. The answer was simple and direct. The Russians, in the first place, would defend with their lives the articles of necessity that they obtained, and in the second place, if they did not get them from us, then they would perforce get them from the Germans.

The next question had to do with the difficulty of payment and exchange. This of course is a serious problem, for the American views foreign trade differently from the German. He is anxious only to complete the immediate transaction and get his money, while the German regards the sale as only the entering wedge for further transactions. Therefore German merchants, backed by the government, have been accepting all the rubles they could get by traffic through Sweden, knowing that later on they could buy mines and factories and banks with them in Russia. Our government could well afford as a part of our war expenditure to back our merchants to the extent of a billion or two billion dollars in the acceptance

of rubles for goods, knowing that a pair of American shoes or a can of condensed milk in Russia today may save the life of an American soldier in France.

The third question was whether the ruble would be good, or whether Russia would repudiate after the war. For our government this is a secondary question if by the expenditure the war can be shortened and our losses be lessened. But repudiation is impossible, in spite of the Bolshevik announcement to that effect. Russia's debt today is something like \$30,000,000,000. Only one-fifth is held abroad; the remainder is largely in the form of issues of paper money. There is scarcely a peasant today who does not possess a large amount of this money; hardly a peasant hut that does not have thousands of rubles. For any government to repudiate and tell the peasant that his money was worthless would be to invite certain massacre. To repudiate the foreign debt and drive all foreign capital out of Russia, merely to save ten per cent. of the annual budget, is inconceivable.

This is the Russian situation as it faces the Allies today. Here are the possibilities. Clever propaganda among the Russians to let them know that we are in the war and are their friends; the organization and support of a great party in Russia pledged to resist the Germans; the immediate dispatch of engineers, organizers of industry, transportation experts, doctors, nurses, and the like; the resumption of commercial relations, made possible by our government financing ruble exchange at a fixed rate and removing trade barriers under careful supervision.

First there would be stiffened the great passive resistance to German economic conquest. Next there would develop a guerilla warfare that would draw

tremendously on Germany's military resources and paralyze her efforts to obtain food and supplies from Russia. Remember the struggle of the people against Napoleon in 1812 and realize that today there would be fighting that guerilla warfare, not peasants armed with scythes and pitchforks, but millions of soldiers who have taken with them from the front their arms and ammunition. And thirdly, if the war should last through another year, there would be within the bounds of possibility organized resistance with a regular army. After popular resistance had been organized, the authorities might well invite Japanese and American military coöperation. To intrude it now, when it would be misinterpreted, would be a grave blunder, imperilling our whole future and instantly throwing European Russia wholly into the hands of Germany.

To sum the whole matter up, it lies in our hands to say whether the Russians are to become again an important factor in the war, or whether through our neglect and stupidity, they are to become an enemy asset. But the question is not only one of the present. It is not merely one of expediency in the war situation of today, motivated by the consideration of its effect upon our losses on the western front. It is a question of the future independence of a great people laden with priceless gifts for the world, and bound up with it are the basic conditions upon which rest the hopes of an enduring peace.

Many important developments have taken place in the Russian situation since the foregoing article was written some three months ago. The impossible political and economic theories of the Bolsheviks have brought increasing chaos and disillusionment. Indus-

trial life has entirely broken down and European Russia faces starvation. There has even been a strong movement among the sane elements to turn to Germany for assistance in reorganization, since existence under the Bolshevik régime is no longer possible.

On the other hand a great change has been wrought in the general situation by the conflict between the Czecho-Slovak troops and the Bolsheviks on the Volga and along the Siberian railway. These troops, who had deserted from Austria and who had fought bravely in the Russian army, were proceeding peaceably eastward across Siberia, bound for the western front, and were doing so under an agreement with the Bolshevik Government. An order was issued by this Government, presumably under German dictation, to disarm them. Naturally they resisted, for they knew that disarmament meant extermination. They overcame the local Soviets all along the line and now hold the principal points from the Volga to Irkutsk, while some fifteen thousand managed to reach Vladivostok.

We have now reached an agreement with the Allied Governments for joint assistance to the Czecho-Slovaks and for economic aid in the reorganization of Russia, following in many respects the suggestions set forth in the foregoing article. President Wilson's announcement of this on August 3 encourages us to believe that a new era is about to begin for tortured Russia and that with regeneration there will come the power to throw off the threatened German yoke.

II

TREATIES OF PEACE

A treaty of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on one part and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other, February 9, 1918

(Official Summary)

The preamble states that the Ukrainian people, having in the course of the present world war declared itself to be independent and expressed a wish to restore peace between itself and the powers at war, desires "to take the first step toward a lasting world's peace, honorable to all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but also lead to the restoration of friendly relations of the peoples in political, legal, economic, and intellectual realms."

The names of all of the plenipotentiaries engaged in the negotiations are then set forth, and they are declared to have reached an agreement on the following points:

Article 1. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

Article 2. Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, as far as these two powers border one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the present war between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Russia. Further north the frontier of the republic beginning at Tarnegrad will in

general follow the line of Bilgerey to Srozeberzszyn, Krasnostau, Pugaszce, Radzyn, Meshiretschei, Sarnaki, Selnik, Wysekelitowsk, Kamietslitowsk, Prushany, and Wydozowskyesee. This will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to ethnographical conditions and with a regard to the desires of the population. Should the Ukrainian People's Republic yet have common frontiers with another of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance, special agreements will be made thereon.

Article 3. The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by the plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.

Article 4. The diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties to Consuls is to be reserved for a special agreement.

Article 5. The contracting parties mutually renounce the reimbursement of their war costs—that is to say, the State expenditure for carrying on the war, as well as indemnification for damages—that is to say, those damages suffered by them and their subjects in the war, as through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's countries.

Article 6. The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, and, as far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of the questions connected herewith will follow by means of separate treaties provided for in Article 8.

Article 7. The contracting parties undertake mutually and without delay to enter into economic relations and organize an exchange for goods on the basis of the following prescriptions:

1. Until the 31st day of July of the current year reciprocal exchange of the more important surplus supplies of agricul-

tural and industrial products will be carried out as follows for the purpose of covering current requirements: The quantities and sorts of products to be exchanged will be settled by a joint commission, to sit immediately upon the signature of the peace treaty. Prices will be regulated by the joint commission. Payments will be made in gold on the basis of 1,000 German imperial gold marks as the equivalent of 462 gold rubles of the former Russian Empire, or 1,000 Austro-Hungarian gold kroner as the equivalent of 393 rubles, 78 kopeks of the former Russian Empire. The exchange of goods fixed by the joint commission aforementioned, which commission will consist of equal numbers of representatives of both parties, will take place through State central bureaus. The exchange of those products which are not fixed by the aforementioned commission will take place by the way of free trade, according to the stipulation of a provisional commercial treaty.

2. So far as it is not otherwise provided, the economic relations between the contracting parties shall continue provisionally, and in any case until the conclusion of a final commercial treaty. But until the termination of a period of at least six months after the conclusion of peace between the Central Powers on the one part and the European States at war with the Central Powers, as well as the United States and Japan on the other part, certain prescriptions are laid down as a basis of relations.

As regards economic relations between Germany and Ukraine the text of the treaty prescribes what parts of the Russo-German commercial and shipping treaties of 1894 and 1904 shall be put into force. The contracting parties further agree to maintain the general Russian customs tariff of January 13, 1903.

The treaty also provides (Section 3) which parts of the Austro-Hungarian-Russian commercial and shipping treaty of February 5, 1906, shall be maintained, and adds:

All parties agree that all articles transported across the territory of either party shall be free of duty. Trade-mark agreements are resumed, and the contracting parties agree to support each other in restoring railway tariffs. Economic relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and Ukraine are to be settled according to the most favored nation definition until definite commercial treaties are concluded.

If the period provided for in the first paragraph of Section 2 should not occur before June 30, 1919, each of the two contracting parties is free from June 30, 1919, to give six months' notice to terminate the prescriptions contained in the above-mentioned section.

4. *a.* The Ukrainian People's Republic will make no claim to preferential treatment which Germany grants Austria-Hungary, or another country bound to her by a customs alliance, which directly borders on Germany, or indirectly through another country bound to her or Austria-Hungary by a customs alliance, or which Germany grants to her own colonies, foreign possessions and protectorates, or to countries bound to her by a customs alliance. Germany will make no claim to preferential treatment which the Ukrainian People's Republic may grant to another country bound to her by a customs alliance, which directly borders on Ukraine, or indirectly through another country bound to her by a customs alliance, or to the colonies, foreign possessions and protectorates of one of the countries bound to her by a customs alliance.

b. In economic intercourse between the treaty customs territory of both States of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the one hand and the Ukraine People's Republic on the other, the Ukrainian People's Republic will make no claim to preferential treatment, which Austria-Hungary grants to Germany or another country bound to her by a customs alliance which directly borders on Austria-Hungary, or, indirectly through another country bound to her or Germany by a customs alliance. Colonies, foreign possessions, and protectorates are in this respect placed on a similar footing.

Austria-Hungary will make no claim to preferential treatment which the Ukrainian People's Republic grants to another country bound to her by a customs alliance which directly borders on Ukraine, or indirectly borders through another country bound to her by a customs alliance, or to colonies, foreign possessions, and protectorates of one of the countries bound to her by a customs alliance.

5. *a.* So far as commodities which originally came from Germany or Ukraine are stored in neutral States, though the obligation rests upon Germany and Ukraine that they shall not be exported either directly or indirectly to the territories of the other contracting party, such restrictions regarding their disposal shall be abolished so far as the contracting parties are concerned. The two contracting parties, therefore, undertake immediately to notify the Governments of neutral States of the above-mentioned abolition of this restriction.

b. So far as commodities which originally came from Austria-Hungary or Ukraine are stored in neutral States, although the obligation rests upon Austria-Hungary and Ukraine that they shall neither directly nor indirectly be exported to the territories of the other contracting party, such restriction respecting their disposal will be abolished so far as the contracting parties are concerned. Both contracting parties, therefore, undertake immediately to notify the Governments of neutral States of the above-mentioned abolition of these restrictions.

Article 8. Restoration of public and private legal relations, the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the question of amnesty and the question of the treatment of merchantmen in enemy hands will be regulated in separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, to form an essential part of the present peace treaty, which, so far as practicable, will take effect simultaneously therewith.

Article 9. The agreements made in this peace treaty form an indivisible whole.

Article 10. For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian texts are authoritative in regard to relations

between Germany and Ukraine, the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian texts for relations between Austria-Hungary and Ukraine, the Bulgarian and Ukrainian texts for relations between Bulgaria and Ukraine, the Turkish and Ukrainian texts for relations between Turkey and Ukraine.

The concluding part of the treaty provides:

The present peace treaty will be ratified. Ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as there are no provisions to the contrary, the peace treaty shall come into force on ratification.

The supplementary treaties provided for in Article VIII also were signed. They cover the following points:

Restoration of consular relations.

Restoration of State treaties.

Restoration of civil law.

Indemnification for civil damages caused by laws of war or by acts contrary to international law.

Exchange of war prisoners and interned civilians.

Care of burial grounds of those fallen in enemy territory.

Provision for the return to their homes of persons affected by the treaty.

Treatment of merchant vessels in enemy hands.

Treaty of peace between the Central Powers and Russia, March 3, 1918

Article 1. The Central Powers and Russia declare the state of war between them to be terminated and are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

Article 2. The contracting nations will refrain from all agitation or provocation against other signatory Governments and undertake to spare the populations of the regions occupied by the powers of the Quadruple Entente.¹

Article 3. The regions lying west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties, and formerly belonging to Russia, shall no longer be under Russian sovereignty. It is agreed that the line appears from the appended map, No. 1, which, as agreed upon, forms an essential part of the peace treaty. The fixing of the line in the west will be settled in the German-Russian Mixed Commission. The regions in question will have no obligation whatever toward Russia, arising from their former relations thereto. Russia undertakes to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of these territories and to let Germany and Austria determine the future fate of these territories in agreement with their populations.

Article 4. Germany and Austria agree, when a general peace is concluded and Russian demobilization is fully completed, to evacuate the regions east of the line designated in Article 3, No. 1, in so far as Article 6 does not stipulate otherwise. Russia will do everything in her power to complete as soon as possible the evacuation of the Anatolian² provinces and their orderly return to Turkey. The districts of Erivan,³ Kars, and Batum will likewise without delay be evacuated by the Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the constitutional or international conditions of these districts, but leave it to the populations of the districts to carry out the reorganization, in agreement with the neighboring States, particularly Turkey.

¹ Official text reads: The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public and military institutions of the other party. In so far as this obligation devolves upon Russia, it holds good also for the territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

² Official text: the provinces of eastern Anatolia.

³ Official text: Erdehan.

Article 5. Russia will without delay carry out the complete demobilization of her army, including the forces newly formed by the present Government. Russia will further transfer her warships to Russian harbors and leave them there until a general peace or immediately disarm. Warships of States continuing in a state of war with the Quadruple Alliance will be treated as Russian warships in so far as they are within Russian control. The barred zone in the article⁴ continues in force until the conclusion of peace. An immediate beginning will be made of the removal of mines in the Baltic and in so far as Russian power extends in the Black Sea. Commercial shipping is free in these waters, and will be resumed immediately. A mixed commission will be appointed to fix further regulations, especially for the announcement of routes for merchant ships. Shipping routes are to be kept permanently free from floating mines.

Article 6. Russia undertakes immediately to conclude peace with the Ukraine People's Republic and to recognize the peace treaty between this State and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. Ukrainian territory will be immediately evacuated by the Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia will cease all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Esthonia and Livonia will likewise be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern frontier of Esthonia follows in general the line of the Narova River. The eastern frontier of Livonia runs in general through Peipus Lake and Pskov Lake to the southwesterly corner of the latter, then over Lubahner (Luban) Lake in the direction of Lievenhof on the Dvina. Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German police force until security is guaranteed by their own national institutions and order in the State is restored. Russia will forthwith release all arrested or deported inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia and guarantee the safe return of deported Esthonians and Livonians. Finland and the Åland Islands will also forthwith be evacuated by the Rus-

⁴ Official text: Arctic Ocean.

sian troops and the Red Guard, and Finnish ports by the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces. So long as the ice excludes the bringing of Russian warships to Russian ports only small detachments will remain behind on the warships. Russia is to cease all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions in Finland. The fortifications erected on the Åland Islands are to be removed with all possible dispatch. A special agreement is to be made between Germany, Russia, Finland, and Sweden regarding the permanent non-fortification of these islands, as well as regarding their treatment in military, shipping, and technical respects. It is agreed that at Germany's desire the other states bordering on the Baltic are also to have a voice in the matter.

Article 7. Starting from the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect their political and economic independence and territorial integrity.

Article 8. Prisoners of war of both sides will be sent home.

Article 9. The contracting parties mutually renounce indemnification of their war costs, that is to say, state expenditure for carrying on the war, as well as indemnification for war damages, that is to say, those damages which have arisen for them and their subjects in the war regions through military measures, inclusive of all requisitions undertaken in the enemy country.

Article 10. Diplomatic and Consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately after ratification of the peace treaty. Special agreements are reserved relative to the admittance of the respective Consuls.

Article 11. The prescriptions contained in appendices 2 to 5 shall govern the economic relations between the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia, namely: Appendix 2 for German-Russian, Appendix 3 for Austro-Hungarian-Russian, Appendix 4 for Bulgarian-Russian, and Appendix 5 for Turkish-Russian relations.

Article 12. The restoration of public and private relations, the exchange of prisoners of war, interned civilians, the

amnesty question, as well as the treatment of merchant ships which are in enemy hands, will be regulated by separate treaties with Russia, which shall form an essential part of the present peace treaty and as far as is feasible shall enter into force at the same time.

Article 13. For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Russian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and Russia; for the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the German, Hungarian, and Russian text; for the relations between Bulgaria and Russia, the Bulgarian and Russian text; for the relations between Turkey and Russia, the Turkish and Russian text.

Article 14. The present peace treaty will be ratified. Instruments of ratification must be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin. The Russian Government undertakes at the desire of one of the Quadruple Alliance powers to exchange ratifications within two weeks. The peace treaty enters into force on its ratification, in so far as its articles, appendices, or supplementary treaties do not prescribe otherwise.

The signatures of the plenipotentiaries are attached. The treaty was drawn up in quintuple form at Brest-Litovsk on March 3.

The semi-official Wolff Bureau of Berlin says that the trade and political questions to which Article 11 refers are to be regulated according to the demands of the German ultimatum and analogously to the Ukrainian treaty. The legal and political agreements correspond substantially to the proposals which were submitted at the first sitting by Germany on the basis of its ultimatum.

Treaty of peace between Germany and Finland, March 7, 1918

CHAPTER I. RATIFICATION OF THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GERMANY AND FINLAND, AND GUARANTEE OF FIN- LAND'S INDEPENDENCE

Article 1. The contracting parties declare that no state of war exists between Germany and Finland, and that they are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another. Germany will do what she can to bring about the recognition of the independence of Finland by all the Powers. On the other hand, Finland will not cede any part of her possessions to any foreign Power or grant a servitude on her sovereign territory to any such Power without first having come to an understanding with Germany on the matter.

Article 2. Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. Provision for the most far-reaching admission possible of consuls on both sides will be reserved for special agreements.

Article 3. Each party shall make good the damages done in its territory by its public bodies or population to the life, liberty, health or property of consular officials of the other party on account of the war, by actions contrary to international law or damage done to the consular buildings of such party or to their fixtures.

CHAPTER II. WAR INDEMNITIES

Article 4. The contracting parties mutually renounce indemnification for their war costs, that is to say, the state expenditure for the conduct of the war, as also compensation for damage done by the war, that is to say, those damages done to them and to their subjects in the war zones by military measures, including all requisitions made in enemy country.

CHAPTER III. RESTORATION OF STATE TREATIES

Article 5. The treaties which lapsed as a consequence of the war between Germany and Russia shall be replaced as soon as possible by new treaties for relations between the contracting parties, which shall correspond to the fresh views and conditions. In particular the contracting parties shall at once enter into negotiations in order to draw up a commercial and shipping treaty. In the meantime the trade relations between the two countries shall be regulated by a commercial and shipping agreement to be signed at the same time as the peace treaty.

Article 6. Treaties to which, in addition to Germany and Russia, third Powers are parties, and in which Finland appears together with Russia, or in the place of the latter, shall come into force between the contracting parties on the ratification of the peace treaty, or, in so far as the entry takes place later, at that time. As regards collective treaties of a political nature to which other belligerent Powers are parties, both parties reserve their attitude until after the conclusion of a general peace.

Chapters IV-IX (inclusive) deal with 'restoration of private rights', 'confiscated properties', 'compensation for civil damages', 'exchange of prisoners', 'amnesty', and 'merchant shipping'.

CHAPTER X. SETTLEMENT OF THE ÅLAND QUESTION

The contracting parties are agreed that the fortifications erected on the Åland Islands shall be done away with as soon as possible, and the permanent non-fortification of these islands, and their other management from a military and shipping technical point of view, shall be regulated by a special agreement between Germany, Finland, Russia, and Sweden; other states situated on the Baltic shall also be parties to the agreement if desired by Germany.

CHAPTER XI. FINAL PROVISIONS

This peace treaty shall be ratified. The ratifying documents shall be exchanged as soon as practicable in Berlin. So far

as is not otherwise stipulated, it shall come into force with its ratification. Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet in Berlin within four months of the ratification, to make supplementary additions to the treaty, in witness whereof the plenipotentiaries on both sides have signed and sealed the present treaty. (7 March 1918.)

Preliminary peace treaty between the Central Powers and Rumania, March 5, 1918

I. Rumania cedes to the Central Allied Powers Dobrudja as far as the Danube.

II. The powers of the Quadruple Alliance will provide and maintain a trade route for Rumania by way of Constanza to the Black Sea.

III. The frontier rectifications demanded by Austria-Hungary on the frontier between Austria-Hungary and Rumania are accepted in principle by Rumania.

IV. Economic measures corresponding to the situation are conceded in principle.

V. The Rumanian Government undertakes to demobilize immediately at least eight divisions of the Rumanian Army. Control of the demobilization will be undertaken jointly by the upper command of Field Marshal von Mackensen's army group and the Rumanian chief army command. As soon as peace is restored between Russia and Rumania the remaining parts of the Rumanian Army also will be demobilized in so far as they are not required for security service on the Russo-Rumanian frontier.

VI. The Rumanian troops are to evacuate immediately the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy occupied by them.

VII. The Rumanian Government undertakes to support with all its strength the transport of troops of the Central Powers through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa.

VIII. Rumania undertakes immediately to dismiss the officers of the powers who are at war with the Quadruple Alliance still in the Rumanian service. The safe conduct of these officers is assured by the Quadruple Alliance. This treaty enters into operation immediately.

The peace of Bucharest, May 6, 1918

CLAUSE I. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP

Article 1. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the one hand, and Rumania on the other, declare the state of war ended and that the contracting parties are determined henceforth to live together in peace and friendship.

Article 2. Diplomatic and Consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The admission of Consuls will be reserved for a future agreement.

CLAUSE 2. DEMOBILIZATION OF THE RUMANIAN FORCES

Article 3. The demobilization of the Rumanian Army, which is now proceeding, will immediately after peace is signed be carried out according to the prescriptions contained in Articles 4 and 7.

Article 4. The regular military bureau, the supreme military authorities and all the military institutions will remain in existence as provided by the last peace budget. The demobilization of divisions eleven to fifteen will be continued as stipulated in the treaty of Focsani signed on March 8 last. Of the Rumanian divisions one to ten, the two infantry divisions now employed in Bessarabia, including the Jaeger battalions which are the remnants of dissolved Jaeger divisions, and including two cavalry divisions of the Rumanian Army, will remain on a war footing until the danger arising from the military operations now being carried on in the Ukraine by the Central Powers ceases to exist.

The remaining eight divisions, including the staff, shall be maintained in Moldavia at the reduced peace strength. Each division will be composed of four infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments, two field artillery regiments and one battalion of pioneers, together with the necessary technical and transport troops. The total number of the infantry of the eight divisions shall not exceed 20,000 men; the total

number of cavalry shall not exceed 3,200; the entire artillery of the Rumanian Army, apart from the mobile divisions, shall not exceed 9,000 men. The divisions remaining mobilized in Bessarabia must, in case of demobilization, be reduced to the same peace standard as the eight divisions mentioned in Article 4.

All other Rumanian troops which did not exist in peace time will at the end of their term of active military service remain as in peace time. Reservists shall not be called up for training until a general peace has been concluded.

Article 5. Guns, machine guns, small arms, horses and cars and ammunition, which are available owing to the reduction or the dissolution of the Rumanian units, shall be given into the custody of the Supreme Command of the Allied (Teutonic) Forces in Rumania until the conclusion of a general peace. They shall be guarded and superintended by Rumanian troops under supervision of the allied command. The amount of ammunition to be left to the Rumanian army in Moldavia is 250 rounds for each rifle, 2,500 for each machine gun and 150 for each gun. The Rumanian army is entitled to exchange unserviceable material at the depots of the occupied region, in agreement with the Allied Supreme Command, and to demand from the depots the equivalent of the ammunition spent. The divisions in Rumania which remain mobilized will receive their ammunition requirements on a war basis.

Article 6. The demobilized Rumanian troops to remain in Moldavia until the evacuation of the occupied Rumanian regions. Excepted from this provision are military bureaus and men mentioned in Article 5, who are required for the supervision of the arms and material laid down in these regions. The men and reserve officers who have been demobilized can return to the occupied regions. Active and formerly active officers require, in order to return to these regions, permission of the chief army command of the allied forces.

Article 7. A General Staff officer of the allied powers, with staff, will be attached to the Rumanian Commander in Chief

in Moldavia, and a Rumanian General Staff officer, with staff, will be attached as liaison officer to the chief command of the allied forces in the occupied Rumanian districts.

Article 8. The Rumanian naval forces will be left to their full complement and equipment, in so far as their crews, in accordance with Article 9, are not to be limited until affairs in Bessarabia are cleared, whereupon these forces are to be brought to the usual peace standard. Excepted herefrom are river forces required for the purposes of river police and naval forces on the Black Sea, employed for the protection of maritime traffic and the restoration of mine-free fairways. Immediately after the signing of the peace treaty these river forces will, on a basis of special arrangement, be placed at the disposal of the authorities intrusted with river policing. The Nautical Black Sea Commission will receive the right of disposing of the naval forces on the Black Sea, and a naval officer is to be attached to this commission in order to restore connection therewith.

Article 9. All men serving in the army and navy, who in peace time were employed in connection with harbors or shipping, shall, on demobilization, be the first to be dismissed in order that they may find employment in their former occupations.

CLAUSE III. CESSIONS OF TERRITORY OUTLINED IN ARTICLES 10, 11, AND 12

Article 10. With regard to Dobrudja, which, according to Paragraph 1 of the peace preliminaries, is to be added by Rumania, the following stipulations are laid down: (A) Rumania cedes again to Bulgaria, with frontier rectifications, Bulgarian territory that fell to her by virtue of the peace treaty concluded at Bucharest in 1913. A commission composed of representatives of the allied powers shall shortly after the signature of the treaty lay down and demarcate on the spot the new frontier line in Dobrudja. The Danube frontier between the regions ceded to Bulgaria and Rumania follows the river valley. Directly after the signature of the

treaty further particulars shall be decided upon regarding the definition of the valley. Thus the demarcation shall take place in Autumn, 1918, at low water level.

(B) Rumania cedes to the allied powers that portion of Dobrudja up to the Danube north of the new frontier line described under Section A; that is to say, between the confluence of the stream and the Black Sea, to the St. George branch of the river. The Danube frontier between the territory ceded to the allied powers and Rumania will be formed by the river valley. The allied powers and Rumania will undertake to see that Rumania shall receive an assured trade route to the Black Sea, by way of Tchernavoda and Constanza (Kustendje).

Article 11 says that Rumania agrees that her frontiers shall undergo rectification in favor of Austria-Hungary as indicated on the map, and continues:

Two mixed commissions, to be composed of equal numbers of representatives of the powers concerned, are immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty to fix a new frontier line on the spot.

Article 12. Property in the ceded regions of Rumania passes without indemnification to the states which acquire these regions. Those states to which the ceded territories fall shall make agreements with Rumania on the following points: First, with regard to the allegiance of the Rumanian inhabitants of these regions and the manner in which they are to be accorded the right of option; secondly, with regard to the property of communes split by the new frontier; thirdly and fourthly, with regard to administrative and juridical matters; fifthly, with regard to the effect of the changes of territory on dioceses.

Clause IV deals with war indemnities, of which Article 13 declares that the contracting parties mutually renounce indemnification of their war costs, and special arrangements are to be made for the settlement of damages caused by the war.

The fifth clause relates to the evacuation of occupied territories, embodied in Articles 14 to 24, summed up as follows:

The occupied Rumanian territories shall be evacuated at times to be later agreed upon. The strength of the army of occupation shall, apart from the formation employed in economic functions, not surpass six divisions. Until the ratification of the treaty the present occupation administration continues, but immediately after the signature of the treaty the Rumanian Government has the power to supplement the corps of officials by such appointments or dismissals as may seem good to it.

Up to the time of evacuation, a civil official of the occupation administration shall always be attached to the Rumanian Ministry in order to facilitate so far as possible the transfer of the civil administration to the Rumanian authorities. The Rumanian authorities must follow the directions which the commanders of the army of occupation consider requisite in the interest of the security of the occupied territory, as well as the security, maintenance, and distribution of their troops.

For the present, railways, posts and telegraphs will remain under military administration and will, in accordance with proper agreements, be at the disposal of the authorities and population. As a general rule, the Rumanian courts will resume jurisdiction in the occupied territories to their full extent. The allied powers will retain jurisdiction, as well as the power of police supervision, over those belonging to the army of occupation. Punishable acts against the army of occupation will be judged by its military tribunals, and also offenses against the orders of the occupation administration. Persons can only return to the occupied territories in proportion as the Rumanian Government provides for their security and maintenance.

The army of occupation's right to requisition is restricted to corn, peas, beans, fodder, wool, cattle, and meat from the

products of 1918, and further, to timber, oil and oil products, always observing proper regard for an orderly plan of procuring these commodities, as well as satisfying the home needs of Rumania.

From the ratification of the treaty onwards the army of occupation shall be maintained at the expense of Rumania. A separate agreement will be made with regard to the details of the transfer of the civil administration, as well as with regard to the withdrawal of the regulations of the occupation administration. Money spent by the allied powers in the occupied territories on public works, including industrial undertakings, shall be made good on their transfer. Until the evacuation these undertakings shall remain under the military administration.

CLAUSE VI. REGULATIONS REGARDING NAVIGATION ON THE DANUBE

Article 24. Rumania shall conclude a new Danube Navigation Act with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, regulating the legal position on the Danube from the point where it becomes navigable, with due regard for the prescriptions subsequently set forth under Sections A to D, and on conditions that the prescriptions under Section B shall apply equally for all parties to the Danube act. Negotiations regarding the new Danube Navigation Act shall begin at Munich as soon as possible after the ratification of the treaty.

The sections follow: (A) Under the name Danube Mouth Commission, the European Danube Commission shall, under conditions subsequently set forth, be maintained as a permanent institution, empowered with the privileges and obligations hitherto appertaining to it for the river from Braila downwards, inclusive of this port. The conditions referred to provide, among other things, that the commission shall henceforth only comprise representatives of states situated on the Danube or the European coasts of the Black Sea. The commission's authority extends from Braila downwards to

the whole of the arms and mouth of the Danube and adjoining parts of the Black Sea.

(B) Rumania guarantees to the ships of the other contracting parties free navigation on the Rumanian Danube, including the harbors. Rumania shall levy no toll on ships or rafts of the contracting parties and their cargoes merely for the navigation of the river. Neither shall Rumania, in the future, levy on the river any tolls, save those permitted by the new Danube Navigation Act.

Section C provides for the abolition after the ratification of the treaty of the Rumanian *ad valorem* duty of one and one-half per cent. on imports and exports.

Articles 25 and 26 deal with Danube questions and provide that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania are entitled to maintain warships on the Danube, which may navigate down stream to the sea and up stream, as far as the upper frontier of Austria's territory, but are forbidden intercourse with the shore of another state or to put in there except under *force majeure* or with the consent of the state.

The powers represented on the Danube Mouth Commission are entitled to maintain two light warships each as guardships at the mouth of the Danube.

Article 27 provides equal rights for all religious denominations, including Jews and Moslems, in Rumania, including the right to establish private schools.

Article 28 provides that diversity of religion does not affect legal, political, or civil rights of the inhabitants, and, pending ratification of the treaty, a decree will be proclaimed giving the full rights of Rumanian subjects to all those, such as Jews, having no nationality.

The remaining three articles provide that economic relations shall be regulated by separate treaties, coming into operation at the same time as the peace treaty. The same applies to the exchange of prisoners.

Economic conditions imposed upon Rumania by the Central Powers

(Official Summary)

The Department of State has received the following summary of certain conditions being imposed upon Rumania by the Central Powers, and comment thereon:

The central empires are imposing on Rumania a contract for the concession, exploitation, and sale of petroleum which constitutes, in addition to a complete seizure of this industry, a scarcely disguised spoliation of all private friendly or foreign interests invested in petroliferous affairs, and, finally, a means of getting hold of all kinds of real estate property throughout the Kingdom.

The contract carries with it a proclamation that for a duration of years the exclusive right of boring and exploitation will be granted for state lands to a company which will be designated by the central empires. The concessions in force will not be renewed and will revert to the new society or company at the expiry of their contract. This society will have the use of all means of communications and petroliferous installations belonging to the state. It may establish others at its expense and for this purpose expropriate private individuals, without being obliged to furnish proof of the public utility of the works which it undertakes. There is, therefore, no corner of the territory which it can not reach under pretext of establishing a railway or road. All litigation will be settled by arbitration. If the parties cannot agree concerning the designation of the final arbitrator, the latter will be nominated by the president of the tribunal at Leipsic. In case of appeal the case will be brought before the tribunal at Bucharest or before that of Berlin at the choice of the defendant. It goes without saying that the defendant will be in principle German and the arbitrator designated by the tribunal at Leipsic and who will judge in the first instance will not be likely to show partiality in favor of the Rumanians.

The petroleum trade will be monopolized and placed in the hands of a society or company whose capital will be more than three-quarters Austro-German and the remainder Rumanian. This society will not be subject to the provisions of the Rumanian codes and laws concerning foreign societies. It will have the disposal, at a price fixed by it, of all petroleum produced by private persons or joint-stock companies and may requisition their installations and means of exploitation if they differ in opinion with them concerning their employment. Every new installation will be, moreover, subject to its authorization. It reserves the right of expropriating the lands of private individuals without having to furnish proof of public utility. The society will have the monopoly of the exploitation of petroleum and its derivatives, and this exportation will be entirely exempt from any control of the Rumanian State.

It is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the fact that these conditions are monstrous. First, Rumania finds herself deprived of the greater part of her natural wealth for the benefit of a foreign state; second, private individuals themselves are spoliated and their fortunes placed at the mercy of foreign societies. Furthermore, no state has ever been placed in the obligation of consenting to such a dismemberment of its sovereignty. The Austro-German societies will have in Rumania and forever equal rights with the Rumanian State and often superior rights. The central empires are establishing in Christian territories the system of capitulations, adding thereto an aggravation as yet unknown—the extension of this privilege to real estate questions.

III

THE CONSTITUTION OF MIDDLE EUROPE

By DR. FRIEDRICH NAUMANN

When will 'Middle Europe' be completed? When and by whom? Now, after peace has been made together in the east, it is high time that a fast treaty should be concluded concerning military unity, economic unity, and a common foreign policy of the Central Powers, for the new eastern boundary raises problems for us that can only be solved in common. A world-history line is drawn from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea which has to serve as the common rampart for all Middle Europeans, once it is there. And those who have had doubts as to its historical justness and usefulness, or still have today, can not evade the fact that for a long time the line of division is drawn for culture and politics. At this line end the Middle European railroads, the Middle European tariff, Middle European law, and Middle European money. Beyond this line there is something still fully unknown, post-revolutionary Russia. Whether a federation of States will come of it, or what, who knows? So much is certain: When this revolution is over, this new boundary will become a matter of the first importance and a peace boundary or a war boundary, according to the spirit that prevails on both sides.

If upon the Middle European side there is no unity of will and organization, the idea that the erection of

the line was a mere accident will not die out among the Russians, Ukrainians, and Rumanians, and each new generation will have to tremble before a new inner European war. Only through a fast Middle European formation can the drawing of the boundary become a monumental event. No eastern imagination can later have any doubts as to the cemented security of the Central European mass. If such a united solidarity is not attained, the unspeakable blood-letting and struggling will begin anew.

And also within the new borders troubles will spring up if we do not find the Middle European union. Poland will only find peace when it gets complete Middle European rights of existence and laws. Since the treaty of Brest-Litovsk it is no longer a question whether Poland shall lie to the east or west of the border. The die is cast, Poland remains Middle European. Now the only question is whether a political arrangement will be found which will not cause the Poles to turn again eastward. That neither Prussian Germany nor Austria-Hungary can alone bring about. Here centralized power and skill are required.

In a word: Those who have begun to make world history should not turn back after the beginning of the work. The signatures of Brest-Litovsk bound them to some further signatures—to the alliance of all those on the west of the border, to the common border rampart, to the Rhein-Danube-Vistula union.

The Kaisers, the Ministers, and the representatives of the peoples of Middle Europe are called to show whether they are worthy of the peace and the greatness of the times. Of the two Kaisers one may at once assume that they would not wish to appear be-

fore posterity as obstacles to this historical step. Just as through a common proclamation in November, 1916, they proclaimed the Polish State, which now has become a historical necessity, so, one day, when the preparations are complete, they will do a greater thing, whereby for the first time the former act will appear in its proper setting. Before all the people they will join hands, forever united. That is the one real, conclusive outcome of this huge war which we have borne together.

Through that alone will the war memories of all concerned become holy and all war acquisitions held fast. Through the free resolution of the monarchs many political differences can be easily and pleasantly prevented. If the highest army leadership of both sides, by virtue of their own inherited rights, declare that from now on they are inclined to arrange military affairs upon similar bases and with firm, trusting consideration, half of the problems of the military convention would be settled.

In theory it is almost impossible to put two sovereign States of equal rank under a system of united military leadership, but practically the war has brought us a unity which needs only to be held fast and translated into terms of peace time.

That is true also of foreign policy. For that no general rule can be given, but the principle of unity must be raised above every doubt. Each of the two States is sovereign, but they are bound together by the idea of unity. Which side then acts in a certain case will depend upon talent, the state of affairs, and the preparations.

There should be no Imperial German predominance, for that is the surest way to destroy the union.

Numerous affairs of life are founded on dualism. In itself a greater dualism is not necessarily unworkable, but friction as much as possible must be disposed of. And here is the place for the governmental and political power of the present generation of Middle European statesmen to give a proof of its ability.

The desire for unity is not to be laid up in a painful plaster cast, but the things that disturb this unity must be removed as far as possible in the beginning. For that there are two kinds of institutions, joint offices and adjustment offices. By joint offices we mean Central European conferences which, made up of equal parts, shall express the spirit of the union without being authorities in the strong sense of the word, and especially Middle European offices for foreign policy, consular affairs, army affairs, justice, trade, social policy, railroads, shipping, and finance. By them the matter that the separate Governments put before their popular assemblies would be previously considered to see what adjustments in form and substance were possible.

As holders of these middle European offices, I think of tried, experienced men in the countries concerned. There are in Vienna as in Berlin and Budapest excellent heads, entirely suited to the union work. Since from past times in office they bring knowledge and authority the esteem of the character of the new offices will not fall. In the course of time, so we hope, a tradition will be established which will bring about a common movement without great changes in the constitution.

In many ways the dual relationship of Austria and Hungary may serve as typical. It is at bottom correctly conceived, and for more than fifty years has

held better than was expected of it, but it lacks the adjustment offices. In regard to economics and finance especially the long standing complaints and attacks of both sides on the ten years' adjustment negotiations have been put off, and the quiet working machinery of the double monarchy is continually in jeopardy. From small frictions and questions in this way frequently arise violent wars.

A similar lasting disturbance of the work of the State the German Empire would never endure or would scarcely be willing to assent to such a system, but rigorous tests will show that such misunderstandings are not at all unavoidable. Fast working courts are needed which, on the basis of general treaties, will settle all such questions (tariff, licenses, taxes, boundary questions) directly by equally divided sittings.

All this will be made much easier through the coming in of more States with the Central Powers, because a transition from dualism to pluralism arises. These States are and remain absolutely sovereign, but they make agreements with the Central Powers by which they are represented in the Middle Europe offices and the adjustment offices. Treaty agreements alone are concerned, and no idea of lasting union.

From different sides the question has been raised whether in the common trade and economic policy a customs parliament should be constituted. We consider it politically unnecessary and economically injurious. It is not necessary, because the present separate parliaments ought to lose as little of their lawful function as their Governments, since in matters of sovereignty nothing is changed. It would, however, work evil because it would probably make economic

questions subjects of national strife. One must turn economic and national affairs as far as possible from each other, decentralize the former, centralize the latter. The Middle Europe trade and economics office will, by its nature, have continually to look to experts and representatives of trades and listen to their wishes, but, according to our idea, it would have nothing to do with party quarrels of Germans, Magyars, Poles, Czechs, etc.

We admit at once that the construction proposed has intricacies and uncertain points, and that it is very easy to criticise this proposal formally. But criticism without constructiveness has really no value. Intricacy and lack of clearness are inherent in forms first created and comprehended. Everything is intricate that is newly erected on a historically prepared groundwork. The constitution of the German Empire itself is a very complicated thing; as most people know, King William I called it, at its origin, an artistically ordered chaos. That has not kept it in practice from doing very good work. Such a constitution for Middle Europe can be attained in not very many years. In historical creations of this sort theory is not first, but the act.

Now is the time for that act.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Post office, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

A VOICE FROM GERMANY:

Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince

By Professor F. W. FOERSTER

AUSTRIA'S PEACE PROPOSALS

The Letter to Prince Sixtus



AUGUST, 1918

No. 129

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

Professor F. W. Foerster of Munich, a son of the eminent professor of astronomy at Berlin, has been the object of vehement attacks in Germany, including an open attack in the Bavarian Landtag. The following is a translation of the complete text of an article by him which appeared in the *Münchener Post* of January 4, 1918.

A VOICE FROM GERMANY

Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince

By Professor F. W. FOERSTER

I

At this time when our enemies, in spite of their great longing for peace, are apparently determined with increasing unanimity to continue the war, it is well for us to look about us and ask what obstacles we offer from our side to the conclusion of peace, instead of trying to throw all the blame for the continuance of this wholesale murder upon our opponents.

It is true that the war fanatics in the ranks of our enemies follow a false idea and fall into the very idolatry of force against which they are fighting. The more one trusts to war the more power it wins over his soul. The nations of the Entente will also be scourged by this universal day of judgment into the recognition that this world conflict cannot be decided

or stopped by force, nor until they take another tone with which to address the German people than that which they have used before and during this war. For our own national self-knowledge, however, it would be highly profitable if we would ask ourselves seriously how it happens that all these peoples on the one hand long so passionately for an enduring peace and yet on the other hand reject just as passionately all negotiations with the present representatives of German authority and of the German spirit.

Why are England and America determined not to lay down their arms until they have broken the power of Germany? A reply which is as cheap as it is superficial is current, namely, that nothing but the most ordinary policy of self-interest is behind this determination. England wishes to rid herself of our competition and to take over our colonies; America wishes to make sure of the interest upon her investments, and so forth. As to England's jealousy of our competition, this is merely a fairy tale invented in the interest of the war. The real England—upon whom, rather than upon the snap judgments of shortsighted individuals, the whole matter depends—knows perfectly well that there has come to her in the last fifteen years of this steadily growing competition, an unexampled increase of her own economic prosperity. Why? Because Germany's success in export trade caused a rapidly increasing demand in the German market for English products. Hence the collapse of the protectionist movement in England, the best proof of the fact that German competition was by no means regarded as a negative economic factor. England as the greatest expert in the subject of economic interdependence could not hide the fact that there is in the

world not only room enough for both powers, but that the work in the world of the one opens up almost inexhaustible opportunities for the work in the world of the other. The talk about England's jealousy of our competition being the determinative factor in the outbreak of the war and its continuance, betrays a very primitive conception of economic conditions. The same may be said of the assertion that England is continuing the war in order to retain our colonies. Shortly before the war England met us more than half way in the matter of our colonial possessions because, as Dr. Solf said only recently, a wider extension of the British possessions would have overtaxed England's powers and her responsibilities for imperial organization.

As to America, the statement that the war is supported there only because of money interests also rests upon a very primitive conception of economic conditions. Not that money interests may not be a very strong motive over there, but America, months ago, would have satisfied these money interests infinitely more surely and profitably if she had come to a speedy conclusion of peace and had re-established business relations with Europe which is in direct need of raw material, than by continuing the war, which even if it is finally won by America will leave a bankrupt Europe with long outstanding debts and a greatly reduced market.

II

Why then do England and America continue this war? They are in this war to abolish war and the threat of war. That seems to many of the young Germans, brought up in the glamor of war, to be

going a little too far. But they do not realize how great a hold the pacifist ideal had taken upon the Anglo-American world in the last twenty-years, not only for idealistic reasons but, as Herbert Spencer emphasized so often, because well established methods of mediation for the settlement of international disputes are indispensable for the preservation of the highly-developed organization of great world-interests. Just because we do not grasp this fact, but insist that the determination of our enemies is based upon a hand-to-mouth, living-by-the-day policy of self-interest, we allow ourselves to be persuaded by would-be clever people that America is arming herself so effectively not against us but against Japan. That is a 'Prussian' psychology. Of course America fears the world policy of Japan, but just because she wishes to avoid at any price the transforming of the new world into a training camp on account of Japan, she is determined to win over Japan and render her inoffensive by pacific means, that is to say through membership in a society of nations. Behind the program of world peace in the message of President Wilson of January 22, 1917, will be found three motives: first, the democratic, ethical idealism of the descendants of the Puritans and Quakers and all that element which because of one or another form of oppression has sought refuge from Europe; second, economic, a technical Americanism which sees in war an outgrown method of adjusting international relations, paralyzing every hope of far-reaching world-wide achievement; and third, the danger of complications with Japan. Only he who clearly understands with what fervor of deeply aroused public sentiment these idealistic and realistic motives drive

America at any cost to place the interrelations of nations upon an entirely new foundation of justice—only he is proof against the absurd editorials with which today the greater part even of the conciliatory German press comments upon President Wilson's policies.

Is it necessary, however, that America should continue the war to establish her program of world policy? Did not the majority resolution of the German Reichstag, as well as the answer of the Central Powers to the Pope's Note, express unequivocally our readiness to coöperate in the realization of such plans for the future? What more could be asked? The answer is very simple: the Entente find no convincing moral guarantee behind all these declarations. They will not believe that that 'majority' is firmly in power. They can unfortunately point to far too many insolent protests from the most influential circles against that resolution. These protests indicate the characteristic position of the would-be intellectual leaders of the nation. The Entente follow with interest the heathenish editorials of the Christian *Kölnische Volkszeitung* which recommends to a great and growing people a Machiavellian policy. It brings hosts of witnesses to prove that academic circles in Germany still hold the point of view that the military authorities should dominate, based upon a policy of force in dealing with international problems. Indeed it suspects that many of those who supported the resolution in the summer of 1917 were influenced not by any fundamental change in their views upon international policies, but by the suspension of military operations. The convictions of such people are often altered by a change in the war situation.

The future society of nations cannot be founded, however, upon such an unreliable public sentiment. The Entente say as to this: A superstition, nourished by the whole of Prussian history, that the safety of the nation is secured only by force of arms has, through its gigantic successes, eaten into the very souls of the Germans; a romantic belief in the power of the rattling of the sword has grown up which can only be destroyed by the bitter experience of a complete break-down of the German position. The deep suspicion that lurks in this conception has unfortunately been strengthened by Czernin's notion of setting a time-limit upon his impressive confession in favor of peace without annexation. As though a time-limit can be put upon convictions regarding the only possible basis of a future society of nations! I am convinced that the nations cannot economically, financially or morally continue a further competition in armaments; therefore I must oppose all violence—that is to say, every attempt to continue hate and distrust, no matter how far behind my point of view others may lag—or I shall arouse the suspicion that I have no convictions and am only playing a skillful game. Such suspicion makes trust impossible.

It is inconceivable that so large a proportion of the German people should talk continually about the enemy's determination to go on with the war and the Germans' wish for peace, without asking themselves if that determination to continue the war does not arise from the fact that our offers of peace are made worthless by the military pride and the spirit of conquest which dominate our interviews and speeches, thereby exciting a hostile self-consciousness on the part of our enemies. Also the tradition of national

selfishness and reliance upon force is too strong to win confidence abroad in a new Germany. When one compares the pacifist literature appearing in England from the pen of noted men of letters (Hobson, Russell, Dickinson, Brailsford) and the corresponding utterances of eminent public men (Lord Buckmaster, Lord Bryce, Lord Courtney, Lord Lansdowne) with what we are permitted to say, one realizes that among us the pacifist literature has been for the most part suppressed; so that it is no wonder our enemies are not yet especially impressed with the power, the authority and the spiritual depth of our desire for peace. A nation's genuine desire for peace must manifest itself more concretely than in general and ambiguous declarations.

The deathlike silence which is forced upon the German people, and indeed upon German statesmen also, by a secret superior power, with regard to the most burning questions concerning the great European catastrophe, does not bring us confidence from abroad. In his open letter to Herr von Kühlmann (printed in the *Manchester Guardian*) Lord Courtney says that the declaration for a future peaceful settlement of international disputes by arbitration will be believed in when the questions in dispute at this very moment are discussed in a really conciliatory spirit. It is just this which is found wanting in us, as for example our treatment of the Alsace-Lorraine question. Lord Courtney has certainly found the weak spot in our protestations concerning peace. Even if we should refuse to give back the tiniest strip of territory, we are bound, if we persist in such an attitude, to take all the more care to meet half-way the demands of others for justice. Either a conciliatory peace is an

empty phrase, merely an attempt to make a mechanical compromise which leaves all the inflammable material ready to ignite again and does not signify in any way a new ordering of international life, or it means a real spiritual and moral unity and reconciliation by means of a general acceptance of certain vital principles which should be our guide in the solution of mutual demands and in present and future conflict of interests. If this is the definition of a conciliatory peace, then it is our duty to try to understand the point of view of our opponents, that is to say the basis which is considered abroad as indispensable, legally and morally, to a lasting peace.

The plain, bald statement, however, that Alsace-Lorraine is a German question does not help in the least toward the settlement of the world crisis, for however German the Alsace-Lorraine question may be it is at the same time a European question. The taking away of the rights of the Alsatians separated us from the democratic sentiment of the rest of the world and will continue to separate us if we do not, through the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question, deliberately recognize a principle which alone will win for us faith in our desire for justice. According to their principle of self-determination the Entente regards an adjustment of that question as a 'symbol of the victory of justice'. They say: Yes, certainly Alsace-Lorraine comes of German stock; but the cultural bond is still closer. Under the French régime of liberty and respect for traditions, through the experience of the French Revolution and, especially through the ideas which sprang from it, and finally through the events of the Napoleonic era, the population of Alsace-Lorraine has been in fact deeply estranged

from Germany. The Prussian administration has roused in the soul of the Alsatians a feeling of outrage. A democratic age demands full expiation for this. The *Manchester Guardian* for October 13, 1917 makes the following summary of the English point of view:

If a world war cannot reverse such a wrong (forceful annexation) may it not be argued in the future that there exists nowhere in the world any ultimate reserve force to which the wronged can appeal. The Germans may and probably do say that our own country was not less guilty of annexing a white population in South Africa, but our country saw its error and reversed it, placing the disposal of South Africa in the hands of the South Africans themselves. Had Germany so acted with Alsace-Lorraine there would from that day have been a different Europe and there would have been no world war.

There are but two possible courses for the German people with regard to these moral and political demands: either we entirely refuse, in a sort of fit of national arrogance, to discuss the matter from this point of view at all and so isolate ourselves from certain principles which are today moving the entire world, although agreement upon these principles may be of the greatest importance for the new foundation of our influence in the world; or we admit that for the restoration of our over-seas position the most important thing of all is full reconciliation with the west and agreement to the demands coming from the west for moral guarantees of a durable peace, especially if mere sentiment is set aside and the matter viewed as *Realpolitik*. When the doctrine of self-determination is viewed in this reasonable light, that is to say not as a principle of dissolution but as a protest against merely mechanical unity, one must not only accept it, but be willing to make sacrifices for it, without the

un-German and narrow-minded fear that our frontiers would thereby be made unsafe. The moral unity of Europe is from now on to be the only reliable protection for frontiers.

It all comes down to this, that the German people must finally understand in what sense the Alsace-Lorraine problem is a European problem. That province should be raised immediately to a position of full legislative rights in equality with the other states. And this should be done solemnly and deliberately in the determination to accept the principles of a new international law which are now moving the rest of the world. If this had been done in December, 1916, it would have been a far more effective offer of peace than all general declarations.

III

In dealing with the Belgian question too, our representative men must make specific statements and not indulge in ambiguous generalities before they can dare, before the judgment seat of exact truth, to talk about the hand which had been extended for peace being rudely rejected. All turns upon the conciliatory spirit, upon the triumph of sound words over all pretense, and not upon pacific formulas. Only when the restoration of Belgium is looked upon as a question of national honor and not as a matter of business, only when we take back the word of the Chancellor as to a committed wrong, only when the sense of right of the German people becomes so strong that it breaks through all pretenses and sees how inadequate are the so-called proofs with which certain teachers of international law have brought suspicion upon the Belgian

government and talked us out of any thought of wrong on our part—only then shall we reach the right conclusions and find the right words to convince the rest of the world that a new Germany has come into existence. After it was stated in the summer of 1917 by German military experts that the whole plan of the French campaign and strategy prove, that the violation of Belgian neutrality did not enter into the plans, all other assertions of a Belgian conspiracy against us have become worthless, quite apart from the fact that all the much quoted conversations dealt not with the making of war but only with defense against German invasion. The foundation for an objective and just examination of the Belgian question has therefore been laid. The determination to carry out such an examination will be far more weighty for the conclusion of peace than ten offers of peace. It is also of vital importance for the respect for law and conscience on the part of the whole German people. It is a national question of the first importance.

Peace depends, however, not only upon us but upon the attitude taken by Austria-Hungary. Has Austria-Hungary comprehended the necessity for an agreement with our opponents on matters of principle, from which all other agreements follow as a matter of course? It is at once evident that a political authority which rests upon the federal union of widely differing nationalities, cannot settle questions by the mere catchword 'self-determination'. There is in this struggle for freedom an anarchistic, destructive tendency which leads every baker's shop to declare itself autonomous. But just because the catchword is rejected, there is all the more obligation to promise radical changes, guided by entirely new principles, in

certain governmental and administrative methods which contributed largely to the outbreak of the world-conflagration. For example, the Austro-Italians, and particularly the Dalmatian populations, should have been promised after the war the greatest possible independence in dealing with questions of taxes, customs, and so forth, and full consent to their autonomy in all matters of education and religion. In such ways this whole world-uprising might have been checked effectively. The fact that, instead of this, the official attitude has been limited to mere insistence on the rights of possession, marks a failure in world policy which must make the impression upon the rest of the world that we have not yet comprehended that the hour for the world-wide application of these policies has struck, and that it is idle to enter into peace negotiations with a people so far removed in all that concerns these vitally important principles. In truth, there grips the people of the Central Powers like a curse a one-sided, political tradition of centralization which holds them imprisoned by the fear of liberty and withholds from them the truth that 'nothing binds so fast as liberty'.

In the *Tägliche Rundschau* during last summer there appeared the following noteworthy paragraph: "Why do we refuse to heed the mighty warning of Russia? Why does not Germany take the lead in this spiritual elevation of the whole conception of war, in this bringing of an august, divine thought to truth from the material chaos? Have we not the youth and the spirit for it?" And in the same sense M. Rade says in the *Christliche Welt*: "Ideas must be the future guardians of peace. They must not only be present but they must be apparent to the world, to all man-

kind. This metaphysical, meta-military side of the question we Germans have disregarded too long. Yes, we ourselves! The time will come when we shall not be able to understand how this could have happened."

IV

Here is the gist of the present crying need of the world. Each people has a part to play in the world civilization according to its special and deepest gifts. If it fails to fulfil its mission then the equilibrium is destroyed. "Great Caesar fell—and when he fell, then you and I and all of us fell down!" We once formed the "innermost centre of international life". We produced the ideas by which the feeling of unity of the civilized world was continually strengthened. For scores of years our part has been reversed. We have become the prophets of national isolation. The declarations of our statesmen regarding ideas of international unity limp always far behind those of others. The poverty of ideas in our policies is actually shocking. Can the world be healed in that way? No, we have much to make good to the world and to ourselves. And the moment is now here. Never was there a time in history when more fruitful opportunities and tasks demanding statesmanship of the highest order were offered to a people than in the present world crisis. The whole enemy world longs for peace and yet at the same time it longs for war because it believes that the mental attitude of an all too large and too influential group among us gives no moral guarantee for a durable peace. We can never refute this world judgment either by arms or through general statements. But we can establish our moral

standing in the world in an entirely new sense if we now become the spokesmen of a new European order and follow a creative policy instead of one of mere possession, not with words and empty self-praise but with practical proposals in which a noble tact will be convincingly displayed, working for the interests of all and for genuine compensation over the entire field of the conflict. We must have the courage to place ourselves and our affairs confidently under the protection of a new international justice, under a genuine world policy instead of an egotistical policy; that is to say, we must interest ourselves in the opportunities of all peoples who share this world agony, drawing upon the wisdom of the entire world to teach us the spirit of justice and upon the wide outlook of a people that trades abroad. We must recognize that such an organizing policy can alone furnish for us the moral atmosphere in which we shall be able to solve the internal problems of our national life. The policy of force and self-interest leads only to destruction.

A statecraft of the sort here described can, however, not be developed by statesmen alone. The entire people must work for it by making an end to the obstacles to conciliation which arise from the insistent assertion of our own rights and our own interests as the continual response to the distrust and criticism of our enemies.

It is our ancient German world-mission which today strikes deep into the German conscience and bids us turn from false idols and a false world policy. To us, the central people of Europe, who by our situation have been forced continually to absorb alien elements and weld these foreign mixtures into a great, com-

prehensive human unity, to us in whose soul there arose in consequence the profound aspiration and joy of mutual understanding and of the friendly adjustment of the respective traits of many peoples, to us it is entrusted as the Central Empire to become the mediator among conflicting traits and interests and traditions and to recognize that in such unifying and moral activity is the only trustworthy protection for our national life. May this realization of our national mission break upon the German people before bitter experience and disappointment teach us, all too harshly, that we have gone astray.

AUSTRIA'S PEACE PROPOSALS

Letter from Emperor Charles to Prince Sixtus¹(Reprinted from *The New York Times*, April 12, 1918)

PARIS, April 11.—The following official note was issued tonight:

Once caught in the cogwheels of lying, there is no means of stopping. Emperor Charles, under Berlin's eye, is taking on himself the lying denials of Count Czernin, and thus compels the French Government to supply the proof. Herewith is the text of an autograph letter communicated on March 31, 1917, by Prince Sixtus de Bourbon, the Emperor of Austria's brother-in-law, to President Poincaré, and communicated immediately, with the Prince's consent, to the French Premier:

"My Dear Sixtus: The end of the third year of this war, which has brought so much mourning and grief

¹The *Manchester Guardian* for May 8 states that in a second letter to Prince Sixtus, the Austrian Emperor expressed confidence that he could induce Germany to accept peace, provided the territorial demands of the Allies were restricted to Alsace-Lorraine as annexed in 1871. He also professed his readiness to make a separate armistice with the Allies, and stated that Bulgaria stood with Austria-Hungary. Of course, it was to be understood that all occupied territory would be evacuated and Belgian independence and sovereignty unconditionally restored.

The first letter was exposed by M. Clemenceau in the spring of 1918 as a result of Count Czernin's charge that France had been seeking a separate peace with Austria. According to the *London Nation* for June 8, 1918, M. Poincaré gave his word of honor that he would show the letter to nobody but M. Ribot, the French Foreign Minister. It was understood, however, that it would be communi-

into the world, approaches. All the peoples of my empire are more closely united than ever in the common determination to safeguard the integrity of the monarchy at the cost even of the heaviest sacrifices.

"Thanks to their union, with the generous co-operation of all nationalities, my empire and monarchy have succeeded in resisting the gravest assaults for nearly three years. Nobody can question the military advantages secured by my troops, particularly in the Balkans.

"France, on her side, has shown force, resistance, and dashing courage which are magnificent. We all unreservedly admire the admirable bravery, which is traditional to her army, and the spirit of sacrifice of the entire French people.

"Therefore it is a special pleasure to me to note that, although for the moment adversaries, no real divergence of views or aspirations separates many of my cated also to King George and the English premier. In April the substance of the letter was transmitted to Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, but he was not at all disposed to treat. Mr. Balfour, who was in America at the time, knew nothing of the existence of the letters. The only other members of the French Cabinet that were informed of the negotiations were M. Painlevé and M. Albert Thomas. Neither the Belgian nor Russian Governments, nor President Wilson, were notified of the proposals. Such British, French and Italian authorities as were informed agreed that the letters contained no satisfactory basis for peace.

After the letter had been revealed by M. Clemenceau, it became the subject of discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Documents relating to the peace proposals from the Austrian Emperor were communicated to the Committee by M. Clemenceau. On the conclusion of its investigations, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee adopted the following resolution: "After having heard evidence relating to the peace conversations initiated and continued by Austria-Hungary in 1917 and 1918, the Committee is of opinion that these conversations did not provide an opportunity at any time for an acceptable peace for France and her Allies."

empire from France, and that I am justified in hoping that my keen sympathy for France, joined to that which prevails in the whole monarchy, will forever avoid a return of the state of war, for which no responsibility can fall on me.

"With this in mind, and to show in a definite manner the reality of these feelings, I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

"Belgium should be entirely re-established in her sovereignty, retaining entirely her African possessions without prejudice to the compensations she should receive for the losses she has undergone.

"Serbia should be re-established in her sovereignty and, as a pledge of our good will, we are ready to assure her equitable natural access to the Adriatic, and also wide economic concessions in Austria-Hungary. On her side, we will demand, as primordial and essential conditions, that Serbia cease in the future all relation with, and suppress every association or group whose political object aims at the disintegration of the monarchy, particularly the Serbian political society, Narodni Ochrana; that Serbia loyally and by every means in her power prevent any kind of political agitation, either in Serbia or beyond her frontiers, in the foregoing direction, and give assurances thereof under the guarantee of the Entente Powers.

"The events in Russia compel me to reserve my ideas with regard to that country until a legal definite Government is established there.

"Having thus laid my ideas clearly before you, I would ask you in turn, after consulting with these

two powers, to lay before me the opinion first of France and England, with a view thus to preparing the ground for an understanding on the basis of which official preliminary negotiations could be taken up and reach a result satisfactory to all.

"Hoping that thus we will soon be able together to put a limit to the sufferings of so many millions of men and families now plunged in sadness and anxiety, I beg to assure you of my warmest and most brotherly affection.

"CHARLES."

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Postoffice, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894.

MEMORANDA AND LETTERS OF DR. MUEHLON

- I. The Viennese Ultimatum to Serbia
- II. Ultimatum to Serbia and Russia's Mobilization:
Reply to the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*
- III. Germany and Belgium
- IV. Letter to Bethmann-Hollweg



SEPTEMBER, 1918

No. 130

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
• NEW YORK CITY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE

VOL. 111, PART 1, 1981
PUBLISHED BY THE
BRITISH ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY



INTRODUCTION

At the outbreak of the World War, Dr. Muehlton was a member of the Krupp board of directors at Essen. As his letters show, he was in touch with persons well informed of the real course of events. He was, therefore, one of the relatively few Germans who knew, from the outset, that the Central Empires had forced an unnecessary and unjustifiable war upon Europe; and he was one of the far smaller number of Germans whom the conduct of their government stirred to indignation and moral revolt. He was unwilling to further Germany's military activities by continued service in the munitions business, and he accordingly severed his connection with the Krupp Company and betook himself to Switzerland. He was willing, at first, to serve his country in other and peaceful ways, and he conducted negotiations on behalf of the German government to obtain wheat from Rumania, at a time when Rumania was still neutral. In 1917, however, he notified Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that he had lost all confidence in the persons who were directing Germany's policies and saw no hope for the world or for Germany itself except in the transfer of power to men of a different stamp. In the spring and early summer of 1918 he published the memoranda and letters reproduced in the following pages, and also a collection of extracts from his war diary, extending from the early part of August to the middle of November, 1914.

In several important matters, Muehlon's revelations supplement the evidence previously at our disposal and confirm our earlier inferences. As regards the Austrian dispute with Serbia, he shows that, before the middle of July, 1914, full agreement had been reached between Berlin and Vienna as to the substance of the ultimatum to be sent to Belgrade. That the framing of this document was left to the Austrian Foreign Office seemed to Muehlon and to Krupp von Bohlen, as it seemed to the French ambassador at Berlin, almost incredible. There is no good reason, however, to doubt von Jagow's statement that the text of the ultimatum was not communicated to the German Foreign Office. Since 1890 the German Emperor had been, not only his own chancellor, but also his own foreign secretary; and the titular incumbents of these offices had been virtually vice-chancellors and under-secretaries.¹

As regards the attitude of the German government towards an eventual Russian mobilization, Muehlon shows that the German Emperor had fully accepted, in advance, the fatal military theory that mobilization is not to be regarded as a precautionary measure but as an act of war.²

Of especial interest is Muehlon's report of the interview between the Emperor and von Bohlen. This confirms the impression, derived from other sources, that the unfavorable outcome of the Emperor's Moroccan enterprise (1905-1911) had left him in a warlike frame of mind. The failure of German diplomacy, directed by the monarch himself, had convinced him that in the next crisis he must unsheathe the German sword.

¹ Munroe Smith, *Militarism and Statecraft* (Putnam, 1918), p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 77-78, 93-95, 101-103, 137-139.

He was stung by the knowledge that his conduct had been regarded as irresolute; and he repeatedly assured von Bohlen that, this time, he would not "fall down." His insistence struck von Bohlen as "comic." Sooner or later, all Germans will realize that it was tragic.

Of interest, also, is Helfferich's statement that the Emperor had gone on his Norwegian cruise in July, 1914, only for the sake of appearances. It will be remembered that in the summer of 1870, when the trap of the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain was sprung on France, Bismarck was at his country home and King William was taking a cure at Ems. To equal the substantial achievements of a man of genius is not easy, but it is very easy to imitate his tricks.

Muehlon's evidence on these matters is, of course, hearsay evidence. He tells us what Helfferich heard from persons who are not named, but are described as men in a position to know the facts, and he repeats what von Bohlen heard from the Emperor and from von Jagow. Hearsay evidence, however, may be of great value. If the historian excluded all evidence that is barred by the technical rules of English judicial procedure, history would lose much of its clarity and completeness. The value of hearsay evidence depends upon the position and character of the immediate and ultimate witnesses. Its credibility is enhanced when the statements cited fit in with fully established facts and help to explain the course of events. Muehlon's revelations satisfy all these tests.

In one important matter Muehlon's evidence is direct. The dealings of the Belgian government with the Krupp Company were matters of which he had immediate personal knowledge. The German assertion that the Belgian government had arranged to

coöperate with Great Britain in aggressive war against Germany has never been substantiated; it has, indeed, been disproved; but Muehlon's testimony that, for years before the war, Belgium had made itself dependent on Germany for military supplies and that, at the outbreak of war, fortress artillery, ordered and fully paid for by the Belgian government and long ready for shipment, was, at the request of the Belgians themselves, still held in storage in the Krupp works at Essen—this testimony reduces the German assertion to an absurdity. It leaves the Belgians at fault in one respect only: they had misplaced their confidence. They believed that the German government would observe its treaty obligations and keep its repeatedly plighted faith.

Muehlon's recent pamphlet, made up of extracts from his war diary and entitled *The Devastation of Europe* (*Die Verheerung Europas*, Füssli, Zürich, 1918, 149 pp.), brings no revelations comparable in importance to those contained in his earlier memoranda and letters. The diary is nevertheless of interest and value as a contemporary picture of German sentiments and beliefs in the early months of the war. It is of interest, also, because it depicts, more fully than the letters, the reaction of at least one German conscience against the conduct of the German government—not only against the way in which that government precipitated the war, but also against the manner in which the war was waged. In this respect the pamphlet is a valuable addition to the scanty but growing German literature of protest.

MUNROE SMITH

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917.

DENKSCHRIFTEN UND BRIEFE VON DR. W. MUEHLON

Bis zum Kriegeausbruch Mitglied des Direktoriums der
Kruppwerke in Essen

I

DAS WIENER ULTIMATUM AN SERBIEN ¹

Mitte Juli 1914 hatte ich, wie des öfteren, eine Besprechung mit Dr. *Helfferich*, dem damaligen Direktor der Deutschen Bank in Berlin und heutigen Stellvertreter des Reichskanzlers. Die Deutsche Bank hatte eine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber einigen grossen Transaktionen eingenommen (Bulgarien und Türkei) an denen die Firma Krupp aus geschäftlichen Gründen (Lieferung von Kriegsmaterial) ein lebhaftes Interesse hatte. Als einen der Gründe zur Rechtfertigung der Haltung der Deutschen Bank nannte mir Dr. Helfferich schliesslich den folgenden: *Die politische Lage ist sehr bedrohlich geworden.* Die Deutsche Bank muss auf jeden Fall abwarten, ehe sie sich in Ausland weiter engagiert. Die Österreicher sind dieser Tage beim Kaiser gewesen. Wien wird in acht Tagen ein sehr scharfes, ganz kurz befristetes *Ultimatum* an Serbien stellen, in dem Forderungen enthalten sind, wie Bestrafung

¹ Published in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, March 21, 1918. Reprinted in *Die Freie Zeitung* (Bern), March 27, 1918. Also in *Meine Londoner Mission*, von Fürst Lichnowsky (Füssli, Zürich, 1918), Anhang, pp. 50-53.

MEMORANDA AND LETTERS OF DR. W. MUEHLON

Until the outbreak of the war a member of the Board of Directors of the
Krupp Works at Essen

I

THE VIENNESE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, at that time director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now vice-chancellor of the Empire. The Deutsche Bank had indicated unwillingness to take part in several large transactions (in Bulgaria and Turkey) in which the Krupp Company, for business reasons (delivery of war material) had a lively interest. One of the reasons ultimately given me by Dr. Helfferich to justify the attitude of the Deutsche Bank was as follows: The political situation had become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements in foreign countries. The Austrians had recently been with the Emperor. Within a week Vienna would send to Serbia a very sharply worded ultimatum with a very short term for reply. In it would be contained such demands as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigations in Serbia.

einer Reihe von Offizieren, Auflösung politischer Vereine, Strafuntersuchungen in Serbien durch Beamte der Doppelmonarchie, überhaupt eine Reihe bestimmter, sofortiger Genugtuungen verlangt wird, andernfalls Österreich-Ungarn an Serbien den Krieg erklärt.

Dr. Helfferich fügte noch hinzu, dass *der Kaiser mit Entschiedenheit für dieses Vorgehen Österreich-Ungarns ausgesprochen habe*. Er habe gesagt, dass er einen österreichisch-ungarischen Konflikt mit Serbien als eine interne Angelegenheit zwischen diesen beiden Ländern betrachte, in die er keinem andern Staat eine Einmischung erlauben werde. Wenn Russland mobil mache, dann mache er auch mobil. Bei ihm aber bedeute Mobilmachung den sofortigen Krieg. *Diesmal gäbe es kein Schwanken*. Die Österreicher seien über diese entschlossene Haltung des Kaisers sehr befriedigt gewesen.

Als ich Dr. Helfferich daraufhin sagte, diese unheimliche Mitteilung mache meine ohnehin starken Befürchtungen eines Weltkrieges zur völligen Gewissheit, erwiderte er, es sehe jedenfalls so aus. Vielleicht überlegten sich aber Russland und Frankreich die Sache doch noch anders. Den Serben gehöre entschieden eine bleibende Lektion. Dies war die erste Mitteilung, die ich erhielt über die Besprechung des Kaisers mit den Bundesgenossen. Ich kannte Dr. Helfferichs besonders vertrauensvolle Beziehungen zu den Persönlichkeiten, die eingeweiht sein mussten, und die Verlässlichkeit seiner Mitteilung. Deshalb unterrichtete ich nach meiner Rückkehr von Berlin unverzüglich Herrn *Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach*, dessen Direktorium in Essen ich damals als Mitglied angehörte. Dr. Helfferich hatte mir dies übrigens ausdrücklich erlaubt. (Es bestand damals die Absicht,

by officials of the Dual Monarchy, and, in general, a series of definite and immediate satisfactions; otherwise Austria-Hungary would declare war on Serbia.

Dr. Helfferich added that the Emperor had expressed decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded an Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would then mobilize also. To him, however, mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no wavering. The Austrians were very well satisfied by this resolute attitude on the part of the Emperor.

When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this gruesome communication converted my fears of a world war, which were already strong, into absolute certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. Perhaps, however, France and Russia would think twice on the matter and reach a different decision. The Serbs certainly deserved a lasting lesson. This was the first information I received about the Emperor's conversations with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's particularly confidential relations with the personages who were sure to have inside information and the trustworthiness of his communication. Accordingly, after my return from Berlin, I promptly communicated my information to Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, of whose board of directors at Essen I was at that time a member. Dr. Helfferich, I may add, had expressly given me permission to do

ihn in den Aufsichtsrat der Firma Krupp aufzunehmen.) Von Bohlen schien betroffen, dass Dr. Helfferich im Besitz solcher Kenntnisse war, machte eine abfällige Bemerkung, dass die Leute von der Regierung doch nie ganz den Mund halten könnten, und eröffnete mir alsdann folgendes: Er sei selbst beim Kaiser dieser Tage gewesen. Der Kaiser habe auch zu ihm von der Besprechung mit den Österreichern und deren Ergebnis gesprochen, jedoch die Sache als so geheim bezeichnet, dass er nicht einmal gewagt haben würde, seinem Direktorium davon Mitteilung zu machen. Da ich aber einmal Bescheid wisse, könne er mir sagen, die Angaben Helfferichs seien richtig. Dieser scheine freilich noch mehr Details zu wissen, als er, Bohlen, selbst. Die Lage sei in der Tat sehr ernst. Der Kaiser habe ihm persönlich erklärt, er werde sofort den Krieg erklären, wenn Russland mobil mache. *Diesmal werde man sehen, dass er nicht umfalle.* Die wiederholte kaiserliche Betonung, in diesem Falle werde ihm kein Mensch wieder Unschlüssigkeit vorwerfen können, habe sogar fast komisch gewirkt.

Genau an dem mir von Helfferich bezeichneten Tage erschien denn auch das Ultimatum Wiens an Serbien. Ich war zu dieser Zeit wieder in Berlin und äusserte mich gegenüber Helfferich, dass ich Ton und Inhalt des Ultimatus geradezu ungeheuerlich fände. Dr. Helfferich aber meinte, das klinge nur in der deutschen Übersetzung so. Er habe das Ultimatum in französischer Sprache zu sehen bekommen und da könne man es keineswegs als übertrieben empfinden. Bei dieser Gelegenheit sagte mir Helfferich auch, dass der Kaiser nur des Scheins wegen auf die *Nordlandreise*

this. (At that time there was an intention to appoint him to membership in the supervisory council of the Krupp Company.) Von Bohlen seemed disturbed that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such information, and he made a censorious remark to the effect that the government people could never quite hold their tongues. He then disclosed to me the following facts. He had himself been with the Emperor recently. The Emperor had spoken to him also of the conversation with the Austrians and of its outcome, but had characterized the affair as so secret that he would not have ventured to communicate it even to his board of directors. Since, however, I was already posted, he could tell me that Helfferich's statements were correct. Indeed, the latter appeared to know more details than he, Bohlen, himself. The situation was really very serious. The Emperor had told him personally that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized. People would see this time that he would not weaken.¹ The Emperor's repeated insistence that in this matter no one would be able to reproach him again with want of resolution had produced an almost comic effect.

On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the ultimatum from Vienna to Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as absolutely monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, thought that the note had that ring only in the German translation. He had had opportunity to see the ultimatum in French, and in that text it could not give any impression of over-statement. On this occasion Helfferich also said to me that it was only for the

¹ More literally: "would not fall down."

gegangen sei, ihr keineswegs die übliche Ausdehnung gegeben habe, sondern sich in jederzeit erreichbarer Nähe und in ständiger Verbindung halte. Nun müsse man eben sehen, was komme. Hoffentlich handelten die Österreicher, die auf eine Annahme des Ultimatums natürlich nicht rechneten, rasch, bevor die anderen Mächte Zeit fänden, sich hineinzumischen. Die Deutsche Bank habe ihre Vorkehrungen schon so getroffen, dass sie auf alle Eventualitäten gerüstet sei. So habe sie das einlaufende Gold nicht mehr in den Verkehr zurückgegeben. Das lasse sich ganz unauffällig einrichten und mache Tag für Tag schon sehr bedeutende Beträge aus.

Als bald nach dem Wiener Ultimatum an Serbien gab die deutsche Regierung Erklärungen dahin ab, dass Österreich-Ungarn auf eigene Faust gehandelt habe ohne Vorwissen Deutschlands. Bei dem Versuch, diese Erklärungen mit den oben genannten Vorgängen überhaupt vereinigen zu wollen, blieb nur etwa die Lösung, dass der Kaiser sich schon festgelegt hatte, ohne seine Regierung mitwirken zu lassen, und dass bei der Besprechung mit den Österreichern deutscherseits davon abgesehen wurde, den Wortlaut des Ultimatums zu vereinbaren. Denn dass der Inhalt des Ultimatums in Deutschland ziemlich genau bekannt war, habe ich oben gezeigt.

Herr Krupp von Bohlen, mit dem ich über diese wenigstens der Wirkung nach lügnerischen deutschen Erklärungen sprach, war davon gleichfalls wenig erbaut, weil in einer so schwerwiegenden Angelegenheit Deutschland doch keine Blankovollmacht an einen Staat wie Österreich hätte ausstellen dürfen, und es

sake of appearances that the Emperor had gone on his northern cruise; that he was not going anything like so far as usual, but was keeping himself near enough to be reached at any time and in constant [telegraphic] connection. Now one must wait and see what would happen. It was to be hoped that the Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted, would act rapidly before the other Powers would have time to interfere. The Deutsche Bank had already made such arrangements as to be prepared for all eventualities. For instance, it was no longer putting back into circulation the gold that came in. This could be done without attracting any notice, and the amounts thus secured day by day were already very considerable.

Immediately after the [publication of the] Viennese ultimatum to Serbia, the German government issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted on its own hand, without Germany's prior knowledge. When one attempted to bring these declarations into any sort of harmony with the proceedings mentioned above, the only possible explanation was that the Emperor had already committed himself without arranging that his government should coöperate, and that, in the conversation with the Austrians, no provision was made on the German side for agreement upon the wording of the ultimatum. For, as I have already shown, the contents of the ultimatum were pretty accurately known in Germany.

Herr Krupp von Bohlen, with whom I spoke about these German declarations—which, in effect at least, were lies—was also far from edified by them, because in so weighty an affair Germany ought not to have given unlimited power of attorney to a state like Aus-

Pflicht der leitenden Staatsmänner gewesen wäre, sowohl vom Kaiser wie von den Bundesgenossen zu verlangen, dass die österreichischen Forderungen und das Ultimatum an Serbien auf das eingehendste diskutiert und festgelegt werden und gleichzeitig das genaue Programm des weiteren Vorgehens überhaupt. Gleichviel auf welchem Standpunkt man stehe, man dürfe sich doch nicht den Österreichern in die Hände geben, sich nicht Eventualitäten aussetzen, die man nicht vorher berechnet habe, sondern hätte an seine Verpflichtungen entsprechende Bedingungen knüpfen müssen. Kurz, Herr von Bohlen hielt die deutsche Ablehnung eines Vorwissens, falls in ihr eine Spur von Wahrheit stecke, für einen Verstoss gegen die Anfangsgründe diplomatischer Staatskunst und stellte mir in Aussicht, er werde mit Herrn von Jagow, dem damaligen Staatssekretär des auswärtigen Amtes, der ein besonderer Freund von ihm war, in diesem Sinne reden. Als Ergebnis dieser Besprechung teilte mir Herr von Bohlen folgendes mit: Herr von Jagow sei ihm gegenüber fest dabei geblieben, dass er an dem Wortlaut des österreichisch-ungarischen Ultimatus nicht mitgewirkt habe, und dass eine solche Forderung von Deutschland überhaupt nicht erhoben worden sei. Auf den Einwand, das sei doch unbegreiflich, habe Herr von Jagow erwidert, dass er als Diplomat natürlich auch daran gedacht habe, ein solches Verlangen zu stellen. Der Kaiser habe sich aber in dem Zeitpunkt, in dem Herr von Jagow mit der Angelegenheit befasst und hinzugezogen wurde, schon so festgelegt gehabt, dass es für ein Vorgehen nach diplomatischem Brauch schon zu spät und nichts mehr zu machen gewesen sei. Die Situation sei so gewesen, dass man mit Verklausulierungen gar nicht mehr habe kommen können.

tria. It was the duty of our leading statesmen to demand, as well of the Emperor as of our allies, that the Austrian demands and the ultimatum to Serbia should be discussed and settled in minute detail and that at the same time the exact program of all further proceedings should be determined. No matter what point of view one took, we ought not to have put ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and exposed ourselves to eventualities that had not been reckoned out in advance. On the contrary, we ought to have attached suitable conditions to our engagements. In short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary principles of diplomatic statecraft; and he told me that he intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, then secretary of state in the Foreign Office, who was a special friend of his. The outcome of this conversation, as communicated to me by Herr von Bohlen, was as follows: Herr von Jagow remained firm in assuring von Bohlen that he had not collaborated in formulating the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that no demand whatever for such collaboration had been advanced by Germany. In reply to the objection that this was incomprehensible, Herr von Jagow said that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally thought of making such a demand. At the time, however, when Herr von Jagow was consulted and drawn into the affair, the Emperor had so committed himself that it was too late for any action on customary diplomatic lines, and there was nothing more to be done. The situation was such that it was no longer possible to suggest modifying clauses. In the end, he, Jagow, had thought that the failure to

Schliesslich habe er, Jagow, sich gedacht, die Unterlassung werde auch ein Gutes haben, nämlich den guten Eindruck, den man in Petersburg und Paris deutscherseits mit der Erklärung machen könne, dass man an dem Wiener Ultimatum nicht mitgearbeitet habe.

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917.

II

ULTIMATUM AN SERBIEN RUSSLANDS MOBILMACHUNG

Eine Antwort an die *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*²

An meiner Darstellung ist wohl die Hauptsache längst bekannt und von der deutschen Regierung nicht geleugnet, nämlich:

1. Dass nach deutscher Auffassung Österreich-Ungarn Serbien züchtigen solle, ohne dass eine dritte Macht darein zu reden habe;
2. Dass die russische Mobilmachung die sofortige Kriegserklärung Deutschlands bedeute.

Beide Standpunkte waren schwere politische Fehler. Das Verhältnis Russlands zu Serbien war näher als das zwischen blossen Verbündeten. Deutschland, das seine Hilfsstellung gegenüber Österreich-Ungarn mit seinen Bündnispflichten erklärte, hätte Russland mindestens als in der gleichen Lage gegenüber Serbien befindlich anerkennen müssen. Wie verhängnisvoll der starre Standpunkt hinsichtlich der russischen Mobilmachung war, ergibt sich schon daraus, dass Deutschland seine Kriegserklärungen in dem Augen-

² *Die Freie Zeitung* (Bern), May 15, 1918.

take such precautions would have its advantages—namely, the good impression which could be made on the German side in St. Petersburg and in Paris by the declaration that Germany had not coöperated in the preparation of the Viennese ultimatum.²

II

THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND RUSSIA'S MOBILIZATION

A Reply to the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*

Long known and not denied by the German government are, I take it, the chief points in my statement, namely:

1. That, as the Germans conceived, Austria-Hungary was to chastise Serbia and no other Power was to interfere in the affair.

2. That Russian mobilization meant immediate declaration of war by Germany.

Both these positions were grave political mistakes. The relation of Russia to Serbia was closer than that between ordinary allies. Germany, which explained its attitude of support as regarded Austria-Hungary by pleading its duties as an ally, was bound to recognize that Russia was, at the very least, in the same position as regarded Serbia. The peril involved in Germany's rigid attitude toward Russian mobilization was shown when it sprang upon the world its declarations of war at the moment when Vienna and St.

² See Appendix, note i.

blicke in die Welt rief, an dem Wien und St. Petersburg eine gemeinsame Basis zu friedlichen Verhandlungen gefunden hatten.

Neu an meiner Darstellung ist etwa, dass die Haltung des Kaisers in Person entschieden im Sinne der genannten beiden Standpunkte war. Wer die Zustände in Deutschland kannte, dürfte ohnehin an der starken persönlichen Stellungnahme des Kaisers nicht gezweifelt haben.

Dass die sogenannte Unkenntnis des Ultimatums an Serbien und das angebliche Unbeteiligtsein an den österreichisch-ungarischen Plänen gegen Serbien nur ein deutsches sophistisches Spiel mit Worten waren, ergab sich unter anderm längst aus der Einleitung des deutschen Weissbuches selbst.

Ich antworte zugleich auf ein Dementi meiner Niederschrift, das unlängst die *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* brachte, wenn ich weiter sage, aus meinen Aufzeichnungen gehe nicht hervor, dass der Kaiser unter allen Umständen den Weltkrieg *gewollt* habe. Aber er hat ihn verschuldet in engerem Sinne. Gewollt hat er eine blutige Züchtigung Serbiens. Warum hätte er statt eines Weltkrieges, dessen Lorbeeren nicht billig zu erringen waren, nicht lieber den Zaren, seinen Freund, überreden wollen, um auf diese Weise die Macht Deutschlands zu vermehren?

Aber dieses Mal war sein Spiel zu verwegen. Er musste es in Ernst verwandeln, als er die russische Mobilmachung nicht verhindern konnte. Es ist wohl glaubwürdig, dass Berlin sogar einen gewissen Druck in jenen kritischen Tagen auf Wien ausübte, die Fäden

Petersburg had discovered a common basis for peaceful negotiations.

What is perhaps new in my statement is that the personal attitude of the Emperor was decidedly in line with these two points of view. No one, however, who knew the conditions obtaining in Germany could have doubted, even in default of positive evidence, the strong stand personally taken by the Emperor.

That the alleged ignorance of the ultimatum to Serbia and the claim to have played no part in the shaping of the Austro-Hungarian plans against Serbia were, on Germany's part, only sophistical juggling with words, was proved long ago, apart from other evidence, by the introduction to the German White Book.

In reply, at the same time, to an article recently published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which disputes my assertions, I make the further statement that my memoranda do not indicate that the Emperor had decided, no matter what happened, to bring on the World War. In a narrower sense, however, he was responsible for its outbreak. He had decided on a sanguinary chastisement of Serbia. Why, instead of risking a World War, in which the laurels of victory were not to be bought cheap, should he not rather have decided to win over his friend, the Czar, by argument, in order thus to increase Germany's power?

This time, however, his play was over rash. He was obliged to follow it up in earnest when he failed to prevent Russian mobilization. We may well believe that, in those critical days, Berlin went so far as to put a degree of pressure on Vienna, urging that

mit St. Petersburg nicht ganz zu zerreißen, um die russische Mobilmachung hintan zu halten. Als sie aber da war, war es nicht Wien, das Russland den Krieg erklärte; Wien war vielmehr gerade auf dem besten Weg zur Einigung, sondern der Kaiser in Berlin, gemäss dem feierlichen, aber trotzdem wahnwitzigen Standpunkt, den er von Anfang an rücksichtslos einzunehmen für gut befunden hatte.

Wenn die *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* ausdrücklich sagt, dass die russische Mobilmachung den Krieg bedeute, habe Berlin stets ausdrücklich betont, so gibt sie die Hauptsache zu: Durch Drohung mit einem grösseren Unrecht und Unglück sollte die Welt eingeschüchtert werden in ihren Versuchen, ein kleineres Unrecht und Unglück (gegen Serbien) abzuwenden, und dadurch sollte nicht nur Serbien, sondern der ganzen Welt eine brutale, für Deutschlands künftige Geltung ausschlaggebende Vergewaltigung, wenn auch eventuell eine unblutige, zugefügt werden.

Auf die übrigen Behauptungen der *Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung*, die nur ablenken sollen, verlohnt es sich kaum einzugehen. Ich habe nichts von einem Potsdamer Kronrat am 5. Juli gesagt, sondern nur, dass der Kaiser in einer Besprechung mit den Österreichern sich in der und der Weise festgelegt habe. Ich habe auch keinen Anlass zu bestreiten, dass die zuständigen Organe die Verhandlungen über die durch den Mord in Serajewo geschaffene schwierige Lage geführt haben, aber wohlverstanden gemäss der allerhöchst ausgegebenen Direktive: Niemand hat in den Streit zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien hinein zu reden, russische Mobilmachung bedeutet sofortigen Krieg.

connections with St. Petersburg be not wholly cut off, but that efforts be made to delay the Russian mobilization. Nevertheless, when the mobilization came, it was not Vienna that declared war against Russia. On the contrary, Vienna was on the direct road to an understanding. It was the Emperor in Berlin, maintaining the solemnly assumed but nevertheless insane attitude which, regardless of consequences, he had seen fit to take from the outset.

When the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* expressly declares that Berlin expressly and uniformly emphasized the view that Russian mobilization meant war, it concedes the main point: by the threat of a greater wrong and calamity the world was to be frightened out of its effort to avert from Serbia a lesser wrong and calamity, and so not only Serbia but all the world was to be subjected to a brutal, although possibly bloodless duress, which was decisively to establish Germany's future position.

The other assertions of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which are meant only to throw its readers off the track, are scarcely worth discussing. I said nothing about a Potsdam crown council on July 5; I said only that in a conversation with the Austrians the Emperor had committed himself in such and such a manner. I have, moreover, no occasion to deny that the negotiations concerning the difficult situation created by the murder in Serajevo were conducted by the agencies in whose competence the matter lay. I maintain, however, that they were conducted on the lines laid down by the Emperor: no one has any right to interfere in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; Russian mobilization means instant war.

Nicht einmal die Bemühungen um Erhaltung des Friedens bestreite ich, wie schon eben gesagt, aber Bemühungen nicht im Sinne einer Verständigung, sondern im Sinne der restlosen Kapitulation vor dem deutschen Standpunkt, mit andern Worten Friedensbemühungen mittels Kriegsdrohungen.

Zu verwahren hat man sich nur noch gegen die Behauptung der *Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung*, der Suchomlinowprozess habe erwiesen, dass die wahren Schuldigen am Weltbrand in St. Petersburg sitzen. Dieser Prozess hat nichts neues erwiesen, als einige interne Vorgänge anlässlich der russischen Mobilmachung. Diese sind nicht erheblicher als etwa die Feststellung wäre, dass auch der deutsche Kaiser geschwankt habe, bevor er sich zum äussersten entschloss.

Auf die Taten kommt es an. Mobilmachung musste nicht Krieg bedeuten, das wussten die Österreicher am besten, die an lange Mobilmachungen ohne Krieg gewohnt waren.

Schuldige im weiteren Sinne am Weltkriege mag es genug und seit langer Zeit geben, Schuldige im engeren Sinne nur wenige und hinsichtlich der hier behandelten Vorgänge sitzen sie in Berlin und Wien.

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917.

III

DEUTSCHLAND UND BELGIEN ³

Die Vergewaltigung Belgiens war ebenso wie die Hollands zwar oft vor dem Kriege als Eventualität erörtert worden, jedoch war es ein militärisches Ge-

³ *Die Freie Zeitung* (Bern), May 4, 1918.

I do not for a moment dispute, I have indeed already reaffirmed, that efforts were made to preserve the peace. These efforts, however, were not directed towards an understanding; their purpose was to secure an unconditional surrender to the German point of view. In a word, they were efforts to preserve peace by threats of war.

Further protest needs to be made only against the assertion of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* that the Sukhomlinof trial has conclusively shown that the real culprits who set the world on fire are to be found in St. Petersburg. This trial has brought out nothing new, except certain internal occurrences connected with the Russian mobilization. These are of no greater importance than would be, let us say, decisive evidence that the German Emperor also wavered before he decided to proceed to extremes.

It is the facts that are of importance. Mobilization did not necessarily mean war. No people knew this better than the Austrians, who were accustomed to long mobilizations without war.

Of those who are to blame in the broader sense for the World War there may be a plenty, and their guilt may date far back. Of those to blame in the narrower sense there are but few; and, as regards the occurrences here under discussion, they are to be found in Berlin and in Vienna.

III

GERMANY AND BELGIUM

The forcible occupation of Belgium, as well as that of Holland, was, it is true, often discussed before the war as a possibility; but it remained a military secret

heimnis geblieben, dass für den Fall eines gleichzeitigen Krieges gegen Russland und Frankreich der deutsche Plan definitiv feststand, Frankreich auf die schnellste Weise und mit allen Kräften niederzuwerfen, bevor das langsame Russland schlagbereit sei, und deshalb *unter allen Umständen* den Durchmarsch durch Belgien zu fordern.

Nachdem der Reichskanzler die dem militärischen Gebot entsprechenden Schritte getan hatte und nachdem er schon wusste, dass Belgien sich zur Wehr setze, trat er vor den Reichstag und entschuldigte sich: Not kenne kein Gebot. Belgien werde wiederhergestellt und entschädigt werden. Seine Rede zeigte klar, dass *Belgien ohne eigenes Verschulden*, lediglich aus deutschen strategischen Erwägungen misshandelt werde. Wenn seine Rechtfertigung auch nicht die Notwendigkeit, gerade diesen Feldzugsplan zu wählen, enthüllte, sondern vielmehr die schrankenlose Brutalität der Pläneschmiede, so war doch sein Eingeständnis der Schuldlosigkeit Belgiens sein grösster Augenblick im Kriege. Das will im heutigen Deutschland etwa so viel heissen, als dass dieses Eingeständnis seine grösste und unverzeihlichste Ungeschicklichkeit war, die gutgemacht werden musste. Es dauerte auch nicht lange, so fingen die bekannten Verdächtigungen der belgischen Neutralität an, die für denkende Menschen zur Genüge widerlegt sind. Belgien sollte eben—besten Falles für dieses Land—ein Handelsobjekt beim Friedensschlusse werden. Inzwischen hat der Krieg so lange gedauert und die Deutschen haben ihre Fänge so tief in das unglückliche Land eingeschlagen, dass man nur mit Schauer daran denken kann, was sie einmal davon zurücklassen.

that in the event of a simultaneous war against Russia and France, the German authorities had definitively adopted the plan of overthrowing France in the quickest possible way and with all available forces, before slow-moving Russia was ready to strike, and had therefore decided, whatever might be the situation, to demand passage through Belgium.

After the imperial chancellor had taken action in conformity with the military mandate, and after he was aware that Belgium was preparing to defend itself, he appeared before the Reichstag and gave his excuse: "Necessity knows no law." Belgium, he said, would be restored and indemnified. His speech showed plainly that Belgium was being maltreated without any fault of its own, solely because of German strategic considerations. Although his plea in justification did not reveal the necessity of choosing precisely this plan of campaign, but rather the boundless brutality of those who framed the plan, his admission of Belgium's innocence was, nevertheless, his greatest moment in the war. In the Germany of today that amounts to saying that this admission was his greatest and most unpardonable blunder. It was a blunder that had to be rectified. It was not long before the now familiar aspersions against Belgian neutrality were started—aspersions which have been sufficiently refuted to satisfy all those who are capable of thinking. Belgium—in the outcome least unfortunate for that country—was to be simply an object of barter at the conclusion of peace. In the meantime the war has lasted so long and the Germans have sunk their fangs so deep in the unhappy country, that one shudders to think how little of it they will leave.

Immerhin kein Reichskanzler hat das Wort vom 4. August 1914 zurückgenommen, nur vor einer klaren Wiederholung hat man sich gescheut.

Ich habe selbst in Deutschland zwar manchen kompetenten Mann gesprochen, aber niemals einen, der mir gegenüber auch nur versucht hätte, mit irgend einem Wort eine Schuld Belgiens anzudeuten. Trotzdem liess man und lässt man Tausende von Handlangern immer neue Anschuldigungen verbreiten, die jene Erklärung des Reichskanzlers vergessen machen und *das deutsche Volk* gegenüber Belgien hart machen sollen. Das deutsche Volk, das ohnehin seine Führer wenig mit Fragen nach Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit im Kriege beunruhigt, *das vor allem das unvermeidliche Elend auf andere abwälzen möchte* und von seinen Führern in der Hauptsache *nur verlangt*, dass sie *keinen materiellen Misserfolg* haben! Das deutsche Volk, das ohnehin—mag der Reichskanzler gesagt haben was nur immer—gewissermassen glauben will, die Belgier hätten den Überfall verdient und keine Bereicherung seines alten Märchenschatzes über Belgien (die Franzosen waren zuerst in Belgien—die Engländer wären doch nach Belgien gekommen—die Belgier hätten sich anständigerweise nicht wehren dürfen, etc.) braucht.

Da mag es denn nicht unnütz sein, wenn ich an meinem bescheidenen Teile etwas zur Steuer der Wahrheit beitrage. Was ich jedem Bekannten mündlich gesagt habe, wirkt vielleicht mehr, wenn ich es den Unbekannten öffentlich unterbreite. Und wenn es nichts nützt, so sei es wenigstens ein Trost für

Up to the present time, indeed, no imperial chancellor has retracted the promise of August 4th; there has only been reluctance to repeat it clearly.

I have myself talked, in Germany, with many men qualified to form an opinion on the subject, but never with one who so much as attempted, with a single word, to hint at any fault on the part of Belgium. Nevertheless, thousands of hirelings were and are still permitted to circulate a constantly growing series of accusations, which are intended to cause that declaration of the imperial chancellor to be forgotten and to harden the hearts of the German people against Belgium. The German people, who, as it is, trouble their leaders with few questions about truth and justice in the war, who above all things desire to roll off upon others the inevitable burden of misery and, in the main, demand from their leaders one thing only—that they encounter no material reverse of fortune! The German people, who, as it is—no matter what the imperial chancellor may have said—are to a certain degree determined to believe that the Belgians got only their deserts when their country was raided, and who do not need any addition to their old stock of fairy tales about Belgium: that the French were in Belgium first; that the English would have come to Belgium anyway; that the Belgians should have behaved themselves and offered no resistance, etc.

It may therefore be not altogether useless, if I contribute my modest share towards the establishment of the truth. What I have told every acquaintance of mine orally, may perhaps be more effective if I submit it publicly to those with whom I am unacquainted. And if it does not help, may it at least be

die Freunde der Wahrheit und für die Belgier im besonderen. Jedenfalls haben meine Angaben den Vorteil, dass sie bei einigem guten Willen nachgeprüft werden können und dass man in Deutschland Tausende von Zeugen und reichliche schriftliche Belege finden kann.

Belgien hatte vor dem Kriege bei der Firma Krupp in Essen vier grosse, moderne Geschütze (28 Centimeter) für die Befestigung von Antwerpen bestellt. Die Geschütze waren Anfang 1914 fertig, abgenommen und völlig bezahlt und versandbereit, aber *die Arbeiten an der Befestigung von Antwerpen waren noch nicht soweit fortgeschritten, dass die Geschütze aufgestellt werden konnten*. Man erinnert sich vielleicht der belgischen Kammerdebatten über diesen Gegenstand. Nun richtete die belgische Regierung an Krupp das Ersuchen, die Geschütze einstweilen selbst noch aufzubewahren. Krupp willfahrte, aber ungern. Eine solche Aufbewahrung kommt selten vor und hat mancherlei Unannehmlichkeiten. Krupp tat widerholte mündliche und schriftliche Schritte, um die Geschütze loszubekommen, die belgische Regierung erneuerte stets ihr Ersuchen um die Gefälligkeit der Aufbewahrung und war sogar bereit, eine Entschädigung dafür zu zahlen. Es wurde immer wieder ein *modus vivendi* gefunden, der beiderseitige Standpunkt blieb unverändert, bis der Krieg ausbrach und das preussische Kriegsministerium diese Geschütze sofort als Beute (Wert vier Millionen) in Essen beschlagnahmte.

Daraus folgere ich: Hätte die belgische Regierung irgendwelche bösen Absichten gegen Deutschland gehabt, oder sich eines deutschen Überfalls versehen, so würde sie, spätestens als der Krieg drohte, ihre

a consolation to the friends of truth and, especially, to the Belgians. In any case, my testimony has the advantage that, with a little good will, it may be substantiated and that thousands of witnesses and ample written evidence may be found in Germany.

Before the war Belgium had ordered from the Krupp Company in Essen four large modern guns (twenty-eight centimeters)³ for the fortifications of Antwerp. At the beginning of 1914 the guns were completed, accepted, paid in full, and ready for shipment; but the work on the fortifications of Antwerp had not yet been carried so far that the guns could be set up. The debates on this subject in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies will perhaps be recalled. At this point the Belgian government requested Krupp to keep the guns in storage for the time being. Krupp agreed, but not willingly. Such storage is unusual, and it entails many inconveniences. Krupp repeatedly took steps, both by word of mouth and in writing, to get rid of the guns; the Belgian government continually repeated its request that Krupp be kind enough to keep them, and was even ready to pay for the accommodation. A *modus vivendi* was repeatedly found, but the attitude of both parties remained unchanged until the war broke out, when the Prussian Ministry of War at once seized these guns in Essen as booty (value four million marks).

From this I draw the following conclusion: Had the Belgian government had any evil intentions whatsoever against Germany, or had it expected a

³ A little more than eleven inches.

kostbaren Geschütze an sich genommen haben, statt darauf zu beharren, dass sie Krupp anvertraut blieben.

Aber ich bin nicht auf dieses eine Beispiel angewiesen. Belgien unterhielt seit langem rege Verbindungen mit Deutschland hinsichtlich seines Kriegsmaterials. Soweit Krupp nicht selbst an die belgische Regierung lieferte, arbeitete die belgische Firma Cockerill in Seraing und viele Staatswerkstätten in enger Fühlung mit Krupp (nach seinen Konstruktionen, Patenten, etc.; Kruppsche Teillieferungen, etc.). Diese Beziehungen sind in allen Ländern ein ziemlich zuverlässiges Barometer politischer Natur, was ich hier nicht weiter ausführen will. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass ein Land umso mehr abhängig wird (nicht nur im Kriegsfall, aber besonders in diesem) und umso schwerer sich umschalten lässt, je mehr es sich auf eine bestimmte ausländische Lieferungsquelle für Kriegsmaterial eingerichtet hat. Es lag für Belgien auch keinerlei technische Notwendigkeit vor, sich an Krupp zu wenden, der z. B. Frankreich gegenüber in seinen Konstruktionen von jeher weit unterlegen war und nur mühsam nachhinkte, wie jeder Fachmann, auch in Deutschland, weiss. Krupps Qualitäten liegen auf einem ganz anderen Gebiet als dem der besseren Konstruktionen und Erfindungen. Kurz, Belgiens Beziehungen zu Krupp waren der Ausdruck eines freundschaftlichen Bestrebens gegenüber Deutschland. Ich habe immer den Eindruck gehabt, dass Belgien das geschäftsgierige, empfindliche, scharf nachdrängende Deutschland durch reichliche Aufträge bei guter Laune erhalten zu können glaubte, während es von Frankreich, dessen Industrie wenig

German attack, it would, at the very latest when war threatened, have secured possession of its expensive guns, instead of insisting that they should remain in Krupp's care.

My evidence, however, is not confined to this single instance. For many years Belgium kept up active connections with Germany in the matter of its war materials. In those instances in which the Krupp Company did not itself fill the orders of the Belgian government, the Belgian firm of Cockerill in Seraing and many government shops worked in close touch with the Krupp Company (using its designs, patents, etc.; receiving part-shipments from Krupp, etc.). These relations are in all countries a pretty trustworthy sort of political barometer. This is a point on which I shall not at present enlarge. It is obvious that a country becomes increasingly dependent (not solely in case of war, but especially in that event) and finds it increasingly difficult to wheel round, in proportion to the extent to which it has arranged to obtain its war materials from a definite foreign source.⁴ For Belgium, moreover, there was no sort of technical necessity to turn to the Krupp Company, which has always been far inferior to France, for example, in its designs and has only with difficulty limped along after that country, as every expert, even in Germany, is well aware. Krupp's advantages are found in quite another field than that of better designs and inventions. In short, Belgium's relations with Krupp were the expression of an effort to keep on a friendly footing with Germany. I have always had the impression that by giving large orders to Germany, which is greedy for business, keen in its pursuit, and quick to

⁴ See Appendix, note ii.

Regierungsunterstützung genoss und zudem sorgloser war, Verständnis für die Gründe der Bevorzugung Deutschlands und Begnügung mit den menschlichen Sympathien erwartete.

Wenige Monate nun vor dem Kriege knüpfte Belgien ein weiteres und besonders wichtiges Band zwischen sich und Krupp. Es überliess sich hinsichtlich einer neuen (kaum erprobten) Munition für Feldartillerie ganz dieser Firma. Krupp, der sich bedeutende direkte Bestellungen zusicherte, übertrug die Berechtigung zur Fabrikation dieser Munition an Cockerill unter Mitwirkung, natürlich, der zuständigen Behörden, die sich für ihre eigenen Werkstätten das gleiche sicherten. Das hiess für Cockerill und das belgische Kriegsministerium rege und andauernde Zusammenarbeit mit Kruppschen Vertretern, Ingenieuren, etc., und entsprechende Abhängigkeit vom Lizenzgeber. Ich hatte damals häufig den Besuch eines Cockerillschen Direktors und halte es nicht für überflüssig zu bemerken, dass mir noch bei Kriegsausbruch ein Schreiben von Cockerill vorlag, dass er eine Lizenzanzahlung von einer Million Franken soeben überweise.

Man bedenke, die enge Abhängigkeit des Kriegsmaterialgeschäfts von Regierungsintentionen und beurteile dann auf Grund der hier erwähnten und offenkundigen Vorgänge die *mala fides* der belgischen Regierung gegenüber Deutschland.

take offense, Belgium believed that it could keep that country in good humor, whereas she expected France, whose industry enjoyed little support from the government and was, moreover, less keen as regarded its own development, to understand her reasons for favoring Germany and to be content with general indications of sympathy.

A few months before the war Belgium established another and particularly important connection between itself and Krupp. For its supply of a new (scarcely tested) ammunition for field artillery it placed itself entirely in the hands of this company. After securing large direct orders, Krupp conceded the privilege of manufacturing this ammunition to Cockerill, with the coöperation, of course, of the competent [Belgian] authorities, who saw to it that their own works also secured the same privilege. For Cockerill and the Belgian Ministry of War this arrangement meant active and sustained coöperation with Krupp's representatives, engineers, etc., and a corresponding dependence on the grantor of the licenses. At that time one of Cockerill's directors paid me frequent visits; and I do not consider it superfluous to note that, at the moment of the outbreak of the war, a letter from Cockerill lay before me, informing me that he was just sending a payment on the license amounting to one million francs.

Consider the close dependency of the war-material business on governmental intentions, and then, on the basis of the occurrences I have here recounted, which are matters of public knowledge, pass judgment on the alleged *mala fides* of the Belgian government towards Germany.

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917.

IV

BRIEF AN BETHMANN-HOLLWEG ⁴

Bern, den 7. Mai 1917

Seiner Exzellenz dem Herrn Reichskanzler von Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin.

Euer Exzellenz!

So zahlreich und schwer auch die Irrtümer und Verfehlungen auf deutscher Seite von Kriegsbeginn an waren, so glaubte ich doch lange Zeit hoffen zu können, dass eine bessere Einsicht und Gesinnung bei unsern massgebenden Persönlichkeiten allmählich durchdringen werde. In dieser Hoffnung hatte ich während des Krieges meine Arbeit in Rumänien in gewissem Masse zur Verfügung gestellt, und war ich bereit, auch in meinem jetzigen Aufenthaltslande, der Schweiz, mitzuhelfen, soweit das Ziel der Bemühungen Annäherung der feindlichen Parteien sein sollte. Dass ich jeder andern Tätigkeit, die nicht auf Versöhnung und Wiederherstellung unmittelbar sich richtete, abgeneigt war, habe ich schon kurz nach Kriegsausbruch dadurch gezeigt, dass ich meine Stellung als Mitglied des Kruppschen Direktoriums niedergelegt habe.

Seit Anfang dieses Jahres ist mir nun jede Hoffnung hinsichtlich der heutigen Leiter Deutschlands geschwunden. Das Friedensangebot *ohne Angabe der Kriegsziele*, der verschärfte Unterseebootkrieg, die Deportationen der Belgier, die Verwüstungen in

⁴ *Die Freie Zeitung* (Bern), May 4, 1918.

IV

LETTER TO BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

To His Excellency the German Imperial Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin.

Your Excellency:

Many and grave as were the mistakes and failures on the German side from the beginning of the war, I still believed for a long time that there was room for the hope that a clearer view and a better frame of mind would gradually come to prevail among the personages in control of our affairs. It was in this hope that, during the war, I placed my services in Rumania to a certain extent at the disposal of the government,⁵ and was ready to coöperate also in my present country of residence, Switzerland, in so far as the object of my efforts was to be a *rapprochement* of the hostile parties. That I was averse to any activity of a different character, not immediately directed toward reconciliation and restoration, I showed shortly after the outbreak of the war, by resigning my position as a member of the Krupp Board of Directors.

Since the beginning of this year [1917] all my hopes have disappeared as regards the present leaders of Germany. The offer of peace without any statement of our war aims, the more trenchant conduct of submarine warfare, the deportations of Belgians, the de-

⁵ Before Rumania entered the war, Dr. Muehlton, acting for Germany, had concluded agreements with Minister Bratiano concerning the delivery of wheat. *L'Humanité*, March 31, 1918.

Frankreich, die Versenkung englischer Hospital-schiffe sind Beispiele der Handlungen, die immer wieder von neuem unsere verantwortlichen Persönlichkeiten derartig disqualifiziert haben, dass sie nach meiner Überzeugung für eine gutwillige, gerechte Verständigung überhaupt nicht mehr in Betracht kommen dürfen. Sie mögen für ihre Person sich noch ändern, aber sie können nicht Repräsentanten der deutschen Sache bleiben. Als solche verdienen sie weder Langmut noch Nachsicht mehr. Das deutsche Volk kann die geschehenen schweren Versündigungen an seiner, Europas und der Menschheit Gegenwart und Zukunft erst dann wieder gutzumachen beginnen, wenn es sich durch andere Männer von anderer Art vertreten lässt. Es ist keine Ungerechtigkeit, dass es heute dem Odium der ganzen Welt verfallen ist, so fehlerhaft und unvollkommen diese auch sein und bleiben möge: Der Triumph unserer bisherigen militärischen und politischen Kriegführung würde eine Niederlage der höchsten Gedanken und Hoffnungen der Menschheit sein. Man braucht nur den Fall zu setzen, ein erschöpftes, demoralisiertes oder die Gewalt verabscheuendes Volk werde den Frieden aus der Hand dieser selben Regierung annehmen, die den Krieg geführt hat, um zu erkennen, wie trügerisch und trüb es um das Niveau und die Aussichten des Völkerlebens bestellt bliebe.

Als Mensch und als Deutscher, der es gut meint mit dem irregeführten und gequälten deutschen Volke, wende ich mich endgiltig von den Männern des heutigen deutschen Regimes ab. Möge jeder, der dazu in der Lage ist, ebenso handeln. Mögen bald viele Deutsche so weit sein.

vastations in France, the sinking of English hospital ships—these are samples of the constantly recurring acts which have so disqualified our responsible authorities that, in my judgment, they can no longer be taken into account in any effort to attain an honestly meant and just understanding. They may change their personal attitude, but they cannot remain representatives of the German cause. As such they no longer deserve either patience or indulgence. The German nation cannot begin to repair the grievous offenses committed against its own as well as Europe's present and future until it gets itself represented by other men of a different stamp. It suffers no injustice in being exposed today to odium throughout the world. However faulty and imperfect this world may be and may remain, the triumph of our military and political warfare, as it has thus far been conducted, would be a defeat of the highest ideals and hopes of mankind. We need only imagine that a nation that is exhausted or demoralized, or that abhors violence, should accept a peace granted by this same government that has conducted the war, and we shall recognize how deceptive and dark the situation would be as regards the level of international life and the prospects of national existence.⁶

As a human being and as a German who desires the welfare of the misled and maltreated German people, I turn away, once for all, from the men of the present German régime. May everyone, who is in a position to do so, act in the same way. May many Germans soon reach such a position.

⁶ The character of the peace which Germany imposed upon Russia at Brest-Litovsk, in February, 1918, shows how clearsighted a prophet Dr. Muehlton was in May, 1917. *L'Humanité*, March 31, 1918.

Da mir eine Kundgebung in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit nicht möglich ist, habe ich es für den gegebenen Weg gehalten, Euer Exzellenz von diesem meinem Standpunkt zu unterrichten.

DR. W. MUEHLON

Since it is not possible for me to make a statement in the German press, I have regarded it as the suitable course to inform your Excellency of the position I occupy.

DR. W. MUEHLON

APPENDIX

I. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

The documents published by the French government shortly after the outbreak of the war show that the text of the ultimatum was known at Munich before it was delivered to the Serbian government; also that the French ambassador at Berlin found it difficult to believe that it was not known to the German Foreign Office.

M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Serbian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand, official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me today that the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*), was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.¹

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914

I asked the Secretary of State today, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute

¹ French Yellow Book, No. 21; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 153.

with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Serbian government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localized.

I then said to him that, not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: "It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe. . . .

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. . . .

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Serbia.²

II. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE KRUPP COMPANY

Dr. Muehlon corroborates the assertions previously made by M. Emile Waxweiler, director of the Solvay Institute of Sociology, University of Brussels. M.

² French Yellow Book, No. 30; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 161, 162.

Waxweiler's statements, however, are somewhat fuller.

There is one typical fact which may be set against the imputations that aim at representing Belgium as having been in military accord with France before the present war. Why has the German press never indicated that all Belgium's supply of cannons and artillery ammunition, as well as part of her other war material, comes from Germany? At the most, the Krupp Company permitted some Belgian factories to coöperate in the manufacture of certain guns and projectiles. At the moment of the outbreak of war, a considerable part of the following orders, which had been entrusted to the Krupp Company with the coöperation of Belgian firms, was not yet delivered:

30,000 universal shells (7.5 cm.)
18,000 fuses with detonators
70,000 double-acting fuses
4 eclipse guns (28 cm.)
4 embrasure guns (28 cm.)

In addition, various orders had been placed with other German firms, such as Werner, Siemens and Halske, Siemens and Schückert, Erhardt, etc.

If Belgium had contemplated military coöperation with France, would she not have placed her orders in French factories? Moreover, during the course of the war, a highly critical situation arose for the Belgian army. Not having received from Germany all the expected deliveries, and, on the other hand, having been obliged to transfer into France its base of operations together with all its elements of production, it found itself dependent on material and supplies of quite a different type from its own. And it was only after serious study of the matter by Belgian and French engineers that a way was found of solving the complicated problem of supplying the Belgian army, equipped with German material, with munitions of a slightly modified French type.

A similar difficulty presented itself as regards rifle equipment. Taken by surprise, in the midst of a complete army reorganization, Belgium did not possess at the moment of the outbreak of hostilities a sufficient number of rifles. This shortage led her, after the war had begun, to ask France, in particular, for 10,000 Lebel rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle. These rifles were distributed among the soldiers of the fortress of Antwerp. This

circumstance affords a very simple explanation of a fact that has been construed against Belgium by the *Tägliche Rundschau* of October 15. The Germans had found a French rifle in the hands of a Belgian soldier; they alleged, moreover, that the "Belgian cartridges," carried by the soldier, corresponded with the caliber of the "French rifle," and from all this they drew the conclusion that an arrangement existed between Belgium and France. The Belgian Government issued in November, in a communication made by their Minister at The Hague, a formal denial: all the cartridges with which the Belgian troops were armed at the time of the outbreak of the war were of Belgian manufacture, and none of them corresponded with the caliber of the French Lebel rifle, which they obviously did not fit.³

³ Waxweiler, *La Belgique neutrale et loyale* (Paris, Payot, 1915), pp. 155-157; *Belgium Neutral and Loyal* (New York, Putnam, 1915), pp. 161-164.



INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Post office, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

- I. The League of Nations, by Viscount Grey of Falloden
- II. A League of Nations, by Nicholas Murray Butler
- III. Labor and the League of Nations, by Ordway Tead
- IV. The European Commission of the Danube: An Experiment
in International Administration, by Edward Krehbiel
- V. Address by President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera
House, New York, September 27, 1918



OCTOBER, 1918

No. 131

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

I

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODEN

(Reprinted from *The New York Times*, June 30, 1918)

There are projects that exist in shadowy form in an atmosphere of tepid idealism, admired by those who see that, if possible, they would be desirable. From time to time an attempt is made to embody them in material form and make them of practical use in national or international politics. It is then discovered that what appeared as an ideal to be wholly desirable and amiable cannot be of practical use, unless we are ready to subject ourselves to some limitations or discipline that may be inconvenient, and unless we are prepared to overcome some difficulties that were not at first sight apparent.

The ideal is found to have in fact a stern and disagreeable as well as an easy and amiable side to it. Thereupon the storm beats against it. Those who never thought it desirable, for there are intelligences to which most ideals seem dangerous and temperaments to which they are offensive, and who had previously treated it only with contempt in the abstract, offer the fiercest opposition to it as a practical proposal. Many of its supporters are paralyzed by difficult aspects which they had not previously considered, and the project recedes again into a region of shadows or abstract resolutions.

This, or something like this, has hitherto been the history of the ideal that has now become associated with the phrase "League of Nations," but it does not follow that the history of this or of other ideals will be the same after the war as before it. There is more at stake in this war than the existence of individual States or empires or the fate of the Continent. The whole of modern civilization is at stake, and whether it will perish, be submerged, as has happened to previous civilizations of older types, or whether it will live and progress depends upon whether the nations engaged in this war, and even those that are onlookers, learn the lessons that the experience of the war may teach them. It must be with nations as with individuals. In the great trials of life they must become better or worse, they cannot stand still. They must learn to profit by experience and rise to greater heights, or else sink lower and drop eventually into an abyss. And this war is the greatest trial of which there is any record in history. If the war does not teach mankind new lessons that will so dominate the thought and feeling of those who survive it and those who succeed the survivors as to make new things possible, then the war will be the greatest catastrophe as well as the most grievous trial and suffering of which mankind has any record.

Therefore, it does not follow that a league of nations to secure the peace of the world will remain impossible because it has not been possible hitherto, and I propose in this paper to consider shortly, to state rather than examine, for it would take a long time to examine thoroughly conditions that have not been present before, and that are present now, or may soon be

present, and that are essential if a league of nations is to become effective.

These conditions appear to me to be as follows:

First, the idea must be adopted with earnestness and conviction by the executive heads of States. It must become an essential part of their practical policy, one of their chief reasons for being, or continuing to be, responsible for the policy of their States. They must not adopt it only to render lip service to other persons whom it is inconvenient or ungracious to displease. They must lead and not follow. They must compel, if necessary, and not be compelled.

This condition was not present before the war. To what extent is it present now? It is not possible to answer this question fully, but it can be answered certainly and affirmatively as regards President Wilson, the executive head of the United States, and this alone is sufficient to give new life and purpose to the idea of a league of nations. President Wilson and his country have had in this matter the great advantage of having been for more than two years and a half, before April, 1917, able to observe the war as neutrals, free from the intense anxiety and effort that absorb all the thought and energy of the belligerents. They were able not only to observe but to reflect and to draw conclusions.

One of the conclusions has been that if the world, of which they form an important part, is to be saved from what they consider disaster, they must enter the war against Germany. Another has been that if national liberty and peace are to be secure in the future there must be a league of nations to secure them.

It must not be supposed from this that the Governments of the Allies are less ready to draw or have not

already drawn the same conclusion from the experience of the war, but their countries have been at war all the time. They have been fighting, it is true, for the same ideal of national human liberty as the United States, but fighting also for the immediate preservation of national existence in Europe, and all their thought and energy has been concentrated upon resistance to imminent peril. Nevertheless, in this country, at any rate, the project of a league of nations has met with widespread, cordial acceptance.

On the other hand, the Military Party in Germany are, and must remain, opposed to it. They resent any limitation upon the use of force by Germany as fatal to German interests, for they can conceive no development and even no security except one based solely upon force. Any other conception is fatal, and this exclusive conception is essential to the maintenance of the power of the Military Party in Germany. As long, therefore, as this rule in Germany continues Germany will oppose the League of Nations. Nothing will change this except the conviction among the German people that the use of force causes at least as much suffering to themselves as to others, and that the security based upon law and treaty and the sense of mutual advantage is better than the risks, dangers, and sufferings of the will to supreme power and the efforts to obtain it, and this conviction must so work upon them as to displace the Military Party and their policy and ideals from power in Germany.

The situation, therefore, of this first condition essential to make the League of Nations practical may be summed up as follows:

It is present certainly as regards the executive head of the United States, which is potentially the strongest

and actually the least exhausted of all belligerent States. It either is, or will at the end of the war be found to be, present as regards the Governments of the countries fighting on the same side as the United States. Even among their enemies Austria has publicly shown a disposition to accept the proposal and probably welcomes it genuinely, though secretly, as a safeguard for her future, not only against old enemies but against Prussian domination. All small States, belligerent or neutral, must naturally desire in their own interest everything that will safeguard the small States as well as the great from aggression and war.

There remains the opposition of Germany, where the recent military success and ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence. Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her, and that when the world is free from the menace of these military rulers, with their sharp swords, shining armor, and mailed fists, Germany will find peaceful development assured and preferable to expansion by war and will realize that the condition of true security for one nation is the sense of security on the part of all nations.

Till Germany feels this to be true there can be no League of Nations in the sense intended by President Wilson. A league such as he desires must include Germany, and should include no nation that is not thoroughly convinced of the advantages, of the necessity, of such a league, and is, therefore, not prepared to make the efforts, and if need be the sacrifices necessary to maintain it.

The second condition essential to the foundation of the League of Nations is that the Governments and peoples of the States willing to found it understand clearly that it will impose some limitations upon the national action of each, and may entail some inconvenient obligation. Smaller and weaker nations will have rights that must be respected and upheld by the league. Stronger nations must forego the right to make their interests prevail against the weaker by force, and all States must forego the right in any dispute to resort to force before other methods of settlement by conference, conciliation, or if need be arbitration, have been tried. This is the limitation. The obligation is that if any nation will not observe this limitation upon its national actions, if it breaks the agreement which is the basis of the league, rejects all peaceful methods of settlement and resorts to force against another nation, they must one and all use their combined force against it.

The economic pressure that such a league could use would in itself be very powerful, and the action of some of the smaller States composing the league could not perhaps go beyond the economic pressure, but those States that have the power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military, or naval, they possess. It must be clearly understood and accepted that deflection from or violation of the agreement by one or more States does not absolve all or any of the others from the obligation to enforce the agreement.

Anything less than this is of no value. How worthless it may be can be seen by reading the debate in the House of Lords in 1867 upon the Treaty Guaranteeing the Neutrality of Luxemburg. It was there explained that we entered only into a collective guarantee. By

this it was apparently meant that if any one of the guaranteeing powers violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, or even if any one of them declined to take active steps to defend it, Great Britain and the other guarantors were thereby absolved from taking any action whatever. This was contrasted at the time with the Belgian treaty, which entailed a separate guarantee. Hitherto the nations of the world had made reserves in arbitration or conciliation agreements, showing that they were not prepared to accept the limitations upon national action that are essential to secure an effective league of nations. An exception is the conciliation treaty between Great Britain and the United States negotiated before the war. But the statement made above is generally true. The nations also carefully abstained from undertaking any obligation to use force to uphold the benevolent rules of agreements of general application that had been recorded at The Hague Conferences. Such obligation had been confined to local objects like the neutrality of Belgium or to alliances between particular powers, made to protect or serve their special interests.

Are the nations of the world prepared now, or will they be ready after the war, to look steadily and clearly at this aspect of the League of Nations; at the limitations and obligations that it will impose, and to say whole-heartedly and convincingly, as they have never done before: "We will accept and undertake them?" Individuals in civilized States have long ago accepted analogous limitations and obligations as regards disputes between individuals. These are settled by law, and any individual who, instead of appealing to law, resorts to force to give effect to what he considers his rights, finds himself at once opposed and restrained

by the force of the State—that is, in democratic countries, by the combined force of other individuals. And we not only accept this arrangement, but uphold it as essential to prevent the oppression of one by another, to secure each person in quiet life, and to guarantee to each the greatest liberty that is consistent with the equal liberty of his neighbors. That at any rate is part of the theory and object of democratic government, and if it is not perfectly attained, most of the proposals for improving it look rather to increased than to diminished State control.

But in less civilized parts of the world individuals have not reached the point of view from which this order of things seems desirable. There is the story of the native chief in Africa who protested to the British official against having to pay any taxes. The British official explained, no doubt in the best modern manner, that these taxes were used to keep order in the country, with the result that men and women and the flocks and herds in the possession of every tribe were safe, and each could live in its own territory without fear of disturbance, and that the payment of taxes was for the good of all. The effect of this explanation was to make the chief very angry. Before the British came he said he could raid the neighborhood, return with captives and captures of all sorts, and be received in triumph by the women and the rest of the tribe when he returned. The protection of his own tribe from similar raids he was willing to undertake himself. "Now," he said, "you come here and tell me that I ought to like to pay taxes to be prevented from doing this, and that makes me mad."

The analogy between States and individuals or groups of individuals, is not perfect, but there is suffi-

cient analogy to make it not quite irrelevant to ask whether after this war the view held by the great States of the relations desirable between themselves will be that of the African chief or that of individuals in what we call civilized nations.

Nothing but experience convinced individuals that law was better than anarchy to settle relations between themselves. And the sanction that maintains law is the application of force with the support of the great majority of individuals behind it. Is it possible that the experience of this war will produce a settled opinion of the same sort to regulate the relations of States with one another and to safeguard the world from that which is in fact anarchy? What does the experience of this war amount to?

Our minds cannot grasp it. Thought is crushed by the accumulated suffering that the war has caused and is still causing. We cannot utter all we feel, and if it were not that our feelings are in a way stunned by the very violence of the catastrophe, as physical nerves are to some extent numbed by great blows, the human heart could not bear up and live under the trial of this war. Great must be the effect of all this; greater after, even, than during the war, on the working of men's minds and on human nature itself, but this is not what I intend to urge here.

I will urge only one point, and one that is for the head rather than the heart. We are now in the fourth year of the war. The application of scientific knowledge and the inventions of science during the war have made it more terrible and destructive each year. The Germans have abrogated all previously accepted rules of warfare. The use of poisonous gas, the firing from the sea upon open, undefended towns, and the indis-

criminate bombing of big cities from the air were all introduced into the war by Germany.

It was long before the Allies adopted any of these practices even as reprisals, but the Germans have forced a ruthless, unlimited application of scientific discovery to the destruction of human life, combatant and non-combatant. They have shown the world that now and henceforth war means this, and nothing less than this.

If there is to be another war in twenty or thirty years' time, what will it be like? If there is to be concentrated preparation for more war, the researches of science will be devoted henceforth to discovering methods by which the human race can be destroyed. These discoveries cannot be confined to one nation, and their object of wholesale destruction will be much more completely achieved hereafter even than in this war. The Germans are not blind to this, but, as far as I can see, their rulers propose to avoid future wars by establishing domination by Germany forever.

Peace can never be secured by the domination of one country, securing its power and prosperity by submission and disadvantage to others; and the German idea of a world peace secured by the power of German militarism is impracticable as well as unfair and abhorrent to other nations. It is as intolerable and impossible in the world as despotism would be here or in the United States.

In opposition to this idea of Germany, the Allies should set forth, as President Wilson has already set forth, an idea of peace secured by mutual regard between States for the rights of each, and the determination to stamp out any attempt at war as they would a plague that threatened the destruction of all.

When those who accept this idea and this sort of peace can in word and deed speak for Germany we shall be within sight of a good peace.

The establishment and maintenance of a league of nations such as President Wilson had advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transcend them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of States are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in any State.

"Learn by experience or suffer," is the rule of life. We have all of us seen individuals becoming more and more a misery to themselves and others because they cannot understand or will not accept this rule. Is it not applicable to nations as well? And, if so, have not nations come to the great crisis in which for them the rule "Learn or perish" will prove inexorable? All must learn the lesson of this war. The United States and the Allies cannot save the world from militarism unless Germany learns her lesson thoroughly and completely, and they will not save the world or even themselves by a complete victory over Germany until they, too, have learned and can apply the lesson that militarism has become the deadly enemy of mankind.

II

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

(Reprinted from the London *Daily Chronicle*, July 27, 1918)

The experiences of the war have carried far forward the time-old project to bring about closer and better coöperation between nations in establishing and maintaining order and justice throughout the world. The dreams of the seers of past centuries can shortly be realized. Out of the present alliance of free democratic peoples it will not be difficult to build the structure of a league or society of nations which, without attempting too much, will at least put into effect the lessons taught by the present war, and erect the stoutest sort of a barrier against the recurrence of so terrible a calamity.

A league to establish and to enforce the rules of international law and conduct is now in existence, with Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States as its most potent members. These nations and those associated with them have already, in effect, united under a single command their fighting armies, brought into closest coöperation their navies, pooled their mercantile shipping, their financial resources, their food supplies and their munitions of war. What seemed quite impossible five years ago has now been easily and smoothly accomplished under the pressure of the supreme need of resisting the Teutonic attempt

to reduce the free nations of the world to the position of serfs under the domination of the Imperial German Government.

This league should be a permanent addition to the world's organization for order and peaceable progress. Upon its firm and permanent establishment three consequences will necessarily follow: First, there can be no separate alliances or ententes of a political or military character between the nations included in the league. Second, there can be a speedy reduction of armaments, both to lighten the burdens of taxation and to turn the minds of the nations away from international war, to prevent which will be one of the chief aims of such a league. Third, the most favored nation clause must be made applicable to all members of the league, whenever treaties of commerce are concluded between any two or more of the nations that are included in it. This will either greatly lessen, or wholly remove, one of the strongest economic temptations to international war.

The International Court of Justice urged by the American delegation at the second Hague Conference should now be called into being. This court would have the same jurisdiction over questions affecting international relations and international law that the Supreme Court of the United States has over all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution of the United States and treaties made under its authority. A somewhat similar jurisdiction already attaches within the British Empire to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The enforcement, when necessary, of the findings of this court, should be a matter of joint international action in accordance with a definite plan to be determined upon when the court is estab-

lished. The principle upon which this action will rest has been stated with characteristic precision by Mr. Asquith when he said that the rule of the authority of an international court "must be supported in case of need by the strength of all; that is, in the last resort, by armed force." For the success of this court it is imperative that secret international understandings be deprived of any validity whatever in international law. It should be provided that, as a condition of the validity in international law of any treaty between two contracting powers, a copy of it must be deposited immediately upon its ratification in the archives of the international court of justice at The Hague. There would then be at least one official public depositary for every existing valid treaty.

It should be clearly understood that any such plan of international coöperation as this league of nations, would involve the giving up by each nation included in the league of the absolute right of its government to deal finally and without appeal except to war, with questions arising out of treaties or relations between itself and some other government. Little serious progress can be made in getting rid of war and in better organizing the world until the free peoples are ready to have their several governments take this long step forward.

It is important that this league of nations should begin by not attempting too much. The line of least resistance, and therefore of greatest possible progress, is to lay stress upon the power and authority of a single international judicial authority, and to accustom the public opinion of the world to seek and to defer to the findings of such authority. All international agreements between members of the league would in effect

be acts of international legislation, and in due time some formal international legislative body might be brought into existence. It would be much better, however, to give this body a chance to grow up naturally, rather than to attempt to bring it into existence as part of a logical and systematically worked-out plan.

Such a league of nations as is here outlined will rest upon a moral foundation. Its aim will be to advance the good order, the satisfaction and the happiness of the world. It will not be, and should not be, merely a league to enforce peace. A league of that name might well rest solely upon force and entirely overlook both law and equity. Doubtless Germany and Austria-Hungary now feel that they are joint and several members of a highly meritorious league to enforce peace—peace upon their own terms and as they conceive it. A league of nations that aims to declare and to enforce principles of international law and justice, will of necessity be a league to establish peace, because it will be a league to establish those foundations upon which alone permanent peace can rest.

There is no good reason why there should be any farther delay in bringing this league formally into existence. Even while military and naval operations are being pressed forward to that certain victory which will one day be theirs, this league should be formally established, and international organs created by it to prepare systematically and scientifically for promptly dealing with the grave economic, social and political problems that the cessation of hostilities, the demobilization of armies and the new world conditions that are to be the result of the overthrow of Prussian militarism will certainly bring forward for quick solution.

It would be difficult to make a better statement of the rights and duties of nations than those adopted by the American Institute of International Law at Washington on January 6, 1916, and supplemented by the same body at Havana, Republic of Cuba, on January 23, 1917.¹

¹ These declarations will be supplied upon written request to the Secretary, American Association for International Conciliation, 407 West 117th Street, New York City.

III

LABOR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By ORDWAY TEAD

"We must seek by the creation of some international organization to . . . diminish the probability of war."—
Mr. Lloyd George to the Trade Union Congress at
Westminster, January 5, 1918.

The labor groups of the allied countries have spoken with unmistakable clearness in favor of a social control of economic forces which will reduce the likelihood of war. They understand in a profound way the part that economic factors play in preserving or destroying the peace. Their analysis of the weaknesses of nineteenth century industrialism as it is presented in the War Aims of the Inter-Allied Labor Conference, hews straight and vigorously to the line. The European labor leaders are masters of their economic theory.

The workers, according to this document which speaks for some millions in the proletarian movements of England, France, Belgium, and Italy, are opposed to any form of economic war which "would inevitably lead to reprisals." They favor "the utmost possible development, by appropriate government action, of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world." And they demand an "international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of legislation on factory conditions" and other labor standards. Finally, they recognize the need for systematic arrangements

"on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities (foodstuffs) to the different countries, in proportion, not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs." In other words, their statement, brief as it is, embodies several principles which are fundamental at once to permanent peace and to a wise reconstruction.

The workers declare that the chief provocations of war are the demand of all nations for access to raw materials; the exportation of capital, the sale of foreign credits; and the inequality of working and living standards between countries with the movements of population which this is likely to entail. To the wiping out of these provocations the organized workers of Europe are now committed. They demand a democratic peace as the only kind of peace that will assure a fundamental attack upon these problems; and they favor the creation of a league of nations as the super-body which shall be charged with the international administration of their solution. In order to assure adequate consideration of the problems and provocations they consider most relevant, working class representatives are demanding a place at the peace table; and they contemplate a world labor conference to be held simultaneously with the official negotiations of settlement. Alone among the political factions in their respective countries the working class parties are passionately united and explicit in their repudiation of selfish economic gains as the outcome of the war. Alone among the special interests the workers insist that "of all the conditions of peace none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war."

This faith and aspiration are splendid. The logic of labor's economic analysis seems irrefutable; its positive principles seem unassailable. But how, practically, are the workers to give effect to their ideas? Can labor in the allied countries project plans for actual organization through which their bold desires can be fulfilled? Upon their ability to grapple with these immense problems depends the effectiveness of the labor movement in international affairs in the next half century. Labor, therefore, has an immensely sobering task—a task not only self-chosen, but one imposed by the sheer weight of its interest in the right kind of a settlement. It has the duty, which is indeed shared by all liberal citizens, of examining existing proposals which give promise of assuring permanent peace; of making public what it believes to be the predominant causes of war and of suggesting further plans and methods intended to eliminate those causes.

It is my purpose here to consider in the light of labor's demands and of existing facts in the world of international events the one big constructive suggestion which the world has now to work upon—the idea of a league of nations. Labor is lending earnest support to the proposal for a league. Yet, oddly enough, despite the widespread and almost sudden popularity which this idea has attained, it is still a somewhat tentative and nebulous one. It still suffers from too great a generality of statement. Until it is removed from the realm of the abstract, until the conception of the society of nations is broadened to include something more than political functions and interests, there is grave danger that the idea may prove an impractical instrument of genuine demo-

cratic internationalism, in exactly the same way that the nineteenth century state proved ill-adapted to effective democratic national control.

As endorsed by the inter-allied workers the idea contemplates the immediate establishment "actually as a part of the treaty of peace with which the present war will end, of a universal league or society of nations, a supernational authority, with an international high court to try all justiciable issues between nations. . . ." But what these justiciable issues are, upon what matters the "international legislature" should legislate—these are vital questions for which no answers are suggested. Nor has there been any public attempt to relate these plans for supernational political machinery to labor's industrial program. Indeed, there has been an almost complete hiatus between the thinking regarding the political structure involved in a league of nations and the economic functions which it is becoming increasingly obvious, the league must assume. Labor has urged a league with an organization patterned on familiar political forms. Yet it also demands in the next breath an international control over commodities and materials for which conventional political government offers no analogies and no clues. Can the democratically minded workers achieve any reconciliation between the ideas of a political and economic internationalism? Does the league of nations offer any ground for such a reconciliation?

It is largely the popular over-emphasis of the political analogies which gives point to the objection that the projected world society appears to contemplate no definite job. Yet, clearly, if it is to make good, the league requires specific functions. Any organiza-

tion possessing vitality has come into being only in response to a need recognized and pondered until some coöperative way of meeting it is seen. Demand for the performance of a function is the only valid occasion for the creation of a body to perform it. Of international organizations this is especially true. To be successful they must be functional in character—that is, they must exist in response to a felt need and be so constituted as to meet that need. This is a simple truth; but it can be of immense value in helping to keep our thinking on international problems clear. If we hold this truth in view, we can get the right perspective on organizations and can be on our guard against those with resonant names but vague duties.

But the league of nations, it is popularly supposed, will be charged with the duty of enforcing peace. As Mr. Wells puts it, there is a "plain necessity" for a universal society as a condition of organizing the world for peace. Yet whether or not "keeping the peace" involves a concrete program and definite activities is still not a matter of wide agreement. Certainly, as we have construed it in political and diplomatic affairs down to the present the peace-keeping job is very much in the air, related to a thousand projects and policies, but having no single and genuine rallying point of its own. In existing institutions the task generally characterized as "preserving the peace" is largely a negative one. No one would seriously suggest, for example, that the municipal court by virtue of its function of maintaining order provides the cohesive force which holds the local community together. There are a thousand local functions more indispensable, more vitally contributory to the pre-

servation of law and peace. In reality, it is through the administration of health, education, municipal training and the various local utilities which are urgently required by common necessity that the local community is unified and stabilized.

Internationally, it is equally true that functions upon which common necessity dictates coöperation are the ones for which the nations should provide joint organizations. This is in line with the war's great lesson: that peace is best maintained not so much by efforts to keep the peace as by common efforts to solve the problems that provoke the nations to war. If, as a recent writer observes, "all nations act from self interest," it is only honest moral economy to entrust to supernational bodies definite tasks in the performance of which each nation is undeniably and permanently interested. Where the common self-interest of each country is best served by common participation in the solving of common problems, can we afford not to act together? Can labor after the sacrifices of the war stop short of demanding bodies on a world-wide basis to which some more positive work than the maintenance of peace is assigned?

If there is doubt concerning the reality of the function popularly attributed to a league of nations, it can be removed only by clarifying the statement of the function. The world's problem becomes one of discovering what issues require international action to ensure national salvation. Such necessitous problems are obviously to a large extent economic in character. They relate to food supply and sustenance. Concerning precisely what difficulties coöperative action is imperative and isolation equivalent to

starvation, is therefore a subject for close analysis by the members of a society of nations.

In line with this conclusion is the recent statement of Professor Gilbert Murray concerning after-war problems. "There will not," he says, "be enough food and there will not be enough shipping. . . . We must, to some extent, pool our ships and pool our food supply. And those who do not join the pool will starve. I think there will have to be a great and drastic international association—a vast Hoover commission—to which the various state governments will have to bow under pain of their people's starvation."

Two other important considerations regarding the league of nations may appear at first sight to be somewhat metaphysical. Actually, however, both have very practical bearings and consequences. As Professor Seignobos says in *The New Europe*,¹ the league of nations is a "translation into international terms of the doctrine of the social contract." The doctrine of the social contract was formulated to explain how people became associated together under systematic governments. It stresses the idea of a deliberate rational intention shared by a group of people, as the actuating motive in the creation of government. It minimizes the element of a common necessity. The Pilgrims signing the compact in the cabin of the Mayflower have become the classic example of this theoretical explanation of the origin of constitutionalism in a conscious act of thought and will.

Yet this example rightly interpreted illustrates the exact opposite of the social contract theory. Actually it illustrates the fact that *some common necessity, some*

¹ Seignobos, *The New Europe*, vol. vi, No. 77.

situation in which the interests of each are best served by common action, is the real occasion of the signing of a common contract—is the real occasion for organized group activity. The Pilgrims did not say: Go to now, let us have a government. Their thought was rather: How can we best secure common loyalty, joint protection, assured stability in the conduct of those affairs which interest us all? Similarly, if the league of nations is to be built on no deeper foundation than the deliberate rational intentions of the several nations—no matter how good those intentions are—it will partake of the same unreality which vitiates the social contract theory itself. Good intentions, rationally conceived plans of things that ought to be—these are not the groundwork on which a sound and permanent superstructure of internationalism can be reared. If there are to be contracts and if contracts are to have force and effect, the ties that bind must be ties of necessity, of common need, of joint gain and advantage by the upholding of the contracts.

Again, the stressing by all the advocates of a league of nations of the demand for a “supernational authority” has in it serious elements of risk. It is one thing to say that with respect to any particular issue which arises between nations there should be some one body to which final appeal in those special matters may be taken. It is quite another thing to say that with respect to all issues, all appeal should be to *one* great, supreme “International High Court.” We know, as Professor Seignobos has phrased it, that “modern civilized states are founded on the idea of national sovereignty which, in naked terms, is simply the legalization of the force possessed by the respective governments.” We have seen the uses and abuses to

which that force can be put in the hands of states, whether they be nominally democratic or nominally autocratic. Labor, especially in England, has lately come to have a strong antipathy for the degree of centralized responsibility which the absolute sovereignty of the state entails. The organized workers the world over have come to fear the state to the extent that the state means not common action for the common good but rather action enforced upon the people by a dominant governing group (regardless of how that group gets its power). Claims of absolutism, of final authority and ultimate power are as inimical to personal freedom and growth when they are made in behalf of states as when made in behalf of churches or institutions of any kind.

For these reasons the practice of absolute sovereignty and faith in it are everywhere on the wane. The power of the state, as state, promises to decline as power for public and social control is better organized through functional and more or less voluntary groups.

Yet in the face of this tendency people are proposing—and labor is supporting the idea—not alone to have one supreme source of authority in international matters, but to enforce its decrees by the use of an overwhelming aggrandizement of internationalized force. This idea gets its clear acknowledgment in the title of the League to Enforce Peace. I repeat that as respects any one question over territorial divisions or matters of economic adjustment between nations it *may* be necessary and practical to create a temporary umpire to secure adjustment. But it is a fair question whether the transfer of absolutism in sovereignty from the state to the super-state (which

is what the proposal for a highly centralized league to enforce peace really comes to) would not be paying too dearly for a very doubtful gain.

Mr. G. D. H. Cole in his "Self Government in Industry"² proposes that within the state the problem of adjusting the claims of sovereignty to the claims of personality can be solved by dividing sovereignty between the supreme organization of the nation in its producing capacity (an industrial parliament) and the supreme organization of the consumers (the present political parliaments). If issues come to a deadlock between these two groups, the only recourse, as he conceives it, is to effect whatever ultimate adjustment is possible without an appeal to force. In the contest for power between the state as producer and the state as consumer, the individual gets his chance to preserve and advance the claims of personality and freedom. Perhaps this approach has its suggestion for our thinking in international affairs. Certainly it is becoming daily clearer that if international government means the re-establishment of absolute sovereignty on a basis twice removed from popular control, the weakness of that government will be fundamental and the allegiance it can summon will diminish as soon as its exercise of power becomes significant.

But let no one imagine that for these reasons the league of nations is an impractical suggestion. The foregoing discussion has attempted only to point to the dangers inherent in the popular understanding of the idea. The central notion of joint action on those problems which the nations share and which can find no solution in the absence of joint action is funda-

² Published by Bell, London, 1918.

mental. I am only asking for a slight shift in emphasis in our thinking about the league. The task really is to find the problems upon which the nations admit the need for joint action, and to advocate the creation of supernational bodies which are adapted to solving each particular problem in question, whether it be, for example, distribution of the world's wheat or fertilizer supply, the protection of patents and copyrights, a reserve board to administer an international gold clearance fund, the framing of uniform labor laws for the nations, or the adjustment of territorial boundaries.

The league of nations will be effective, real and successful to the extent that it directs its attention to analyzing the common needs of the nations and to instituting functional organizations of administration and control. This is its first important work. Far from being without function, the league has this indispensable task. It must set up under sound representative control agencies calculated to solve the problems upon which the nations *must* coöperate if they are to be solved at all.

This brings us, I believe, to a point of definite intersection between the idea of an international political structure and the demand for world control of economic matters like raw materials and shipping. The workers will find in the league an instrument of control in the economic sphere which will give abundant promise of vital social usefulness. They may even find that, in demanding genuine international control over the difficult matters of industrial readjustment, they are in that way best effecting the creation of a society of nations. This society may very possibly grow first out of the agencies of economic control

which the war has brought and only afterwards come to take on the desirable attribute of a political super-state.

But should this happen, labor will have to be zealously on guard against two dangers. It must be sure that these international agencies are absolutely above any suspicion of maintaining or erecting economic barriers. And, in order to have assurance on this first point, it must be certain that the national representation on these world bodies is genuinely in the national interest, and not in the interest of special privileged groups in any of the affected countries.

Whatever world organization is projected, there can be no deep-rooted and abiding peace and good will among the nations in the absence of a definite motive to administer, as the workers have finely said, "the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world."

IV

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE
DANUBE: AN EXPERIMENT IN INTER-
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION^{1 2}

By EDWARD KREHBIEL

(Reprinted from *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1918)

"Il ne peut porter ombrage à personne,
puisqu'il est tout le monde y est soumis."—Count Károlyi.³

At the conference between the Bolsheviki and the Germans, held at Brest-Litovsk during the closing days of last year, the Danube River Commission re-

¹ Address of the president of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association at the annual meeting held in Berkeley, California, November 30, 1917. Slight alterations have been made to conform to developments in Europe.

² The sources consulted in the preparation of this article include: *Recueil de documents relatifs à la liberté de navigation du Danube*, by D. Sturdza (Berlin, Puttkammer & Muhlbrecht); *Les travaux de la Commission Européenne des bouches du Danube, 1859 à 1911*, by D. Sturdza (Vienne, Librairie Gerold & Cie.); *British and Foreign State Papers*; *British Parliamentary Papers*: 1882, Vol. lxxx (C. 3253), (C. 3392), 1883, Vol. lxxxii (C. 3525), (C. 3526), (C. 3527), (C. 3591), (C. 3804); *French Diplomatic Documents*: *Affaires étrangères*, *Navigation du Danube*; *Conférence et traité de Londres* (1883); *Notice sur les travaux d'amélioration de l'embouchure du Danube et du bras de Soulina, 1857-1891*. The reports of the British commissioners are found in *Parliamentary Papers*: 1872, lxx (C. 467), 1878, lxxxii (C. 1976), 1894, xc (C. 7502) and 1907 Commercial, no. 9.

³ Speaking of the proposed Commission Mixte for the Upper Danube, *British and Foreign State Papers* (hereafter abbreviated—B. F. S. P.), 74, p. 1240.

ceived a new importance from the demand of the Central Powers that the commission be so reorganized as to include Bulgaria. As this proposal indicates that the navigation of the Danube will be discussed when peace comes to be made, it is timely to recall the history of the European Commission of the Danube; doubly timely, indeed, as this commission is one of the most successful and suggestive experiments in international administration, a policy which under the leadership of President Wilson is now, happily, making rapid headway.

Before the Crimean War the commerce of the Lower Danube was greatly hampered by the quarantine regulations imposed by Russia, which since 1829 had practically usurped control of the river mouths by establishing a series of quarantine stations. Besides these restrictions, there were natural obstacles which hindered the trade of the Danubian states. Complaints were made, chiefly by Austria at first, but by others after the adoption of free trade by Great Britain stimulated grain shipments from the Danube, that Russia was not only doing nothing to dredge the silted channel, but that she was, on the contrary, aggravating the already bad conditions for the very purpose of hindering commerce on the Danube and increasing that of Odessa.⁴ Grain ships and other cargoes were continually shoaling on the river bed, which ever shifted with flood and drought. This meant lighterage, and gave a profitable business to river barges, manned chiefly by Greeks, who were regarded and denounced as pirates, and were charged with being in collusion with river pilots to run ships aground, and

⁴ B. F. S. P., 44, p. 457.

with stealing freely from the cargoes.⁵ But no redress could be had, and recrimination waxed ever more bitter until the Crimean War led to an adjustment.

The suggestion to establish an international commission to free the river from impediments seems to have originated with Charles Cunningham, British vice-consul at Galatz, who in a report of September 30, 1850, proposed as one of several methods "that the different nations interested in the navigation of the Danube should name Commissioners (as seems to be done on the Rhine), and the Commission to attend to the duties of clearing the Sulina,"⁶ a branch of the Danube delta.

This suggestion was elaborated in a memorandum⁷ of the plenipotentiaries of Austria, France and Great Britain, addressed to Prince Gortchakoff of Russia, setting down certain fundamental principles. The second principle was thus stated:

To give the freedom of navigation of the Danube all the development possible, it appears desirable that the course of the Lower Danube, from the point where it becomes common to two riverain states, should be withdrawn from the existing territorial jurisdiction. . . . In any case the free navigation of the river cannot be assured unless it is placed under the control of a syndical authority invested with the powers necessary to remove the now existing obstacles at the outlets of the stream, or which may form there later.⁸

⁵ Report of Colonel Stokes on Improvements in the Danube since 1856; British Blue Books 1871, Commercial 467. Also Bey, Voisin, Notice sur les Travaux d'Amélioration de l'Embouchure du Danube et du Bras de Soulina, 1857-1891, 11 n. See also correspondence between Great Britain and Russia respecting obstacles to navigation of the Danube, 1849-1853, B. F. S. P., 44, pp. 417-476.

⁶ B. F. S. P., 44, p. 439.

⁷ December 28, 1854.

⁸ B. F. S. P., 45, p. 53.

In the conferences to discuss these principles, Baron Prokesch-Osten, one of Austria's delegates, read a statement⁹ giving his views as to the best procedure. He proposed among other measures that the principles for international rivers developed at the Congress of Vienna be applied to the Danube from the point where the river becomes common to the two states, Austria and Turkey.

In the ensuing article-by-article discussion, the debate turned almost wholly on the establishment of the proposed European and Riverain Commissions, on the question of their effect on the sovereignty of the contracting states, and on the representation of nations in them.

The Russian plenipotentiaries objected to the use of the word "syndicat," because it was vague and new.¹⁰ The intention, said Gortchakoff, was to assure free navigation of the river; therefore the regulative commission, designated as a "syndicat," should have a scientific and technical character; should be concerned with commerce, and should be kept free of all political considerations. To this Baron Bourqueney of France replied that political considerations could not be wholly excluded from a matter which had risen to the importance of a European guarantee; that the notorious failure to open the Danube justified the greatest precautions, and that therefore the syndicate ought to represent the interests of all. Prince Gortchakoff replied that if the word "syndicat" implied any exercise of sovereignty he must oppose it.¹¹ The discussion continuing in a later conference, Prince Gortchakoff

⁹ March 21, 1855. B. F. S. P., 45, pp. 68-78.

¹⁰ B. F. S. P., 45, p. 69.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 45, p. 69.

stated that his objections to the term were not directed against the institution itself, but were designed to discover a word better adapted to express the idea intended. It was finally agreed to substitute the phrase "European commission" for the word "syndicat." ¹²

Another point of difference was upon the representation of the nations in the commission. Lord John Russell on behalf of England expressed the desire of his government to be represented upon the executive commission, otherwise known as the Riverain Commission, on the ground of England's important interests in the Danube. To this the plenipotentiaries of Austria replied that, according to the Act of the Congress of Vienna, commissions of this kind should be composed of the delegates of riverain states, and that in so far as this concerned that part of the Danube which traversed her territory, Austria would insist on this principle.¹³ Eventually Russell proposed that if the Riverain Commission were composed of delegates of the riverain states only, the European Commission, having general control of the freedom of navigation, should be permanent. Objections being raised against the necessity and the utility of such permanence, Russell proposed that the European Commission should not be dissolved without unanimous consent. This proposal met with acceptance, and a new article was drafted embodying these arrangements.¹⁴

The proposal to neutralize the delta of the Danube, in so far as it affected the liberty of movement and action of the permanent commission, met with deter-

¹² B. F. S. P., 45, p. 74.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

mined opposition on the part of the Russian plenipotentiaries. Gortchakoff said that he would not at all consent to a combination which was in effect an indirect expropriation. As to the idea of granting the rights of extraterritoriality to the members of the commission, Gortchakoff observed that this would be applying to Russia a principle which had so far been applied only to the seaports of the Levant. Lord John Russell observing that if neither neutralization nor extraterritoriality were accepted, it would be necessary to define and enumerate exactly the powers of the permanent commission, Gortchakoff replied that he would willingly consent to an agreement on that subject; though he was bound to say that the proposals thus far presented had no purpose other than to hinder the navigation of the Danube, while Russia on the contrary was anxious to obtain its complete development.

When the question was taken up in a later session, the Russian plenipotentiaries declared that they would not oppose any combination which should be shown to be necessary to attain the complete freedom of navigation, but that they were opposed to such arrangements as the neutrality of the delta, which in their opinion went beyond that purpose, and indeed, was in certain respects opposed to its realization. Baron Prokesch in discussing the meaning of the word "neutrality" in this case, stated that when he introduced the word into his original draft, he had given it no political significance.¹⁵ He added that if, in his opinion, the neutrality or even the surrender of the delta had been indispensable to secure the free action of the commissions, he did not think it would have

¹⁵ B. F. S. P., 45, pp. 76-78.

been going beyond the bounds of moderation to formulate such a principle in the interest of Europe, since it was accepted in principle by Russia, and especially since the isles themselves seemed to have no real value for Russia. After vainly examining various proposals, nothing more was possible than approval of the vague statement that "Russia binds herself to aid in every way the action of the permanent congress."

The agreements arrived at in the various sessions of the plenipotentiaries were embodied in a memorandum which, with some changes,¹⁶ became the basis of the article incorporated in the Peace of Paris at the close of the Crimean War.

The passages in the Peace of Paris relating to the new joint agent may be summarized as follows:

The European nations declare that the arrangement respecting the Lower Danube "henceforth forms a part of the public law of Europe," and is placed under their guarantee. The regulations of police and quarantine shall rest upon the basis of facilitating as much as possible the passage of vessels, and with the exception of these regulations no obstacle whatever shall be opposed to free navigation of the river by any of the nations concerned.

The European Commission was established by Article XVI:

With a view to carry out the arrangements of the preceding Article, a Commission, in which Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, shall each be represented by one delegate, shall be charged to designate and to cause to be executed the Works necessary. . .

¹⁶ In the Treaty of Paris the jurisdiction of the commission was limited to the portion of the river from Isatcha to the sea, whereas in the preliminary draft above it included the portion from Galatz to the sea (B. F. S. P., 45, p. 78).

In order to cover the Expenses of such Works, as well as of the establishments intended to secure and to facilitate the Navigation at the Mouths of the Danube, fixed Duties, or a suitable rate, settled by the Commission by a majority of votes, may be levied, on the express condition that, in this respect as in every other, the Flags of all Nations shall be treated on the footing of perfect equality.

The Riverain Commission was created by Article XVII:

A Commission shall be established, and shall be composed of delegates of Austria, Bavaria, the Sublime Porte, and Würtemberg (one for each of these Powers), to whom shall be added Commissioners from the Three Danubian Principalities¹⁷ whose nomination shall have been approved by the Porte. This Commission, which shall be permanent: 1. Shall prepare Regulations of Navigation and River Police; 2. Shall remove the impediments, of whatever nature they may be, which still prevent the application to the Danube of the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna; 3. Shall order and cause to be executed the necessary Works throughout the whole course of the River; and 4. Shall, after the dissolution of the European Commission, see to maintaining the Mouths of the Danube and the neighboring parts of the Sea in a navigable state.

Article XVIII: It is understood that the European Commission shall have completed its task, and that the River Commission shall have finished the Works described in the preceding Article, Nos. 1 and 2, within the period of two years. The signing Powers assembled in Conference having been informed of that fact, shall, after having placed it on record, pronounce the Dissolution of the European Commission, and from that time the permanent River Commission shall enjoy the same powers as those with which the European Commission shall have until then been invested.¹⁸

¹⁷ Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia.

¹⁸ As the subsequent relations of the European and the Riverain Commission are complex and confusing, it is worth while giving a summary at this point. The European Commission, consisting of representatives of the greater nations, was appointed for two years and was to install the works for opening the river. It was then to

The European Commission of the Danube, created by the treaty, and consisting of seven delegates,¹⁹ met and organized on November 4, 1856. It fixed its headquarters at Galatz, and appointed Charles Hartley chief engineer. Its position was as follows: It depended for funds on Turkey, which had agreed to advance them and had declined the participation of other nations; it had no basis for an opinion as to the best way to attack the river problem; it found river traffic paralyzed; it was expected to complete the opening of the stream in two years.²⁰

In its instructions of April 8, 1857, to the chief engineer, the commission called for a detailed report of the three branches of the delta as a basis for selecting that in which the definitive work should be undertaken. Hartley declared that the exigency of time prevented an exhaustive research of this sort, and expressed the opinion that available data justified attempting provisional works in the Sulina Channel.²¹ Mindful of the fact that its appointment was for two years only, and anxious to avoid the charge of delay and costliness, the commission decided to try first-aid methods in the form of dredges. This experiment speedily demonstrated that no simple remedy could

turn the management over to the Riverain Commission, composed of delegates of the states bordering on the river. The riverain states were eager to get the control of the river into their own hands, and the non-riverain states, loath to lose control, sought to keep the European Commission alive. In this they were successful, and despite strong insistence from the riverain states the Riverain Commission never came into power, and was presently wholly abandoned.

¹⁹ Rumania was represented after it became independent, 1878.

²⁰ Protocol 16, Congress of Paris, March 27, 1856. B. F. S. P., 46, p. 107; Stokes (First Commissioner of Great Britain); Bey, *The Danube and its Trade*, p. 10, n. 3.

²¹ Bey, pp. 10-13.

possibly cure the trouble, and also tended to exculpate Russia from many of the charges previously made.²² A comprehensive report of the chief engineer made on October 17, 1857,²³ cleared up many of these points, but not before objections were heard. The technical advisers of the British government declared that the provisional works on the Sulina were merely money thrown into the sea, and the government twice telegraphed its commissioner to cause the work to be suspended. Having voted with his colleagues, these instructions placed the commissioner in a quandary between his national and his international duty. Legally he was clearly bound to execute the mandate of his nation; morally he—and his nation—were bound by his vote as a commissioner. It later developed that three other governments had sent similar instructions to their delegates.²⁴ Thus four out of seven sovereign nations had given an order to stop work, but the work went on by reason of the existence of the commission. The incident is a poignant illustration of the tendency of a joint agent of nations to determine the action of its constituents.

Meanwhile, prolonged discussion on the branch to be developed went on without producing any agreement; and, the two years ending, it became necessary to refer the matter to the powers.²⁵ In the conferences

²² Bey, pp. 15-16, 148, n.

²³ Extracts, Bey, pp. 16-43.

²⁴ Bey, p. 148, n.

²⁵ Four powers, England, France, Prussia and Sardinia, in 1858 appointed a special technical commission, which in 1858 reported in favor of developing the Saint Georges branch. This report was accepted. In the meantime, however, the European Commission, with a view to facilitating commerce, temporarily constructed provisional works on the Sulina branch, which were finished in 1861 (Bey, p. 426). The unexpectedly great estimates of cost for improv-

held by them, a sharp clash arose over the continuance of the European Commission beyond the period of two years provided by the treaty. Austria and Turkey, both riverain states, spiritedly opposed lengthening its life. Long and heated discussion brought no agreement, and the five non-riverain Powers—finally supported by Turkey—resolved that the European Commission should finish the work it had begun. Austria entered reservation, but was helpless by virtue of the treaty stipulation that the European Commission could be dissolved by unanimous consent only.²⁶ It is another illustration of the compelling force of an international joint agent that Austria did not exercise the right she undoubtedly possessed to withdraw from the whole affair.

The conferences of the Powers on the opening of the river continued into 1860, when work was temporarily suspended because a railway from Tchernavoda to Constanza, begun with British capital, threatened to compete with river trade.²⁷

The unexpectedly satisfactory results yielded in the interval by the provisional works on the Sulina led to a decision to make those works permanent. Accordingly the seven powers through their plenipotentiaries issued the Public Act of November 2, 1865.²⁸ By this the European Commission of the Danube was charged, to the exclusion of any interference, with administer-

ing the Saint Georges channel, the delay occasioned by the competing Tchernavoda-Constanza Railroad, and the fact that the provisional works on the Sulina yielded results beyond all expectations, led the powers in 1865 to decide to make the Sulina works permanent (Bey, pp. 48, 429).

²⁶ Bey, pp. 149-153.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

²⁸ B. F. S. P., 55, p. 93.

ing, maintaining and developing the works on the river, and was given power to settle the question of the channels to be chosen. In ratifying this convention, the Powers proposed to extend the life of the European Commission for an additional five years.²⁹ This was eventually approved, Russia, in accepting, stating that this period should be the outside limit not to be exceeded in any case.³⁰

In 1871, at the expiration of the five years, the Powers, viewing the circumstance that the commission had contracted loans for the period, lengthened its life for twelve years, or to April 24, 1883. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin gave Rumania representation on the commission, and extended the jurisdiction of the body to Galatz.³¹

²⁹ March 28, 1866. B. F. S. P., 56, p. 624, abbrev. *cf.* Bey, p. 161 *et seq.*

³⁰ Bey, p. 169.

³¹ Art. LIII, Treaty of Berlin, 1878. Bulgaria and Serbia have resented the refusal to admit them on terms of equality into the commission. (B. F. S. P., 69, p. 765; and 74, p. 1231 *et seq.*) The matter has become one of Bulgaria's war aims and is incorporated in the German terms submitted to the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk.

"Art. VIII. Russia agrees that the administration of the mouth of the Danube be intrusted to a European Danube commission, with a membership from the countries bordering upon the Danube and the Black Sea. Above Braïla the administration is to be in the hands of the countries bordering the river." (*New York Times*, January 3, 1918.) Whether this means, as it may, that the Central Powers propose to have a riverain instead of a European Commission of the Danube remains to be seen. If that is their purpose it ought to fail. For a watercourse of the character of the Danube is of international importance and interest, and the erection of a local national control runs contrary to both the needs of the case and the spirit of the times. If any change is made in the control of the Danube it ought to be in the direction of wider international control. The proposal to give Bulgaria a seat on the commission is directly connected with the fact that Bulgarian forces now hold the Lower Danube, and indicates Bulgaria's intention to retain the Dobruđja, and in consequence to be entitled to representation on the commission as a riparian state.

When the twelve years expired in 1883, a European conference continued the Danube Commission for a period of twenty-one years from April 24, 1883, and provided for an automatic renewal after that for periods of three years, subject to denunciation with a year's notice, at the expiration of any triennium. The jurisdiction of the commission was extended from Galatz to Braïla.³² The Riverain Commission was not again brought into the discussion.

Conformably to the terms of this arrangement, the commission has since 1904 been renewed by three-year periods. It outlasted the first years of the Great War, as is indicated by the appointment of a new commissioner by France in 1916 to succeed a deceased member. The fate of the commission since the conquest of the Danube delta by the Central Powers has not been discovered, and may from this time forward be disregarded.

It is high time to examine more closely the constitution, the powers and the jurisdiction of the commission born into history with such travail and nurtured through infancy into youth with such grave concern and skilful solicitude. By way of preliminary it must be observed that as a matter of course no international commission is legally superior to the nations creating it. The nations erecting the Danube Commission were sovereign states, and each was free to approve or veto the proposal. If, then, they approved of this joint agency, it goes without saying that they guarded

³² Certain changes were, at Russia's instance, made in the jurisdiction of the Kilia branch of the delta; and the navigation and police regulations enacted in 1882 by the Danube Commission with the assistance of Serbia and Bulgaria were declared applicable to that part of the Danube between Braïla and the Iron Gates (B. F. S. P., 74, pp. 20-22).

their sovereign independence in every way possible. Accordingly they carefully enumerated the powers to be enjoyed by the commission, reserved the right to approve or reject its findings, and jealously limited its life to prevent its getting out of hand. Still, however free a person may be to make or refuse an engagement, once the engagement is made, there is a contractual and moral obligation which replaces the former foot-looseness. This applies to nations, as the events of the last years show. Indeed, the nations formally accepted the principle when on Russia's abrogation of the neutralization of the Black Sea, the following action was taken:

The plenipotentiaries of North Germany, of Austria-Hungary, of Great Britain, of Italy, of Russia, and of Turkey, meeting to-day in conference have agreed that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can unbind itself of the obligations of a treaty or qualify its stipulations, except with the consent of the contracting parties by way of an amicable agreement.³³

Thus a treaty is in itself virtually a restriction of untrammelled sovereignty. Now if the treaty, instead of merely pledging its signatory to some course of action, as its own interpretation of the agreement shall dictate, creates some common agent, the mere existence of such an agent tends to place decision in his hands and to take it from the several contracting parties, or, put in another way, the presence of a joint agent makes it more embarrassing and difficult for a nation to go an independent or contrary course. Thus one may for practical purposes distinguish between the legal sovereignty of the contracting nations and their moral obligation—often enforced by public opinion—to heed a commission. In most cases of ar-

³³ London, January 17, 1871. B. F. S. P., 61, pp. 1198-1199.

bitration the parties have enjoyed the legal right to reject the award; but they have very rarely employed it.

The moral sovereignty—if one may use a somewhat exaggerated phrase—of an international joint agent becomes more effective for good, because it offers an organ through which nations can approach one another on the basis of common or united action, instead of as rivals, as is the case in an ambassadorial conference. Not that rivalries are not carried into commissions, but the fundamental conception of a commission is coöperation, whereas ambassadors represent competition.

Considering the moral strength of a commission, it is no wonder that nations are jealous of the powers they confer on it, and that they scrutinize every proposal with the greatest care to ascertain whether it conceals a surrender of national sovereignty. The wonder then is that a commission like that of the Danube enjoyed such great powers as it did.

During its earlier years, the commission was jealously regarded from all quarters, and during this period of trying to make good it lived a sort of hand-to-mouth existence. The agreements reached by it had chiefly to do with raising revenues. The adoption of regulations for its own procedure, for police, navigation and so forth, was hampered by the original plan to replace the European Commission by the permanent Riverain Commission. However, when in 1865 the achievements of the European Commission induced the powers to continue it, the elaboration of its rights and duties could be postponed no longer. This need was satisfied by the plenipotentiaries of the powers at Galatz, in a Public Act with an Annex contain-

ing the Regulations of Navigation and Police and the tariff.³⁴

A summary of this act and of later acts and revisions is best arranged topically.

The initial function of the Danube Commission concerned the mastery of the river obstacles, a thing that jealous competing nations had not been able to accomplish. Accordingly the commission was armed with discretion in technical matters by Article XVI of the treaty, quoted above, which charged it "to designate and to cause to be executed the works necessary . . . to clear the Danube." In 1865 the commission was further charged "to the exclusion of all interference whatever, to administer these works and establishments for the advantage of the navigation, to watch over their maintenance and preservation, and to give them all the development that the requirements of the navigation may demand." At the same date its discretion was virtually extended to the choice of the proper channel to be developed, which had from the first been largely a political matter.³⁵ The Powers even agreed that no quays or jetties or other establishments of that nature could be constructed in designated areas by either the territorial authorities or private concerns, unless the plans had been communicated to the European Commis-

³⁴ November 2, 1865. B. F. S. P., 55, p. 93 *et seq.* This replaced a provisional regulation of navigation and police, November 21 1864 (B. F. S. P., 55, p. 119). It was in turn replaced on November 8, 1870 (*ibid.*, 62, p. 540 *et seq.*), on November 10, 1875 (*ibid.*, 67, p. 639 *et seq.*), on May 19, 1881 (*ibid.*, 78, p. 325 *et seq.*), and on May 21-28, 1891; Sturdza: *Recueil de Documents relatifs à la liberté de Navigation du Danube*, pp. 687-808. There were special regulations for the river between Braïla and the Iron Gates, June 2, 1882 (Bey, p. 346), and March 10, 1883 (B. F. S. P., 74, p. 23 *et seq.*).

³⁵ B. F. S. P., 55, pp. 94-95, Art. II, III.

sion and had been recognized as being in conformity with its general program.³⁶

The methods it employed for the exercise of its control and the agents through whom it should act were laid down by the powers in conference in elaborate regulations of navigation and police. Considering that these regulations were approved by the powers themselves in a conference, it is astonishing to read that "the present regulation . . . may be modified, according to need, by the European Commission"—surely a prerogative of no mean significance.³⁷ Indeed in one instance the commission exceeded its powers, in establishing a pilot service from the sea as far as Braila; but the act was allowed because of its urgent necessity.³⁸

The exercise of navigation on the Lower Danube was placed under the authority of the Inspector General and the Captain of the Port of Sulina, who are named and paid by the Sublime Porte, but who carry out the regulations enacted by the powers, under the "direction of the European Commission, and as invested with an international character."³⁹ The commission may accordingly request their dismissal of the Sublime Porte. The latter may institute an inquiry, which the commission has a right to attend by delegate, but it must without delay remove the agent whose culpability is proved.

The two officers were endowed with limited judicial functions, being empowered to decide summarily on disputes arising between captains of the same nation-

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Art. VI.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 55, p. 119, Art. CXII.

³⁸ Stokes, Blue Books, 1871, Com. 467.

³⁹ B. F. S. P., 55, pp. 89, 96, 100-101.

ality as the contending parties, or, in default of them, of two other captains.⁴⁰ They were also authorized, each within his jurisdiction, to decide disputes between licensed pilots and merchant captains, if their intervention was sought by the latter.⁴¹ They were further empowered to take cognizance of offenses committed within their jurisdictions against the regulations, and to pronounce the infliction of fines in the first instance, in accordance with the provisions of the act.⁴² Appeals against these decisions were permitted within three months to the European Commission. "The judgment rendered on the appeal is final, and can be the object of no further proceedings whatever."⁴³ A similar procedure applies to attempts to evade fines.⁴⁴

To give effect to its decisions the commission needed some sanction. Nor was this wanting. The Treaty of Paris permitted each of the contracting nations to station two light war vessels at the mouths of the Danube.⁴⁵ The function of these vessels was defined as follows:

Each naval force . . . acts on the vessel of its own nationality, and upon those whose flag it is called upon to protect, whether by virtue of treaties or usage, or in consequence of a general or special delegation. In default of a vessel of war qualified to interfere, the international authorities can have recourse to the vessel of war of the territorial power.⁴⁶

Whether the European Commission is permitted to summon the vessels of the several nations is not

⁴⁰ B. F. S. P., 55, Art. VI, p. 101.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 55, Art. LXXIX, p. 112.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Art. CVIII.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Art. XV.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. XIX.

⁴⁶ B. F. S. P., 55, p. 97, Art. XI.

directly stated in this connection. The act is more explicit on this point in connection with attempts to evade tariffs, for it provides that commanders shall be called on to assure the payment of duties and of penalties affixed, with respect to vessels of their own nationality, and states:

The action of the ships of war shall be demanded *en règle* through the Captain of the Port of Sulina upon requisition of the accountant charged with the administration of the Navigation Cash Office. In default of a ship of war having power to coerce an offending vessel, the Captain of the Port shall have recourse to the intervention of the Ottoman man-of-war stationed at Sulina.⁴⁷

The financial operations of the commission throw a further light on its powers and international character. The treaty, as the extract already given shows, empowered the commission to fix and levy equitable duties in order to secure the revenue to carry on its work. All questions of tariffs were to be decided by a majority of votes of the commission. To this highly important provision a great part of the success of the commission has been credited.⁴⁸ It need hardly be noted that majority rule prevents veto of an action by any one nation—thus favoring the one at the expense of the many—that majority rule results in making law for the minority, and that it therefore represents a truly profound abatement of national sovereignty. It is a principle well-nigh essential to the effective coöperation of states, and the fruits that come from its employment on the Danube urge its wider application.

Though empowered to levy duties, the commission could not hope to get adequate revenue from this

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127, Art. XVIII.

⁴⁸ Bey, p. 147, n.

source until the river was opened to general traffic. Consequently it was at the beginning dependent on the Sublime Porte, which had reserved to itself the function of financing the river improvements in their first stages. True to this arrangement, the Turkish government from 1857 to 1860 supplied 3,739,540 francs, exclusive of divers other aids in material and the like estimated at about 80,000 francs. The arrangement was not without its drawbacks. Funds came irregularly, thereby often causing the commission serious embarrassment, or compelling it to stop work during the most favorable seasons. Several times, indeed, it was compelled to contract short-time loans at high interest rates to pay current expenses and to meet its contracts.

This situation was happily remedied once the improvements in the river permitted enough traffic to enable the levying of tolls. A provisional tariff was enacted by the commission July 5, 1860.⁴⁹ Opposition was expected from the vessels, but did not develop. The Porte voluntarily abandoned its right to supply funds, on condition that it be reimbursed for its advances. Eventually this resulted in taking the Navigation Cash Office at Sulina out of Turkey's control and placing it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission.⁵⁰ By these steps the commission became an international financial agent with considerable independence. It could by majority vote fix tariffs,

⁴⁹ There were various revisions, among them: March 7, 1863; November 2, 1865; April 26, 1867; November 9, 1870; 1873; December 31, 1880; November 21, 1882; December 2, 1884; November 17, 1887; November 19, 1889; November 4, 1902 (Bey, pp. 370-388; Sturdza, *Les Travaux de la Commission Européenne des Bouches du Danube*, pp. 221-222).

⁵⁰ B. F. S. P., 72, p. 9, cf. 55, p. 98.

could disburse at discretion, could acquire a surplus. But the novel prerogative was that the international commission could go into the money market and contract loans. Its first loans were made to repay the Turkish advances. In 1860 the Ottoman Bank of Galatz agreed to lend up to about 750,000 francs, but at the onerous rate of 12 per cent. interest, besides 1 per cent. commission. In 1862 the Nord-deutsche Bank of Hamburg lent the Commission 880,000 francs at 6 per cent. interest and 5 per cent. commission, payable in advance. These loans were virtually discharged by the end of 1865. The decision reached in November of that year to make permanent the temporary works of the Danube foreshadowed new loans. Two and a half million francs were needed, but when the commission approached the banks it found that it lacked the credit necessary to borrow so large a sum, except on terms that were prohibitive. No solution was found until six of the powers represented in the commission jointly guaranteed the loan (April 30, 1868).⁵¹ The salutary effect of this guarantee on the commission's credit was apparent in the loan of approximately three and a third million francs (3,375,000) with Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, London, at 4 per cent. interest. Many other financial operations of a similar nature were conducted by the commission. When as a consequence of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 the commission got into financial straits, it secured money by issuing bonds, offering the river tolls as security. To be sure, the rate of 10 per cent. was high, but the significant fact is that the joint agent of the nations was developing a real identity

⁵¹ British Blue Books, 1878, LXXXII (C. 2006), No. 14.

and personality. Its venturesomeness was rewarded with complete solvency.⁵²

Passing by the matter of sanitary control, the commission enjoyed another attribute of sovereignty in its neutrality. Russia opposed the principle in its early stages, and kept it out of the treaty. With the passage of time the opposition waned, and in 1865 the Public Act of that year declared that "the works and establishments of all kinds created by the Commission . . . particularly the Navigation Cash Office at Sulina . . . shall enjoy neutrality . . . and shall be, in case of war, equally respected by all the belligerents."⁵³ How this neutrality has fared in the present war is not known.

As a final evidence of the personality of the joint agent of the Danube, one may note that after fifteen years of existence the commission was allowed to have its own insignia and flag.⁵⁴

Such is the history, and such the achievement of the European Commission of the Danube, the most ambitious and the most successful experiment in international administration. It remains to consider what light this experiment throws on the problem of bridging the gap between sovereign states.

Three possible ways of doing this are easily discernible. One is by judicial methods, and finds strong support among those who advocate compulsory arbitration or a world court of one sort or another. The obvious difficulty is that no world court can hope to operate without some universal principles to apply, and these are not yet codified. This seems to indicate

⁵² Bey, pp. 127-144.

⁵³ B. F. S. P., 55, p. 99, Art. XXI; cf. Art. VII, *ibid.*, 61, p. 10.

⁵⁴ B. F. S. P., 72, pp. 10-11.

that those who urge world legislation by developing the Hague Conference into a genuine legislature are nearer the solution. But even if such a legislature could be secured, it would have the greatest difficulty in framing general laws or principles that would be applicable to a diversified earth.

The international administrative agent escapes these objections and has certain advantages. It is created to deal with a single problem, and adjusts itself, its procedure and action to the needs of its task, irrespective of how these principles apply to other, perhaps similar problems. Instead of trying to lay down a coördinated set of principles applicable to all the world, it is pragmatic, and does what is convenient in its own case. It may even reverse itself, a thing not possible where a universal law has been decreed. On the other hand, its own precedents are certain to have an influence upon its later actions, and thus there grows up a body of customary law, proved by experience. The international administrative agent enjoys all the advantages which accrue from customary law, and is free from the difficulties of a codified law, which springs into being full-fledged.

If the preceding be true of one commission, it will be true of others. Each will have its own problem, and its own solution; each will develop a body of custom that will harden into law. And by their several activities they will in a space of time develop a whole body of rules which will in effect be the foundation of the super-state itself.

V

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT WILSON

At the Metropolitan Opera House, New York,
September 27, 1918

(Reprinted from *Official U. S. Bulletin*)

My Fellow Citizens:

I am not here to promote the loan. That will be done—ably and enthusiastically done—by the hundreds of thousands of loyal and tireless men and women who have undertaken to present it to you and to our fellow citizens throughout the country; and I have not the least doubt of their complete success; for I know their spirit and the spirit of the country. My confidence is confirmed, too, by the thoughtful and experienced coöperation of the bankers here and everywhere, who are lending their invaluable aid and guidance. I have come, rather, to seek an opportunity to present to you some thoughts which I trust will serve to give you, in perhaps fuller measure than before, a vivid sense of the great issues involved, in order that you may appreciate and accept with added enthusiasm the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by your men and your means to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have; and it is my mission here tonight to try to make it clear once more what the

war really means. You will need no other stimulation or reminder of your duty.

At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement.

We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course.

The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the

governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot "come to terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be in deed and in truth the common object of the governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and

not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Govern-

ment's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well-known principles of

international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubtings and mischievous perversions of counsel and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigues and weakening morale and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be unceremoniously, aside and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite as plainly if in less unvarnished terms.

As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues

of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be willfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as time and circumstance have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get someone to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to

speaking. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battlefield; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed forever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

SPECIAL BULLETIN

THE DAWN IN GERMANY?

THE LICHNOWSKY AND OTHER
DISCLOSURES



BY
JAMES BROWN SCOTT

NOVEMBER, 1918

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

THE DAWN IN GERMANY?

The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures

By JAMES BROWN SCOTT

(Reprinted from *The American Journal of International Law*, April, 1918)

In the earlier part of March extracts appeared in the German press of a Memorandum written by Prince Lichnowsky, Imperial German Ambassador to Great Britain at the outbreak of the war of 1914, and more of this Memorandum is said to have been published in the Stockholm *Politiken*. In the account given in the London *Times* for March 15, 1918, it is said that:

The Memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months ago, for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his personal friends, and only half-a-dozen type-written copies were made. One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of the Minority Socialist Party; but how it happened that a copy got across the German frontier forms a mystery to which *Politiken* declines to give any clue. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated Kuchelna (Prince Lichnowsky's country seat), August, 1916.

The most casual reading of the Memorandum will disclose why the Prince's Memorandum has created a sensation in Germany, where the views expressed by the former Ambassador to Great Britain have not been avowed by the authorities. Naturally, they have been discussed in the Reichstag, and statements have

appeared from time to time in the press that the Prince would be tried and punished for treason, or sedition, or for some other heinous offense.

As regards the Reichstag, the London *Times*, in its issue of March 21, 1918, says in a dispatch from Amsterdam, dated the 19th:

In the Main Committee of the Reichstag the subject of Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum was discussed. Herr von Payer, the Vice-Chancellor, read a letter from the Prince, in which he stated that the Memorandum had been written with a view to his future justification. These notes were intended for the family archives. They have found their way into wider circles by an "unprecedented breach of confidence." The Prince expressed regret for the incident.

Herr von Payer stated that the Prince had tendered his resignation, which had been accepted, but as he had been simply guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him.

A few of the more significant passages of the Memorandum are quoted, with summaries of omitted portions.

The Prince arrived in London in November, 1912, and found that "people had quieted down about Morocco," as an agreement had been reached concerning this question between France and Germany. The Haldane Mission had, he said, failed because Germany insisted upon a promise of neutrality, instead of contenting itself with a treaty with Great Britain insuring it against attacks from that country. However, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had, to quote the Prince's exact language, "not given up the idea of reaching an understanding with us and he tried it first in colonial and economic matters." The purpose of Sir Edward Grey as stated by the German Ambassador was to settle outstanding controversies with France and

Great Britain, and thereafter reach similar agreements with Germany, "not to isolate us," to quote the Prince, "but as far as possible to make us partners in the existing union. As British-French and British-Russian differences had been bridged over, he wished also the British-German differences to be settled as far as possible and to insure world peace by means of a network of treaties," which the Prince said would probably have included an agreement on the naval question after an understanding had been reached obviating the dangers of war. Such was Grey's program in his own words, the Prince says, apparently quoting Sir Edward Grey, upon which the Prince comments that it had "no aggressive aims, and involved . . . for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly *rapprochement* and understanding with Germany'. In short, to bring the two groups nearer together."

Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures concerning the attitude on the Balkan situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain, on the other, are of the utmost importance, as they show an agreement of the Central European Powers to exclude Russia from Balkan affairs, to substitute their own influence for that of Russia, and to make of those states dependencies instead of making them independent, inasmuch as the Prince shows that Russian influence had really ceased in each instance with the independence of each of the Balkan States.

It will be recalled that Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, after having beaten Turkey in what is known as the First Balkan war, fell out about the distribution of the spoils of victory, and that in a conference by their plenipotentiaries held in London they failed to agree. The consequence was the

Second Balkan war, of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, in which Rumania joined, against Bulgaria, which had insisted upon the lion's share of the common victory. In this second war Bulgaria was badly beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded in 1913. In these various negotiations, Austria was an interested party, insisting that the principality of Albania should be created out of the spoils claimed by Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbia be denied an outlet to the seas. The attitude of the Central German Powers and of Great Britain is thus stated by Prince Lichnowsky, who was then German Ambassador to London:

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal conversation in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war. The British statesman from the beginning took the stand that England had no interest in Albania on account of this question and was therefore not willing to let it come to a war. He wished simply as an honest broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. He therefore by no means placed himself on the side of the members of the alliance, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he contributed not a little by his good will and effectual influence toward bringing about concord and agreement. Instead of assuming an attitude similar to that of the English, we without exception took the position prescribed to us from Vienna. Count Mensdorff represented the Triple Alliance in London. I was his second. My mission consisted in supporting his propositions.

So much for the attitude of the different Powers. Next as to the conduct of Sir Edward Grey and the consequences of the Balkan settlement conducted by Austria-Hungary and Germany. On these points the Prince said in his Memorandum:

Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calmness, and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become com-

plicated, he would draft a form of agreement which hit the matter right and always met approval. His personality enjoyed equal confidence from all members of the conference. We really again successfully stood one of the many tests of strength which characterize our politics. Russia had had to yield to us everywhere, so that she was never in a position to insure success of the Serbian wishes. Albania was created as an Austrian vassal state and Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of the conference was therefore a fresh humiliation for the Russian self-consciousness. As in 1878 and 1908, we had taken a stand against the Russian program without German interests being at stake. Bismarck knew how to mitigate the error of the Congress by secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question. The downward path again taken in the Bosnian question was continued in London, and when it led into the abyss it was not opportunely abandoned.

It is common knowledge that Austria-Hungary had picked Bulgaria as the winner in the Second Balkan war, and that its defeat was a blow to what it considered its prestige. The Prince calls attention to this in the following passage, and the absence of a specious pretext evidently was the reason in the Prince's mind, although he does not say so, for the outbreak of the war a year earlier than it actually occurred:

The idea of wiping it out by a campaign against Serbia seems soon to have gained ground in Vienna. The Italian revelations prove this and it is to be supposed that the Marquis San Giuliano, who very appropriately characterized the plan as a most dangerous adventure, preserved us from becoming involved in a world war as early as the summer of 1913.

But however interesting these passages may be, they are merely episodes in a memoir whose great value consists in the disclosure that before the outbreak of the war of 1914, Great Britain had not only, as is well known, settled its differences with France and Russia, but also that Sir Edward Grey, representing Great Britain, had peaceably settled its controversies with

Germany; that the terms of the treaty adjusting their conflicting claims to the satisfaction of Germany had not only been substantially agreed upon, but that the treaty itself had been drafted and initialed by Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain, and by Prince Lichnowsky on behalf of Germany.

It appears that the agreement between the two countries extended to colonial matters in Africa, as well as economic questions in Asia. In regard to the former, the Prince says, speaking of the treaty of 1898:

Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo region from the south; besides this there were the valuable islands of San Thomé and Príncipe. . . . Furthermore, we received the northern part of Mozambique. . . .

"The British Government," the Prince says again, "showed the greatest obligingness in behalf of our interests. Grey purposed proving to us his good will and also furthering our colonial development in general, as England hoped to divert German development of strength from the North Sea and from Europe to the ocean. 'We do not begrudge Germany her colonial development', said a member of the Cabinet to me."

Of the Asiatic situation, and especially of the Bagdad Railway, the Prince has much to say, and the purpose of the two governments appears to have been to divide Asia Minor into two spheres of influence. The economic enterprises were adjusted essentially in accordance with the wishes of the German Bank, and the railroad itself was prolonged to Basra, so that Bagdad was no longer constituted the terminal point of the road. An international commission was to

attend to the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. Germany was to have a part in the construction of the harbor at Basra, and obtain rights in the navigation of the Tigris.

The success of these negotiations and their consequences not merely to the contracting Powers, but to the world at large, are thus stated by the German negotiator:

Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra became our interest zone, without prejudice to more ancient British rights in the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation establishments. Furthermore, we received the whole territory of the Bagdad and Anatolian railroad.

The coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railroad were considered as British economic territory, Syria as French, and Armenia as Russian. If both treaties had been concluded and published, an understanding would thereby have been reached with England which would forever have dispelled all doubts as to the possibility of an Anglo-German coöperation.

In connection with Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum, the following three documents are to be considered.

The first is entitled "Terms of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1914," as corrected by Dr. Zimmermann, Under-Secretary at the outbreak of the war, and later Imperial German Secretary of State, and handed in 1916 to Mr. S. S. McClure.¹ It is thus worded:

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is definitely left to German capital in coöperation with Turkey. In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working will not be hindered by England.

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which German capital is concerned with 60 per cent. and English capital with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra to the Persian Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to.

¹ Mr. S. S. McClure's *Obstacles to Peace*, 1917, pages 40-42.

3. Kuwait is excluded from the agreement between Germany and England.

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested with 50 per cent., German capital with 25 per cent., and Turkish with 25 per cent.

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be developed by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 50 per cent. by England, at 25 per cent. by the German Bank, at 25 per cent. by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irrigation works there had been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. This society exercises south of Basra, on the Schat-el-Arabia, as well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the production and transport of oil.

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand to French capital for the construction of railways in southern Syria and Palestine.

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozambique.

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which established the political predominance of France in Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" to the trade of all nations.

The second is the dispatch of the Belgian Minister at Berlin to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs dated February 20, 1914, as officially published by the German Government in its collection of Belgian documents found in the Foreign Office at Brussels, upon the occupation of that city by German troops.²

² Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914. (Reports of the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London and Paris to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914.) Issued by the Imperial German Foreign Office, 1915, under the title "Belgian Diplomatsists". No. III, pages 131-132.

The material portion of this document, confirming Prince Lichnowsky's statements regarding the French agreement, is as follows:

The Franco-German agreement concerning Asia Minor, concluded very recently at Berlin after difficult negotiations and thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor, assures to France a large sphere of action and influence in Syria. She will be able to build a railway line starting from Beirut along the valley of the Orontes, back of the Antilebanon as far as Aleppo, the point of junction with the German lines. Another French line, also starting from Beirut, passing through Homs, will reach the Euphrates in the direction of the 35th parallel. M. Cambon showed me on the map these lines which are not yet known to the public. The coast of the Mediterranean between Alexandretta and Beirut will be neutralized; no railway can be built there either by Germany, or by France, be it along the coast or across the Antilebanon. A line of this sort was not considered necessary. It would arouse the hostility of the fanatic tribes of the Antilebanon, who close their country to Europeans and carry the products of the soil, the chief one of which is tobacco, to the harbor of Latakia themselves. The difficulty of the negotiations consisted principally in the exact delimitation of the French and German zones of influence (60 kilometers on each side of the railway), so as to prevent them from overlapping. In addition to this, France retains the railway concessions which she obtained from Turkey in the rich mineral district of ancient Cappadocia, along the Black Sea, and the very profitable railway of Smyrna and Casaba.

The third document is entitled "The Bagdad Railway. Complete Anglo-German Agreement," and, as contained in the *London Times* for June 16, 1914, is as follows:

Berlin, June 15 (Through Reuter's Agency)

The Anglo-German Agreement regarding the Bagdad Railway and Mesopotamia has been initialed in London by Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. A complete understanding has been reached on all questions at issue.

The agreement will not come into force until after the conclusion of the negotiations with Turkey, as on some material

points the assent of the Porte will be necessary. The contents of the agreement can therefore not be divulged at present.

In another portion of the Memorandum the German Ambassador writes of the Serbian crisis that led to the war of 1914, and this section of his revelations is a damaging indictment of the policy which his country pursued. "On board the *Meteor* [the Kaiser's yacht], we heard," he says, "of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the Austrian Throne. His Majesty expressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain." What these views were, the Ambassador evidently did not know.

Going to Berlin, he found von Bethmann-Hollweg, then Imperial Chancellor, much troubled at the outlook, and he complained of Russian armaments. The distrust and dislike of Russia appeared to pervade the Foreign Office. Dr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that Russia was about to raise nine hundred thousand fresh troops, and "his words showed an unmistakable animosity against Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way."

The Prince refers to the Potsdam council on July 5, 1914, of which he was not informed at the time, and about which he contents himself with saying: "Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5 the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result." Apparently the die had been cast; Austria-Hungary was to take action against Serbia, and the attempt was to be made to localize the trouble. That is to say, the whole affair was to be looked upon as a bout between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia, to which the European Powers might be spectators, but not participants. This is indicated by the Prince, who says: "I then received instructions that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 'death-blow' to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public opinion from opposing Austria."

The Prince believed that England could not be counted upon and he warned his government against the projected punitive expedition against the little country; indeed, he says that he gave a warning against the whole project, which he described as "adventurous and dangerous," and he advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians because he did not believe in the localization of the conflict. To this warning Herr von Jagow is reported to have answered that Russia was not "ready," that there would doubtless be a certain amount of "bluster," but that the firmer Germany stood by Austria, "the more would Russia draw back." The Prince states that the then German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, had informed his government "that Russia would not move in any circumstance," and that these reports caused Germany to "stimulate" Austria-Hungary "to the greatest possible energy." Sir Edward Grey's influence with Russia was the only hope of maintaining peace, and the Prince therefore begged him to urge moderation in Russia if Austria should demand satisfaction from Serbia. The Prince was not successful with the English press, which felt that exploitation of the assassination of the Austrian heir for political purposes could not be justified, and the English press urged moderation on Austria's part.

Upon the appearance of the ultimatum on July 24, giving Serbia twenty-four hours in which to accept the conditions, "the whole world," the Prince says, "except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for a review, was not demobilized."

In order to prevent this catastrophe, the Prince apparently urged Sir Edward Grey to press for a conciliatory reply from Serbia, as the attitude of the Russian Government showed that the situation was very serious. Sir Edward Grey complied, and to quote the Prince's language, on the attitude of the British Government at this time, "the Serbian reply was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch [the Serbian Premier] had actually accepted everything except two points, about which he declared his readiness to negotiate." The action of Sir Edward Grey and of Russia, which had already suggested modification, was indeed very important, so important that the Prince felt himself justified in saying: "If Russia and England wanted war, in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of note would have remained unanswered."

Sir Edward went over the Serbian reply with the German Ambassador, and they discussed Sir Edward's mediation proposal, "to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties." The French, the Italian, and the German Ambassadors were to have met under Sir Edward's presidency, and the whole difficulty could have been adjusted, the Prince saying, "It would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points which in the main concerned the participation of the Austrian

officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given good will, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would have improved our relations to England." The Prince was so convinced of this that he urged it upon his government, saying that "otherwise a world-war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain." The advice, however, was rejected, as it was against the dignity of Austria, and Germany did not want to interfere in the Serbian affair which was the affair of its ally, and the Prince was directed to work for "localization of the conflict."

The Prince had no illusions as to the attitude of his government, or misgivings as to the result of Sir Edward's policy, for he says: "Of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold [Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war."

Germany not only refused Sir Edward's proposal, but had none of its own to make. The impression, the Prince said, became stronger that his country desired war, and after calling attention to the Russian appeals and declarations of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Czar's humble telegrams, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, the warning of the Italian Foreign Minister, of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and his own urgent advice, the Prince concludes, "It was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred."

"After that," the Prince says, "events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the

strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.”

With England’s entry into the conflict the Prince’s mission was at an end. “It was wrecked,” he says, “not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.”

Under the next section of the Memorandum the Prince has some reflections under the title of “Retrospect,” written two years later, in which he ruefully comments that there was no place for him in a system which “tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read,” and he might have added in this connection what he says elsewhere, under a system which keeps an Ambassador uninformed of negotiations taking place elsewhere, and even has the counselor of the Embassy spy upon the Ambassador, report his conduct to the Foreign Office, and conduct negotiations behind his back.

After some observations that might be considered of a personal character, he says:

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who at any rate reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs.

Germany, he insists, “needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history.” The Prince even believes that his country

could have taken up the question of the limitation of armaments, without needing to think of Austria, much less to follow whithersoever it cared to go, but, "I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost."

There are passages from two sections which should be quoted in the Prince's own words, as the intervention of a third hand might convey the impression that they had been tampered with. They are the "Question of Guilt," and "The Enemy Point of View."

Under the first caption the Prince writes:

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation;

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference;

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply;

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Tsar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world-war.

Under the second caption he says:

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were those people not right who declared that it was the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi which dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil? Were those people not right who said that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentlemen? Were they not right who said that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side? . . .

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.

In the same issue of the London *Times* of March 28, 1918, from which this account of Lichnowsky's revelations have been summarized, there is a translation of a very interesting, and what the *Times* calls "astonishing memorandum" by one Dr. Wilhelm Muehlton, a Director of the Krupp Works at Essen at the time of the outbreak of the war, and for some time thereafter. Muehlton's memorandum figured in the debate in the Reichstag committee on March 16, and it is stated by the *Times* to have appeared in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, from which it is reproduced in translated form. It should be stated, before proceeding to the analysis of

the memorandum, that Dr. Muehlon is now a resident of Switzerland.

It is natural that this memorandum should be considered in connection with that of the late German Ambassador to Great Britain, as it confirms some of his statements and furnishes precious information hitherto withheld from the public, as it apparently was from the Imperial Ambassador at London. Dr. Muehlon records conversations which he had about the middle of July, 1914, with Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and later Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, and with Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, head of the Krupp firm, of which Dr. Muehlon was a Director.

The Krupp people were interested in some large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, and apparently Dr. Muehlon saw Helfferich in regard to them. The Deutsche Bank was evidently unwilling to meet Dr. Muehlon's advances. Dr. Helfferich stated the reasons in a peculiarly frank and interesting manner:

The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal investigations in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia.

This implied a very considerable familiarity with the future as well as with the past, and it is not surprising, as German finance and German diplomacy are so interrelated, that one involves the other.

The future Vice-Chancellor had evidently and prop-

erly enough been taken into the secret, for Dr. Muehlon continues that Dr. Helfferich added:

The Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these two countries, in which he would permit no other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would be no oscillation.

This was probably a reference to the Moroccan question, in which war trembled in the balance, but peace eventually tipped the scales.

According to Helfferich, "the Austrians were extremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on the part of the Kaiser."

This disclosure made a very great impression upon Dr. Muehlon, who had feared a world-war, and apparently felt that it could not be avoided unless France and Russia reconsidered their attitude. Upon his return from Berlin to Essen it was natural that Dr. Muehlon should communicate this bit of news to Herr Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Helfferich had given him permission to do so, but it was not news to Herr von Bohlen, who had recently been with the Kaiser and who, according to Dr. Muehlon, "had spoken to him also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its result, but he [evidently meaning the Kaiser] had described the matter as so secret that he [Krupp] would not even have dared to inform his own directors." Krupp confirmed Helfferich's statements, saying that the situation was very serious, and that "the Kaiser had told him that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about." The

subsequent events have shown that these two gentlemen were only too well informed, as on the very day indicated by Helfferich, the Austrian ultimatum appeared.

Meeting Dr. Helfferich after the ultimatum had been sent, that gentleman is reported by Dr. Muehlon to have said "that the Kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch;" there was nothing to do but to wait and to see what would happen, and according to Dr. Helfferich, as recorded by Dr. Muehlon, the Austrians did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted, and they were "acting rapidly, before the other Powers could find time to interfere."

In a subsequent conversation had with Herr Krupp von Bohlen, the statement of the German Government that Austria-Hungary had acted alone, without Germany's previous knowledge, was the subject of discussion, and such conduct on the part of Germany appeared to them inexplicable, as it has to many others, inasmuch as by so doing Germany apparently gave Austria a free hand, without informing itself as to what that hand would do. Herr von Bohlen, therefore, asked his friend, von Jagow, then Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with whom he was very intimate, who informed him that "he had nothing to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that Germany had never made any such demands." Herr von Bohlen remarked that such action was inconceivable, and Herr von Jagow is stated to have replied that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally thought of inquiring as to the extent to which Austria

had intended to go, but when called in "the Kaiser had," to quote Dr. Muehlon's memorandum, "so committed himself that it was too late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done."

It was not to be expected that Lichnowsky's Memorandum would be allowed to pass without notice on the part of the Imperial officials whom the Prince had implicated in the misconduct of German affairs. On March 20, 1918, Herr von Jagow made some observations on the Memorandum in the *North German Gazette*. Certain minor matters are questioned, and some errors of detail corrected, but the former Imperial Secretary of State proceeds with the care and caution becoming one who was apparently writing from memory. Certain statements which von Jagow advances on his own account are of more than ordinary interest, and seem to be admissions of the general correctness of Lichnowsky's Memorandum, and in any event are to be considered as evidence coming from German sources that Great Britain had by negotiation removed great and outstanding differences which, but for other reasons, would and should have prevented the two nations from falling out. Thus Herr von Jagow says:

When, in January, 1913, I was appointed Secretary of State I regarded an Anglo-German *rapprochement* as desirable, and an agreement about the points at which our interests touched or crossed as obtainable. In any case, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A main point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—because it had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to push us out there, a conflict seemed, indeed, to me to be hardly avoidable. As soon as possible I took up in Berlin the settlement about the Bagdad Railway. We found the English Government ready to

meet us, and the result was the agreement which had almost been completed when the world-war broke out.

At the same time the negotiations about the Portuguese colonies, which had been begun by Count Metternich and continued by Baron Marschall, were resumed by Prince Lichnowsky. I intended to begin later on—when the Bagdad Railway question, in my opinion the most important question, had been settled—further agreements about other questions, in the Far East, for example.³

This would seem to be an admission that agreement was reached with Great Britain concerning the Bagdad policy and the Portuguese colonies, and of the correctness of Lichnowsky's account of these transactions. The reason for the refusal to complete and to publish these treaties at that time is thus stated by the former Imperial Secretary:

With well-justified prudence we intended to postpone publication until an appropriate moment, when the danger of adverse criticism was no longer so acute—if possible simultaneously with the publication of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the eve of conclusion. The fact that *two* great agreements had been concluded between England and us would have made the reception considerably more favorable, and would have helped us over the defects of the Portuguese agreement. Our hesitation was due to respect for the effect of the agreement, with which we desired to achieve an improvement of our relations to England and not a fresh disturbance of them. It is true—although this was a secondary consideration—that we were also influenced by the aims which we were then making to secure economic interests in the Portuguese colonies; these interests would, of course, have been more difficult to secure if the agreement had been published.

Herr von Jagow, like Prince Lichnowsky, pays his tribute to Sir Edward Grey, but reproaches him with not preventing the war. This would indeed be a serious charge, if Sir Edward could have prevented it,

³ Reproduced in part, in English translation, in the *London Times*, April 1, 1918.

but it is at any rate less serious than that he had begun it. On this point and the apparent disinclination of the English people to go to war, Herr von Jagow remarks:

I am by no means willing to adopt the opinion, which is at present widely held in Germany, that England laid all the mines which caused the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his serious wish to reach an agreement with us. But he had involved himself too deeply in the net of Franco-Russian policy. He could no longer find the way out, and he did not prevent the world-war—as he could have done. Among the English people also the war was not popular, and Belgium had to serve as a battlefield.

It is with difficulty that the undersigned has resisted the temptation of an observation here and there of his own, but as a citizen of a belligerent country, he has endeavored to refrain from comment, and to allow the views of the various personages quoted or summarized to speak for themselves. But what would seem prejudice on the part of a citizen of a country at war with the Imperial German Government may not seem to be so on the part of a German subject. Therefore, a portion of a letter is quoted in conclusion, written from Bern, to the then Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, under date of May 7, 1917, by Dr. Wilhelm Muehlton, who, after the outbreak of the war, had, in 1916, negotiated treaties on behalf of Germany with Rumania before its entry into the war. This letter is printed in the London *Times* of April 4, 1918, and is said to have been given to the correspondent of the Parisian Socialist journal *L'Humanité* and published by him with the writer's consent:

However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumulated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I never-

theless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our directors. . . .

But since the first days of 1917 I have abandoned all hope as regards the present directors of Germany. Our offer of peace without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the submarine war, the deportation of Belgians, the systematic destruction in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have so degraded the governors of the German Empire that I am profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever from the elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The personalities may change, but they cannot remain the representatives of the German cause.

The German people will not be able to repair the grievous crimes committed against its own present and future, and against that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods—the methods by which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and politically—would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent to a peace with a government which has conducted such a war, in order to understand how the general level and the changes of life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive.

As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away definitely from the present representatives of the German *régime*. And I have only one wish—that all independent men may do the same, and that many Germans may understand and act.

That the soul of Germany, as its friends in other days have seen it or felt it to be, may regain the ascendancy, and that the ideals of Kant may prevail over the practices of Clausewitz and his successors, is the hope and prayer of the undersigned.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation.
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Post office, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

THE "LUSITANIA"

Opinion of Court, United States District Court, Southern
District of New York—In the matter of the petition of
the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, as owners of
the Steamship "Lusitania", for limitation of its liability.



NOVEMBER, 1918

No. 132

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

STATEMENT AS TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS GROWING OUT OF DESTRUCTION OF THE "LUSITANIA"

After the destruction of the "Lusitania" a series of actions were begun against the Cunard Company. Some of these were brought in England and have not yet been tried. Sixty-seven actions at law and suits in Admiralty were instituted in the United States. Most of these were brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, but some were brought in the United States Courts, in Illinois and Massachusetts, and some in the New York State Supreme Court in New York and Kings Counties.

All of the actions were brought either by passengers who claimed to have been injured or by the representatives of passengers who had lost their lives. The total damages demanded in the sixty-seven actions amounted to \$5,883,479. Most of this was claimed for loss of life. The total claims for personal injuries amounted to \$444,700 and there were some relatively small claims for loss of baggage.

Many of the claimants contended that the Cunard Company was responsible because the speed of the ship had been reduced without notice, because ports were left open, because collapsible boats were not loose, because the crew did not distribute life belts, because the German Embassy in the United States had given public warning; because the Company did not direct the master of the ship to depart from the

usual course, and failed to instruct him to make land-falls after dark, to cross the danger zone in the dark, to pass through the danger zone at the highest speed and to zigzag. They further claimed that the navigation of the ship was negligent; that the master disobeyed Admiralty instructions; that the Company had failed to provide a competent master and crew, and that after the torpedoing ports were left open and boats negligently handled.

Some of the claimants, while admitting that the "Lusitania" was sunk by a public enemy, denied that the sinking was unlawful, and some claimed that the German Government had given due notice that vessels would be torpedoed without warning. One of the claimants contended that the "Lusitania" was loaded with highly explosive materials; that these exploded when the steamship was torpedoed by a German submarine; that the speed had been reduced to about eight nautical miles; that she carried the component parts of war vessels, to wit, of submarines; that she carried troops; that she was painted a grey color; that she carried gun cotton, nitroglycerine, dynamite and other munitions of war and highly dangerous explosives, and that she had the appearance and character of a war vessel.

Under the statutes of the United States it was permissible to consolidate and try together all these actions by means of a proceeding to limit liability of the owners of the "Lusitania." Such a proceeding was accordingly brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the initial steps in that proceeding, as well as the trial itself, were had before Judge Julius M. Mayer, of that court. In that proceeding, the first issue was

whether there was negligence on the part of either the Cunard Company or of the officers of the vessel. If it had been determined that there was negligence, the court would then have had to consider whether the negligent acts were the acts of the Company itself or of the officers of the vessel, for in the latter case the Company would be entitled to have its liability limited to the value of its interest in the S.S. "Lusitania" and her pending freight.

From Judge Mayer's opinion it will appear that the court held that there was no negligence and it was therefore not necessary for the court to consider the second question.

In June, 1915, almost immediately following the destruction of the "Lusitania," a proceeding was had in the Wreck Commissioners' Court in Great Britain to inquire as to the circumstances of the destruction of the vessel. Lord Mersey, Wreck Commissioner of the United Kingdom, presided at those proceedings which continued from June 15 to July 1, 1915, thirty-six witnesses being examined. All of the testimony taken before Lord Mersey which was deemed material by either side was offered at the trial before Judge Mayer.

By reason of war conditions, it was necessary to take considerable additional testimony by commission before trial. The District Court accordingly issued two commissions to take testimony in the United States and one to take testimony in England. The latter commission was issued to Mr. R. V. Wynne, of London, and thirty-three witnesses were examined before him, the proceedings extending from June 12 to June 22, 1917.

The trial itself was opened before Judge Mayer and continued from April 17 to May 6, 1918, forty witnesses being examined. After the conclusion of the testimony the case was orally argued and subsequently, on July 10, 1918, briefs were filed. Decision was rendered August 23, 1918.

THE LUSITANIA

Opinion of Court, United States District Court, Southern District of New York—In the matter of the petition of the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, as owners of the Steamship "Lusitania," for limitation of its liability.

Before Hon. JULIUS M. MAYER, *District Judge*:

On May 1, 1915, the British passenger-carrying merchantman "Lusitania" sailed from New York bound for Liverpool, with 1,257 passengers and a crew of 702, making a total of 1,959 souls on board, men, women and children. At approximately 2:10 on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, weather clear and sea smooth, without warning, the vessel was torpedoed and went down by the head in about 18 minutes, with an ultimate tragic loss of life of 1,195.

Numerous suits having been begun against the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, the owner of the vessel, this proceeding was brought in familiar form, by the steamship company, as petitioner, to obtain an adjudication as to liability and to limit petitioner's liability to its interest in the vessel and her pending freight, should the court find any liability.

The sinking of the "Lusitania" was inquired into before the Wreck Commissioner's Court in London, June 15, 1915, to July 1, 1915, and the testimony then adduced, together with certain depositions taken pursuant to commissions issued out of this court and the testimony of a considerable number of passengers,

crew and experts heard before this court, constitute the record of the cause. It is fortunate for many reasons, that such a comprehensive judicial investigation has been had; for in addition to a mass of facts which give opportunity for a clear understanding of the case in its various aspects, the evidence presented has disposed, without question and for all time, of any false claims brought forward to justify this inexpressibly cowardly attack upon an unarmed passenger liner.

So far as equipment went, the vessel was seaworthy in the highest sense. Her carrying capacity was 2,198 passengers and a crew of about 850 or about 3,000 persons in all. She had 22 open life boats capable of accommodating 1,322 persons, 26 collapsible boats with a capacity of 1,283, making a total of 48 boats with a capacity for 2,605, in all, or substantially in excess of the requirements of her last voyage. Her total of life belts was 3,187 or 1,959 more than the total number of passengers, and, in addition, she carried 20 life buoys. She was classed 100 A1 at Lloyd's, being 787 feet long over all, with a tonnage of 30,395 gross and 12,611 net. She had four turbine engines, 25 boilers, 4 boiler rooms, 12 transverse bulkheads dividing her into 13 compartments, with a longitudinal bulkhead on either side of the ship for 425 feet, covering all vital parts.

The proof is absolute that she was not and never had been armed nor did she carry any explosives. She did carry some 18 fuse cases and 125 shrapnel cases consisting merely of empty shells without any powder charge, 4,200 cases of safety cartridges and 189 cases of infantry equipment, such as leather fittings, pouches, and the like. All these were for deliv-

ery abroad but none of these munitions could be exploded by setting them on fire in mass or in bulk nor by subjecting them to impact. She had been duly inspected on March 17, April 15, 16 and 17, all in 1915, and before she left New York, the boat gear and boats were examined, overhauled, checked up and defective articles properly replaced.

There is no reason to doubt that this part of her equipment was in excellent order when she left New York. The vessel was under the command of a long service and experienced captain and officered by competent and experienced men. The difficulties of the war prevented the company from gathering together a crew fully reaching a standard as high as in normal times (many of the younger British sailors having been called to the colors), but, all told, the crew was good and, in many instances, highly intelligent and capable. Due precaution was taken in respect of boat drills while in port, and the testimony shows that those drills were both sufficient and efficient. Some passengers did not see any boat drills on the voyage, while others characterized the drills, in effect, as formally superficial. Anyone familiar with ocean traveling knows that it is not strange that boat drills may take place unobserved by some of the passengers who, though on deck, may be otherwise occupied or who may be in another part of the ship and such negative testimony must give way to the positive testimony that there were daily boat drills, the object of which mainly was to enable the men competently and quickly to lower the boats.

Each man had a badge showing the number of the boat to which he was assigned and a boat list was posted in three different places in the ship.

Each day of the voyage a drill was held with the emergency boat which was a fixed boat, either No. 13 on the starboard side or No. 14 on the port side, according to the weather, the idea, doubtless, being to accustom the men quickly to reach the station on either side of the ship. The siren was blown and a picked crew from the watch assembled at the boat, put on the life belts, jumped into the boat, took their places and jumped out again.

Throughout this case it must always be remembered that the disaster occurred in May, 1915, and the whole subject must be approached with the knowledge and mental attitude of that time. It may be that more elaborate and effective methods and precautions have been adopted since then, but there is no testimony which shows that these boat drills, as practised on the voyage, were not fully up to the then existing standards and practices. There can be no criticism of the bulkhead door drills, for there was one each day.

In November, 1914, the directors of the Cunard Company, in view of the falling off of the passenger traffic, decided to withdraw the "Lusitania's" sister ship, "Mauretania", and to run the "Lusitania" at three-fourth's boiler power, which involved a reduction of speed from an average of about 24 knots to an average of about 21 knots. The ship was operated under this reduced boiler power and reduced rate of speed for six round trips until and including the fatal voyage, although at the reduced rate she was considerably faster than any passenger ship crossing the Atlantic at that time. This reduction was in part for financial reasons and in part "a question of economy of coal and labor in time of war." No profit was expected

and none was made, but the Company continued to operate the ship as a public service. The reduction from 24 to 21 knots is, however, quite immaterial to the controversy, as will later appear.

Having thus outlined the personnel, equipment and cargo of the vessel, reference will now be made to a series of events preceding her sailing on May 1, 1915.

On February 4, 1915, the Imperial German Government issued a proclamation as follows:

PROCLAMATION

1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the 18th of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account.

2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone as, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships.

3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea and in a strip of not less than 30 miles width along the Netherlands coast is in no danger.

VON POHL

Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy

Berlin, February 4, 1915

This was accompanied by a so-called memorial, setting forth the reasons advanced by the German Government in support of the issuance of this proclamation, an extract from which is as follows:

Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent by all the military means

at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers or merchandise to such vessels.

To this proclamation and memorial the Government of the United States made due protest under date of February 10, 1915. On the same day protest was made to England by this Government regarding the use of the American flag by the "Lusitania" on its voyage through the war zone on its trip from New York to Liverpool of January 30, 1915, in response to which, on February 19, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, handed a memorandum to Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to England, containing the following statement:

It was understood that the German Government had announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes without giving any opportunity of making any provisions for saving the lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the "Lusitania" raised the United States flag on her inward voyage and on her subsequent outward voyage. A request was made by the United States passengers who were embarking on board her that the United States flag should be hoisted, presumably to insure their safety.

The British Ambassador, Hon. Cecil Spring-Rice, on March 1, 1915, in a communication to the American Secretary of State, regarding an economic blockade of Germany, stated in reference to the German proclamation of February 4th:

Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles are a war area and has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. This is in effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, this attack can only be delivered by submarine agency.

Beginning with the 30th of January, 1915, and prior to the sinking of the "Lusitania" on May 7, 1915, German submarines attacked and seemed to have sunk 20 merchant and passenger ships within about 100 miles of the usual course of the "Lusitania", chased two other vessels which escaped, and damaged still another.

It will be noted that nothing is stated in the German memorandum, *supra*, as to sinking enemy merchant vessels without warning but, on the contrary, the implication is that settled international law as to visit and search and an opportunity for the lives of passengers to be safeguarded, will be obeyed "although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise."

As a result of this submarine activity, the "Lusitania", on its voyages from New York to Liverpool beginning with that of January 30, 1915, steered a course further off from the South Coast of Ireland than formerly.

In addition, after the German Proclamation of February 4, 1915, the "Lusitania" had its boats swung out and provisioned while passing through the danger zone, did not use its wireless for sending

messages, and did not stop at the Mersey Bar for a pilot, but came directly up to its berth.

The petitioner and the master of the "Lusitania" received certain advices from the British Admiralty on February 10, 1915, as follows:

INSTRUCTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO SUBMARINES

10th February, 1915

Vessels navigating in submarine areas should have their boats turned out and fully provisioned. The danger is greatest in the vicinity of ports and off prominent headlands on the coast. Important landfalls in this area should be made after dark whenever possible. So far as is consistent with particular trades and state of tides, vessels should make their ports at dawn.

On April 15, and 16, 1915, and after the last voyage from New York, preceding the one on which the "Lusitania" was torpedoed, the Cunard Company and the master of the "Lusitania" received at Liverpool the following advices from the British Admiralty:

Confidential Daily Voyage Notice 15th April, 1915, issued under Government War Risk Scheme.

German submarines appear to be operating chiefly off prominent headlands and landfalls. Ships should give prominent headlands a wide berth.

Confidential memo. issued 16th April, 1915:

War experience has shown that fast steamers can considerably reduce the chance of successful surprise submarine attack by zig-zagging—that is to say, altering the course at short and irregular intervals, say in 10 minutes to half an hour. This course is almost invariably adopted by war ships when cruising in an area known to be infested by submarines. The underwater speed of a submarine is very low and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get into position to deliver an attack unless she can observe and predict the course of the ship attacked.

Sir Alfred Booth, Chairman of the Cunard Line, was a member of the War Risks Committee at Liver-

pool, consisting of shipowners, representatives of the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, which received these instructions, and passed them on to the owners of vessels, including the Cunard Company, who distributed them to the individual masters.

On Saturday, May 1, 1915, the advertised sailing date of the "Lusitania" from New York to Liverpool on the voyage on which she was subsequently sunk, there appeared the following advertisement in the *New York Times*, *New York Tribune*, *New York Sun*, *New York Herald* and the *New York World*, this advertisement being in all instances, except one, placed directly over, under or adjacent to the advertisement of the Cunard Line regarding the sailing of the "Lusitania":

Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies. That the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles. That in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or of any of her allies are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

April 22, 1915

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

This was the first insertion of this advertisement, although it was dated more than a week prior to its publication. Captain Turner, the master of the vessel, saw the advertisement or "something of the kind" before sailing and realized that the "Lusitania" was included in the warning. The Liverpool office of the Cunard Company was advised of the sailing and the number of passengers by cable from the New York office, but no mention was made of the above quoted

advertisement. Sir Alfred Booth was informed through the press of this advertisement on either Saturday evening, May 1, or Sunday morning, May 2.

The significance and construction to be given to this advertisement will be discussed *infra*, but it is perfectly plain that the master was fully justified in sailing on the appointed day from a neutral port with many neutral and non-combatant passengers, unless he and his company were willing to yield to the attempt of the German Government to terrify British shipping. No one familiar with the British character would expect that such a threat would accomplish more than to emphasize the necessity of taking every precaution to protect life and property, which the exercise of judgment would invite.

And, so, as scheduled, the "Lusitania" sailed, undisguised, with her four funnels and a figure so familiar as to be readily discernible not only by naval officers and mariners, but by the ocean-going public generally.

The voyage was uneventful until May 6. On approaching the Irish coast, on May 6, the Captain ordered all the boats hanging on the davits to be swung out and lowered to the promenade deck rail and this order was carried out under the supervision of Staff Captain Anderson who later went down with the ship. All bulkhead doors which were not necessary for the working of the ship were closed and it was reported to Captain Turner that this had been done. Lookouts were doubled, and two extra were put forward and one on either side of the bridge; that is, there were two lookouts in the crow's-nest, two in the eyes of the ship, two officers on the bridge, and a quartermaster on either side of the bridge.

Directions were given to the engine room to keep the highest steam they could possibly get on the boilers and in case the bridge rang for full speed to give as much as they possibly could. Orders were also given that ports should be kept closed.

At 7:50 p. m. on May 6, the "Lusitania" received the following wireless message from the Admiral at Queenstown:

Submarines active off south coast of Ireland

and at 7:56 the vessel asked for and received a repetition of this message. The ship was then going at a rate of 21 knots per hour.

At 8:30 p. m. of the same day the following message was received from the British Admiralty:

To all British ships 0005.

Take Liverpool Pilot at bar and avoid headlands. Pass harbors at full speed; steer mid-channel course. Submarines off Fastnet.

At 8:32 the Admiralty received a communication to show that this message had been received by the "Lusitania" and the same message was offered to the vessel seven times between midnight of May 6 and 10 a. m. of May 7.

At about 8 a. m. on the morning of May 7, on approaching the Irish coast, the vessel encountered an intermittent fog or Scotch mist, called "banks" in sea-faring language and the speed was reduced to 15 knots. Previously, the speed, according to Captain Turner's recollection, had been reduced to 18 knots. This adjustment of speed was due to the fact that Captain Turner wished to run the last 150 miles of the voyage in the dark so as to make Liverpool early on the morning of May 8, at the

earliest time when he could cross the bar without a pilot.

Judging from the location of previous submarine attacks, the most dangerous waters in the "Lusitania's" course were from the entrance to St. George's Channel to Liverpool Bar. There is no dispute as to the proposition that a vessel darkened is much safer from submarine attack at night than in the daytime and Captain Turner exercised proper and good judgment in planning accordingly as he approached dangerous waters. It is futile to conjecture as to what would or would not have happened had the speed been higher prior to the approach to the Irish coast, because, obviously, until then, the Captain could not figure out his situation, not knowing how he might be impeded by fog or other unfavorable weather conditions.

On the morning of May 7, 1915, the ship passed about 25 or 26 and, in any event, at least $18\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Fastnet, which was not in sight. The course was then held up slightly to bring the ship closer to land and a little before noon land was sighted and what was thought to be Brow Head was made out.

Meanwhile, between 11 a. m. and noon, the fog disappeared, the weather became clear and the speed was increased to 18 knots. The course of the vessel was S. 87 E. Mag. At 11:25 a. m. Captain Turner received the following message:

Submarines active in southern part of Irish Channel last heard of 20 miles south of Coningbeg Light vessel make certain "Lusitania" gets this.

At 12:40 p. m. the following additional wireless message from the Admiralty was received:

Submarines 5 miles south of Cape Clear proceeding west when sighted at 10 a. m.

After picking up Brow Head and at about 12:40 p. m., the course was altered in shore by about 30 degrees to about N. 63 or 67 E. Mag., Captain Turner did not recall which. Land was sighted which the Captain thought was Galley Head, but he was not sure and, therefore, held in shore. This last course was continued for an hour at a speed of 18 knots until 1:40 p. m. when the Old Head of Kinsale was sighted and the course was then changed back to the original course of S. 87 E. Mag.

At 1:50 p. m. the Captain started to take a four-point bearing on the Old Head of Kinsale and while thus engaged and at about 2:10 p. m., as heretofore stated, the ship was torpedoed on the starboard side. Whether one, two or three torpedoes were fired at the vessel cannot be determined with certainty. Two of the ship's crew were confident that a third torpedo was fired and missed the ship. While not doubting the good faith of these witnesses, the evidence is not sufficiently satisfactory to be convincing.

There was, however, an interesting and remarkable conflict of testimony as to whether the ship was struck by one or two torpedoes and witnesses, both passengers and crew, differed on this point, conscientiously and emphatically, some witnesses for claimants and some for petitioner holding one view and others called by each side holding the opposite view. The witnesses were all highly intelligent and there is no doubt that all testified to the best of their recollection, knowledge or impression, and in accordance with their honest conviction. The weight of the testimony (too voluminous to analyze) is in favor of the "two torpedo" contention, not only because of some convincing direct testimony (as, for instance, Adams, Lehman,

Morton), but also because of the unquestioned surrounding circumstances. The deliberate character of the attack upon a vessel whose identity could not be mistaken, made easy on a bright day, and the fact that the vessel had no means of defending herself, would lead to the inference that the submarine commander would make sure of her destruction. Further, the evidence is overwhelming that there was a second explosion. The witnesses differ as to the impression which the sound of this explosion made upon them—a natural difference due to the fact, known by common experience, that persons who hear the same explosion even at the same time will not only describe the sound differently but will not agree as to the number of detonations. As there were no explosives on board, it is difficult to account for the second explosion except on the theory that it was caused by a second torpedo. Whether the number of torpedoes was one or two is relevant, in this case, only upon the question of what effect, if any, open ports had in accelerating the sinking of the ship.

While there was much testimony and some variance as to the places where the torpedoes struck, judged by the sound or shock of the explosions, certain physical effects, especially as to smoke and blown-up débris, tend to locate the areas of impact with some approach to accuracy.

From all the testimony it may be reasonably concluded that one torpedo struck on the starboard side somewhere abreast of No. 2 boiler room and the other, on the same side, either abreast of No. 3 boiler room or between No. 3 and No. 4. From knowledge of the torpedoes then used by the German submarines, it is thought that they would effect a rupture of the

outer hull 30 to 40 feet long and 10 to 15 feet vertically.

Cockburn, Senior Second Engineer, was of the opinion that the explosion had done a great deal of internal damage. Although the lights were out, Cockburn could hear the water coming into the engine room. Water at once entered No. 1 and No. 2 boiler rooms, as a result necessarily attributable to the fact that one or both of the coal bunkers were also blown open. Thus, one torpedo flooded some or all of the coal bunkers on the starboard side of Nos. 1 and 2 boiler rooms and apparently flooded both boiler rooms.

The effect of the other torpedo is not entirely clear. If it struck midway between two bulkheads, it is quite likely to have done serious bulkhead injury. The "Lusitania" was built so as to float with two compartments open to the sea and with more compartments open she could not stay afloat. As the side coal bunkers are regarded as compartments, the ship could not float with two boiler rooms flooded and also any adjacent bunker and, therefore, the damage done by one torpedo was enough to sink the ship.

To add to the difficulties, all the steam had gone as a result of the explosions and the ship could not be controlled by her engines.

Little, Senior Third Engineer, testified that in a few seconds after the explosion, the steam pressure fell from 190 to 50 pounds, his explanation being that the main steam pipes or boilers had been carried away.

The loss of control of and by the engines resulted in disability to stop the engines, with the result that the ship kept her headway until she sank. That the ship commenced to list to starboard immediately is abundantly established by many witnesses.

Some of the witnesses (Lauriat and Adams, passengers, Duncan, Bestic and Johnson, officers) testified that the ship stopped listing to starboard and started to recover and then listed to starboard until she went over.

This action, which is quite likely, must have resulted from the inrush of water on the port side. There can be no other adequate explanation consistent with elementary scientific knowledge; for, if the ship temporarily righted herself, it must have been because the weight of water on the two sides was equal or nearly so. The entry of water into the port side must, of course, have been due to some rupture on that side. Such a result was entirely possible and, indeed, probable.

The explosive force was sufficiently powerful to blow débris far above the radio wires—*i.e.*, more than 160 feet above the water. The boiler rooms were not over 60 feet wide and so strong a force could readily have weakened the longitudinal bulkheads on the port side in addition to such injury as flying metal may have done. It is easy to understand, therefore, how the whole pressure of the water rushing in from the starboard side against the weakened longitudinal bulkheads on the port side would cause them to give way and thus open up some apertures on the port side for the entry of water. Later, when the water continued to rush in on the starboard side, the list to starboard naturally again occurred, increased and continued to the end. As might be expected, the degree of list to starboard is variously described but there is no doubt that it was steep and substantial.

A considerable amount of testimony was taken upon the contention of claimants that many of the

ship's ports were open, thus reducing her buoyancy and substantially hastening her sinking. There is no doubt that on May 6, adequate orders were given to close all ports. The testimony is conclusive that the ports on Deck F (the majority of which were dummy ports) were closed. Very few, if any, ports on E deck were open and, if so, they were starboard ports in a small section of the first class in the vicinity where one of the torpedoes did its damage. A very limited number of passengers testified that the port holes in their staterooms were open and, if their impressions are correct, these port holes, concerning which they testified, were all, or nearly all, so far above the water that they could not have influenced the situation.

There was conflicting testimony as to the ports in the dining room on D deck. The weight of the testimony justifies the conclusion that some of these ports were open—how many, it is impossible to determine. These ports, however, were from 23 to 30 feet above the water, and when the gap made by the explosion and the consequent severe and sudden list are considered, it is plain that these open ports were not a contributing cause of the sinking and had a very trifling influence, if any, in accelerating the time within which the ship sank.

From the foregoing, the situation can be visualized. Two sudden and extraordinary explosions, the ship badly listed so that the port side was well up in the air, the passengers scattered about on the decks and in the staterooms, saloons and companionways, the ship under headway and, as it turned out, only 18 minutes afloat—such was the situation which confronted the officers, crew and passengers in the endeavor to save the lives of those on board.

The conduct of the passengers constitutes an enduring record of calm heroism with many individual instances of sacrifice and, in general, a marked consideration for women and children. There was no panic but, naturally, there was a considerable amount of excitement and rush and much confusion and, as the increasing list rendered ineffective the lowering of the boats on the port side, the passengers, as is readily understandable, crowded over on the starboard side.

The problem presented to the officers of the ship was one of exceeding difficulty, occasioned largely because of the serious list and the impossibility of stopping the ship or reducing her headway.

The precaution of extra lookouts resulted in a prompt report to the Captain, via the bridge, of the sighting of the torpedo. Second Officer Heppert, who was on the bridge, immediately closed all watertight doors worked from the bridge and the testimony satisfactorily shows that all watertight doors worked by hand were promptly closed. Immediately after Captain Turner saw the wake of the torpedo, there was an explosion and then Turner went to the navigation bridge and took the obvious course, *i. e.*, had the ship's head turned to the land. He signalled the engine room for full speed astern, hoping, thereby, to take the way off the ship and then ordered the boats lowered down to the rail and directed that women and children should be first provided for in the boats. As the engine room failed to respond to the order to go full speed astern and, as the ship was continuing under way, Turner ordered that the boats should not be lowered until the vessel should lose her headway and he told Anderson, the Staff Captain, who was in charge of the port boats, to lower the boats when he

thought the way was sufficiently off to allow that operation. Anderson's fidelity to duty is sufficiently exemplified by the fact that he went down with the ship.

Jones, First Officer, and Lewis, Acting Third Officer, were in charge of the boats on the starboard side and personally superintended their handling and launching. Too much cannot be said both for their courage and skill but, difficult as was their task, they were not confronted with some of the problems which the port side presented. There, in addition to Anderson, were Bestic, Junior Third Officer, and another officer, presumably the second officer. These men were apparently doing the best they could and standing valiantly to their duty. Anderson's fate has already been mentioned and Bestic, although surviving, stuck to his post until the ship went down under him. The situation can readily be pictured even by a novice.

With the ship listed to starboard, the port boats, of course, swung inboard. If enough man power were applied, the boats could be put over the rail but then a real danger would follow. Robertson, the ship's carpenter, aptly described that danger in answer to a question as to whether it was possible to lower the open boats on the port side. He said:

No. To lower the port boats would just be like drawing a crate of unpacked china along a dock road. What I mean is that if you started to lower the boats you would be dragging them down the rough side of the ship on rivets which are what we call "snap headed rivets," they stand up about an inch from the shell of the ship, so you would be dragging the whole side of the boat away if you tried to lower the boats with a 15 degree list.

That some boats were and others would have been seriously damaged is evidenced by the fact that two

port boats were lowered to the water and got away (though one afterward filled) and not one boat reached Queenstown.

Each boat has its own history (except possibly boats 2 and 4), although it is naturally difficult, in each case, to allocate all the testimony to a particular boat.

There is some testimony given in undoubted good faith, that painted or rusted davits stuck out but the weight of the testimony is to the contrary. There were some lamentable occurrences on the port side, which resulted in spilling passengers, some of whom thus thrown out or injured went to their death. These unfortunate accidents, however, were due either to lack of strength of the seaman who was lowering or possibly, at worst, to an occasional instance of incompetency—due to the personal equation so often illustrated where one man of many may not be equal to the emergency. But the problem was of the most vexatious character. In addition to the crowding of passengers in some instances, was this extremely hazardous feat of lowering boats swung inboard from a tilted height, heavily weighted by human beings, with the ship still under way. It cannot be said that it was negligent to attempt this because, obviously, all the passengers could not be accommodated in the starboard boats.

On the starboard side, the problem, in some respects, was not so difficult while, in others, troublesome conditions existed quite different from those occurring on the port side. Here the boats swung so far out as to add to the difficulty of passengers getting in them, a difficulty intensified by the fact that many more passengers went to the starboard

side than to the port side and also, that the ship maintained her way. Six boats successfully got away. In the case of the remaining boats, some were successfully lowered but later met with some unavoidable accident and some were not successfully launched (such as Nos. 1, 5 and 17) for entirely explainable reasons which should not be charged to inefficiency on the part of the officers or crew.

The collapsible boats were on the deck under the open life-boats and were intended to be lifted and lowered by the same davits which lowered the open boats after the open boats had gotten clear of the ship. It was the duty of the officers to get the open boats away before giving attention to the collapsible boats and that was a question of time. These boats are designed and arranged to float free if the ship should sink before they can be hoisted over. They were cut loose and some people were saved on these boats.

It is to be expected that those passengers who lost members of their family or friends and who saw some of the unfortunate accidents, should feel strongly and entertain the impression that inefficiency or individual negligence was widespread among the crew. Such an impression, however, does an inadvertent injustice to the great majority of the crew, who acted with that matter-of-fact courage and fidelity to duty which are traditional with men of the sea. Such of these men, presumably fairly typical of all, as testified in this court, were impressive not only because of inherent bravery but because of intelligence and clear-headedness and they possessed that remarkable gift of simplicity so characteristic of truly fearless men who cannot quite understand why an ado is made of

acts which seem to them merely as, of course, in the day's work.

Mr. Grab, one of the claimants, and an experienced transatlantic traveler, concisely summed up the situation when he said:

They were doing the best they could—they were very brave and working as hard as they could without any fear; they didn't care about themselves. It was very admirably done. While there was great confusion, they did the best they could.

It will unduly prolong a necessarily extended opinion to sift the voluminous testimony relating to this subject of the boats and the conduct of the crew, and something is sought to be made of comments of Captain Turner, construed by some to be unfavorable but afterwards satisfactorily supplemented and explained, but if there were some instances of incompetency they were very few and the charge of negligence in this regard cannot be successfully maintained.

In arriving at this conclusion, I have not overlooked the argument earnestly pressed that the men were not sufficiently instructed and drilled; for I think the testimony establishes the contrary in the light of conditions in May, 1915.

I now come to what seems to me the only debatable question of fact in the case, *i. e.*, whether Captain Turner was negligent in not literally following the Admiralty advices and, also, in not taking a course different from that which he adopted.

The fundamental principle in navigating a merchantman, whether in times of peace or of war, is that the commanding officer must be left free to exercise his own judgment. Safe navigation denies the proposition that the judgment and sound discretion of the captain of a vessel must be confined in a mental

strait-jacket. Of course, when movements are under military control, orders must be strictly obeyed, come what may. No such situation, however, was presented either to petitioner or Captain Turner. The vessel was not engaged in military service nor under naval convoy. True, she was, as between the German and British governments, an enemy ship as to Germany, but she was unarmed and a carrier of not merely non-combatants but, among others, of many citizens of the United States, then a neutral country, at peace with all the world.

In such circumstances, the captain could not shield himself automatically against error behind a literal compliance with the general advices or instructions of the Admiralty nor can it be supposed that the Admiralty, any more than the petitioner, expected him so to do. What was required of him was that he should seriously consider and, as far as practicable, follow the Admiralty advices and use his best judgment as events and exigencies occurred; and if a situation arose where he believed that a course should be pursued to meet emergencies which required departure from some of the Admiralty advices as to general rules of action, then it was his duty to take such course, if in accordance with his carefully formed deliberate judgment. After a disaster has occurred, it is not difficult for the expert to show how it might have been avoided and, there is always opportunity for academic discussion as to what ought or ought not to have been done; but the true approach is to endeavor, for the moment, to possess the mind of him upon whom rested the responsibility.

Let us now see what that responsibility was and how it was dealt with. The rules of naval warfare

allowed the capture and, in some circumstances, the destruction of an enemy merchant ship but, at the same time, it was the accepted doctrine of all civilized nations (as will be more fully considered *infra*), that, as Lord Mersey put it, "there is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those on board."

The responsibility, therefore, of Captain Turner, in his task of bringing the ship safely to port was to give heed not only to general advices advanced as the outcome of experience in the then developing knowledge as to submarine warfare, but particularly to any special information which might come to him in the course of the voyage.

Realizing that if there was a due warning in accordance with international law and an opportunity, within a limited time, for the passengers to leave the ship, nevertheless that the operation must be quickly done, Captain Turner, on May 6, had taken the full precautions such as swinging out the boats, properly provisioned, which have been heretofore described. The principal features of the Admiralty advices were (1) to give the headlands a wide berth; (2) to steer a mid-channel course; (3) to maintain as high a speed as practicable; (4) to zig-zag and (5) to make ports, if possible, at dawn, thus running the last part of the voyage at night.

The reason for the advice as to keeping off headlands was that the submarines lurked near those prominent headlands and landfalls to and from which ships were likely to go. This instruction Captain Turner entirely followed in respect of Fastnet which was the first point on the Irish coast which a vessel bound from New York to Liverpool would ordinarily approach closely and, in normal times, the passing

would be very near or even inside of Fastnet. The "Lusitania" passed Fastnet so far out that Captain Turner could not see it. Whether the distance was about 25 miles, as petitioner contends, or about $18\frac{1}{2}$ miles, as claimant calculates, the result is that either distance must be regarded as a wide berth in comparison with the customary navigation at that point and, besides, nothing happened there. At 8:30 p. m. on May 6, the message had been received from the British Admiralty that submarines were off Fastnet so that Captain Turner, in this regard, not only followed the general advices but the specific information from the Admiralty.

At 11:25 a. m. on May 7, Captain Turner received the wireless from the Admiralty plainly intended for the "Lusitania", informing him that submarines (plural) were active in the southern part of the Irish Channel and when last heard of were 20 miles south of Coningbeg Light Vessel. This wireless message presented acutely to the Captain the problem as to the best course to pursue, always bearing in mind his determination and the desirability of getting to the Liverpool Bar when it could be crossed while the tide served and without a pilot. Further, as was stated by Sir Alfred Booth, "The one definite instruction we did give him with regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a pilot." The reasons for this instruction were cogent and were concisely summed up by Sir Alfred Booth during his examination as a witness as follows:

It was one of the points that we felt it was necessary to make the Captain of the "Lusitania" understand the importance of. The "Lusitania" can only cross the Liverpool Bar at certain states of the tide, and we therefore warned the Captain, or

whoever might be captain, that we did not think it would be safe for him to arrive off the bar at such a time that he would have to wait there, because that area had been infested with submarines, and we thought therefore it would be wiser for him to arrange his arrival in such a way, leaving him an absolutely free hand as to how he would do it, that he could come straight up without stopping at all. The one definite instruction we did give him with regard to that was to authorize him to come up without a pilot.

The tide would be high at Liverpool Bar at 6:53 on Saturday morning, May 8. Captain Turner planned to cross the Bar as much earlier than that as he could get over without stopping, while at the same time figuring on passing during the darkness the dangerous waters from the entrance to St. George's Channel to the Liverpool Bar.

Having thus in mind his objective, and the time approximately when he intended to reach it, the message received at 11:25 a. m. required that he should determine whether to keep off land approximately the same distance as he was when he passed Fastnet, or to work in shore and go close to Coningbeg Lightship. He determined that the latter was the better plan to avoid the submarines reported in mid-channel ahead of him.

When Galley Head was sighted, the course was changed so as to haul closer to the land and this course was pursued until 1:40 p. m., at which time Captain Turner concluded that it was necessary for him to get his bearings accurately. This he decided should be done by taking a four-point bearing during which procedure the ship was torpedoed. It is urged that he should have taken a two-point bearing or a cross bearing which would have occupied less time, but, if, under all the conditions which appealed to his judgment as a

mariner, he had taken a different method of ascertaining his exact distance and the result would have been inaccurate or, while engaged in taking a two-point bearing the ship had been torpedoed, then somebody would have said he should have taken a four-point bearing. The point of the matter is that an experienced captain took the bearing he thought proper for his purposes and to predicate negligence upon such a course is to assert that a captain is bound to guess the exact location of a hidden and puzzling danger.

Much emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the speed of the ship was 18 knots at the time of the attack instead of 24 or, in any event, 21 knots, and upon the further fact (for such it is), that the ship was not zig-zagging as frequently as the Admiralty advised or in the sense of that advice.

Upon this branch of the case much testimony was taken (some *in camera*, as in the Wreck Commissioner's Court) and, for reasons of public interest, the methods of successfully evading submarines will not be discussed. If it be assumed that the Admiralty advices as of May, 1915, were sound and should have been followed, then the answer to the charge of negligence is two-fold; (1) that Captain Turner, in taking a four-point bearing off the Old Head of Kinsale, was conscientiously exercising his judgment for the welfare of the ship, and (2) that it is impossible to determine whether, by zig-zagging off the Old Head of Kinsale or elsewhere, the "Lusitania" would have escaped the German submarine or submarines.

As to the first answer, I cannot better express my conclusion than in the language of Lord Mersey:

Captain Turner was fully advised as to the means which in the view of the Admiralty were best calculated to avert the perils

he was likely to encounter, and in considering the question whether he is to blame for the catastrophe in which his voyage ended I have to bear this circumstance in mind. It is certain that in some respects Captain Turner did not follow the advice given to him. It may be (though I seriously doubt it) that had he done so his ship would have reached Liverpool in safety. But the question remains, was his conduct the conduct of a negligent or of an incompetent man. On this question I have sought the guidance of my assessors, who have rendered me invaluable assistance, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that blame ought not to be imputed to the Captain. The advice given to him, although meant for his most serious and careful consideration, was not intended to deprive him of the right to exercise his skilled judgment in the difficult questions that might arise from time to time in the navigation of his ship. His omission to follow the advice in all respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence.

He exercised his judgment for the best. It was the judgment of a skilled and experienced man, and although others might have acted differently and perhaps more successfully he ought not, in my opinion, to be blamed.

As to the second answer, it is only necessary to outline the situation in order to realize how speculative is the assertion of fault. It is plain from the radio messages of the Admiralty (May 6, 7:50 p. m., "Submarines active off south coast of Ireland"; May 6, 8:30 p. m., "Submarines off Fastnet"; the 11:25 message of May 7, *supra*: May 7, 11:40 a. m., "Submarines 5 miles south of Cape Clear, proceeding west when sighted at 10 a. m."), that more than one submarine was lying in wait for the "Lusitania".

A scientific education is not necessary to appreciate that it is much more difficult for a submarine successfully to hit a naval vessel than an unarmed merchant ship. The destination of a naval vessel is usually not known, that of the "Lusitania" was. A submarine commander, when attacking an armed

vessel, knows that he, as the attacker, may and likely will also be attacked by his armed opponent. The "Lusitania" was as helpless in that regard as a peaceful citizen suddenly set upon by murderous assailants. There are other advantages of the naval vessel over the merchant ship which need not be referred to.

It must be assumed that the German submarine commanders realized the obvious disadvantages which necessarily attached to the "Lusitania" and, if she had evaded one submarine, who can say what might have happened five minutes later? If there was, in fact, a third torpedo fired from the "Lusitania's" port side, then that incident would strongly suggest that, in the immediate vicinity of the ship, there were at least two submarines.

It must be remembered also that the "Lusitania" was still in the open sea, considerably distant from the places of theretofore submarine activity and comfortably well off the Old Head of Kinsale from which point it was about 140 miles to the Scilly Islands and that she was nearly 100 miles from the entrance to St. George's Channel, the first channel she would enter on her way to Liverpool.

No transatlantic passenger liner and, certainly none carrying American citizens, had been torpedoed up to that time. The submarines, therefore, could lay their plans with facility to destroy the vessel somewhere on the way from Fastnet to Liverpool, knowing full well the easy prey which would be afforded by an unarmed, unconvoyed, well-known merchantman, which from every standpoint of international law had the right to expect a warning before its peaceful passengers were sent to their death. That the attack was deliberate and long contemplated and intended

ruthlessly to destroy human life, as well as property, can no longer be open to doubt. And when a foe employs such tactics it is idle and purely speculative to say that the action of the captain of a merchant ship, in doing or not doing something or in taking one course and not another, was a contributing cause of disaster or that had the captain not done what he did or had he done something else, then that the ship and her passengers would have evaded their assassins.

I find, therefore, as a fact, that the captain and, hence, the petitioner, were not negligent.

The importance of the cause, however, justifies the statement of another ground which effectually disposes of any question of liability.

It is an elementary principle of law that even if a person is negligent, recovery cannot be had unless the negligence is the proximate cause of the loss or damage.

There is another rule, settled by ample authority, *viz.*: that, even if negligence is shown, it cannot be the proximate cause of the loss or damage, if an independent illegal act of a third party intervenes to cause the loss.

Jarnagin v. Travelers' Protective Assn., 133 F. R. 892;

Cole v. German Savings & Loan Soc., 124 F. R. 113;

See also, *Insurance Co. v. Tweed*, 7 Wall. 44;

Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176;

Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117;

The Young America, 31 F. R. 749;

Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 F. R. 400.

Claimants contend strongly that the case at bar comes within *Holladay v. Kennard*, 12 Wall. 254,

where Mr. Justice Miller, who wrote the opinion, carefully stated that that case was not to be construed as laying down a rule different from that of *Railroad Co. v. Reeves*, *supra*. An elaborate analysis of the *Holladay* and other cases will not be profitable; suffice it to say, neither that nor any other case has changed the rule of law above stated, as to the legal import of an intervening illegal act of a third party.

The question then, is whether the act of the German submarine commander was an illegal act.

The United States courts recognize the binding force of International Law. As was said by Mr. Justice Gray in *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U. S. 677, 700:

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.

At least, since as early as June 5, 1793, in the letter of Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to the French Minister, our government has recognized the law of nations as an "integral part" of the laws of the land.

Moore's International Law Digest, I, p. 10:

The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 187;

The New York, 175 U. S. 187, 197;

Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 146;

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46.

To ascertain International Law, "resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of commentators and jurists . . . Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals . . . for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is."

The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677 (and authorities cited).

Let us first see the position of our government and then ascertain whether that position has authoritative support. Mr. Lansing, in his official communication to the German Government, dated June 9, 1915, stated:

But the sinking of the passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the "Lusitania", the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those aboard the ship in jeopardy. This principle the Government of the United States understands the explicit instructions issued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial

German Admiralty to its commanders at sea to have recognized and embodied as do the naval codes of all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a right to depend. It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon this principle that the United States must stand. * * *

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done.

White Book of Department of State entitled "Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties European War No. 2," at page 172. Printed and distributed October 21, 1915.

The German Government found itself compelled ultimately to recognize the principle insisted upon by the Government of the United States for, after considerable correspondence and, on May 4, 1916 (after the *Sussex* had been sunk), the German Government stated:

The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels as recognized by international law, the sole exception being the

conduct of warfare against the enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships that are encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain; * * *

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

See Official Communication by German Foreign Office to Ambassador Gerard, May 4, 1916 (White Book No. 3 of Department of State, pp. 302, 305).

There is, of course, no doubt as to the right to make prize of an enemy ship on the high seas and, under certain conditions, to destroy her and equally no doubt of the obligation to safeguard the lives of all persons aboard, whether passengers or crew.

Phillemore on International Law, 3d Ed. Vol. 3, p. 584.

Sir Sherston Baker on "First Steps in International Law," p. 236.

G. B. Davis on "Elements of International Law," pp. 358, 359.

A. Pearce Higgins on "War and the Private Citizen," pp. 33, 78, referring to proceedings of "Institute of International Law at Turin" in 1882.

Creasy on International Law, p. 562, quoting Chief Justice Cockburn in his judgment in the Geneva Arbitration.

L. A. Atherby-Jones on "Commerce in War," p. 529.

Professor Holland's Article, Naval War College, 1907, p. 82.

Oppenheim on International Law, 2 Ed. Vol. 2, pp. 244, 311.

Taylor on International Law, p. 572.

Westlake on International Law, 2nd Ed., p. 309, Part II.

Halleck on International Law, Vol. II, pp. 15, 16.

Vattel's Law of Nations, *Chitty's Ed.*, p. 362.

Two quotations from this long list may be given for convenience, one stating the rule and the other the attitude which obtains among civilized governments: Oppenheim sets forth as among violations of the rules of War:

(12) Attack on enemy merchantmen without previous request to submit to visit.

The observation in Vattel's Law of Nations is peculiarly applicable to the case of the "Lusitania":

Let us never forget that our enemies are men. Though reduced to the disagreeable necessity of prosecuting our right by force of arms, let us not divest ourselves of that charity which connects us with all mankind. Thus shall we courageously defend our country's rights without violating those of human nature. Let our valor preserve itself from every stain of cruelty and the luster of victory will not be tarnished by inhuman and brutal actions.

In addition to the authorities *supra*, are the regulations and practices of various governments. In 1512, Henry VIII issued instructions to the Admiral of the Fleet which accord with our understanding of modern International Law. (Hosack's Law of Nations, p. 168). Such has been England's course since.

22 Geo. 2nd C. 33, 2 Sec. 9 (1749);

British Admiralty Manual of Prize Law 188,
Secs. 303, 304.

Substantially the same rules were followed in the Russian and Japanese regulations and probably in the codes or rules of many other nations.

Russian Prize Regulations, March 27, 1895
 (cited in Moore's Digest, Vol. VII, p. 518);
 Japanese Prize Law of 1894 Art. 22 (cited
 in Moore, *supra*, Vol. VII, p. 525);
 Japanese Regulations, March 7, 1904 (see
 Takahashi's Cases on International Law
 during Chino-Japanese War).

The rules recognized and practised by the United States, among other things, provide:

(10) In the case of an enemy merchantman it may be sunk, but only, if it is impossible to take it into port, and provided always that the persons on board are put in a place of safety. (*U. S. White Book, European War*, No. 3, p. 192.)

These humane principles were practised both in the war of 1812 and during our own war of 1861-1865. Even with all the bitterness (now happily ended and forgotten) and all the difficulties of having no port to which to send a prize, Captain Semmes of the "Alabama", strictly observed the rule as to human life, even going so far as to release ships because he could not care for the passengers. But we are not confined to American and English precedents and practices.

While acting contrary to its official statements, yet the Imperial German Government recognized the same rule as the United States and prior to the sinking of the "Lusitania", had not announced any other rule. The war zone proclamation of February 4, 1915, contained no warning that the accepted rule of civilized naval warfare would be discarded by the German Government.

Indeed, after the "Lusitania" was sunk, the German Government did not make any such claim but, in

answer to the first American note in reference to the "Lusitania", the German Foreign Office, per von Jagow, addressed to Ambassador Gerard a note dated May 18, 1915, in which, *inter alia*, it is stated in connection with the sinking of the British Steamer "Falaba":

In the case of the sinking of the English steamer "Falaba", the commander of the German submarine had the intention of allowing passengers and crew ample opportunity to save themselves.

It was not until the captain disregarded the order to lay to and took to flight, sending up rocket signals for help, that the German commander ordered the crew and passengers by signals and megaphone to leave the ship within 10 minutes. As a matter of fact he allowed them 23 minutes and did not fire the torpedo until suspicious steamers were hurrying to the aid of the "Falaba". (*White Book No. 2, U. S. Department of State*, p. 169.)

Indeed, as late as May 4, 1916, Germany did not dispute the applicability of the rule as is evidenced by the note written to our Government by von Jagow of the German Foreign Office, an extract from which has been quoted *supra*.

Further, section 116 of the German Prize Code (Huberich & Kind translation, p. 68) in force at the date of the "Lusitania's" destruction, conformed to the American rule. It provided:

Before proceeding to a destruction of the vessel, the safety of all persons on board, and, so far as possible, their effects, is to be provided for, and all ship's papers and other evidentiary material, which according to the views of the persons at interest, is of value for the formulation of the judgment of the prize court, are to be taken over by the commander.

Thus, when the "Lusitania" sailed from New York, her owner and master were justified in believing that, whatever else had theretofore happened, this simple, humane and universally accepted principle would

not be violated. Few, at that time, would be likely to construe the warning advertisement as calling attention to more than the perils to be expected from quick disembarkation and the possible rigors of the sea after the proper safeguarding of the lives of passengers by at least full opportunity to take to the boats.

It is, of course, easy now in the light of many later events, added to preceding acts, to look back and say that the Cunard Line and its captain should have known that the German Government would authorize or permit so shocking a breach of international law and so foul an offense, not only against an enemy but as well against peaceful citizens of a then friendly nation.

But, the unexpected character of the act was best evidenced by the horror which it excited in the minds and hearts of the American people.

The fault, therefore, must be laid upon those who are responsible for the sinking of the vessel, in the legal as well as moral sense. It is, therefore, not the Cunard Line, petitioner, which must be held liable for the loss of life and property. The cause of the sinking of the "Lusitania" was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government, acting through its instrument, the submarine commander, and violating a cherished and humane rule observed, until this war, by even the bitterest antagonists. As Lord Mersey said, "The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime."

But, while in this lawsuit, there may be no recovery, it is not to be doubted that the United States

of America and her Allies, will well remember the rights of those affected by the sinking of the "Lusitania" and, when the time shall come, will see to it that reparation shall be made for one of the most indefensible acts of modern times.

The petition is granted and the claims dismissed without costs.

JULIUS M. MAYER,
District Judge

August 23, 1918

ADDENDUM

The grounds upon which the decision is put render unnecessary the discussion of some other interesting questions suggested.

As to the exception to Interrogatory Twentieth, brushing aside all technical points, I am satisfied that the withheld answer relates to matters irrelevant to the issues here. It certainly cannot be expected, in war time, that an American court will ask for the disclosure of information deemed confidential by the British Admiralty nor can I see any good reason for delaying a decree until some future date when the information may be forthcoming; for it seems to me that no matter what other general advices of the Admiralty may have been given prior to May 7, 1915, the result of this case must be the same.

J. M. M.
D. J.

INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Published monthly by the
American Association for International Conciliation
Entered as second class matter at New York, N. Y.,
Post office, February 23, 1909, under act of July 16, 1894

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE

SERIES No. IV

- I. Official Correspondence between the United States and
Austria-Hungary, and Terms of Armistice
- II. Official Correspondence between the United States and
Germany, and Terms of Armistice
- III. Official Correspondence between the United States and
Turkey, and Terms of Armistice



DECEMBER, 1918

No. 133

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
SUB-STATION 84 (407 WEST 117TH STREET)
NEW YORK CITY

I

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

1. Note from Government of Austria-Hungary to
Secretary of State, September 16, 1918.

LEGATION OF SWEDEN

WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 16, 1918

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate to you the following note addressed by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the Royal Government of Sweden and received by me on this day by telegraph:

"Although it was declined by the enemy powers, the peace proposal made on December 12, 1916, by the four Allied Powers which never desisted from the conciliatory intent that had prompted it, nevertheless, was the beginning of a new phase in the history of this war. From that day the question of peace after two and a half years of fierce struggle suddenly became the main topic of discussion in Europe, nay, in the world, and has been steadily gaining prominence ever since. From that day nearly every belligerent state has repeatedly voiced its opinion on the subject of peace. The discussion, however, was not carried on along the same lines. Viewpoints varied according to the military and political conditions, and so, thus far at least, no tangible or practical result has been achieved. Notwithstanding those fluctuations, a lessening of the distance between the viewpoints of the two parties could be noted though no attempt will be made to deny the great divergences of opinion which divide the two enemy camps and which it has heretofore been impossible to reconcile. One

may be, nevertheless, permitted to notice that some of the extreme war aims have been departed from, and that the fundamental basis of a universal peace is to some extent agreed upon. There is no doubt that on either side the desire of the peoples to reach an understanding and bring about peace is becoming more and more manifest. The same impression is created when the manner in which the peace proposal of the four allied powers was received in the past is compared with the subsequent utterances of their adversaries whether they came from responsible statesmen or from personages holding no office but likewise wielding political influence. By way of illustration confined to a few instances, the Allies in their reply to President Wilson's note advanced claims which meant nothing less than the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the mutilation and radical changes in the political structure of Germany, and also the annihilation of European Turkey. With time, those terms that could not be enforced without a crushing victory were modified or partly abandoned by some of the official declarations of the Entente.

"Thus Mr. Balfour, in the course of last year plainly declared to the English Parliament that Austria-Hungary was to solve her domestic problems by herself and that Germany could not be given another constitution through foreign influence; Mr. Lloyd George afterward announced, in the beginning of this year, that the Allies were not fighting for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or to despoil the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or, again, to bring internal reforms to Germany. We may also add that in December, 1917, Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had pledged itself to create an independent state including the German territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the utterances of the Central Powers they leave no doubt that those states are merely fighting to defend the integrity and safety of their territories. Much greater than in respect to concrete war aims is the evidence that the principles upon which peace could be concluded and a new order of things established in

Europe and throughout the world have in a way drawn nearer to one another. On this point President Wilson in his address of February 12, and July 4, 1918, formulated principles that have raised no objection from his Allies and whose wide application will shortly meet with objections from the four allied powers provided, to be general and consistent with the vital interests of the states concerned. To agree upon general principles, however, would not suffice; an agreement should also be reached as to their interpretation and application to the several concrete questions of war and peace.

"To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a compromise peace has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasing that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will check its development for decades to come—and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing about the decision by arms which four years of efforts, hardships and immense sacrifices have failed to bring about. Now, by what means, in what manner can the way be paved that will finally lead to such a compromise. Can anyone in earnest expect that goal to be attained by adhering to the method heretofore followed in the discussion of the peace problem? We dare not answer that question in the affirmative. The discussion as conducted until now from one rostrum to another by the statesmen of the several countries was substantially but a series of monologues. It lacked sequence above all. Speeches delivered, arguments expounded by the orators of the opposite parties received no direct immediate reply. Again, the publicity of those utterances, the places where they were delivered excluded every possible serviceable result. In such public utterances the eloquence used is of the high-pitched kind which is intended to thrill the masses. Whether intentionally or not, the gap between conflicting ideas is thus widened. Misunderstandings that cannot easily be eradicated, spring up, and a simple straightforward exchange of ideas is hampered as soon as mentioned,

and even before an official answer can be made by the adversary every declaration of the statesmen in power is taken up for passionate and immoderate discussion by irresponsible persons, but the statesmen themselves are obsessed by a fear that they may unfavorably influence public opinion in their country and thereby compromise the chances of the war, and also of prematurely disclosing their true intentions. That is why they use thunderlike¹ speech and persist in upholding unflinching points of view. If, therefore, it were intended to seek the basis for a compromise apt to make an end of the war, whose prolongation would mean nothing but suicide and to save Europe from that catastrophe, resort should be had in any event to some other method which would permit of continuous and direct converse between the representatives of the governments and between them only. Such an exchange of views would take in the conflicting views of the several belligerent states to the same extent as the general principles on which to build up peace and the relations between states, and might first lead to an understanding as to those principles. The fundamental principles once agreed upon, an effort should be made in the course of the informal negotiations to apply them concretely to the several peace questions and thereby bring about their solution. We indulge the hope that none of the belligerents will object to this proposed exchange of views. There would be no interruption of military operations. The conversation would go no further than deemed useful by the participants; the parties concerned could be put to no disadvantage thereby. The exchange of views, far from doing any harm, could be but beneficial to the cause of peace; what might fail at the first attempt could be tried over again; something will at least have been done toward elucidating the problems. How many are the deep-rooted misunderstandings that might be dispelled! How many the new ideas that would break their way out! Human

¹ The French text has 'donnantes' which is here meaningless; 'tonnantes', with the above meaning was probably the word sent and distorted in transmission.

sentiments so long pent up could burst forth from all hearts, creating a warmer atmosphere while safeguarding every essential point and dispel many a discussion which at this time seems important. We are convinced that it is the duty of all belligerents to mankind to take up together the questions whether there is no way, after so many years of a struggle which, notwithstanding all the sacrifices it has cost, is still undecided and the whole course of which seems to demand a compromise, of bringing this awful war to an end. The Imperial and Royal Government, therefore, comes again to the governments of all the belligerent states with a proposal shortly to send to a neutral country, upon a previous agreement as to the date and place, delegates who would broach a confidential non-binding conversation over the fundamental principles of a peace that could be concluded. The delegates would be commissioned to communicate to one another the views of their respective governments on the aforesaid principles and very freely and frankly interchange information on every point for which provision should be made.

"The Imperial and Royal Government has the honor to apply for your kindly good offices and to request that the Royal Government of Sweden kindly communicate the present communication which is addressed to all the belligerent states simultaneously, to the Government of the United States of America and of Great Britain.

(Signed) BURIAN"

Be pleased to accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration. (Signed) W. A. F. EKENGREN

His Excellency,

Mr. ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State of the United States,
etc., etc., etc.

2. Reply of Secretary of State, September 17, 1918.

Sir:

September 17, 1918

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, dated September 16th. communicating to me a note from the

Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary, containing a proposal to the governments of all the belligerent states to send delegates to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace. Furthermore, it is proposed that the delegates would be charged to make known to one another the conception of their governments regarding these principles and to receive analogous communications, as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

In reply I beg to say that the substance of your communication has been submitted to the President who now directs me to inform you that the Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

Mr. W. A. F. EKENGREN,

Minister of Sweden,

In Charge of Austro-Hungarian Interests

3. Note from Government of Austria-Hungary to Secretary of State, October 7, 1918.

LEGATION OF SWEDEN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(Translation)

October 7, 1918

Excellency:

By order of my government I have the honor confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of

the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President of the United States of America:

"The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace hereby addresses itself to His Lordship the President of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12, 1918, should serve as a foundation and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account."

Be pleased to accept, etc.

His Excellency, (Signed) W. A. F. EKENGREN

Mr. ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington

4. Reply of Secretary of State, October 18, 1918.

From the Secretary of State to the Minister of Sweden:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

October 18, 1918

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 7th instant in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following reply:

"The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his

address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

“ ‘X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.’ ”

“Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

“The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere ‘autonomy’ of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.”

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

5. Note from Government of Austria-Hungary to Secretary of State, October 29, 1918.²

DEPARTMENT OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN INTERESTS

LEGATION OF SWEDEN

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Excellency:

October 29, 1918

By order of my Government, I have the honor to beg you to transmit to the President the following communication from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary:

² *Official U. S. Bulletin*, October 31, 1918.

"In reply to the note of the President, Mr. Wilson, to the Austro-Hungarian Government, dated October 18 of this year, and about the decision of the President to take up, with Austria-Hungary separately, the question of armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the President and his opinion of the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had put upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace between Austria-Hungary and the entente States, and for an immediate armistice on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary, and begs the President, Mr. Wilson, to take the necessary measures to that effect."

Be pleased to accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) W. A. F. EKENGREN

His Excellency,

ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

6. Note from Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Secretary of State, October 29, 1918.³

Immediately after having taken direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after the dispatch of the official answer to your note of October 18, 1918, by which you were able to

³ *The New York Times*, October 29, 1918.

see that we accept all the points and principles laid down by President Wilson in his various declarations, and are in complete accord with the efforts of President Wilson to prevent future wars and to create a League of Nations, we have taken preparatory measures, in order that Austrians and Hungarians may be able, according to their own desire and without being in any way hindered, to make a decision as to their future organization, and to rule it.

Since the accession to power of Emperor King Charles his immovable purpose has been to bring an end to the war. More than ever this is the desire of the Sovereign of all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, who acknowledge that their future destiny can only be accomplished in a pacific world, by being freed from all disturbances, privations, and sorrows of war.

This is why I address you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, praying that you will have the goodness to intervene with the President of the United States in order that in the interest of humanity, and in the interest of all those who live in Austria-Hungary, an immediate armistice may be concluded on all fronts, and for an overture that immediate negotiations for peace will follow.

7. Terms of Armistice Accepted by Austria, November 4, 1918.⁴

MILITARY CLAUSES

1. The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea, and air.

2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in clause 3 below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force α (?), reduced to prewar effectives (effectiveness?).

Half the divisional, corps, and army artillery and equip-

⁴*Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 4, 1918.

ment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commander-in-chief of the allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Pic Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Zoaller. The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis, and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terloug), and the watershed of the Cols di Podberdo, Podlaniscam and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg, excludes the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries. From Schneeberg it goes down toward the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia, and Volosca, in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present Province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Trivania and, to the south, territory limited by a line from the (Semigrad?) of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastward, so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water-courses flowing toward Sebenico, such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago, and Puntadura in the north up to Meleda in the south, embracing Santandrea, Busi, Lisa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza, and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and passages, only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta, and Brazza. All territory thus evacuated (shall be occupied

by the forces?) of the allies and of the United States of America.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds, including coal belonging to or within those territories (to be?), left in situ and surrendered to the allies according to special orders given by the commander in chief of the forces of the associated powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the associated powers.

4. The allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation. The armies of the associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the associated powers (wherever?) they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within the date.

6. The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

7. The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all allied prisoners of war and interned subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by the commander-in-chief of the forces of the associated powers on the various fronts. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austria-Hungary personnel, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

NAVAL CONDITIONS

1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marine of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

2. Surrender to allies and the United States of fifteen Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under the supervision of the allies and United States.

3. Surrender to allies and United States with their complete armament and equipment of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors to be designated by the allies and United States of America. All other surface warships, including river craft, are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of allies and United States of America.

4. Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of allied and associated powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The allies and associated powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube the allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

5. The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-

Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the allies and the United States of America.

6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and impactionized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the allies and the United States of America.

7. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment, and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

8. Occupation by the allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

9. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the allies and associated powers to be returned.

10. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

11. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and associated powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

II

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANYI. Note from German Chancellor to President
Wilson, October 6, 1918.LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND
WASHINGTON, D. C.Department of
German Interests

October 6, 1918

Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my government, the original text of a communication from the German Government, received by this Legation late this afternoon, from the Swiss Foreign Office.

An English translation of this communication is also enclosed. The German original text, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN
Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland,
In charge of German interests in the
United States

Mr. WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States,
Washington

(Enclosure)

Translation of communication from German Government to the President of the United States, as transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland, on October 6, 1918:

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN,
Imperial Chancellor

2. Reply of Secretary of State, October 8, 1918.

From Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

October 8, 1918

I have the honor to acknowledge, on behalf of the President, your note of October 6th, enclosing a communication from the German Government to the President; and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor:

"Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January last and in subsequent addresses and that its object in entering into discussions would

be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

"The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

"The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

Mr. FREDERICK OEDERLIN,

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland *ad interim*,

In charge of German interests in the United States

3. Note from German Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 12, 1918.

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Department of
German Interests

October 14, 1918

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my Government, the original text, received this morning, of a communication from the German Government to the President of the United States, in reply to his communication

to the Imperial German Chancellor, transmitted to me by Your Excellency on October 8, 1918.

I beg herewith also to enclose the English translation of this communication, as transmitted by the German Legation in Berne to the Swiss Foreign Office.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN

Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland,
In charge of German interests in the
United States

His Excellency,
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State

(Enclosure)

Translation of the reply from the German Government to the communication of October 8, 1918, of the President of the United States transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland to the Secretary of State on October 14, 1918:

In reply to the question of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares;

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January the eighth and in his subsequent addresses as the foundations of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently, its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the governments of the powers associated with the United States also accept the position taken by President Wilson in his addresses.

The German Government in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about an

armistice declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

SOLF

State Secretary of Foreign Office

4. Reply of Secretary of State, October 14, 1918.

From the Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland, *ad interim*, in charge of German interests in the United States:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 14, 1918

Sir:

In reply to the communication of the German Government, dated the 12th instant, which you handed me today, I have the honor to request you to transmit the following answer:

"The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the eighth and twelfth of October, 1918.

"It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which

must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

"The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain, not only but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

"It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount

Vernon on the fourth of July last. It is as follows: 'The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency'. The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

"The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

Mr. FREDERICK OEDERLIN,

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland, *ad interim*,

In charge of German interests in the United States

5. Note from German Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 20, 1918.

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Department of
German Interests

October 22, 1918

Sir:

By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit herewith to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication dated October 20, 1918, from the German

Government, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office. I beg to also enclose an English translation of the communication in question as transmitted to the Swiss Foreign Office by the German Government with the request that it be forwarded to Your Excellency's Government.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN

Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland

His Excellency,

ROBERT LANSING,

Secretary of State,

Washington

(Enclosure)

Translation issued by the German Government of its communication dated October 20, 1918, transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland on October 22, 1918.

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary and are in so far permitted by international law. The

German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decision on peace and war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this government. In future no government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is,

however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

(Signed) SOLF,

State Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Berlin, October 20, 1918

6. Reply of Secretary of State, October 23, 1918.

From the Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland *ad interim*, in charge of German interests in the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir:

October 23, 1918

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the twenty-second transmitting a communication under date of the twentieth from the German Government and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows:

"Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the twenty-seventh of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the

present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

"The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of

the twentieth of October, it does not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

Mr. FREDERICK OEDERLIN,

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland, *ad interim*,

In charge of German interests in the United States

7. Note from German Minister of Foreign Affairs,
October 27, 1918.

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Department of
German Interests

October 28, 1918

Sir:

I am instructed by my Government and have the honor to submit to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication from the German Government, dated October 27, 1918, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office.

I beg leave also to inclose an English translation of the above-mentioned communication, the German text of which, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

F. OEDERLIN
Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland,

His Excellency,

MR. ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington

Translation of a communication from the German Government, dated October 27, 1918, as transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of Switzerland on October 28, 1918:

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States.. The President knows the far-reaching changes which have taken place and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitu-

tionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice, which is the first step toward a peace of justice, as described by the President in his pronouncements.

(Signed) SOLF

State Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Berlin, October 27, 1918.

8. Note from Secretary of State to the German Government, November 5, 1918.

From the Secretary of State to the Minister of Switzerland, in charge of German interests in the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 5, 1918

Sir:

I have the honor to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government:

"In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

"The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

'The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause two relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

'Further, in the conditions of peace, laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.'

"I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German

Government, and to communicate to them terms of an armistice."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

Mr. HANS SULZER,

Minister of Switzerland,

In charge of German interests in the United States

9. Terms of Armistice Accepted by Germany and President Wilson's Address to the Congress, November 11, 1918.⁵

Gentlemen of the Congress:

In these anxious times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

The German authorities who have, at the invitation of the Supreme War Council, been in communication with Marshal Foch have accepted and signed the terms of armistice which he was authorized and instructed to communicate to them. Those terms are as follows:

I. MILITARY CLAUSES ON WESTERN FRONT

1. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

2. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become

⁵*Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 11, 1918.

prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

3. Repatriation beginning at once and to be completed within fourteen days of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted. ⁶

4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: Five thousand guns (two thousand five hundred heavy, two thousand five hundred field), thirty thousand machine guns, three thousand minenwerfer. Two thousand aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly, D. Seventy-three's and night bombing machines). The above to be delivered in situ to the Allies and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note. ⁶

5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be determined by the Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these points in thirty kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it forty kilometers to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and as far as practicable a distance of thirty kilometers from the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of eleven days, in all nineteen days after the signature of the armistice. All movements

⁶For subsequent amendment see page 45.

of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note annexed.⁶

6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.⁷

7. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives, fifty thousand wagons and ten thousand motor lorries in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the same period, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of railways in the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ. All stores of coal and material for the up-keep of permanent ways, signals and repair shops left entire in situ and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. A note appended regulates the details of these measures.⁷

8. The German command shall be responsible for revealing all mines or delay acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as

⁶ For subsequent amendment see page 45.

⁷ For subsequent amendment see page 46.

poisoning or polluting of springs, wells, etc.) under penalty of reprisals.⁸

9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and the United States armies in all occupied territory. The up-keep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine land (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.⁸

10. An immediate repatriation without reciprocity according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish.⁸

11. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

II. DISPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

12. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Rumania or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914.⁸

13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents, now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

15. Abandonment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.⁹

⁸ For subsequent amendment see page 47.

⁹ For subsequent amendment see page 48.

16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for any other purpose.⁹

III. CLAUSE CONCERNING EAST AFRICA

17. Unconditional capitulation of all German forces operating in East Africa within one month.⁹

IV. GENERAL CLAUSES

18. Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other Allied or Associated States than those mentioned in clause three, paragraph nineteen, with the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected.⁹

19. The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or repatriation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit, in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

V. NAVAL CONDITIONS

20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the

⁹ For subsequent amendment see page 48.

naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

21. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of one hundred and sixty German submarines (including all submarine cruisers and mine laying submarines) with their complete armament and equipment in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. All other submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.⁹

23. The following German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, for the want of them, in Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers, including two mine layers, fifty destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.¹⁰

24. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allies and Asso-

⁹ For subsequent amendment see page 48.

¹⁰ For subsequent amendment see page 49.

ciated Powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Categat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

26. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allies and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.¹⁰

27. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

28. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes and all other harbor materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft and all materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.¹⁰

29. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in clause twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

30. All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

31. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

32. The German Government shall formally notify the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the

¹⁰ For subsequent amendment see page 49.

Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately canceled.

33. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

VI. DURATION OF ARMISTICE

34. The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, on forty-eight hours' previous notice.¹¹

VII. TIME LIMIT FOR REPLY

35. This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

It is not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such force as to contribute in a way of which we are all deeply proud to the great result. We know, too, that the object of the war is attained; the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now

¹¹ For subsequent amendment see page 50.

we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will now seek to revive it? The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany which once could secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world is discredited and destroyed. And more than that—much more than that—has been accomplished. The great nations which associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely united in the common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice, embodied in settlements which are based upon something much better and much more lasting than the selfish competitive interests of powerful states. There is no longer conjecture as to the objects the victors have in mind. They have a mind in the matter, not only, but a heart also. Their avowed and concerted purpose is to satisfy and protect the weak as well as to accord their just rights to the strong.

The humane temper and intention of the victorious governments has already been manifested in a very practical way. Their representatives in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives; and steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. By the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift

the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand. Hunger does not breed reform; it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible.

For with the fall of the ancient governments which rested like an incubus upon the peoples of the Central Empires has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves, With what governments, and of what sort, are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements besides our own is it to rest?

Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered now or at once. But the moral is not that there is little hope of an early answer that will suffice. It is only that we must be patient and helpful and mindful above all of the great hope and confidence that lie at the heart of what is taking place. Excesses accomplish nothing. Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant recent proof of that. Disorder immediately defeats itself. If excesses should occur, if disorder should for a time raise its head, a sober second thought will follow and a day of constructive action, if we help and do not hinder.

The present and all that it holds belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness.

The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government and who are now coming at last into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with their initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbors and of their former masters, and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last.

10. Amendments Made in Terms of Armistice with Germany.¹²

The Secretary of State has been advised of certain changes in the terms of the armistice signed by representatives of the Allies and the United States and of Germany on November 11.

ARTICLE THREE

Repatriation beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

ARTICLE FOUR

Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following war material: Five thousand guns (two thousand five hundred heavy and two thousand five hundred field), twenty-five thousand machine guns, three thousand minenwerfer, one thousand seven hundred aeroplanes (fighters, bombers, firstly all of the D. seven's and all the night bombing machines). The above to be delivered in situ to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure number one) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

ARTICLE FIVE

Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United States garrison holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with the bridgeheads at these points of a thirty kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream

¹² *Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 13, 1918.

and at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier of Holland up to the frontier of Switzerland. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine lands (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within further period of sixteen days, in all thirty-one days after the signing of the armistice. All the movements of evacuation or occupation are regulated by the note (annexure number one) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

ARTICLE SIX

In all territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, and equipment not removed during the period fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain: Five thousand locomotives and one hundred fifty thousand wagons in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in annexure number two and total of which shall not exceed thirty-one days. There shall likewise be delivered five thousand motor lorries (camione automobiles) in good order within the period of thirty-six days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the period of thirty-one days together with prewar personnel and material. Further

the material necessary for the working of railways in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ. All stores of coal and material for the up-keep of permanent way, signals, and repair shops shall be left in situ. These stores shall be maintained by Germany in so far as concerns the working of the railroads in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note annexure number two regulates the details of these measures.

ARTICLE EIGHT

The German command shall be responsible for revealing within the period of forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delayed action fuses on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

ARTICLE NINE

The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The up-keep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine and (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

ARTICLE TEN

The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial or convicted. The Allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war including the one of July nineteen-eighteen in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German pris-

oners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

ARTICLE TWELVE

All German troops at present in the territories which before belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany, defined as above, as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

ARTICLE FIFTEEN

Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

ARTICLE SIXTEEN

The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN

Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN

Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed of all interned civilians including hostages (persons?) under trial or convicted, belonging to the Allied or Associated Powers other than those enumerated in article three.

ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO

Surrender to the Allies and the United States of all submarines (including submarine cruisers and all mine-laying

submarines) now existing with their complete armament and equipment in ports which shall be specified by the Allies and United States. Those which cannot take these shall be disarmed of the personnel and material and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready for the sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designed for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of fourteen days after the signing of the armistice.

ARTICLE TWENTY-THREE

German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall be immediately disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, in default of them, in Allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They will there remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The following warships are designated by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), fifty destroyers of the most modern types. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely disarmed and classed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military armament of all ships of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage will be given by wireless.

ARTICLE TWENTY-SIX

The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States should give consideration to

the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

ARTICLE TWENTY-EIGHT

In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon in situ and in fact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus, and supplies of every kind.

ARTICLE THIRTY-FOUR

The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days with option to extend. During this period if its clauses are not carried into execution the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning forty-eight hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of articles three and eighteen shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted. This commission will act under the authority of the Allied military and naval commanders-in-chief.

This armistice has been signed the eleventh of November, 1918, at five o'clock French time. (F. Foch, R. E. Weymas, Erzberger, A. Oberndorff, Winterfeldt, Vanselow.)

SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS

- a. Speech of Prince Maximilian of Baden, Imperial German Chancellor, to the Reichstag, October 5, 1918.¹³

In accordance with the Imperial decree of September 30, the German Empire has undergone a basic alteration of its political leadership.

¹³ *The New York Times*, October 7, 1918.

As successor to Count George F. von Hertling, whose services in behalf of the Fatherland deserve the highest acknowledgment, I have been summoned by the Emperor to lead the new Government.

In accordance with the governmental method now introduced, I submit to the Reichstag, publicly and without delay, the principles upon which I propose to conduct the grave responsibilities of the office.

These principles were firmly established by the agreement of the federated Governments and the leaders of the majority parties in this honorable House before I decided to assume the duties of Chancellor. They contain, therefore, not only my own confession of political faith, but that of an overwhelming portion of the German peoples' representatives, that is, of the German nation, which has constituted the Reichstag on the basis of a general, equal, and secret franchise, and according to their will. Only the fact that I know the conviction and will of the majority of the people are back of me has given me strength to take upon myself conduct of the empire's affairs in this hard and earnest time in which we are living.

One man's shoulders would be too weak to carry alone the tremendous responsibility which falls upon the Government at present. Only if the people take active part, in the broadest sense of the word, in deciding their destinies; in other words, if responsibility also extends to the majority of their freely elected political leaders, can the leading statesman confidently assume his part of the responsibility in the service of folk and Fatherland.

My resolve to do this has been especially lightened for me by the fact that prominent leaders of the laboring class have found a way in the new Government to the highest offices of the Empire. I see therein a sure guarantee that the new Government will be supported by the firm confidence of the broad masses of the people, without whose true support the whole undertaking would be condemned to failure in advance. Hence, what I say today I say is not only in my own name

and those of my official helpers, but in the name of the German people.

The program of the majority parties, upon which I take my stand, contains, first, an acceptance of the answer of the former Imperial Government to Pope Benedict's note of August 1, 1916, and an unconditional acceptance of the Reichstag resolution of July 19, the same year. It further declares willingness to join a general league of nations based on the foundation of equal rights for all, both strong and weak. It considers the solution of the Belgian question to lie in the complete rehabilitation (*wiederherstellung*) of Belgium, particularly of its independence and territorial integrity. An effort shall also be made to reach an understanding on the question of indemnity.

The program will not permit the peace treaties hitherto concluded to be a hindrance to the conclusion of a general peace.

Its particular aim is that popular representative bodies shall be formed immediately on a broad basis in the Baltic provinces, in Lithuania, and Poland. We will promote the realization of necessary preliminary conditions therefor without delay by the introduction of civilian rule. All these lands shall regulate their constitutions and their relations with neighboring peoples without external interference.

In the matter of international policies I have taken a clear stand through the manner in which the formation of the Government was brought about. Upon my motion leaders of the majority parties were summoned for direct advice. It was my conviction, gentlemen, that unity of Imperial leadership should be assured, but not through mere schismatic party allegiance by the different members of the Government. I considered almost still more important the unity of ideas. I proceeded from this viewpoint, and have, in making my selections, laid greatest weight on the fact that the members of the new Imperial Government stand on a basis of a just peace of justice, regardless of the war situation, and that they have openly declared this to be their standpoint at the time when we stood at the height of our military successes.

I am convinced that the manner in which Imperial leadership is now constituted, with coöperation of the Reichstag, is not something ephemeral, and that when peace comes a Government cannot again be formed which does not find support in the Reichstag and does not draw its leaders therefrom.

The war has conducted us beyond the old multifarious and disrupted party life, which made it so difficult to put into execution a uniform and decisive political wish. The formation of a majority means the formation of a political will, and an indisputable result of the war has been that in Germany, for the first time, great parties have joined together in a firm, harmonious program and have thus come into position to determine for themselves the fate of the people.

This thought will never die. This development will never be retracted, and I trust that, so long as Germany's fate is ringed about by dangers, those sections of the people outside the majority parties and whose representatives do not belong to the Government will put aside all that separates us and will give the Fatherland what is the Fatherland's.

This development necessitates an alteration of our Constitution's provisions along the lines of the Imperial decree of September 30, which shall make it possible that these members of the Reichstag who entered the Government will retain their seats in the Reichstag. A bill to this end has been submitted to the Federal States and will immediately be made the subject of their consideration and decision.

Gentlemen, let us remember the words spoken by the Emperor on August 4, 1914, which I permitted myself to paraphrase last December at Karlsruhe: 'There are, in fact, parties, but they are all German parties.'

Political developments in Prussia, the principal German Federal State, must proceed in the spirit of these words of the Emperor, and the message of the King of Prussia promising the democratic franchise must be fulfilled quickly and completely. I do not doubt, also, that those Federal States which still lag behind in the development of their constitutional conditions will resolutely follow Prussia's example.

For the present, as the example of all belligerent states demonstrates, the extraordinary powers which a condition of siege compels cannot be dispensed with, but close relations between the military and civilian authorities must be established which will make it possible that in all not purely military questions, and hence especially as to censorship and right of assemblage, the attitude of the civilian executive authorities shall make itself heard and that final decision shall be placed under the Chancellor's responsibility.

To this end, the order of the Emperor will be sent to the military commanders. With September 30, the day of the decree, began a new epoch in Germany's internal history. The internal policy whose basic principles are therein laid down is of deciding importance on the question of peace or war.

The striking force which the Government has in its strivings for peace depends on whether it has behind it the united, firm, and unshakable will of the people. Only when our enemies feel that the German people stand united back of their chosen leaders—then only can words become deeds.

At the peace negotiations the German Government will use its efforts to the end that the treaties shall contain provisions concerning the protection of labor and insurance of laborers, which provisions shall oblige the treaty-making States to institute in their respective lands within a prescribed time a minimum of similar, or at least equally, efficient institutions for the security of life and health, as for the care of laborers in the case of illness, accident or invalidism.

Of direct importance are the conclusions which the Government in the brief span of its existence has been able to draw from the situation in which it finds itself and to apply practically to the situation. More than four years of bloodiest struggle against a world of numerically superior enemies are behind us, years full of the hardest battles and most painful sacrifices. Nevertheless, we are of strong heart and full of confident faith in our strength, resolved to bear still heavier sacrifices for our honor and freedom and for the happiness of our posterity, if it cannot be otherwise.

We remember with deep and warm gratitude our brave troops, who, under splendid leadership, have accomplished almost superhuman deeds throughout the whole war and whose past deeds are a sure guarantee that the fate of us all will also in future be in good and dependable hands in their keeping. For months a continuous, terrible, and murderous battle has been raging in the west. Thanks to the incomparable heroism of our army, which will live as an immortal, glorious page in the history of the German people for all times, the front is unbroken.

This proud consciousness permits us to look to the future with confidence. But, just because we are inspired by this feeling and the conviction that it is also our duty to make certain that the bloody struggle be not protracted for a single day beyond the moment when a close of the war seems possible to us which does not affect our honor, I have, therefore, not waited until today to take a step to further the idea of peace.

Supported by the consent of all duly authorized persons in the Empire, and by consent of all our Allies acting in concert with us, I sent on the night of October 4-5, through the mediation of Switzerland, a note to the President of the United States, in which I requested him to take up the bringing about of peace and to communicate to this end with all the belligerent States.

The note will reach Washington today or tomorrow. It is directed to the President of the United States because he, in his message to Congress January 8, 1918, and in his later proclamations, particularly in his New York speech of September 27, proposed a program for a general peace which we can accept as a basis for negotiations.

I have taken this step not only for the salvation of Germany and its Allies, but of all humanity, which has been suffering for years through the war.

I have taken it also because I believe the thoughts regarding the future well-being of the nation which were proclaimed by

Mr. Wilson are in accord with the general ideas cherished by the new German Government and with it the overwhelming majority of our people.

So far as I am personally concerned, in earlier speeches to other assemblages, my hearers will testify that the conception which I hold of a future peace has undergone no change since I was entrusted with the leadership of the Empire's affairs.

I see, hence, no distinction whatever between the national and international mandates of duty in respect of peace. For me the deciding factor is solely that all participants shall with equal honesty acknowledge these mandates as binding and respect them, as is the case with me and with the other members of our new Government. And so, with an inner peace, which my clear conscience as a man and as a servant of the people gives me, and which rests at the same time upon firm faith in this great and true people, this people capable of every devotion, and upon their glorious armed power, I await the outcome of the first action which I have taken as the leading statesman of the Empire.

Whatever this outcome may be, I know it will find Germany firmly resolved and united either for an upright peace which rejects every selfish violation of the rights of others, or for a closing of the struggle for life and death to which our people would be forced without our own fault if the answer to our note of the powers opposed to us should be dictated by a will to destroy us.

I do not despair over the thought that this second alternative may come. I know the greatness of the mighty powers yet possessed by our people, and I know that the incontrovertible conviction that they were only fighting for our life as a nation would double these powers.

I hope, however, for the sake of all mankind, that the President of the United States will receive our offer as we mean it. Then the door would be opened to a speedy, hon-

orable peace of justice and reconciliation for us, as well as for our opponents.

*b. Note from German Minister of Foreign Affairs to Secretary of State, November 13, 1918.*¹⁴

Convinced of the common aims and ideals of democracy, the German Government has addressed itself to the President of the United States with the request to reestablish peace. This peace was meant to correspond with the principles the President always has maintained. The aim was to be a just solution of all questions in dispute, followed by a permanent reconciliation of all nations.

Furthermore, the President declared he did not wish to make war on the German people and did not wish to impede its peaceful development. The German Government has received the conditions of the armistice.

After the blockade, those conditions, especially the surrender of means of transport and the sustenance of the troops of occupation, would make it impossible to provide Germany with food, and would cause the starvation of millions of men, women and children, all the more as the blockade is to continue.

We had to accept the conditions, but feel it is our duty to draw the President's attention most solemnly and in all earnestness to the fact that enforcement of the conditions must produce among the German people feelings contrary to those upon which alone the reconstruction of the community of nations can rest, guaranteeing a just and durable peace.

The German people, therefore, in this fateful hour, address themselves again to the President, with the request that he use his influence with the Allied Powers in order to mitigate these fearful conditions.

(Signed) SOLF

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, November 13, 1918.

c. Note from German Government to Secretary of State, November 12, 1918.¹⁵

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Department of
German Interests
Sir:

November 12, 1918

By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit the following cable:

"The German Government urgently requests the President of the United States to inform the German Chancellor Ebert, by wireless, whether he may be assured that the Government of the United States is ready to send foodstuffs without delay, if public order is maintained in Germany and an equitable distribution of food is guaranteed."

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

HANS SULZER,
Minister of Switzerland

His Excellency,
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State, Washington

d. Reply of Secretary of State, November 12, 1918.¹⁶

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 12, 1918

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today, transmitting to the President the text of a cable inquiring whether this Government is ready to send food-

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, November 14, 1918.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, November 14, 1918.

stuffs into Germany without delay, if public order is maintained in Germany and an equitable distribution of food is guaranteed.

I should be grateful if you would transmit the following reply to the German Government:

"At a joint session of the two houses of Congress on November 11, the President of the United States announced that the representatives of the Associated Governments in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives, and that steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. Furthermore, the President expressed the opinion that by the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand.

"Accordingly the President now directs me to state that he is ready to consider favorably the supplying of foodstuffs to Germany and to take up the matter immediately with the Allied Governments, provided he can be assured that public order is being and will continue to be maintained in Germany, and that an equitable distribution of food can be clearly guaranteed."

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

MR. HANS SULZER,

Minister of Switzerland,

In charge of German interests in the United States.

e. Note of Secretary of State to German Government, November 15, 1918.¹⁷

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 15, 1918

SIR:

I should be gratified if you would be good enough to convey the following communication to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the German Government:

"The Government of the United States has received the radio messages addressed to the President of the United States by the German Government, relative to relief from certain requirements imposed in the armistice with the Ottoman Government and the armistice with the German Government.

"The communications which have been received will be forthwith communicated to the other Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated and also to the Supreme War Council in Paris.

"The Government of the United States takes this opportunity to suggest to the German Government that communications of this nature, which pertain to the terms of the armistice or to matters in which all the Associated Governments are interested, should be sent to all the Governments and not addressed alone to the President or Government of the United States.

"The Government of the United States also desires to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that these communications should be presented through established diplomatic channels rather than by direct radio communication."

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ROBERT LANSING

Mr. HANS SULZER,

Minister of Switzerland,

In charge of German Interests in the United States

¹⁷ *Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 18, 1918.

III

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY

- I. Note from Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey in Madrid to President Wilson, October 14, 1918.

EMBAJADA DE ESPAÑA EN WASHINGTON

October 14, 1918

Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, acting upon instructions from my government, the text of a communication received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain from the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey in Madrid, on October 12th, and which reached me late yesterday, Sunday evening.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) JUAN RIAÑO

The Honorable

WOODROW WILSON,

President of the United States

(Enclosure)

The undersigned, Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey, has the honor, acting upon instructions from his government, to request the Royal Government to inform the Secretary of State of the United States of America by telegraph, that the Imperial Government requests the President of the United States of America to take upon himself the task of the re-establishment of peace; to notify all belligerent states of this demand and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations. It (the Imperial Government) accepts as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress

of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, specially the speech of September 27.

In order to put an end to the shedding of blood, the Imperial Ottoman Government requests that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

2. Reply of Secretary of State, October 31, 1918.¹⁸

From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Spain:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 31, 1918

Excellency:

I did not fail to lay before the President the note which you addressed to him on the fourteenth instant, and handed to me on that date.

Acting under the instructions of your Government, you inclosed with that note the text of a communication received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, from the chargé d'affaires of Turkey at Madrid on October 12, in which the good offices of the Government of Spain were sought to bring to the attention of the President the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government that he take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace, and that he notify all belligerent states of the request, and invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations, the Imperial Ottoman Government accepting as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially his speech of September 27. It is further requested by the Imperial Ottoman Government that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

By direction of the President, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States

¹⁸*Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 1, 1918.

will bring the communication of the Turkish chargé d'affaires to the knowledge of the Governments at war with Turkey.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING

His Excellency

SEÑOR DON JUAN RIAÑO Y GAYANGOS

Ambassador of Spain

3. Terms of Armistice accepted by Turkey, October 31, 1918.

1. Opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; access to the Black Sea; allied occupation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus forts.

2. The positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters are to be indicated, and assistance is to be given to sweep and remove them as required.

3. All available information about mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated.

4. All allied prisoners of war as well as Armenian interned persons and prisoners are to be collected at Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except troops required for the surveillance of the frontiers and maintenance of internal order, the number of affectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies, after consultation with the Turkish government.

6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey, these ships to be interned in such Turkish ports as directed, except small vessels required for police and similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

7. The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

8. Free use by the Allied ships of all ports and anchorage now under Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the

enemy; similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and demobilization of the army.

9. Use by the Allies of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

10. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

11. Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish forces in north-western Persia behind the pre-war frontier, already ordered, and part of Trans-Caucasia to be evacuated by Turkish troops, as already ordered; the remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation.

12. All wireless, telegraph, and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish government messages excepted.

13. Prohibition against destruction by the Turks of any naval, military, or commercial material.

14. Facilities are to be given for the purchase of coal, oil, fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources after the requirements of the country have been met, and none of the above to be exported.

15. Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including portions of the trans-Caucasian railways under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum, and Turkey is to raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Assiryemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander. Withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order to be determined under clause 5.

17. Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison, Turkey to guarantee to stop supplies to and communications with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

18. Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

19. All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilians, to be evacuated within one month from the Turkish dominions, those in the remote districts as soon after as possible.

20. Compliance with such orders as will be conveyed, regarding the disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including the transport of the portion of the Turkish army to be demobilized under clause 5.

21. An Allied representative attached to the Turkish ministry of supplies to safeguard Allied interests. This representative is to be furnished with all that is necessary for this purpose.

22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied powers, the release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over the military age to be considered.

23. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve for themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

24. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey to cease from noon, local time, Thursday, the 31st day of October.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

1. Program of the Association, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. April, 1907.
2. Results of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, by Andrew Carnegie. April, 1907.*
3. A League of Peace, by Andrew Carnegie. November, 1907.*
4. The results of the Second Hague Conference, by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and Hon. David Jayne Hill. December, 1907.*
5. The Work of the Second Hague Conference, by James Brown Scott. January, 1908.*
6. Possibilities of Intellectual Coöperation Between North and South America, by L. S. Rowe. April, 1908.*
7. America and Japan, by George Trumbull Ladd. June, 1908.*
8. The Sanction of International Law, by Elihu Root. July, 1908.*
9. The United States and France, by Barrett Wendell. August, 1908.
10. The Approach of the Two Americas, by Joaquim Nabuco. September, 1908.*
11. The United States and Canada, by J. S. Willison. October, 1908.*
12. The Policy of the United States and Japan in the Far East. November, 1908.*
13. European Sobriety in the Presence of the Balkan Crisis, by Charles Austin Beard. December, 1908.*
14. The Logic of International Coöperation, by F. W. Hirst. January, 1909.*
15. American Ignorance of Oriental Languages, by J. H. DeForest. February, 1909.*
16. America and the New Diplomacy, by James Brown Scott. March, 1909.*
17. The Delusion of Militarism, by Charles E. Jefferson. April, 1909.
18. The Causes of War, by Elihu Root. May, 1909.*
19. The United States and China, by Wei-ching Yen. June, 1909.*
20. Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. July, 1909.*

21. Journalism and International Affairs, by Edward Cary. August, 1909.*
22. Influence of Commerce in the Promotion of International Peace, by John Ball Osborne. September, 1909.*
23. The United States and Spain, by Martin Hume. October, 1909.*
24. The American Public School as a Factor in International Conciliation, by Myra Kelly. November, 1909.*
25. Cecil Rhodes and His Scholars as Factors in International Conciliation, by F. J. Wylie. December, 1909.*
26. The East and the West, by Seth Low. January, 1910.*
27. The Moral Equivalent of War, by William James. February, 1910.
28. International Unity, by Philander C. Knox. March, 1910.*
29. The United States and Germany, by Karl Von Lewinski. April, 1910.*
30. The United States and Mexico, by James Douglas. May, 1910.*
31. The International Duty of the United States and Great Britain, by Edwin D. Mead. June, 1910.*
32. An Economic View of War and Arbitration, by John B. Clark, LL.D. July, 1910.*
33. *Peace Versus War: The President's Solution*, by Andrew Carnegie. August, 1910.*
34. Conciliation through Commerce and Industry in South America, by Charles M. Pepper. September, 1910.*
35. International Conciliation in the Far East: A Collection of Papers Upon Various Topics, by Rt. Rev. L. H. Roots, Rev. Dr. J. H. DeForest, Prof. E. D. Burton, Rev. Dr. Gilbert Reid and Hon. John W. Foster. October, 1910.*
36. The Capture and Destruction of Commerce at Sea, and Taxation and Armaments, by F. W. Hirst. November, 1910.*
37. Selections from Speeches Delivered in Congress on the Naval Appropriation Bills, by Hon. Theodore E. Burton. December, 1910.*
38. School Books and International Prejudices, by Albert Bushnell Hart. January, 1911.*
39. Peace and the Professor, by Grant Showerman. February, 1911.*
40. Woman and the Cause of Peace, by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. March, 1911.*
41. The Expansion of Military Expenditures, by Alvin S. Johnson. April, 1911.*
42. The First Universal Races Congress, by the Rt. Hon. Lord Weardale. May, 1911.*
43. Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1911.*

44. The United States and Latin America at the Hague, by William I. Hull. July, 1911.*
45. The Emotional Price of Peace, by Professor Edward L. Thorndike. August, 1911.*
46. Letter to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States of America; by His Holiness Pope Pius X. September, 1911.*
47. The Existing Elements of a Constitution of the United States of the World, by H. La Fontaine. October, 1911.*
48. The General Arbitration Treaties of 1911. November, 1911.*
49. The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, by Heinrich Lammasch; and Forces Making for International Conciliation and Peace, by Jackson H. Ralston. December, 1911.*
50. Finance and Commerce: Their Relation to International Good Will; A Collection of Papers by Sereno S. Pratt, Isaac N. Seligman, E. H. Outerbridge, Thomas F. Woodlock, and George Paish. January, 1912.*
51. Do the Arts Make for Peace? by Frank Jewett Mather, Jr. February, 1912.*
52. An Anthropologist's View of War, by Franz Boas. March, 1912.*
53. The Mirage of the Map, by Norman Angell. April, 1912.*
54. Philosophy of the Third American Peace Congress, by Theodore Marburg. May, 1912.*
55. The International Mind, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1912.*
56. Science as an Element in the Developing of International Good Will, by Sir Oliver Lodge. July, 1912.*
57. The Interest of the Wage-earner in the Present Status of the Peace Movement, by Charles Patrick Neill. August, 1912.*
58. The Relation of Social Theory to Public Policy, by Franklin H. Giddings. September, 1912.*
59. The Double Standard in Regard to Fighting, by George M. Stratton. October, 1912.*
60. As to Two Battleships. Debate upon the Naval Appropriation Bill, House of Representatives. November, 1912.*
61. The Cosmopolitan Club Movement, by Louis P. Lochner. December, 1912.*
62. The Spirit of Self-Government, by Elihu Root. January, 1913.*
63. The Panama Canal Tolls, by William Howard Taft and Amos S. Hershey. February, 1913.*
64. Internationalism; A Selected List of Books, Pamphlets and Periodicals, by Frederick C. Hicks. March, 1913.*
65. The Interparliamentary Union, by Christian L. Lange. April, 1913.*

66. The Press and World Peace, by W. C. Deming. May, 1913.*
67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason. June, 1913.*
68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch. July, 1913.*
69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira Lima. August, 1913.*
70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne. September, 1913.*
71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot. October, 1913.*
72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane. November, 1913.*
73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton. December, 1913.*
74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried. January, 1914.*
75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray Butler. February, 1914.*
76. Our Relations with South America and How to Improve Them, by George H. Blakeslee. March, 1914.*
77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson. April, 1914.*
78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from *La Revue* of February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson. May, 1914.*
79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne. June, 1914.*
80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprinted from the *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1914. July, 1914.*
81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England. August, 1914.*
82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D. September, 1914.*
83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series I.
 - I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
 - II. The Servian Reply.
 - III. The British White Paper.
 - IV. The German White Book. October, 1914.
84. Additional Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series II.*
 - I. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to Reichstag, August 4, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Prime Minister to House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
 - III. The Russian Orange Book.
 - IV. The Original Texts of the Austrian Note of July 23, 1914, and the Serbian Reply of July 25, 1914, with annotations. November, 1914.

85. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. III.
 - I. The Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg.
 - II. Address of the President of the Council to the French Senate, August 4, 1914.
 - III. Official Japanese Documents.
 - IV. Address to the People by the German Emperor, December, 1914.
86. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IV.
 - I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914.
 - II. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag. December 2, 1914.
 - III. The Belgian Gray Book. (July 24, August 29, 1914.) January, 1915.
87. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the British Government. February, 1915.
88. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V.

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the British Government. March, 1915.
89. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VI.*

The Austrian Red Book, Official Translation Prepared by the Austrian Government. April, 1915.
90. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VII.

The Serbian Blue Book. May, 1915.
91. The Fundamental Causes of the World War, by Alfred H. Fried. June, 1915.
92. To the Citizens of the Belligerent States, by G. Heymans. July, 1915.
93. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VIII.

Italy's Green Book. Translation approved by Royal Italian Embassy, Washington, D. C. August, 1915.
94. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IX.

Official Correspondence Between the United States and Germany.
 - I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 24, 1914.
 - II. Contraband of War, September 4, 1914—April 26, 1915.
 - III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915—September 7, 1915.
 - IV. Case of the William P. Frye, March 31, 1915—July 30, 1915. September, 1915.
95. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. X.

Official Correspondence Between the United States and Great Britain.
 - I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914—October 22, 1914.
 - II. Contraband of War, August 5, 1914—April 10, 1915.
 - III. Restraints of Commerce, December 26, 1914—July 31, 1915.
 - IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915—April 8, 1915. October, 1915.
96. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XI.
 - I. Secretary Bryan's Letter to Senator Stone Regarding Charges of Partiality Shown to Great Britain, January 20, 1915.

- II. The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Penfield, June 29, 1915.
- III. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, August 12, 1915. November, 1915.
97. Referendum on the Report of the Special Committee on Economic Results of the War and American Business. Reprinted by permission of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. December, 1915.*
98. The Land Where Hatred Expires, by Albert Léon Guérard. January, 1916.
99. America's Opinion of the World War, by Eduard Bernstein. Translated by John Mez. February, 1916.
100. International Coöperation, by John Bassett Moore. The Outlook for International Law, by Elihu Root. March, 1916.
101. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XII.
Statement of Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-Borne Commerce of Germany. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. January, 1916.
Great Britain's Measures Against German Trade. A Speech Delivered by the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, on the 26th of January, 1916. April, 1916.
102. Super-Resistance, by Harold C. Goddard. May, 1916.
103. Official Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XIII.
German White Book on Armed Merchantmen. June, 1916.
104. Official Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XIV.
Speech of Imperial German Chancellor before the Reichstag, on April 5, 1916. July, 1916.
105. Inter Arma Veritas, by William Allan Neilson. August, 1916.
106. The Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace. Affirmative—William Howard Taft; Negative—William Jennings Bryan. September, 1916.
107. Nationality and Beyond, by Nicholas Murray Butler. Do We Want Half the Hemisphere? by Brander Matthews. October, 1916.
108. War and Human Progress, by James Bryce. November, 1916.
109. The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruysen. Translated by John Mez. December, 1916.
110. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series I. January, 1917.
111. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series II. February, 1917.
112. What is a Nationality? Part II of The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruysen. March, 1917.
113. The Bases of an Enduring Peace, by Franklin H. Giddings. April, 1917.
114. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XV.
The Entry of the United States. May, 1917.

115. The War and the Colleges, from an Address to Representatives of Colleges and Universities, delivered by the Hon. Newton D. Baker, May 5, 1917. June, 1917.
116. The Treaty Rights of Aliens, by William Howard Taft. July, 1917.
117. The Effect of Democracy on International Law, by Elihu Root. August, 1917.
118. The Problem of Nationality. Part III of The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruysen. September, 1917.
119. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace, Series III. October, 1917.
120. The United States and Great Britain, by Walter H. Page. The British Commonwealth of Nations, by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. America and Freedom, by Viscount Grey. November, 1917.
121. The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, held at Long Beach, N. Y., May 28-June 1, 1917. An Experiment in Education, by Stephen Pierce Duggan. December, 1917.
122. The Aims of the War: Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London *Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1917. Reply by Cosmos printed in the *New York Times*, December 1, 1917. The President's Address to the Congress, December 4, 1917. January, 1918.
123. Victory or Defeat: No Half-way House, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, December 14, 1917; British Labor's War Aims, statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917; Great Britain's War Aims, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918; Labor's After-War Economic Policy, by Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.; America's Terms of Settlement, address by President Wilson to the Congress, January 8, 1918. British Labor Party's Address to the Russian People, January 15, 1918. February, 1918.
124. The United States and Japan: text of the Root-Takahira Understanding of November 30, 1908, and of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 3, 1917; Japan and the United States, address by the Hon. Elihu Root, October 1, 1917; The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, address by the Hon. James L. Slayden, November 15, 1917; What of Our Fears of Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette. March, 1918.
125. The Awakening of the German People, by Otfried Nippold. April, 1918.
126. The Anniversary of America's Entry into the War: An address delivered by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918; an article written for *The Daily Chronicle* of London by Professor Gilbert Murray. May, 1918.
127. The Lichnowsky Memorandum: Introduction and translation by Munroe Smith, German text from the *Berliner Börsen-Courier*, Appendix by Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro; Reply of Herr von Jagow. June, 1918.

128. America and the Russian Dilemma, by Jerome Landfield. The German Peace Treaties with the Ukraine, Russia, Finland and Rumania. The Constitution of Middle Europe, by Friedrich Naumann. July, 1918.
129. A Voice from Germany: Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince, by Professor F. W. Foerster. Austria's Peace Proposals: The Letter to Prince Sixtus. August, 1918.
130. Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlton: Introduction and translation by Munroe Smith, German text and Appendix. September, 1918.
131. The League of Nations, by Viscount Grey of Falloden and Nicholas Murray Butler; Labor and the League of Nations, by Ordway Tead; The European Commission of the Danube, by Edward Krehbiel; Address by President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, September 27, 1918. October, 1918.
132. The "Lusitania": Opinion of Court, United States District Court, Southern District of New York; In the matter of the petition of the Cunard Steamship Company, limited, as owners of the Steamship 'Lusitania,' for limitation of its liability. November, 1918.
133. Official Documents Looking toward Peace, Series No. IV. December, 1918.

Special Bulletins:

The United States and Australia, by Percival R. Cole. March, 1910.*

Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1910.*

Mr. Carnegie's Letter to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for the Advancement of Peace, and Resolutions adopted by the Trustees. January, 1911.*

Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, by Cardinal Gibbons. May, 1911.

International Arbitration, by Sir Charles Fitzpatrick. August, 1911.*

The Dawn of World Peace, by William Howard Taft, president of the United States. November, 1911.*

Deutschland und Grossbritannien; eine Studie über Nationale Eigentümlichkeiten, by Lord Haldane. (In German.)*

Address at Peace Dinner, December 30, by Andrew Carnegie. December, 1911.*

Great Britain and Germany; a Study in National Characteristics, by Lord Haldane. March, 1912.*

War Practically Preventable and Arguments for Universal Peace, by Rev. Michael Clune. June, 1912.*

Who Makes War? From the *London Times*. February, 1913.*

On Naval Armaments, by Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill. April, 1913.*

Profit and Patriotism, and Money-Making and War. Reprints. May, 1913.*

- A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. December, 1913.
- The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from the Congressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913.
- Wanted—A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt. January, 1914.*
- The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill. January, 1914.*
- A Panama Primer. Reprinted from *The Independent*. March 30, 1914. April, 1914.*
- The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint from the *New York Times*, April 27, 1914. June, 1914.*
- The Japanese in California. June, 1914.*
- The Changing Attitude toward War as Reflected in the American Press. September, 1914.
- The Great War and Its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler. October, 1914.*
- Address of William H. Taft, May 17, 1914. October, 1914.
- Contemporary War Poems. December, 1914.*
- The War and Peace Problem, Material for the Study of International Polity, by John Mez. February, 1915.
- Syllabus of Lectures on the War and Peace Problem for the Study of International Polity, by John Mez. February, 1915.
- A Dozen Truths About **Pacifism** by Alfred H. Fried, translated by John Mez. March, 1915.*
- Educational Factors Toward Peace, by Leon Fraser. April, 1915.*
- A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism, by Alfred H. Fried. Translated by John Mez. April, 1915.*
- Internationalism. A list of Current Periodicals selected and annotated by Frederick C. Hicks. May, 1915.*
- Spirit of Militarism and Non-Military Preparation for Defense, by John Lovejoy Elliott and R. Tait McKenzie. June, 1915.*
- Existing Alliances and a League of Peace, by John Bates Clark. July, 1915.*
- Is Commerce War? by Henry Raymond Mussey. January, 1916.
- Peace Literature of the War, by John Mez. January, 1916.
- Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations? by Suh Hu. Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded June, 1916.

Labor's War Aims: Memorandum on War Aims, adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, February 22, 1918; The Allied Cause is the Cause of Socialist Internationalism: Joint Manifesto of the Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist League. June, 1918.

The Dawn in Germany: The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures, by James Brown Scott. November, 1918.

* Edition exhausted.

Up to the limit of the editions printed, any one of the above will be sent postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation, 407 West 117th Street, New York, N. Y.

Copies of the above, so far as they can be spared, will be sent to libraries and educational institutions for permanent preservation postpaid upon receipt of a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for International Conciliation.

A charge of five cents will be made for copies sent to individuals. Regular subscription rate twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

Executive Committee

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER	STEPHEN HENRY OLIN
JAMES SPEYER	ROBERT A. FRANKS
JAMES L. SLAYDEN	GEORGE BLUMENTHAL
JOSEPH P. GRACE	GANO DUNN
THOMAS W. LAMONT	

Acting Secretary

HENRY S. HASKELL

Director of Inter-American Division

PETER H. GOLDSMITH

Correspondents

FRANCIS W. HIRST, London, England
T. MIYAOKA, Tokio, Japan

Organizing Secretaries for South America


BENJAMIN GARCIA VICTORICA, American Legation, Buenos Aires
A. G. ARAUJO JORGE, Foreign Office, Rio de Janeiro
JUAN BAUTISTA DE LAVALLE, San Pedro, 88, Lima

724

COUNCIL OF DIRECTION OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION

LYMAN ABBOTT, NEW YORK
 EDWIN A. ALDERMAN, CHARLOTTESVILLE,
 VA.
 JOHN R. ALPINE, CHICAGO, ILL.
 ROBERT BACON, NEW YORK
 RICHARD BARTHOLDT, ST. LOUIS, MO.
 GEORGE BLUMENTHAL, NEW YORK
 CLIFTON R. BRECKENRIDGE, EUREKA
 SPRINGS, ARKANSAS
 WILLIAM J. BRYAN, LINCOLN, NEBRASKA
 T. E. BURTON, CLEVELAND, OHIO
 NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, NEW YORK
 ANDREW CARNEGIE, NEW YORK
 RICHARD H. DANA, BOSTON, MASS.
 ARTHUR L. DASHER, MACON, GA.
 HORACE E. DEMING, NEW YORK
 GANO DUNN, NEW YORK
 CHARLES W. ELIOT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
 AUSTEN G. FOX, NEW YORK
 ROBERT A. FRANKS, ORANGE, N. J.
 JOHN P. FREY, CINCINNATI, OHIO
 ROBERT GARRETT, BALTIMORE, MD.
 JOSEPH P. GRACE, NEW YORK
 WILLIAM GREEN, INDIANAPOLIS, IND.
 WILLIAM J. HOLLAND, PITTSBURGH, PA.
 HAMILTON HOLT, NEW YORK
 DAVID STARR JORDAN, STANFORD
 UNIVERSITY, CAL.
 J. H. KIRKLAND, NASHVILLE, TENN.
 MRS. JAMES LEES LAIDLAW, NEW YORK
 THOMAS W. LAMONT, NEW YORK
 ADOLPH LEWISOHN, NEW YORK
 CLARENCE H. MACKAY, NEW YORK

THEODORE MARBURG, BALTIMORE, MD.
 BRANDER MATTHEWS, NEW YORK
 SILAS MCBEE, NEW YORK
 GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, PRINCETON, N. J.
 ANDREW J. MONTAGUE, RICHMOND, VA.
 MRS. PHILIP N. MOORE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
 W. W. MORROW, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
 LEVI P. MORTON, NEW YORK
 STEPHEN H. OLIN, NEW YORK
 MRS. PERCY V. PENNYBACKER, NEW YORK
 HENRY S. PRITCHETT, NEW YORK
 A. V. V. RAYMOND, BUFFALO, N. Y.
 IRA REMSEN, BALTIMORE, MD.
 JAMES FORD RHODES, BOSTON, MASS.
 ELIHU ROOT, NEW YORK
 J. G. SCHURMAN, ITHACA, N. Y.
 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
 CHARLES HITCHCOCK SHERRILL, NEW YORK
 MRS. SEWARD A. SIMONS, LOS ANGELES, CAL.
 F. J. V. SKIFF, CHICAGO, ILL.
 JAMES L. SLAYDEN, WASHINGTON, D. C.
 WILLIAM M. SLOANE, NEW YORK
 JAMES SPEYER, NEW YORK
 OSCAR S. STRAUS, NEW YORK
 MRS. MARY WOOD SWIFT, BERKELEY, CAL.
 GEORGE W. TAYLOR, DEMOPOLIS, ALA.
 O. H. TITTMAN, WASHINGTON, D. C.
 W. H. TOLMAN, NEW YORK
 CHARLEMAGNE TOWER, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
 EDWARD TUCK, PARIS, FRANCE
 GEORGE E. VINCENT, NEW YORK
 WILLIAM D. WHEELWRIGHT, PORTLAND, ORE.
 MARY E. WOOLLEY, SOUTH HADLEY, MASS.



JX International conciliation
1906
A25
no.122-133
cop.2

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
